HomeMy WebLinkAboutKing County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan - 2020-2025 (RES4413)
2020-2025
King County Regional Hazard
Mitigation Plan
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary................................................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 10
Mitigation Plan Priorities: .................................................................................................................................. 10
Timeline ................................................................................................................................................................ 11
Revisions from 2015 Edition ............................................................................................................................ 11
Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapters ..................................................................................................... 11
Hazard Mitigation Planning Process .................................................................................................................... 13
Mitigation Planning Partner Engagement ....................................................................................................... 15
Jurisdiction Plan Annex Process ....................................................................................................................... 16
Review and Incorporation of Reports and Studies ........................................................................................ 16
King County Plan Update Timeline ................................................................................................................. 17
Support for Community Rating System (CRS) Communities ..................................................................... 20
Public Outreach Process .................................................................................................................................... 21
Continued Public Participation ......................................................................................................................... 26
King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Program Capabilities ..................................................................... 27
Plan Integration ................................................................................................................................................... 27
Program and Policy Capabilities ....................................................................................................................... 31
Integration with Departments and other Jurisdictions ................................................................................. 35
Potential Sources of Hazard Mitigation Funding .......................................................................................... 37
King County Hazard Mitigation Grant Assistance Program ....................................................................... 41
Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program ............................................................................... 41
Participation in CRS ........................................................................................................................................... 42
Regional Risk and Probability Summaries....................................................................................................... 43
Risk Assessment Overview .................................................................................................................................... 45
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Methodology ........................................................................................................................................................ 46
Data ....................................................................................................................................................................... 46
Vulnerable Populations and Population-Based Vulnerability ...................................................................... 49
Determinants of Population Vulnerability .................................................................................................. 49
Jurisdiction-Specific Risk Assessments ............................................................................................................ 52
King County Development Trends and Risk Trajectory .............................................................................. 53
Regional Risk Profile: Avalanche .......................................................................................................................... 56
Hazard Description ............................................................................................................................................ 56
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences .............................................................................. 57
Scenario Drivers .................................................................................................................................................. 59
Priority Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................................................ 59
Priority Impact Areas ......................................................................................................................................... 59
Regional Risk Profile: Civil Disorder ................................................................................................................... 62
Hazard Description ............................................................................................................................................ 62
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences .............................................................................. 63
Scenario Drivers .................................................................................................................................................. 65
Priority Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................................................ 66
Priority Impact Areas ......................................................................................................................................... 66
Regional Risk Profile: Cyber Incident .................................................................................................................. 68
Hazard Description ............................................................................................................................................ 68
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences .............................................................................. 70
Scenario Drivers .................................................................................................................................................. 72
Priority Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................................................ 75
Priority Impact Areas ......................................................................................................................................... 75
Regional Risk Profile: Dam Failure ...................................................................................................................... 78
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Hazard Description ............................................................................................................................................ 78
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences .............................................................................. 82
Scenario Drivers .................................................................................................................................................. 83
Priority Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................................................ 85
Priority Impact Areas ......................................................................................................................................... 86
Full List of Dams That Impact King County ................................................................................................. 90
Regional Risk Profile: Earthquake ...................................................................................................................... 101
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 101
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 101
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 104
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 106
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 108
Regional Risk Profile: Flood ................................................................................................................................ 119
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 119
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 120
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 123
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 126
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 127
Regional Risk Profile: Hazardous Materials ...................................................................................................... 132
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 132
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 134
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 135
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 136
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 137
Regional Risk Profile: Health Incident ............................................................................................................... 140
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Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 140
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 141
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 142
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 144
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 144
Regional Risk Profile: Landslide.......................................................................................................................... 146
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 146
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 147
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 149
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 150
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 151
Regional Risk Profile: Severe Weather ............................................................................................................... 154
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 154
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 154
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 157
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 158
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 160
Regional Risk Profile: Terrorism ......................................................................................................................... 166
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 166
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 167
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 171
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 172
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 172
Regional Risk Profile: Tsunami and Seiche ....................................................................................................... 175
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 175
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Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 176
Tsunami Scenario Drivers ............................................................................................................................... 178
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 179
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 179
Regional Risk Profile: Volcano ............................................................................................................................ 182
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 182
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 183
Summary of Hazard Effects ............................................................................................................................ 185
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 185
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 186
Regional Risk Profile: Wildfire ............................................................................................................................ 190
Hazard Description .......................................................................................................................................... 190
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences ............................................................................ 193
Scenario Drivers ................................................................................................................................................ 194
Priority Vulnerabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 195
Priority Impact Areas ....................................................................................................................................... 196
Hazard Mitigation Strategies ................................................................................................................................ 199
Mitigation Plan Goals: ...................................................................................................................................... 200
Mitigation Plan Goals - 14 Determinants of Equity .................................................................................... 200
Mitigation Plan Strategies ................................................................................................................................ 201
Mitigation Plan Projects ................................................................................................................................... 202
Prioritizing Hazard Mitigation Projects ......................................................................................................... 202
Crosswalk with the Strategic Climate Action Plan ....................................................................................... 204
Ongoing Plan Maintenance and Strategy Updates ...................................................................................... 205
Plan Approval and Adoption .......................................................................................................................... 207
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Mitigation Strategy Status Updates from the 2015 Plan ............................................................................. 208
2020 King County Hazard Mitigation Strategies ......................................................................................... 222
Reduce Flood Impacts to the Unincorporated King County Road System ............................................ 227
Increase Seismic Resilience of Bridges in Unincorporated King County ................................................ 228
Stormwater Outfall Erosion Hazard Inventory ........................................................................................... 229
Resilience in Design and Build of Critical Water Treatment and Conveyance Facilities ....................... 231
Landslide, Erosion, and Sedimentation Event Mapping ............................................................................ 232
Stormwater and Surface Water Infrastructure Risk Reduction.................................................................. 234
Sea Level Rise Resilience in Wastewater Facilities ....................................................................................... 236
Stormwater and Surface Water Infrastructure Risk Reduction.................................................................. 237
Control System Security and Performance ................................................................................................... 239
GIS Emergency Response Mapping and Real-Time Flow Data ............................................................... 240
Emergency Communications Enhancements .............................................................................................. 241
Emergency Event Management System ........................................................................................................ 242
Flood Warning Program .................................................................................................................................. 243
Post-Flood Recovery Efforts .......................................................................................................................... 244
Home Elevations .............................................................................................................................................. 245
Home Acquisitions and Relocations .............................................................................................................. 247
Protect and Restore Natural Floodplain Functions ..................................................................................... 248
Flood Risk Mapping ......................................................................................................................................... 250
Public Information Flood Activities .............................................................................................................. 252
Flood Insurance Promotion ............................................................................................................................ 253
Enforce Higher Floodplain Management Regulations ............................................................................... 254
Manage Flood Protection Facilities ................................................................................................................ 256
Seismic Evaluation of King County Courthouse and Maleng Regional Justice Center ......................... 257
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Integrate ESJ into Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Activities ........................................................... 258
Seismic Lifeline Route Resilience ................................................................................................................... 260
Integrate Hazard Mitigation and Comprehensive Planning ....................................................................... 261
Engage Community Organizations in Emergency Management .............................................................. 262
Climate Integration Training ........................................................................................................................... 263
Disaster Skills Risk Reduction Training ........................................................................................................ 264
Dam Failure Risk and Impact Reduction ...................................................................................................... 265
Wildfire Preparedness and Risk Reduction ................................................................................................... 266
Hazard Mitigation Assistance Grant Support .............................................................................................. 267
Public Assistance Grant Support .................................................................................................................... 268
Language Accessible Video Emergency Messaging..................................................................................... 270
King County Facilities Indoor Air Quality Monitoring Network ............................................................. 271
Medical Gas Seismic Detection & Emergency Shut Off ............................................................................ 273
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Executive Summary
The King County Hazard Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan promotes programs and projects that partner
with communities to build a foundation of resilience before, during, and after disasters. Hazard
mitigation is the mission area of emergency management that argues life safety is not good enough. Disasters
are not foregone conclusions. Incidents will always occur, but their impact is within our ability to change
if we target investments in areas that will reinforce those areas most critical to our community, thereby
making us all more resilient.
For the 2020 Plan, we identify investments and opportunities to strengthen 14 determinants1 of equity
and social justice, areas the whole community has identified as necessary to make King County a welcoming
community where every person can thrive.
1. Access to Affordable, Healthy Food
2. Access to Health and Human Services
3. Access to Parks and Natural Resources
4. Access to Safe and Efficient Transportation
5. Affordable, Safe, Quality Housing
6. Community and Public Safety
7. Early Childhood Development
8. Economic Development
9. Equitable Law and Justice System
10. Equity in Government Practices
11. Family Wage Jobs and Job Training
12. Healthy Built and Natural Environments
13. Quality Education
14. Strong, Vibrant Neighborhoods
We can strengthen and support each of these areas through investments in better land use practices,
stronger infrastructure, healthy habitats and systems, improved accessibility, and individual and family
resilience. The hazard mitigation strategies contained in this plan will each be reported on biannually to
help provide updates on areas where investments would be most critical.
In addition to hazard mitigation strategies, this plan includes risk profiles designed to provide an
overview of the key priorities, vulnerabilities, and potential impacts of natural and human-caused
hazards. We examine risk in terms of property, the economy, natural systems, infrastructure systems,
government operations, and populations, with a focus on populations more likely to suffer losses or long
recovery times from a disaster.
1 King County Office of Equity and Social Justice. 2016. Equity and Social Justice Strategic Plan. Accessed online on
11/13/19 from https://kingcounty.gov/elected/executive/equity-social-justice/strategic-plan.aspx.
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Finally, this plan lays out a process to identify and prioritize hazard mitigation projects over the long
term and to increase investment in communities that are more vulnerable to disasters. We do this by
taking a holistic approach to prioritization.
This plan was developed through the partnership of many county staff and local jurisdictions. The work
is a result of their commitment and input throughout the planning process.
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Introduction
The King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan promotes programs and projects that partner with
communities to build a foundation of resilience before, during, and after disasters. This plan update
reassesses risks and vulnerabilities to eight natural and seven human-caused hazards and develops
strategies to reduce risk from those hazards. In addition to a base plan covering King County as a whole,
each participating jurisdiction developed an annex that independently meets most FEMA planning
requirements. Each annex, plus this base plan, meets the planning requirements outlined in 44 CFR
201.6. In addition to King County, over 60 cities and special purpose districts developed plan annexes.
Mitigation Plan Priorities:
King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan Steering Committee (Steering Committee) set the
following priorities for the 2018 plan update process.
Break down planning
silos and establish new
partnerships
Collaborate with jurisdictions to build integrated hazard mitigation strategies,
including around risk management, floodplain management, comprehensive
planning, equity and social justice, and climate change.
Provide more education
and training to partners
to prepare for FEMA
DRRA grants in 2020
In preparation for a tripling of federal grants for natural hazard mitigation
through the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, beginning in 2020, work with
planning partners and county agencies to identify projects and project
champions. Build capacity among planning partners to identify vulnerability,
craft a mitigation strategy, communicate project benefits, and successfully
pursue hazard mitigation grant funding.
Conduct a robust public
outreach process
involving all planning
partners.
Implement a proactive outreach strategy focused hazard mitigation success
stories and hands-on demonstrations of effective mitigation projects, working
with the media to follow-up on stories highlighting Washington’s need for
more hazard preparedness and resilience.
Develop quality hazard
mitigation strategies and a
method to prioritize and
track them.
Work with planning partners to craft comprehensive hazard mitigation
strategies that are measurable, actionable, trackable, and identify specific
funding sources. Prioritize strategies in accordance with opportunity to
reduce risk and further county priorities.
Integrate equity and
social justice into our
understanding of risk and
vulnerability.
Work with King County departments to identify an appropriate way to
address population vulnerability. Include this information in the plan in a way
that is operationally meaningful and can support mitigation strategies that will
reduce risk to these populations.
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Integrate mitigation
planning and climate
preparedness
Fully integrate with the update process for the Strategic Climate Action Plan.
Integration includes participation in workgroups and shared strategies that
increase climate and hazard resilience.
Timeline
February-May 2019:
Begin planning process
Meet with each of the 60+ jurisdictions participating in this plan update.
Convene the steering committee. Draft plan format and begin GIS analysis.
Begin outreach strategy. Develop first drafts of the risk assessment.
June-September: Conduct
public outreach
Work with partners on community outreach; conduct media outreach;
conduct mitigation strategy development workshops with planning partners.
October-December Review the plan and submit to FEMA.
January-April, 2020 Complete revisions and adopt the plan prior to expiration on April 30, 2020.
Revisions from 2015 Edition
The 2020 plan was fully rewritten and reformatted to reflect updated priorities and a greater emphasis on
hazard mitigation strategies. The most substantive change is to those strategies, which are formatted in
an action-plan style, consistent with the Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan. With the
change to mitigation strategies, the method of reporting has also been updated.
The risk assessments in this edition have been shortened and refocused to better support the intended
audience - emergency managers who are called upon to plan for and respond to these hazards. The
information is largely taken from the 2016 Hazard Inventory and Risk Assessment and the 2018 FEMA
RiskMAP Risk Report.
The capabilities assessment in this edition has been modified to focus on the relationship between
programs, plans, and policies that could support mitigation and the hazard mitigation plan and program.
This change will help the plan better reflect how each capability supports mitigation instead of just listing
potential capabilities. A similar process was used to document potential sources of funding.
This plan is written to meet or exceed the relevant elements of the Emergency Management Standard
(ANSI standard) by the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).
The number of participating jurisdictions increased from the 2015 update. In 2015, 53 jurisdictions
participated in the plan. For this update, over 60 jurisdictions participated in the planning process and at
least 50 are expected to submit complete annexes for FEMA approval.
Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan Chapters
The base plan satisfies all requirements for King County plus many of the planning requirements for
local planning partners. The plan is organized as follows.
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Planning Process: The planning process section corresponds roughly to Element A in the FEMA
Mitigation Plan Review Guide and includes information on the planning process, including public
outreach, meetings, and the planning timeline.
Capabilities Assessment and King County Hazard Mitigation Program: The capabilities chapter meets
requirements associated with coordinating the hazard mitigation program with other entities as well as
information on available funding.
Risk Assessment: The risk assessment chapters include profiles of each profiled natural and human-
caused hazard. These profiles are brief and are designed to provide an overview to emergency managers
and other users of this plan. This section meets the requirements of Element B in the FEMA Mitigation
Plan Review Guide.
Hazard Mitigation Strategies: Hazard mitigation strategies are the key deliverable of this plan and include
information on how strategies are identified, developed, and prioritized. This section meets most of the
requirements in Element C of the FEMA Mitigation Plan Review Guide.
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Hazard Mitigation Planning Process
King County’s 2019 Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan (RHMP) was developed with input of a multi-
agency, multi-jurisdictional steering committee. The Steering Committee supervised the writing of the
plan and was consulted for final decisions made by the King County Emergency Management Planning
Team. The process was led by King County Emergency Management, which facilitated both the internal
county process and supported individual city planning efforts. Individual departments developed their
own strategies internally and then socialized the strategies with the other county participants.
Steering Committee Members
Name Email Organization Focus Area
Lara Whitely-
Binder lwbinder@kingcounty.gov
King County
Department of
Natural Resources
and Parks
Climate Preparedness
Specialist
Mitch Paine mpaine@kingcounty.gov
King County
Department of
Natural Resources
and Parks
Floodplain
Management
Program Manager
Cecelia Hayes Cecelia.Hayes@kingcounty.gov
King County
Department of
Executive Services
Equity and Social
Justice Program
Manager
Karen Wolf karen.wolf@kingcounty.gov
King County
Executive Office
Comprehensive/Land
Use Planning Policy
Analyst
Cynthia
Hernandez cynthia.hernandez@kingcounty.gov
King County
Department of
Natural Resources
and Parks
Emergency
Management
Program Manager
Sean Catanese sean.catanese@kingcounty.gov
King County Risk
Management Risk Management
Andrew Stevens astevens@sammamish.us
City of
Sammamish Emergency Manager
Ellen Montanana emontanana@bellevuewa.gov City of Bellevue Emergency Manager
Jennifer Franklin jennifer.franklin@mercergov.org
City of Mercer
Island Emergency Manager
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Janet Sailer janet.sailer@spwsd.org
Sammamish
Plateau Water
District Emergency Manager
Steve Moye smoye@ccud.org
Coal Creek Utility
District Manager
Janice Rahman janice.rahman@kingcounty.gov
King County
Emergency
Management
Recovery Program
Manager
Mike Ryan mryan@bellevuewa.gov
King County
Emergency
Management
N/E Zone
Coordinator
Sarah Miller sarah.miller@kingcounty.gov
King County
Emergency
Management S Zone Coordinator
Jeffrey Linn jlinn@kingcounty.gov King County GIS GIS
Derrick Hiebert dhiebert@kingcounty.gov
King County
Emergency
Management
Planning Process
Facilitator, Plan
Author
The team met monthly to review progress and make key decisions about the direction of the planning
effort. These meetings were hosted by King County Emergency Management.
Steering Committee Meeting Topics
Month Topic
February 2019
Outline proposed planning process and timeline and approve plan and plan
annex templates.
March Identify public outreach sites and strategy
April Integrating equity and social justice into the mitigation plan.
May Integrating equity and social justice into the mitigation plan.
June Establish plan goals, priorities, and strategy prioritization method
July Workshop 2 – hazard mitigation strategies.
August Review capabilities assessment
September Review risk assessment
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October Long-term mitigation plan monitoring and implementation strategy
November Review draft base plan and King County hazard mitigation strategies
January 2020 Submit plan to FEMA
March 2020 Incorporate FEMA revisions
April 2020 Receive notice of Approval, Pending Adoption from FEMA
June 2020 Plan adoption and final approval
In addition to the multi-jurisdictional steering committee, the King County Emergency Management
Coordinating Committee (EMCC) contributed to the plan update as the steering committee for the King
County-specific hazard mitigation strategies. This committee consists of every King County department
as well as representatives from the King County Executive’s Office and the King County Council. A list
of all EMCC members is available in the Capabilities chapter. The EMCC meets monthly.
Individual jurisdiction annexes were developed in partnership with King County, but with separate
internal steering committees. The members of each jurisdiction’s steering committee are documented in
each annex.
Mitigation Planning Partner Engagement
The King County portion of this plan focuses on unincorporated areas of the county. These areas
border, or are served by, cities, tribes, and special purpose districts, all of whom were invited to
participate in this plan update. For the purpose of interjurisdictional coordination, King County defined
‘neighboring jurisdictions’ as these partners since they are the entities most critical to effective
implementation of multi-jurisdictional mitigation projects and since many city residents receive county
services and visa-versa. In addition to coordination with these jurisdictions, King County maintains a
high level of engagement with neighboring counties, especially Pierce and Snohomish. The planning
team invited counterparts in Pierce and Snohomish to attend each of the planning workshops described
below. There are also multiple other concurrent planning efforts involving these counties, including the
Close Coordinated Terrorist Attack (CCTA) program and the Regional Catastrophic Planning (RCPG)
effort.
The planning process kicked off in November 2018 with a meeting and workshop to which all planning
partners were invited. At this workshop, participants learned about the process, expectations, and were
asked to provide commitment letters with billing rates to meet federal grant match requirements.
To support the more-than-60 planning partners, the planning team met individually or in small groups
with each jurisdiction to discuss the planning process and go over the planning requirements. These
meetings took place between February and May.
To supplement these meetings, King County hosted a webinar and two in-person planning workshops in
June 2019 (June 3, 10, and 27). During these workshops, the planning team presented updated
information on public outreach, plan integration, risk assessments, and strategy prioritization.
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In addition to planning assistance workshops, King County partnered with FEMA RiskMAP and
Washington State to offer three workshops on the identification of threats and hazards, the development
of mitigation strategies, and the process to successfully fund those strategies. The workshops were held
on December 13, 2018, July 25, 2019, and August 22, 2019. Approximately 70 attendees were recorded
at each. Invitees included representatives from all King County departments, all cities, most special
purpose districts, and other agencies and organizations such as the Port of Seattle and the Northwest
Healthcare Response Network.
Following the submission of the base plan in December 2019, King County will begin a second stage of
outreach targeting those jurisdictions who missed the original submission deadline and those who were
not previously involved. Among the second group, school districts will be proactively engaged and
offered assistance in developing annexes to the hazard mitigation plan.
Sign-in sheets for all outreach events are available upon request.
Jurisdiction Plan Annex Process
Jurisdictions may join the regional hazard mitigation plan at any time by submitting a letter of intent to
King County Emergency Management and completing the planning process and plan template. Each
plan can be unique, and jurisdictions may do more than what is required in the template; however, this
template is designed to help walk communities through the planning process in an accessible way.
Further details on how to conduct the process are available in the King County Regional Hazard
Mitigation Plan. King County staff will provide technical assistance to planning partners, whenever
possible.
Review and Incorporation of Reports and Studies
In addition to the data sources outlined in the Risk Assessment section of this plan, the planning team
leveraged a number of existing and ongoing planning processes and other documents. More information
can be found in the Program Capabilities chapter of this plan.
• The Strategic Climate Action Plan (SCAP) is a plan designed to assess the impacts of climate
change on King County and develop strategies to both reduce risk from climate impacts and
reduce King County’s contribution to climate change. The planning team for the RHMP
included the lead for the SCAP and participated in the SCAP.
• The State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan was used for data on hazards and for identifying
capabilities. Another contribution from that plan is the hazard mitigation strategy format, which
was copied and modified for use in the King County plan.
• The Equity and Social Justice Strategic Plan was integral to establishing the hazard mitigation
plan goals and the process by which mitigation projects are prioritized.
• Puget Sound Regional Council’s Vision 2050 lays out planning policies and guidelines for the
King-Pierce-Kitsap-Snohomish county area and is undergoing an update in 2019 and 2020. The
mitigation planning team reviewed and contributed to the planning process for Vision 2050.
• The King County Floodplain Management Plan is being updated and data from that planning
effort is included in sections of this plan referring to the NFIP, flood risk, and flood mitigation
strategies.
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• The Washington, DC Hazard Mitigation Plan (draft) was a source for inspiration for the
method of prioritizing mitigation strategies and conducting the risk assessment for vulnerable
populations.
• The 2018-2019 FEMA RiskMAP Risk Report for King County was reviewed for data and
mapping purposes as well as for information on historic disasters and potential mitigation
strategies.
• The 2019 King County Dam Inventory from the Washington State Department of Ecology and
guidance from the King County Dam Safety Program.
• The Clean Water and Health Habitat Initiative, uniting departments involved in health and
environmental resilience, was convened by the King County Executive and includes the hazard
mitigation program.
• The draft Regional Resiliency Assessment Program report for transportation for Western
Washington.
King County Plan Update Timeline
The following is a timeline of significant events and milestones for King County in the Regional Hazard
Mitigation Plan Update.
Plan Update Timeline
PLANNING ACTIVITY DATE SUMMARY ATTENDEES
Plan Kickoff 11/28/18 Conducted a kickoff meeting for
the planning process, including
discussions of expectations and
the project timeline.
Designated county, city,
and special district staff
who are leading local
plan updates
Risk Assessment
Workshop
12/13/18
First workshop with FEMA
RiskMAP staff to socialize hazard
data and develop problem
statements.
Approximately 80
attendees including GIS
staff, county
departments, city
emergency managers,
and other program
managers with interest
in mitigation
Steering Committee
Meeting Kickoff
2/19/19 Outline proposed planning
process and timeline and approve
plan and plan annex templates.
Steering committee
Outreach Strategy
Meeting
2/22/19
Meet with staff to identify
outreach strategy
OEM Director,
Outreach Team,
Coordination Team
Steering Committee
Meeting
3/12/19 Identify public outreach sites and
strategy
Steering committee
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Steering Committee
Meeting
4/30/19 Integrating equity and social
justice into the mitigation plan.
Steering committee
EMCC Meeting 5/1/19 Discuss planning process, DRRA
funding, and mitigation strategies
County departments
Steering Committee
Meeting
5/14/19 Integrating equity and social
justice into the mitigation plan.
Steering committee
Mitigation Technical
Webinar
6/3/19 Reviewed planning process and
helped local partners on mitigation
planning questions
local jurisdiction
partners
EMCC Meeting 6/5/19 Mitigation strategy meeting
discussions and identify points of
contact in each agency
County departments
Mitigation Technical
Workshop
6/10/19 Reviewed planning process and
helped local partners on mitigation
planning questions
local jurisdiction
partners
Steering Committee
Meeting
6/11/19 Establish plan goals, priorities, and
strategy prioritization method
Steering committee
CSA Town Hall
Outreach Event
6/18/19 Comments received included
concerns about mitigation of solid
waste facilities, whether or not
earthquake insurance makes sense,
and need for snow mitigation
following February snowstorm.
Residents from central
King County and the
Issaquah/Hobart/Maple
Valley areas.
Approximately 100
attendees.
CSA Town Hall
Outreach Event
6/25/19 Discussed concerns about impacts
to Enumclaw area from a
lahar/Mt. Rainier
Residents from
southeast King County,
predominately from
Enumclaw and nearby
unincorporated areas.
Approximately 100
attendees.
Mitigation Technical
Workshop
6/27/19 Reviewed planning process and
helped local partners on mitigation
planning questions
local jurisdiction
partners
Mitigation Strategy
Meetings
7/9/19 Met with internal planning
partners (county departments) to
develop mitigation strategies.
DES, FMD and KC
International Airport
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Mitigation Strategy
Meetings
7/11/19 Met with internal planning
partners (county departments) to
develop mitigation strategies.
DNRP
Mitigation Strategy
Meetings
7/11/19 Met with internal planning
partners (county departments) to
develop mitigation strategies.
Local Services (Roads)
Mitigation Strategy
Meetings
7/15/19 Met with internal planning
partners (county departments) to
develop mitigation strategies.
Local Services
(Permitting)
Hazard Mitigation
Workshop
7/25/19 Worked through the entire
strategy development process
from risk identification to
mitigation projects.
County and local
partners, approximately
75 attendees
Steering Committee
Meeting
8/20/19
Review mitigation capabilities
Steering committee
Mitigation Funding
Workshop
8/22/19 Worked through process of
developing a successful hazard
mitigation grant application
County and local
partners. Approximately
60 attendees.
Clean Water Healthy
Habitat Initiative
Workshop
9/4/19 Participated in a process to
coordinate mitigation planning
efforts with other environmental
quality, climate change, and hazard
reduction programs in the county.
60-100 attendees from
multiple county
departments, especially
DNRP.
Steering Committee
Meeting
9/16/19 Review risk and vulnerability
assessments
Steering committee
CSA Town Hall
Outreach Event
9/10/19 Residents looked at the hazard
information and discussed
strategies for protecting their
community from an earthquake. A
major concern is the likelihood
that the area will be isolated by an
earthquake due to liquefaction.
Dozens of residents
from the areas of White
Center, Highline,
Skyway, and Burien.
Critical Transportation
Workgroup
9/17/19
Discussed the establishment and
mitigation of lifeline
transportation routes for a post-
Cascadia scenario.
County departments,
local jurisdictions, and
state agencies
participated in the
workshop.
Steering Committee
Meeting
10/8/19 Review base plan and King
County mitigation strategies
Steering committee
20
CSA Town Hall
Outreach Event
10/17/19
Discussed flooding in the
Snoqualmie-Carnation-Duvall
areas.
Residents from the
northeastern portion of
the county, especially in
Snoqualmie, Carnation,
and Duvall
County Departments
Strategy Coordination
11/14/19 Meet with King County
departments to go over all the
mitigation strategies, eliminate
gaps, and ensure consistent
priorities.
County departments,
including OEM, FMD,
DNRP, PHSKC, KCIT,
DES.
Steering Committee
Meeting
11/12/19
Review draft base plan
Steering committee
Submit to WA EMD
and FEMA
12/15/19 Submit full mitigation plan to
FEMA for review
Planning Team
Support for Community Rating System (CRS) Communities
The hazard mitigation plan update process was also closely linked to the update for King County’s Flood
Hazard Management Plan. To receive credit, participating jurisdictions must follow the CRS process
outlined in the current version of the CRS Coordinators Manual, element 510. At a minimum,
jurisdictions wanting to receive CRS planning credit must have at least two participants in one of the
planning teams.
As such, a separate, parallel process was led by the King County River and Floodplain Management
Section. This process was integrated into the planning effort for the overall hazard mitigation plan. Three
meetings were held in addition to the regular mitigation planning meetings. The flood portion steering
committee consisted of the following members:
Committee Member Organization Key Role
Gwyn Berry City of Snoqualmie Floodplain Manager/Planner
Bob Freitag UW Institute for Hazard
Mitigation Planning & Research
Director
Elissa Ostergaard Snoqualmie Watershed Forum Salmon Recovery Manager
Scott Smith King County Permitting Division Senior Engineer
Monica Walker King County River & Floodplain
Management Section
Program Manager, White-Cedar-
Sammamish Basin
Ken Zweig King County River & Floodplain
Management Section
Program Manager, Countywide
Policy and Planning Unit
21
PLANNING ACTIVITY DATE SUMMARY ATTENDEES
Planning Meeting 1 10/10/19
Discussed the flood hazard
assessment.
Representatives from
cities, county
departments, academia,
and the public.
Planning Meeting 2 10/30/19
Developed flood hazard mitigation
strategies.
Representatives from
cities, county
departments, academia,
and the public.
Planning Meeting 3 11/6/19
Prioritize hazard mitigation
strategies and review draft risk
assessment.
Representatives from
cities, county
departments, academia,
and the public.
Public Outreach Process
Public outreach during the plan update process is considered to be a critical part of hazard mitigation
planning. For this update, participating jurisdictions are asked to conduct two outreach events. One of
these events should be a meeting-style event and the other could be any event desired by the jurisdiction,
including workshops, fairs, neighborhood meetings, etc. Jurisdictions were encouraged to make the
meetings valuable to the community. Holding a separate, stand-alone meeting for the sole purpose of
this plan update was NOT required, especially if using an existing event, like a commissioner’s meeting,
could help expand public engagement and engage elected officials simultaneously. Jurisdictions were also
encouraged to partner with neighbors or special purpose districts serving their area for more effective
public outreach events.
To count as outreach for the hazard mitigation plan, meetings had to meet the following requirements.
1. Be advertised to the general public. You do NOT have to publish an ad in the paper. You can
use your newsletters, social media, press releases, and other mechanisms to conduct outreach.
2. Promote two-way communication between the public and the planning team.
3. Focus on hazard mitigation, resilience, risk-reduction, etc., for some significant part of the
event. The focus does not have to be solely on mitigation, and you do not have to refer to the
event as related to “mitigation planning;” however, the concepts of resilience, risk-reduction,
etc., should be discussed.
4. Be documented. This is very important. Please summarize both who attends and what they
contribute and make sure to include it in the plan.
County public outreach partnered with the Department of Local Services and other local jurisdictions to
ensure that events occurred throughout unincorporated areas as well as in incorporated areas served by
some county services. The unincorporated area events were part of Community Service Area (CSA)
Town Halls. These events are well-attended and well-advertised, with 60-100 attendees per meeting. This
outreach model, partnering with existing meetings and services, is designed to help put emergency
management and hazard mitigation in context. The work done in hazard mitigation is almost exclusively
22
carried out by non-emergency management entities. By partnering with other departments and using
outreach mechanisms where they would all be present, it may be possible to help demonstrate the role of
emergency management in the community and the partnerships that good hazard mitigation requires.
The following is an excerpt from the King County Department of Local Services newsletter that goes
out to nearly 8000 residents.
23
King County Public Meetings
Date Location Summary Attendees
6/18/19
Greater Maple
Valley CSA
Comments received included
concerns about mitigation of solid
waste facilities, whether or not
earthquake insurance makes sense,
and need for snow mitigation
following February snowstorm.
Residents from central King
County and the
Issaquah/Hobart/Maple Valley
areas. Approximately 100
attendees.
6/25/19
Enumclaw/
Southeast King
County CSA
Discussed concerns about impacts
to Enumclaw area from a
lahar/Mt. Rainier
Residents from southeast King
County, predominately from
Enumclaw and nearby
unincorporated areas.
Approximately 100 attendees.
9/12/19
White Center
CSA
Residents looked at the hazard
information and discussed
strategies for protecting their
community from an earthquake. A
major concern is the likelihood
that the area will be isolated by an
earthquake due to liquefaction.
Dozens of residents from the
areas of White Center, Highline,
Skyway, and Burien.
10/17/19
Snoqualmie/
Carnation/
Duvall CSA
Discussed flooding in the
Snoqualmie-Carnation-Duvall
areas.
Residents from the northeastern
portion of the county, especially
in Snoqualmie, Carnation, and
Duvall
The Des Moines Farmers Market public outreach event hosted by the City of Des
Moines and including King County Emergency Management and Valley regional Fire
Authority.
24
The following is a questionnaire
handed out at these events. Major
topics of discussion, and any
comments or feedback on the
plan and planning process, are
included in the summary table for
the public meetings.
King County Emergency
Management also joined several
locally-led events. For this, the
planning team developed a table-
sized 3D-printed topographic map
of the county with an aerial image
printed on it. The interactive, 3D
physical map was used to talk
about the county’s history of
hazards, flooding, climate change,
landslides, lahar zones,
liquefaction areas, and more.
The model was available for use
by local jurisdictions both with
and without county staff so that it
could be used to support a wider range of outreach activities.
Finally, in addition to in-person outreach, King County Emergency Management developed a website,
https://www.kingcounty.gov/hazardplan. The website explains the purpose of mitigation and provides
an overview of key hazards and examples of effective hazard mitigation. This website will be kept up for
at least the duration of the plan review.
Joint Public Meetings
Date Location Summary Attendees
7/16/19
City of
Medina
Presented to the City of Medina Emergency
Management Committee and other local
residents and led a discussion afterward. The
primary interest was on how residents could
contribute to mitigation and resilience goals
for their city. Residents in Medina will serve
as the steering committee for the mitigation
plan update and will help identify and
prioritize mitigation strategies based on at-
risk, high-priority community assets.
Community members,
elected officials, and
members of Medina
EMC. Approximately 20
people attended.
7/24/19
City of North
Bend
World Café workshop at the North Bend
Public Library
No attendees were
recorded at this event.
25
8/21/19
City of
Kenmore
Presentation and hazard mitigation booth
with 3D map at a Kenmore Town Square
movie night. Spoke with approximately 25
people. The main focus of questions were
around which areas of the community were at
higher risk. Also collected feedback from
community members on their ranking of
Kenmore’s mitigation strategies.
Lots of children plus
community members
attended. Over 100
attendees estimated.
8/27/19
Cities of
Tukwila, Kent,
Covington
and SeaTac
Presented on county hazard mitigation efforts
and discussed countywide risks at a joint
public meeting at Fire Station 74 in Kent.
Major comments included questions about
how cities and the county are prioritizing
mitigation investments, comments on the risk
of fire from homes built very close together,
and questions about the restoration of water
in areas with unstable soils.
10-12 attendees, mostly
from Kent, spoke with
staff from their cities
and King County
Emergency
Management
City of Des
Moines
Hosted a booth at Des Moines Farmers
Market. Discussed the possibility of Des
Moines becoming an island after a major
earthquake. Discussed the vulnerability of the
waterfront relative to the lower-vulnerability
of the rest of the city. The City of Des
Moines and Valley Regional Fire Authority
were also present and completed surveys for
their mitigation plan annexes.
The booth was occupied
continuously by
residents from 10AM
until 2PM.
9/28/19
Cities of
Maple Valley,
Covington,
and Black
Diamond
Annual preparedness fair 3D map booth and
presentation. Spoke with dozens of residents
and several elected officials and shared
information on hazard risk and ways to
address hazard risk. Major comments were
related to length of time needed to reach
residents in far-flung areas following an
earthquake, especially given the response
times during the February 2019 winter
storms.
Hundreds of residents
from the area and cities
around Maple Valley.
Dozens stopped by the
booth.
26
Residents examining the 3D hazard map at a North City Water public outreach event (Source: Diane Pottinger, North
City Water)
Continued Public Participation
King County and its partner cities already maintains substantial public outreach capabilities, focusing on
personal preparedness and education. Information on ongoing progress in implementing the hazard
mitigation plan will be integrated into public outreach efforts. The Community Service Area Town Hall
events led by the Department of Local Services are scheduled annually and provide a unique opportunity
to highlight mitigation successes. This will provide King County residents, already engaged in personal
preparedness efforts, with context and the opportunity to provide feedback on the county’s progress and
priorities in large-scale mitigation. In the vertical integration of risk-reduction activities from personal to
local to state and federal, it is important that the public understand how its activities support, and are
supported by, larger-scale efforts.
The outreach and mitigation teams will also continue to work with media and other agency partners to
publicize mitigation success stories and help explain how vulnerabilities are being fixed. When possible,
public tours of successfully-completed mitigation projects will be organized to allow community
members to see successful mitigation in action.
27
King County Regional Hazard Mitigation
Program Capabilities
King County includes 39 cities, over 129 special purpose
districts, and large unincorporated areas. While each city and
special purpose district is responsible for its own hazard
mitigation efforts, King County supports these jurisdictions
through region-wide services and planning coordination,
including efforts associated with land use, emergency
management, and floodplain management. County
departments involved in hazard mitigation efforts include
Executive Services (facilities management, emergency
management), local services (permitting, roads), Natural
Resources and Parks (wastewater, landslides, floodplain
management, climate change), and the Office of the
Executive (planning).
As the lead agency for hazard mitigation, King County
Emergency Management (KC EM) engages partners to
promote and/or support mitigation activities. KC EM also
publicizes Hazard Mitigation Assistance grant opportunities
and provides technical support to develop applications and
administer awards. KC EM also serves on interagency
workgroups such as comprehensive planning, climate
adaptation, and transportation as a way of promoting
consistency in risk assessment and reduction priorities.
The focus of King County Emergency Management’s
hazard mitigation program is integration, including plan
integration, program integration, and
departmental/jurisdictional integration. Plan integration
helps ensure partners use the best available data and that
plan outcomes are supportive of a resilient future. Program
integration helps partners find fund sources and support
outside of their departments or programs. Department and
jurisdiction integration builds on the role the county EOC serves for response, engaging resources to
promote and implement the most effective, highest-priority hazard mitigation opportunities. In a large
county with dozens of partners, a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach is less effective at building
resilience. KC EM’s approach is to unify partners behind the vision of resilience laid out in this plan.
Plan Integration
When plans and planning processes are more integrated, it is possible to achieve greater impact through
clearer definition, smarter investment, partnerships, and innovation. Successful integration requires
Hazard Mitigation Program
Hazard mitigation is most effective
when implemented through a
systematic program that establishes
priorities and understands that
resilience requires system-wide
investments in mitigation.
Cohesive, comprehensive strategies
and the establishment of
partnerships are the core elements
of a program. Individual projects
matter, but are made more effective
by systematic, strategic
implementation.
In order to support this program,
King County Emergency
Management convenes multi-
agency committees, offers technical
assistance on federal mitigation
grants, supports partners in
planning and mitigation projects,
and maintains and updates the
King County Regional Hazard
Mitigation Plan.
28
coordination between planning efforts and, especially, cross-participation in planning processes. The
goals of plan integration are to:
• Ensure consistency with jurisdiction priorities across all planning processes
• Leverage opportunities to further multi-benefit initiatives that are supported by multiple
planning processes
• Achieve common measures of success for outcomes
The hazard mitigation plan can benefit from integration with planning processes that:
• Prioritize and invest in infrastructure
• Regulate development
• Set strategic direction for programs
To other planning processes, the hazard mitigation plan brings risk and vulnerability information to help
prioritize projects and set development standards or regulations. The mitigation plan also comes with
potential funding for investments in cost-effective risk-reduction projects. On the other hand, the
mitigation plan depends on other plans and processes to implement many strategies. Since the mitigation
plan is not itself a regulatory or budgetary document, strategies identified in the mitigation plan are often
best implemented through those processes or programs.
There are many plans and planning processes within King County that impact hazard risk. These include
strategic plans, long-range plans, resource plans, and capital plans.
TITLE DESCRIPTION LEAD INTEGRATION
STRATEGY
Capital Facilities
Plans
Capital facilities plans identify and
prioritize large-scale projects.
Entities involved in this include the
King County Facilities Management
Division and the King County
Flood Control District.
Various • Integrate mitigation
strategies from
capital plans
• Encourage the use
of hazard
information to
prioritize capital
improvements
• Support county
departments with
funding gaps in
accessing Hazard
Mitigation
Assistance to
complete or expand
projects that are
identified as
important but are
unfunded or
partially funded.
29
Clean Water and
Health Habitat
Strategic Plan
The CWHH Strategic Plan seeks to
establish a strategic alignment
across all plans that impact clean
water and healthy habitat in order
to achieve “greater impact through
clearer definition, smarter
investment, partnerships, and
innovation.” This process is just
starting, and it includes over 20
separate plans and programs.
Department of
Natural
Resources and
Parks
• Participate in plan
development.
• Align outcome
measures and
program
prioritization
methods
• Work through this
process to help
align mitigation
planning with other
planning in the
natural resource
sector, such as
forest health, solid
waste, and salmon
recovery.
Comprehensive
Plan
The King County Comprehensive
Plan is the long-range guiding
policy document for all land use
and development regulations in
unincorporated King County, and
for regional services throughout the
County including transit, sewers,
parks, trails and open space.
Executive’s
Office
• Encourage updates
to the critical areas
ordinance
• Provide feedback
and comments on
the plan
Comprehensive
Emergency
Management Plan
(CEMP)
The CEMP is for use by elected
and appointed County officials, and
King County government
department directors, managers and
staff in mitigating, preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from
disasters.
This plan is a product of
coordinated planning efforts
between King County Emergency
Management, County departments,
emergency management
representatives from various
political jurisdictions, and selected
private and nonprofit sector
interests. It meets the requirements
of WAC 118-30 and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's
(FEMA) planning guidance for the
National Response Framework and
Emergency
Management
• The Hazard
Mitigation Plan
provides the risk
profiles that
support the
development of the
CEMP.
• The Hazard
Mitigation Plan is
also a component
(the mitigation
component) of the
CEMP.
30
the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) compliance.
Equity and Social
Justice Strategic
Plan
The Equity and Social Justice
Strategic Plan is a blueprint for
action and change that will guide
the county’s pro-equity policy
direction, decision-making,
planning, operations and services,
and workplace practices in order to
advance equity and social justice
within County government and in
partnership with communities.
Executive’s
Office
• Follow guidance in
the ESJ plan for the
prioritization of
strategies
• Develop
information on
populations
vulnerable to
hazards and share
with ESJ planning
teams
Flood Hazard
Management Plan
The current (2013) King County
Flood Hazard Management Plan is
a functional annex of the
comprehensive plan. It outlines the
County’s approach to
comprehensive floodplain
management including land use
planning, flood mitigation efforts,
and flood protection facilities
management.
Department of
Natural
Resources and
Parks
• Work with
department
responsible for
floodplain
management to
write the flood risk
assessment.
• Work with local
CRS coordinators
to ensure the
mitigation plan is
worth the
maximum number
of points.
Strategic Climate
Action Plan
King County’s Strategic Climate
Action Plan (SCAP) is a five-year
blueprint for County action to
confront climate change,
integrating climate change into all
areas of County operations and its
work in the community. The SCAP
is King County’s blueprint for
climate action and provides a “one-
stop-shop” for county decision-
makers, employees, and the general
public to learn about the County’s
climate change goals, priorities and
commitments.
Department of
Natural
Resources and
Parks
• Inter-workgroup
participation
• Integrated
mitigation strategies
• Consistent risk
assessments
Strategic Plan for
Road Services
The Road Services Strategic Plan
lays out system needs and
anticipated service levels and an
asset management approach to
road maintenance and
improvement.
Department of
Local Services
• Integrate mitigation
strategies
31
Program and Policy Capabilities
With over 15,000 employees and dozens of departments and offices, King County has a tremendous
capability to implement mitigation projects. Mitigation efforts are underway throughout the county,
including such organizations as the Rivers and Floodplain Management Section of DNRP and the
Wastewater Treatment Division of DNRP.
The hazard mitigation planning process has engaged participants from across these program and policy
areas in order to establish a common assessment of hazards, identify potential mitigation strategies,
partnerships for future projects, and to assess county capabilities to implement mitigation projects. The
list below identifies King County policies and programs that support and implement hazard mitigation
and assesses the effectiveness of each. For state-level policies and programs that support hazard
mitigation, such as the Growth Management Act, please see the Washington State Enhanced Hazard
Mitigation Plan.2
The following table identifies the programs and organizations contributing regularly to hazard mitigation.
PROGRAM/POLICY MITIGATION ACTIVITIES LEAD
Building and
Development
Codes
Building and development codes are adopted and modified
from the 2015 IBC by Washington State Building Code
Council and King County. These codes help ensure that
new construction and substantial improvements meet
international standards, accounting for our hazard risk.
Department of
Local Services,
Permitting
Building and
Development Code
Enforcement
The Department of Local Services, Permitting Division is
the agency that provides land use, building and fire
regulatory and operating permits, code enforcement and a
limited number of business licenses for unincorporated
areas of King County. Other local jurisdictions provide
similar services within incorporated areas. The Code
Enforcement Section investigates complaints regarding
violations of King County Codes (KCC) related to zoning,
building, property maintenance, shorelines and critical areas
in unincorporated King County.
Department of
Local Services,
Permitting
Community Rating
System
The CRS program rewards communities that have
established exceptional floodplain management programs
and undertaken certain activities to reduce flood risk. King
County is one of the highest rated communities in the
country. The program provides NFIP policyholders in
floodplains with a discount of up to 40% on their
insurance.
DNRP
DLS
KCEM
2 Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan. 2018. “Potential Sources of Funding and Mitigation Capability.”
Accessed online on 7/12/19 from https://mil.wa.gov/enhanced-hazard-mitigation-plan.
32
Critical Areas
Ordinance
The critical areas ordinance requires the identification of
geologically-hazardous and frequently-flooded areas. These
areas must either be protected from development or any
development in these areas must be designed to account
for hazard risk.
Department of
Local Services
Equity and Social
Justice
King County has deep and persistent inequities – especially
by race and place–that in many cases are getting worse and
threaten our collective prosperity. Launched by King
County Executive Ron Sims in 2008 and formalized by
Executive Dow Constantine and the Metropolitan King
County Council via ordinance in 2010, Equity and Social
Justice (ESJ) is an integrated part of the County’s work and
is supported by the Office of Equity and Social Justice
since it was established in early 2015.
King County
Executive’s
Office, Office of
Equity and Social
Justice
Facilities
Management
Division
The Facilities Management Division (FMD) oversees and
maintains King County's real estate assets. The Major
Projects and Capital Planning section is tasked with
efficiently and effectively delivering large-scale projects in
alignment with the policy directives of King County
government, the facility needs of employees and the public,
and for overall service to the community. Part of this
includes the development of hazard-resilient facilities.
Department of
Executive
Services, FMD
GIS King County GIS provides analysis support, mapping, and
other data to all King County departments. This data is
valuable for hazard mitigation planning activities.
KCIT
Hazard Mitigation The hazard mitigation program works with partners across
county departments and local jurisdictions to coordinate
and promote hazard mitigation projects.
The program also coordinates applications to federal
Hazard Mitigation Assistance grant programs and conducts
hazard mitigation planning for the county in partnership
with local jurisdictions and special-purpose districts.
KC Emergency
Management
King County
Conservation
District
The King County Conservation District is an independent
special purpose district with separately-elected
commissioners. It promotes water, land, soil, and forest
conservation and preservation and conducts wildfire risk
reduction activities.
King County
Conservation
District
King County IT KCIT leads the county’s response to, and preparedness for,
cyber incidents. KCIT has helped local cities recover from
ransomware and other attacks.
King County
Information
Technology
(KCIT)
33
King County Flood
Control District
In 2007, the King County Flood Control District was
established to provide a proactive, regional approach to
flooding as well as funding to improve the county's nearly
500 aging and inadequate flood protection facilities.
Funding for the Flood Control District comes from a
county-wide property levy of 12.9 cents per $1,000 assessed
value. This amounts to $54 per year on a $416,000 home.
The levy raises roughly $54.5 million a year. This funding
dramatically increases the number of projects that can be
completed each year. The additional local funding also
enhances the District's ability to receive federal and state
matching funds.
The King County Flood Control District is a separate
special purpose district.
King County
Flood Control
District
Landslide Hazards The Landslide Hazards program conducts mapping and
outreach associated with landslide risk.
DNRP Water
and Land
Resources
Division
Land Use Planning
and Zoning
Land use planning and zoning establishes growth and land
use patterns that are consistent with long-range plans and
supported by infrastructure.
King County
Executive’s
Office
National Flood
Insurance Program
Communities that participate in the National Flood
Insurance Program adopt a floodplain management code in
exchange for FEMA making flood insurance available to
residents and businesses.
DNRP, DLS –
Permitting
Division
Office of Risk
Management
Services
Risk Management investigates and resolves claims against
King County in a fair and expeditious manner, and also
provides internal services to King County agencies,
including:
• Insurance: King County administers a self-insurance
program and purchases a variety of other insurance
policies and related services consistent with good risk
management practices and the needs of the County.
• Contracts: Risk Management advises King County
agencies on insurance requirements, indemnification,
release, and hold harmless provisions in all types of
contracts. Risk Management actively negotiates these
provisions and, together with the Prosecuting
Attorney's Office, assists agencies in pursuing and
tendering claims arising out of contractual relations.
• Recovery Services: The recovery section of Risk
Management is charged with seeking compensation for
Department of
Executive
Services
34
damages caused to King County property or injury to
King County employees by negligent third parties.
• Loss Control Program: The Loss Control Manager
works with King County agencies to identify areas of
potential loss and recommend strategies to reduce
exposure to liability. The Loss Control Program also
administers continuing workplace training and
education for King County employees.
Part of this work includes the development and
maintenance of a risk register of events and information on
how those events can impact King County.
Public Health Public Health — Seattle & King County (Public Health)
works to protect and improve the health and well-being of
all people in King County as measured by increasing the
number of healthy years that people live and eliminating
health disparities.
Public Health is the one of the largest metropolitan health
departments in the United States with 1,400 employees, 40
sites, and a biennial budget of $686 million. The
department serves a resident population of nearly 2.2
million people in an environment of great complexity and
scale, with 19 acute care hospitals and over 7,000 medical
professionals. Over 100 languages are spoken here, and
King County is an international destination welcoming
nearly 40 million visitors annually.
Public Health protects the public from threats to their
health, promotes better health, and helps to assure that
people are provided with accessible, quality health care.
Health protection functions include disease control, such as
tuberculosis, HIV, communicable disease epidemiology and
immunizations, and ensuring that the air is safe to breathe,
and water and food are safe to consume.
Health promotion functions include preventing behaviors
that lead to disease, averting injuries and managing chronic
health conditions.
Health provision functions include convening and leading
system-wide efforts to improve access and quality,
advocating for access to quality health care for all, forming
partnerships with service providers and directly providing
individual health services when there is a public health
need.
Public Health
Seattle-King
County
35
Road Services
Division
Road services builds and maintains over 2000 miles of road
and 200 bridges. They are responsible for many mitigation
activities, including those related to culvert replacement,
pavement preservation, and bridge retrofits.
Department of
Local Services
Shoreline Master
Program
King County has nearly 2,000 miles of shoreline along
major lakes and rivers and Vashon-Maury Island. These
shorelines provide habitat for fish and wildlife, places for
public enjoyment and space for wide-ranging waterfront
land uses. The Shoreline Master Program helps preserve
these spaces and uses, thereby reducing risk to hazards
including sea-level rise.
DLS – Permitting
Division
Wastewater
Treatment Division
Invest in upgrades to pipe and water treatment facilities to
make them more resilient to earthquakes, severe weather,
flooding, and climate-change.
DNRP
Integration with Departments and other Jurisdictions
Beyond departmental integration, King County works with local jurisdictions, special purpose districts,
and tribes to support effective risk reduction. King County coordinates activities related to emergency
management and hazard mitigation through two bodies, the Emergency Management Coordinating
Committee (EMCC) and the Emergency Management Advisory Committee (EMAC), which are each
described in greater detail in the table below.
King County Stakeholder Integration Capabilities
ORGANIZATION DESCRIPTION MEMBERSHIP
Clean Water /
Healthy Habitat
Initiative
An initiative convened by the
county executive to help
streamline projects, increase
collaboration, and improve
results for the work
accomplished through the
spending of $6 Billion over the
next decade on clean water
and habitat protection in King
County.
All county agencies
King County
Community
Rating System
Users Group
King County and the cities
who are part of CRS meet to
coordinate efforts and provide
technical assistance to each
other on maintaining and
improving CRS ratings.
• Auburn
• Bellevue
• Issaquah
• Kent
• North Bend
• Renton
• Snoqualmie
• Carnation
36
• Redmond
• King County
Emergency
Management
Coordinating
Committee
(EMCC)
EMCC is charged by the King
County Council with
coordinating interdepartmental
emergency preparedness
matters. EMCC works to
support departments in
developing continuity of
operations plans, preparedness
plans, and hazard mitigation
plans. It also contributes to
after action reports. EMCC
has played an important role in
the mitigation plan update
process for the county by
identifying and dedicating key
staff to participate in planning
and by reviewing and
providing feedback on
planning team activities.
All county departments are included in the
EMCC. The following are those who attend
meetings more regularly.
• King County Emergency Management
• Department of Human Resources
• Metro Transit Department
• Department of Local Services
• Public Health - Seattle and King County
• Department of Natural Resources and
Parks (DNRP)
• Department of Community and Human
Services
• Department of Adult and Juvenile
Detention
• Facilities Management Division of the
Department of Executive Services
• Director’s Office of the Department of
Executive Services
• King County Information Technology
• Office of Labor Relations
• King County Sheriff’s Office
• Office of the King County Executive
• Department of Assessments
• King County District Court
• King County Elections
• DNRP Solid Waste Division
• DNRP Waste Treatment Division
Emergency
Management
Advisory
Committee
(EMAC)
EMAC advises, assists,
reviews, and comments on
emergency management and
homeland security issues,
regional planning, and policies.
They measure and prioritize
core capabilities and
recommend homeland security
allocations and work products
to sustain and enhance
preparedness and operational
levels. Members, as set forth in
code, provide regional and
multi-disciplinary perspective,
and represent cities, fire
service, law enforcement,
The membership for EMAC is established by
the King County Council and includes the
following entities/interests:
• Central region EMS and Trauma Care
Council
• City of Bellevue
• City of Kent
• City of Renton
• City of Seattle
• 1 Utility
• 1 Faith-Based Organization
• 1 Financial Community Organization
• American Red Cross
• KC DNRP
37
hospitals, the Port of Seattle,
government, special purpose
districts, tribes, utilities, non-
profit agencies, and the private
sector.
• KC Metro
• KC Roads
• KC Executive Office
• King County Fire Chief’s Association
• King County Fire Commissioner’s
Association
• King County Police Chief’s Association
• King County Sheriff’s Office
• KC Local Emergency Management
Planning Committee
• Muckleshoot Tribal Nation
• Northwest Healthcare Response
Network
• Port of Seattle
• 1 Private Industry Representative
• Public Health Seattle and King County
• Puget Sound Educational Services
District
• Snoqualmie Tribal Nation
• Sound Cities Association
• Washington Association of Building
Officials
• 1 Water and Sewer District
Representative
Potential Sources of Hazard Mitigation Funding
Hazard mitigation projects are most often completed with funding from capital budgets as part of the
normal building and maintenance processes that occur in any jurisdiction. There is also source and use-
specific funding, such as that provided by the King County Flood Control District that is part of regular
program funding and is highlighted in the program section above. Beyond regular capital funding, there
are dedicated mitigation programs operated by state, county, and federal agencies.
Potential Sources of Hazard Mitigation Funding
PROGRAM LEAD AGENCY DESCRIPTION PROJECT TYPES
BUILD Grants US
Department of
Transportation
(USDOT)
Grants support investments in surface
transportation infrastructure and are to
be awarded on a competitive basis for
projects that will have a significant
local/regional impact.
Transportation and
related infrastructure
retrofits, including
stormwater projects
Building Blocks
for Sustainable
Communities
U.S.
Environmental
This EPA program provides targeted,
technical assistance to communities to
Planning and feasibility
studies
38
Protection
Agency (EPA)
develop resilience plans, development
plans, sustainability strategies, etc.
Building
Resilient
Infrastructure in
Communities
(BRIC)
Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
(FEMA)
New annual mitigation grant program
that is expected to replace PDM. Will
focus more on large-scale
infrastructure projects that reduce risk
to natural hazards.
Most long-term risk-
reduction projects that
protect against fire,
flood, earthquake, and
other natural hazards.
Community
Development
Block Grants
U.S.
Department of
Housing and
Urban
Development
(HUD)
CDBG funds comprehensive plans,
limited infrastructure
planning/construction, feasibility
studies, community action plans.
Income and population restrictions
apply.
Housing and
infrastructure retrofits,
feasibility studies,
planning
Community
Economic
Revitalization
Board
WA
Department of
Commerce
CERB provides loan funding to local
jurisdictions for public infrastructure
to support private business growth and
expansion.
Infrastructure retrofits,
public-private
partnerships
Combined
Water Quality
Funding
Program
WA
Department of
Ecology
Fund sources for projects associated
with publicly-owned wastewater and
stormwater facilities. The integrated
program also funds nonpoint source
pollution control activities.
Drinking-water system
improvements,
feasibility studies,
source-water
protection,
infrastructure retrofits
Cooperating
Technical
Partnership
Program
FEMA The program creates partnerships
between FEMA and qualified local and
state partners to create, maintain, and
publicize up-to-date flood and other
hazard maps and data.
Planning, outreach,
feasibility studies
Drinking Water
State Revolving
Fund
WA
Department of
Health
The Drinking Water State Revolving
Fund (DWSRF) provides loans to
drinking water systems to pay for
infrastructure improvements. In some
cases, partial loan forgiveness is
offered.
Infrastructure retrofits,
source-water
protection, planning,
drinking-water system
improvements
Emergency
Watershed
Protection
Program
Natural
Resource
Conservation
Service
(NRCS)
Emergency recovery measures for
runoff retardation and erosion
prevention to relieve imminent hazards
created by a natural disaster.
Infrastructure retrofits,
slope stabilization,
source-water
protection, flood risk
reduction, erosion
prevention
Estuary and
Salmon
Department of
Fish and
ESRP provides funding restoration
and protection efforts in Puget Sound,
Acquisitions, slope
stabilization, flood risk
39
Restoration
Program
Wildlife
(DFW)
including projects such as flood
storage, erosion control, and climate
resilience measures.
reduction projects,
ecosystem restoration
FireWise Fuel
Mitigation Grant
Program
WA
Department of
Natural
Resources
The Fuel Mitigation Grant provides a
cost share for communities engaged in
defensible space and fuels reduction
projects.
Wildfire fuels
reduction, defensible
space
Floodplains by
Design
WA
Department of
Ecology
Floodplains by Design is the primary
grant program for projects that reduce
flood hazards while restoring the
natural functions that Washington
rivers and floodplains provide.
Slope stabilization,
ecosystem recovery,
flood-risk recovery
Flood Mitigation
Assistance Grant
Program
FEMA FMA provides funding to local
jurisdictions and states for projects and
planning that reduces or eliminates
long-term risk of flood damage to
structures insured under the NFIP.
Flood risk reduction
projects that benefit
the NFIP, including
acquisitions,
elevations, and some
structural mitigation
such as local risk
reduction structures
and dry floodproofing.
Hazard
Mitigation Grant
Program
FEMA
HMGP is authorized statewide after a
disaster declaration and is the most
flexible of FEMA’s three mitigation
programs. Jurisdictions must have an
approved hazard mitigation plan and
projects must be cost effective.
Most long-term risk-
reduction projects that
protect against fire,
flood, earthquake, and
other natural hazards.
King County
Flood Control
District Flood
Reduction
Grants
King County
Flood Control
District
The Flood Reduction Grants target
medium and small local flood
reduction projects including projects
where the control of stormwater will
have a direct benefit in reducing
flooding. Eligible applicants include
homeowners, special districts, tribes,
cities, and county agencies.
Projects can address
either existing or
potential flooding and
proposals should show
that the flooding has
current or potential
economic impacts.
King County
Budget
King County The two-year King County budget for
2019-2020 was approximately $11.6
billion dollars. Approximately 15% of
this money makes up the general fund.
Major Expenditures are: Metro Transit
(21%), Wastewater (14%), Health &
Human Services (13%), and Law,
Safety, & Justice (12%). There are
~15,000 full-time-equivalent (FTE)
Various
40
county employees with most employed
in Transit (35%), Criminal Justice
(25%), and Public Health (9%).
King County
Loss Control
Fund
Office of Risk
Management
The Loss Control Fund is for internal
county projects and is limited to
emergent risks where advance planning
and budgeting were unavailable. $2M
has been appropriated for the 2019-
2020 biennium.
Emergent risks, to
include likely
infrastructure failure
King County
Parks Levy
King County Revenue generated by the parks levy
goes to fund open space protection,
new parks, trails, and other assets. This
funding could theoretically be used for
the acquisition of threatened
properties for preservation as open
space.
Acquisition of high-
hazard properties for
preservation as open
space
Post-Fire
Hazard
Mitigation Grant
Program
U.S. EPA
Program authorized following a Fire
Management Assistance Grant
(FMAG) declaration. Program focuses
on wildfire risk and post-fire risk
mitigation, including fuels reduction
and post-fire flood control projects.
Program prioritizes the county
receiving the FMAG declaration.
Fire-related mitigation,
including defensible
space, generators, and
post-fire flood risk
reduction, planning,
feasibility studies
Pre-Disaster
Mitigation Grant
Program
FEMA
Annual program for cost-effective
mitigation projects and plans.
Jurisdiction must have a current
mitigation plan to be eligible.
Following the 2019 grant round, this
program will be replaced by BRIC.
Most long-term risk-
reduction projects that
protect against fire,
flood, earthquake, and
other natural hazards.
Public Works
Board
WA
Department of
Commerce
Low-interest loans for pre-
construction or new construction for
replacement/repair of infrastructure
for stormwater, solid waste, road, or
bridge projects. Emergency loans are
available for public projects made
necessary by a disaster or imminent
threat to public health and safety.
Utility and
infrastructure retrofits
Rural
Community
Assistance
Corporation
Rural
Community
Assistance
Corporation
Water, wastewater, stormwater, and
solid waste planning; environmental
work; to assist in developing an
application for infrastructure
Planning, feasibility
studies
41
improvements for small, rural
communities.
Rural Water
Revolving Loan
Fund
National Rural
Water
Association
The RWLF provides low-cost loans
for short-term repair costs, small
capital projects, or pre-development
costs associated with larger projects to
small, rural communities.
Source-water
protection, drinking
water system
improvements, other
retrofits
Source Water
Protection Grant
Program
WA
Department of
Health
Projects and studies to identify
solutions to source water protection
problems, implement protection plans,
or update data that directly benefits
source water protection.
Source-water
protection, drinking
water system
improvements, other
retrofits, feasibility
studies
Washington
Transportation
Improvement
Board
Transportation
Improvement
Board
TIB makes and manages street
construction and maintenance grants
to 320 cities and urban counties.
Infrastructure retrofits,
flood risk reduction
Urban and
Community
Forest Program
U.S.
Department of
Agriculture
Program provides technical, financial,
research and educational services to
local jurisdictions and organizations
for the preservation, protection, and
restoration of forestlands.
Natural resource
protection, public
information, planning
King County Hazard Mitigation Grant Assistance Program
A major initiative launching as part of this plan update is the King County Hazard Mitigation Grant
Assistance Program. Led by KC EM, this program seeks to lower the barriers to applying for FEMA
grants, especially given the new opportunities associated with the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018.
King County will support jurisdictions by ensuring the mitigation projects are identified in the regional
plan, offering technical assistance in developing applications, and, when requested, by administering
grants on behalf of communities that lack internal grant management capabilities. This program reflects
KC EM’s focus on end-to-end emergency management, supporting partners across all mission areas
from mitigation to recovery.
Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides federally backed flood insurance in exchange
for communities enacting floodplain regulations. Participation and good standing under NFIP are
prerequisites to grant funding eligibility under the Robert T. Stafford Act. The County and most of the
partner cities for this plan participate in the NFIP and have adopted regulations that meet the NFIP
requirements.
42
King County and 34 of the 39 incorporated areas in the County are participants in NFIP; all are currently
in good standing with the provisions of the NFIP. The five jurisdictions that do not currently participate
in NFIP are Beaux Arts Village, Hunts Point, Maple Valley, Newcastle and Yarrow Point. Except for
Newcastle, these communities have no special flood hazard areas.
Participants in the NFIP must, at a minimum, regulate development in floodplain areas in accordance
with NFIP criteria. Communities participating in the NFIP may adopt regulations that are more stringent
than those contained in 44 CFR 60.3, but not less stringent. The Washington State Building Code Act
requires new construction to be elevated to 1 foot above the base flood elevation or to the design flood
elevation, whichever is higher. Some communities in King County have adopted more stringent
standards. For example, a 3-foot freeboard (height above the 100-year flood elevation) is standard for
most structures in unincorporated King County.
Additionally, in the Puget Sound watershed, communities are required to regulate development in
floodplains in a way that doesn’t cause habitat loss or negative impacts to Chinook, coho, and steelhead
salmon species. This is part of the FEMA/NOAA Biological Opinion related to communities’
participation in the National Flood Insurance Program.
New Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) are currently in a preliminary stage and are scheduled to be
published in mid-2020.
In Washington State, the Department of Ecology is the coordinating agency for floodplain management.
Ecology works with FEMA and local governments by providing grants and technical assistance,
evaluating community floodplain management programs, reviewing local floodplain ordinances, and
participating in statewide flood hazard mitigation planning. Compliance is monitored by FEMA regional
staff and by Ecology. Maintaining compliance under the NFIP is an important component of flood risk
reduction. All planning partners that participate in the NFIP have identified initiatives to maintain their
compliance and good standing. Planning partners who do not currently participate have identified
initiatives to consider enrollment in the program.
Participation in CRS
The Community Rating System is a voluntary program within the NFIP that encourages floodplain
management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements and rewards discounts to ratepayers
in participating communities. King County is a Class 2 community. Flood insurance premiums are
discounted to reflect the reduced flood risk resulting from community actions meeting the following
three goals of the CRS:
• Reduce flood losses.
• Facilitate accurate insurance rating.
• Promote awareness of flood insurance.
For participating communities, flood insurance premium rates are discounted in increments of 5 percent.
For example, a Class 1 community receives a 45-percent premium discount, and a Class 9 community
receives a 5-percent discount. (Class 10 communities are those that do not participate in the CRS; they
receive no discount.) The CRS classes are based on 18 creditable activities in the following categories:
• Public information
43
• Mapping and regulations
• Flood damage reduction
• Flood preparedness
As of this writing, there are 10 CRS-rated communities in King County.
Community Name Class % Discount in SFHA % Discount in non-SFHA
Auburn 5 25 10
Bellevue 5 25 10
Issaquah 5 25 10
Kent 5 25 10
North Bend 5 25 10
Renton 5 25 10
Snoqualmie 5 25 10
Carnation 7 15 5
Redmond 5 25 10
King County 2 40 10
Regional Risk and Probability Summaries
While most of the risk and probability of future occurrence for hazards is similar for all jurisdictions in
King County, some are at greater risk due to specific geographic features including proximity to
floodplain (increases flood probability and risk from earthquakes due to liquefaction). For natural
hazards, the relative probability of occurrence within 25-50 years (High, Medium, or Low) and relative
risk as described in each jurisdiction’s annex are identified in the table below.
The table below does not include Avalanche risk (high annual probability of occurrence, but only in
unincorporated areas) nor tsunami (low probability of occurrence for all areas, exposure is currently only
mapped for the cities of Des Moines and Seattle. Acronyms: WSD = Water and Sewer District, WD =
Water District, SD = School District, RFA = Regional Fire Authority, UD = Utility District.
Community Name Earthquake Flood Landslide Weather Volcano Wildfire
Prob Risk Prob Risk Prob Risk Prob Risk Prob Risk Prob Risk
Auburn
Beaux Arts Village
Bellevue
Bothell
Burien
Clyde Hill
Covington
Des Moines
Duvall
Hunts Point
Issaquah
44
Community Name Earthquake Flood Landslide Weather Volcano Wildfire
Kenmore
Kent
Kirkland
Lake Forest Park
Maple Valley
Mercer Island
Medina
Newcastle
North Bend
Redmond
Renton
Sammamish
SeaTac
Shoreline
Snoqualmie
Tukwila
Woodinville
Cedar River WSD
Covington WD
Coal Creek UD
Highline WD
King County WD 20
King County WD 90
King County WD
125
Lake Meridian WD
North City WD
NE Sammamish
WSD
Northshore UD
Renton SD
Sammamish Plateau
WSD
Skyway WSD
Soos Creek WSD
South King Fire
Valley RFA
Valley View Sewer
Vashon Island Fire
Woodinville WD
Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe
45
Risk Assessment Overview
The King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan Risk Assessment covers 8 natural and 6 human-
caused hazards.
• Avalanche
• Earthquake
• Tsunami
• Volcano
• Landslide
• Wildfire
• Flood
• Severe Weather
• Hazardous Materials
• Health Incident
• Terrorism
• Civil Disturbance
• Cyber Incident
• Dam Failure
These assessments were developed using the best available data from sources including:
• Washington State Fusion Center (Terrorism, Civil Disturbance)
• King County Dam Safety Program (Dam Failure)
• King County IT (Cyber Incident)
• Public Health Seattle-King County (Health Incident)
• Washington State Emergency Management LEPC Program (Hazardous Materials)
• King County Flood Control District (Flood)
• Washington State Emergency Management Geologic Hazards Program (Tsunami, Earthquake,
Volcano)
• King County Strategic Climate Action Plan (Wildfire, Severe Weather)
• Washington State Department of Transportation (Avalanche)
• King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks (Landslide)
• King County Department of Permitting (Structure Fire)
• Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan
• Washington State Department of Natural Resources (Landslide, Earthquake, Tsunami, Volcano,
Wildfire)
• King County Facilities Management Division
• King County Hazard Inventory and Risk Assessment, 2016
• FEMA RiskMAP Program, King County Risk Report (Earthquake, Landslide, Volcano, Flood)
46
Data sources are cited with footnotes throughout the plan. In addition to using data and report
information from the above sources, many also contributed time and expertise to the review and
development of the individual risk assessment chapters.
Methodology
This risk assessment is intended to provide a robust overview containing key details, vulnerabilities, and
considerations to enable emergency managers to plan for disasters. The profiles are designed to be brief,
and yet also comprehensive enough, to be useful during a disaster response to help provide information
on potential impacts and priority vulnerabilities.
This assessment focuses on examining impacts (consequences) from hazards on 10 different topic areas.
These areas reflect best practices as identified by the Emergency Management Accreditation Program
(EMAP) plus priority areas identified by King County.
• King County residents – all residents in King County
• Vulnerable populations – populations more likely to experience losses and recover more slowly
from an incident. Different vulnerable populations may be highlighted depending on the
incident type. For example, wildfire in King County is overwhelmingly a problem of smoke and
smoke impact people with respiratory vulnerabilities most severely.
• Property – private property
• The economy – economic functions and assets
• The environment – natural resources, wildfire, fish, plants, and natural systems
• Health systems – hospitals, pharmacies, and the ability for people to find and receive care
• Government operations (continuity of operations) – King County government operations
• Responders – fire, police, EMS, and related services
• Lifeline infrastructure – power, water/wastewater, transportation, communications
• Public confidence in jurisdiction’s governance and capabilities
Each profile also looks at priority vulnerabilities in order to identify those areas requiring immediate
focus before, during, and after an incident.
Data
GIS data was taken from a variety of King County, Washington State, and federal sources. The data was
sourced via King County GIS, including layers owned by both GIS and by other entities. Some of the
GIS data analyzed in completing this risk assessment include:
TITLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Active Faults Known active faults in the Puget
Sound region
WA State Department of Natural
Resources (DNR)
47
Wastewater
Systems
King County wastewater treatment
and conveyance systems
King County Department of Natural
Resources and Parks Water Treatment
Division (DNRP)
Water Supply
Facilities
Seattle water supply facilities and
conveyance systems. These are used
to supply Seattle as well as many
cities.
City of Seattle Public Utilities
Bridges King County-maintained bridges King County Roads
Rail Routes All rail routes, including BNSF and
Sound Transit
King County GIS
Transit Routes Metro transit routes King County Metro
Arterials Arterial streets King County Roads
Levees and
Revetments
County-maintained flood protection
structures.
DNRP, King County Flood Control
District
BPA
Transmission
Lines
Bonneville Power Administration
power transmission systems
Bonneville Power Administration
Historic Buildings Designated historic buildings King County GIS
Schools School facilities King County GIS
Government
Buildings
King County government buildings King County GIS, Facilities
Management Division
Hospitals and
Medic Units
Hospitals and medic unit locations King County GIS
Pharmacies Pharmacy locations King County GIS
First Responder
Facilities
Locations of fire, police, and EMS King County GIS
City Boundaries City jurisdictional boundaries King County GIS
Rivers and Lakes Waterbodies King County GIS
Building Address
Points
Building address points and age King County Assessor
Building Age Building address points and age King County Assessor
48
Volcanic Hazard
Areas
Lahar, lava flow, and lahar sediment
areas
WA DNR, U.S. Geological Survey
Landslide Hazard
Areas
Historic, deep landslide risk areas WA DNR
Preliminary 100-
year Floodplain
1% annual chance, special flood
hazard area as mapped by FEMA.
Will take effect as the regulatory
floodplain in 2020.
FEMA, King County Flood Control
District
Floodways The regulatory areas including the
channel and adjacent land areas that
must be preserved in order to
discharge the base flood without
increasing the water surface elevation
by more than a designated height.
FEMA, King County Flood Control
District
Liquefaction
Potential
Areas of NEHRP soil classes D, E,
and F.
WA DNR
Landslide Buffer
Areas
Buffers of 50 feet around known
landslide areas.
King County GIS
Statewide Roads State and federal highways King County GIS
Health Insurance
Coverage
Individuals with health insurance, by
Census Tract
US Census, American Community
Survey (ACS)
Travel Time to
Work
Travel time to work on average by
Census Tract
US Census, ACS
Means of
Transportation to
Work
Means of transportation to work, by
percent, by Census Tract
US Census, ACS
Race Self-identified race US Census, ACS
Ethnicity Self-identified ethnicity US Census, ACS
Income Income (range) US Census, ACS
Languages Languages other than English spoken
at home
US Census, ACS
Disability Status Counts of disabled persons King County GIS
Education Educational attainment by years, by
Census Tract
US Census, ACS
49
This and any additional data can be viewed on the ArcGIS online hazard map. This map will be available
at least during the plan review and adoption phase and may be made available permanently:
http://kingcounty.maps.arcgis.com/apps/View/index.html?appid=41abdeae1bf44907a9c14b98a2e5fb9
2.
Vulnerable Populations and Population-Based Vulnerability
Population vulnerability (or social vulnerability) measures factors that theoretically increase the likelihood
of a population to suffer more losses during disasters or recover more slowly after being impacted. There
is a growing body of work on this kind of vulnerability; however, how the data is reported can obscure
the root causes of vulnerability when converted into an index or score. Knowing the root causes of
vulnerability and how those vulnerabilities contribute to losses during disasters is critical for hazard
mitigation professionals since each cause may require a unique strategy to address. For example, if the
vulnerability results from language differences, then this can be addressed with robust translation and
outreach services.
Communities that consider population-based vulnerability and social justice, often do it as an overlay –
examining the impacts of a proposed project on vulnerable populations, for example, after the project
has already been prioritized or mapping the location of vulnerable populations in accordance with some
composite score and institutionally-defined definition of vulnerability. It is unclear if mapping alone, if
awareness alone, has had much impact on where the bulk of resources are directed.
For this analysis, we examine the best available data of factors that have been found to lead to increased
losses or recovery times following hazard events. This is to establish areas with different kinds of
heightened vulnerability. We then overlay data on race, ethnicity, and income. This is to establish where
equity may be a concern, where causes of vulnerability overlap with historically underrepresented
minority populations.
Determinants of Population Vulnerability
Good data at the appropriate scale was not available for all the below factors. However, these are factors
that were identified through research and by the planning team as critical determinants of vulnerability.
Maps of a selection of these factors, along with priority hazard areas, follow the list of variables.
Population factors (population-based measures)
1. Home Ownership Status (Renter)
2. Age (old or young)
Tenure Housing tenure (ownership) status King County GIS
HAZUS for
earthquake
(Seattle Fault,
Cascadia
Subduction Zone)
HAZUS runs for Seattle Fault 7.1 and
Cascadia Subduction Zone 9.0
scenarios
FEMA RiskMAP
50
3. Unemployment
4. Income
5. Wealth
6. Access and Functional Needs/Disability
7. Dependence on public transportation
8. Language other than English spoken at home
9. No health insurance
10. Hazard insurance coverage
11. Minimum wage employment/service sector employment
12. Families with dependents
13. Living in poverty
14. Crime rate
15. Years of schooling completed (HS, BA, MA, etc.)
Accessibility and capital factors (access/infrastructure measures/social capital)
• Access to services (schools, libraries, community centers, county/city facilities)
• Quality of public facilities (public facility effective age)
• Quality of schools
• Access to hospitals or health clinics
• Quality of hospitals/health clinics
• Access to phone and internet
• Average age of housing
• Average commute time/distance to work
• Per capita government spending
• Neighborhood engagement (civic engagement, neighborhood association, something else?)
Meta-factors (determinants of equity)
• Race/ethnicity
• Age
• Income
• Immigrant/refugee status
The results from this analysis will be used to promote more effective, equitable disaster mitigation,
response, and recovery by identifying key vulnerabilities and areas that may require additional
investment. Also, this analysis will help identify areas where public infrastructure is older or less resilient,
or where hazard risk is greater, so that additional investments can be targeted in those areas.
51
The following maps illustrate several of the above variables associated with greater hazard risk along with
high hazard areas and non-white populations. This is just a selection of potential variables and illustrates
how high-hazard areas, factors associated with hazard risk, and communities of color or with higher rates
of disability may overlap. The highest population-risk areas in King County tend to be areas south of
Seattle in the Green River Valley. These areas also are areas with the highest hazard risk. Investments
that target critical public infrastructure and support structures in these communities would likely have
the best cost-benefit ratio. Investments in these areas would have the added benefit of also promoting
more equitable access to high-quality infrastructure and services for populations historically underserved
by public investment.
Homeownership (Darker=More Homeowners) Disability (Darker=Higher Rate)
Median Household Income (Darker=Higher) People of Color (Darker=Higher Percentage)
Liquefaction Potential (Darker=More Risk) 100-Year Floodplains
52
Speak Language Other Than English (High-Low) Car Dependency (Darker=More Car Dependent)
Jurisdiction-Specific Risk Assessments
In addition to this countywide risk assessment, each planning partner completed a risk assessment
focusing on the priority hazards, vulnerabilities, and consequences. These assessments are contained in
each planning partner annex. These assessments will have much more detail about individual jurisdiction
risks and should supplement the wider lens of the risk profiles contained in the core plan.
To complete their assessments, jurisdictions were provided with GIS data and an ArcGIS online map
containing relevant data on hazards and impacts. The data is the same as that used in the base plan risk
assessments, but jurisdictions were asked to focus on impacts specific to their assets and boundaries.
Jurisdictions assessed risk in two ways.
First, jurisdictions looked at hazards that could impact them, how susceptible/vulnerable they are to
those hazards, and the consequences/impacts of a hazard event. The task was to develop “risk elevator
pitches” that summarize the key elements of hazard risk in a way accessible to elected officials and the
public.
Second, jurisdictions were asked to consider an asset-based approach, looking at their priority assets, the
hazards that threaten those assets, and the consequences of losing the asset. All jurisdictions were
encouraged to complete this process, but only special purpose districts were required to complete it. The
goal of this approach was to identify assets that needed mitigation.
In addition to these risk summaries, a map showing the spatially discrete hazards (flood, liquefaction
potential, steep slopes) was developed for cities.
In developing their risk assessments, jurisdictions held internal meetings to select the list of hazards that
would be included and to assess the relative risk of each hazard. Most used a high-medium-low approach
for impact, where high impact is a debilitating event and moderate impacts are serious events that disrupt
operations for multiple days. For those that also considered probability separately from the base plan, a
high probability event is likely to occur on an annual basis. These jurisdiction-specific risk assessments
are not designed to be exhaustive but should give a much clearer picture of risk and vulnerability than is
normally available from countywide assessments.
53
King County Development Trends and Risk Trajectory
From 2010 to 2018 King County has grown at a rate of 13.4% per year.3 This population growth has
coincided with a near doubling of total assessed property values in the county from $340 billion in 2014
to $606 billion in 2019.4 Over $44 billion worth of new construction was assessed from 2014-2018.
Property values stabilized in most of the county in 2018, although many unincorporated areas, especially
in the northeast of the county around Carnation and Duvall, continued to grow at double-digit rates.
The huge growth in property values and development of new lands has also coincided with a growth in
diversity. In 2018, the total population identifying as white declined by nearly 5000 persons while the
non-white population grew dramatically. While this is a small change, it indicates that the future of King
County will be more diverse and more populous.
Also, since 2015 the available science on risk has improved markedly. King County has new landslide
hazard data from Washington State Department of Natural Resources (WA DNR). There is also updated
tsunami data indicating far greater risk than previously recognized in the coastal areas. New climate
change data is available in the Puget Sound State of Knowledge Report.5 Finally, WA DNR is expected
to publish a draft wildland-urban interface fire risk map by the end of 2019, helping to show the extent
of fire risk, much of it spurred by the growth indicated above.
As development has occurred, jurisdictions have invested in risk reduction measures such as the
installation of ductile iron pipe to replace cast iron pipe in water systems. While this work is critical, in
most jurisdictions it is unlikely to be complete for 20-30 years. Other work has included bridge retrofits,
wastewater system improvements, flood risk reduction projects, and risk assessments and planning.
Nevertheless, there are dozens to hundreds of bridges in need of upgrades to keep the transportation
system functioning in the event of a major earthquake.
New science showing more risk and a dramatic increase in population, especially in areas not previously
developed, indicates that the county trajectory is toward more exposure and vulnerability. While there is
ongoing work to reduce risk, it is not keeping up with existing needs, much less the needs of a larger,
more diverse population living across a larger area.
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN RISK 2015-2020
SECTOR RISK CHANGE (Increased -,
Decreased +, No Change =)
EXPLANATION
3 King County Office of the Executive. 2018. 2018 King County Quick Facts. Accessed online on 8/28/19 from
https://kingcounty.gov/depts/executive/performance-strategy-budget/regional-planning/Demographics.aspx.
4 King County Office of Economic and Financial Analysis. July 19, 2019. July 2019 King County Economic and
Revenue Forecast. Accessed online on 8/28/19 from
https://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/business/Forecasting/documents/July2019_Forecast.ashx?la=en.
5 Climate Impacts Group. 2015. Puget Sound State of Knowledge Report. Accessed online on 8/28/19 from
http://cses.washington.edu/picea/mauger/ps-sok/ps-sok_cover_and_execsumm_2015.pdf.
54
King County Residents With a larger population that is likely no
more prepared, risk to King County
residents is estimated to have increased.
Vulnerable Populations While there has been a large increase in
median income, there is more income
inequality and housing insecurity due to
housing costs and other issues. There are
also many new immigrants who may not be
reached by disaster messaging or be familiar
with the region’s hazards. Overall risk to
vulnerable populations has increased as
these populations have grown.
Property While the construction boom is reducing
risk in some areas, some construction
patterns, such as building homes close
together, is increasing risk from fire. Also,
the new development, some of it in
marginal areas is increasing risk. This is
especially acute in areas in the wildland-
urban interface, near floodplains, or on
unstable soils.
The Economy The economy has grown but is also
susceptible to a shock caused by a disaster
that could permanently displace the major
companies that make this region so
competitive. Many of these companies are
highly mobile and a disaster that destroys
the region’s infrastructure could devastate
the economy.
The Environment With heightened climate change and more
development, the environment is more
threatened by hazards including wildfire
and flooding.
Health Systems Health systems have seen modest
improvement in overall risk as hospitals are
upgraded to higher seismic standards.
55
Government
Operations
No increase or decrease in risk to
government operations is identified. While
there continues to be some modest
investment in the resilience of public
facilities, there is still significant risk of
disruption of services during a major
incident, as demonstrated during the 2019
snow event. A seismic event would still
threaten the ability of King County
government to provide services and many
buildings may not be useable.
Responders No change in the risk to responders is
identified.
Infrastructure Systems Although not sufficient to meet the need,
investments in infrastructure have modestly
reduced risk.
Public Confidence Mixed Public confidence in the jurisdictions’
capabilities is estimated to be mixed. On
one hand, emergency management and
county government are delivering services
on a huge scale and received relatively
positive feedback from the February 2019
storms. On the other, there has been little
movement to systematically improve
earthquake resilience, something frequently
reported by the media.
56
Regional Risk Profile: Avalanche
Hazard Description
Avalanche hazards in the Northwest are associated with winter storms in the Cascade and Olympic
Mountain ranges. Avalanches occur when a snow pack loses its grip on a slope and slides downhill.
Typically, slopes of between 20 to 30 degrees and snow packs of 34 inches or more may produce
avalanches. Most natural avalanches occur in back country little used by humans during such weather
conditions. This tends to minimize exposure to avalanche impacts. Most vulnerable are travelers and
winter recreation enthusiasts using Stevens Pass in
northeastern King County, Snoqualmie Pass in
central-eastern King County, and Crystal Mountain
Ski Area near Chinook and Cayuse passes in just
outside of southeastern King County.6
Regionally, severe winter weather in the form or
snowfall in the Cascade Mountains results in a
snowpack that – when conditions are right – can
lead to a natural or man-made/induced avalanche.
Avalanches can result in impacts to transportation
through mountain passes and injuries or death to people using the mountain backcountry recreationally.
Avalanche danger in King County is highest during severe winter weather from October through March
annually. When moist air from the Pacific rises to climb the Cascade Mountains and meets the colder air
of the U.S. interior, precipitation often falls as snow from late October through March or April each
year.
The most frequent impact from avalanche is from pass closures, especially along Snoqualmie Pass on I-
90. In particularly severe events, both Snoqualmie and Stevens
pass may close for days at a time, effectively cutting the state in
half. The other routes that cross the cascades, US 12, US 20,
SR 410, and SR 14, are not suitable for large traffic volumes
and large trucks and are often closed when I-90 and US 2 are
closed. This occurred most recently during the February 2019
snowstorm. In that event, all the east-west highways were
closed, limiting King County’s road salt supply from the east
side of the state. The snowfall totals at the pass exceeded
normal, with 118 total inches in February alone (average
accumulation in February is 73.9 inches). February 12, 2019
broke the 24-hour snowfall record, with 31.5 inches recorded
6 Washington State Department of Transportation, Prediction of Snow and Avalanches in Maritime Climates: Final
Report, WA-RD 203.1, December 1989, p.3.
Stevens Pass WSDOT avalanche control areas
Snoqualmie Pass WSDOT avalanche control areas.
57
by Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) crews recorded at the summit. During
this event, I-90 was closed beginning Monday afternoon, February 11, reopening on Thursday morning
due to avalanche danger.
Avalanche impact areas are mapped for Snoqualmie and Stevens passes, which are maintained
throughout the winter by WSDOT crews. Chinook and Cayuse passes are closed during the winter due
to avalanche danger and difficulty of maintaining a clear roadway.
In addition to the roadway risk, two of the state’s three cross-state railways pass through the Cascades.
These railroads travel along a route similar to the major highways and are similiarly susceptible to
avalanche. Major snowfall and avalanche danger can disrupt rail freight traffic across the state, with
significant economic impacts.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Recreational areas that support snowshoeing, alpine and cross-country skiing, snowmobile areas, and
winter hikers and campers are most at risk from avalanche incidents. Typically, injuries to recreational
hikers, skiers, snow boarders, and climbers occur outside managed areas. Several stretches of Interstate
90 and Highway 2 in King County are vulnerable to avalanches between October and April each year,
depending on snow packs and weather conditions. Both Snoqualmie and Stevens Pass are significant
commercial routes. Cargos are carried between the Ports of Tacoma and Seattle, and eastern
Washington. When Stevens and Snoqualmie Passes are closed, I-84 in Oregon or air travel are the only
practical ways to travel between Spokane and Seattle.
The popular backcountry skiing areas around Stevens and Snoqualmie passes are high-hazard zones
where avalanche fatalities are relatively common. WSDOT posts signs, though these warnings are
frequently ignored. People engaged in snow sports in these areas are often among the most experienced
enthusiasts; however, even with safety equipment, they may trigger or fall victim to avalanches. There
are, on average, one to three fatalities in avalanches statewide each year. Hundreds of avalanches are
thought to occur around the Cascades each winter, though most without any human cause or impact.
There are twelve common factors that contribute to avalanche danger, including old snow depth, old
snow surface, new snow depth, new snow type, snow density, snow fall intensity, precipitation intensity,
settlement, wind direction and wind speed, temperature, subsurface snow crystal structure, and tidal
effect.7 Research done at Snoqualmie Pass indicates that most natural avalanches occur within one hour
after the onset of rain over a weakened snow pack.8 Large amounts of new snow accumulation also
increases avalanche risk, especially when coupled with wide temperature swings.
7 Kruse, Scott M. “Avalanche Evaluation Check List,” Avalanche Review vol. 8, No 4, February 1990
8 Washington State Department of Transportation, Washington State Department of Transportation – Avalanche
Control http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/maintenance/avalanche4
58
Significant Historic Avalanches 2001-2019 – Stevens and Snoqualmie Passes9
YEAR PASS FATALITIES AND INJURIES
1910 (Historic Maximum) Stevens Pass (railway) 96 Fatalities
2001 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 1 Fatality, 2 Injuries
2002 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 10 Injuries
2003 Snoqualmie Pass 1 Fatality, 1 Injury
2004 None None
2005 Snoqualmie Pass 1 Injury, 1 Fatality
2006 None None
2007 Snoqualmie Pass 1 Injury, 2 Fatalities
2008 None None
2009 None None
2010 Snoqualmie Pass 3 Injuries
2011 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 6 Injuries, 2 Fatalities
2012 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 12+ Injuries, 6 Fatalities
2013 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 4+ Injuries, 2 Fatalities
2014 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 7+ Injuries, 1 Fatality
2015 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 2 Injuries, 2 Fatalities
2016 None None
2017 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 2 Injuries, 1 Fatality
2018 Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass 1 Injury, 3 Fatalities
2019 None None
9 Northwest Avalanche Center, Accident Reports. Accessed online on 5/13/19 from
https://www.nwac.us/accidents/accident-reports/
59
Scenario Drivers
There are two kinds of avalanches, loose and slab. Loose avalanches occur when light-grained snow
exceeds its “angle of repose”, collapses a snow drift or bank and fans out as it slides downhill. A slab
avalanche occurs when heavy or melting snow resting on top of looser snow breaks away from the slope
and moves in a mass. The latter often occurs when rains soak the top layer of snow on moderately
sloped terrain.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Back-country
recreationists
Snowmobilers, hikers, and skiers in back-country and off-trail environments
are at the highest risk from avalanche.
Transportation networks
I-90 and US-2 are the most vulnerable routes to avalanche. Disruptions to
both are common during the winter, though most are for a short duration. A
long-duration disruption could have significant economic consequences.
Public safety officers and
volunteers
Search and Rescue regularly travel on search missions for missing
recreationists, putting them at risk from avalanche as well.
Priority Impact Areas
King County residents Avalanche conditions can cause closure of ski areas like: Alpental, Hyak
(Summit East), Ski Acres (Summit Central), Stevens Pass, and/or Crystal
Mountain. The recreational skiers and the people who are seasonally
employed can be impacted when these conditions close ski areas. People
who ski “out of bounds” take exceptional risks in locations where avalanche
control does not maintain safe conditions and search and rescue operations
may be hampered.
Pass closures may inconvenience people by causing them to either take
commercial flights between eastern and western Washington or cause them
to take wide routes around the mountain area through the Columbia Gorge
between Washington and Oregon.
There are no major populations in King County that are exposed to
avalanche terrain. The King County community closest to avalanche country
is Skykomish. It has not experienced an avalanche in recent memory.
Vulnerable populations No specific impacts are expected to vulnerable populations for this hazard.
Property Property exposed to avalanches include ski area lifts and equipment, small
clusters of seasonal vacation homes and utilities supporting ski areas, ski
lodges, ski area support operations, and those vacation properties.
60
The economy Closure of ski areas from avalanche danger usually lasts only a short time.
While revenue to one or more ski areas may be reduced, no long-term
economic impacts can be expected from avalanche issues.
Heavy snows and avalanche danger may close Stevens and/or Snoqualmie
Pass for extended periods. These pass closures can impede transportation of
goods between eastern/western Washington, impact the Port of Seattle and
port/countries around the/Pacific Rim.
Avalanche closure of King County passes may cause motorists and truckers
to reroute through Interstate 84 in Portland.
The most significant avalanche event in Washington State, and the deadliest
in US history, occurred in 1910 near Stevens Pass. Two trains carrying
passengers were hit by an avalanche killing 96 people. Economic impacts are
also substantial. A WSDOT study claimed that a four-day closure at
Snoqualmie Pass in the winter of 2007/2008 cost the state $27.9M in
economic output, 170 jobs, and $1.42M in state revenue (2008 dollars).10
The environment Avalanches are natural events; however, they kill wildlife and trees and can
reshape the landscape.
Health systems There are no known healthcare facilities or systems exposed to avalanches.
Government operations
(continuity of operations)
Avalanche areas are remote to most King County operations. Where
avalanches may occur, King County Sheriff’s Office Search and Rescue, Ski
patrols, and volunteers may be involved. This may include BARK, a group
that provides K-9 search capability for avalanche victims. Support may also
be required from the aviation unit of the King County Sheriff’s Office and
from Emergency Medical Service units.
Support personnel for avalanche control are provided by Washington State
Department of Transportation.
Responders When avalanches bury or injury skiers and backcountry hikers, the King
County Sheriff’s Office Search and Rescue team(s) may be deployed along
with trained volunteers and specially trained volunteer K-9 units like BARK
(Backcountry Avalanche Rescue K-9). Most search missions occur in or
around the off-trail perimeter of ski areas like Snoqualmie Acres, Hyak,
10 Ripley, Richard, “Four-day Snoqualmie Pass closure cost $27.9 million,” Spokane Journal, 11/20/2008. Accessed
online: https://www.spokanejournal.com/local-news/four-day-snoqualmie-pass-closure-cost-279-million/
61
Alpental, Crystal Mountain, and Steven’s Pass. Buried skiers are often
severely injured or may be killed from their injuries or suffocation under
large amounts of snow in areas difficult to reach.
Infrastructure systems There are no critical facilities located in areas of the county subject to
avalanches. Critical infrastructure that may be impacted includes the BNSF
railway (also used by Amtrak) and the east west highways, US 2 (Stevens
Pass) and I-90 (Snoqualmie Pass). Chinook Pass usually closes from October
through May.
Public confidence in
jurisdiction’s governance
and capabilities
The public at risk has a good understanding of the risks from avalanche.
Warnings are regularly posted and announced to skiers and back country
hikers during the winter months.
62
Regional Risk Profile: Civil Disorder
Hazard Description
Civil Disorder and civil disturbances can range from minor to significant events that can disrupt the
functioning of a community for a few days, weeks or months. A worst case-scenario for a King County
civil disorder would be an incident that takes place in a large urban environment and lasts for an
extended period of time. An example of a worst-case scenario was the 1999 Seattle World Trade
Organization rioting which significantly impacted the City and led to numerous injuries and arrests. The
rioting raised Seattle's cost of handling the conference to $9 million from an earlier estimated city cost
of $6 million surpassing worst-case projections11. In addition, downtown Seattle businesses lost an
estimated $20 million in property damage and lost sales during the WTO conference.
Title 18 of the United States Code defines civil disorder and lists the crimes associated with civil
disorder. In Section 231 of Chapter 12, defines civil disorder as: “any public disturbance involving acts
of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which causes an immediate danger of or results in
damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual…(a)(1)…use, application or making
of any firearm, or explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to
persons…or…(a)(2)…transports or manufactures for transportation in commerce any firearm, or
explosive or incendiary device, knowing or having reason to know or intending that the same will be
used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder…or…(a)(3)…commit any act to obstruct, impede, or
interfere with any fireman or law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of
official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder…”.12
The term civil disobedience in contrast is a non-violent form of protest or resistance to obeying certain
laws, demands and commands of a government or of an occupying power. Civil disobedience has been
promoted by nationalist movements in Africa and India, the civil rights movement of the U.S., and
labor and anti-war movements in many countries. Civil disobedience is sometimes equated with protests
or non-violent resistance. Acts of civil disobedience can start peacefully but can lead to violence. In this
context, civil disorder arising from civil disobedience in which participants turn violent and antagonistic
toward public safety and civil authority is illegal. Washington state law defines civil disorder as “any
public disturbance involving acts of violence that is intended to cause an immediate danger of, or to
result in, significant injury to property or the person of any other individual.” Under Revised Code of
Washington 9A.48.120, civil disorder training “as (1)…a person is guilty of civil disorder training if he or
she teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any device or
technique capable of causing significant bodily injury or death to persons, knowing, or having reason to
11 CBC News. January 6, 2000. WTO protests hit Seattle in the pocketbook. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/wto-protests-hit-seattle-in-the-pocketbook-1.245428.
12 Office of the Law Revision Council. 18 USC Ch. 12: Civil Disorders. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter12&edition=prelim.
63
know or intending that same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil
disorder”…and (2) classifies it as a “class B felony.”
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Civil disorder may result from many situations and encompass a broad spectrum of civil action that
ranges from peaceful events to other forms of disturbance caused by a group of people. The severity of
such disturbances often reflects the degree of public displeasure or expression of discontent. Examples
of civil disorder include, but are not necessarily limited to: violent demonstrations and other forms of
obstructions, riots, sabotage, and other forms of crime. Civil disorder can be a dangerous condition that
can become increasingly chaotic and volatile.
Laws have evolved that govern civil disorder and peacefully resolve conflict. In the United States,
gathering in a crowd is constitutionally protected under “the right of the people to peacefully assemble.”
However, assemblies that are not peaceable are generally not protected. The laws that deal with
disruptive conduct are generally grouped into offenses that disturb the public peace. They range from
misdemeanors, such as blocking sidewalks or challenging another to fight, to felonies, such as looting
and rioting.13
The circumstances surrounding civil disorder may be spontaneous or may result from escalating
tensions as was demonstrated during 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization protests. Civil disorder
can erupt anywhere but the most likely locations are those areas with large population groupings or
gatherings.14 Sites that are attractive for political rallies should be viewed as potential locations for the
epicenter of civil disorder events. Disruption of critical infrastructure may occur during very severe civil
disorder events. Public services such as water, power, communication, and transportation may be
temporarily unavailable.
Civil disorder can also occur in proximity to locations where a ‘trigger event’ occurred as was the case in
January 2017 at University of Washington when demonstrators and counter-demonstrators gathered as
a politically conservative commentator was scheduled to speak. Violent protests took place on campus
and a person was shot.
The Seattle Mardi Gras riot occurred on February 27, 2001, when disturbances broke out in the Pioneer
Square neighborhood during Mardi Gras celebrations. There were numerous random attacks on revelers
over a period of about three and a half hours. There were reports of widespread brawling, vandalism,
and weapons being brandished. Damage to local businesses exceeded $100,000. About 70 people were
13 Revised Code of Washington Title 9A.
14 Mid-America Regional Council. 2015. Regional Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.marc.org/Emergency-Services-9-1-1/pdf/2015HMPdocs/HMP2015_Sec4-HAZ-CivilDisorder.aspx.
64
reported injured. Several women were sexually assaulted. One man, Kris Kime, died of injuries sustained
during an attempt to assist a woman being brutalized.15
Civil disorder can also occur as a collective outburst from a causal factor or driver. For example, past
May Day protests in Seattle have routinely exhibited violence or vandalism. A 2013 May Day protest in
downtown Seattle turned violent with police responding to demonstrators throwing rocks, bottles, metal
pipes, fireworks -- and even a skateboard. The clashes left eight officers with injuries, and police
reporting the arrests of 17 people on various offenses including property destruction and assault. During
the clashes, police deployed flash-bang grenades and tackled unruly protesters to the ground.16 In 2016
May Day protest in Seattle a peaceful march turned violent when protesters lit fireworks and threw
rocks and Molotov cocktails at police. Nine people were arrested and five officers were injured in the
clashes.
While May Day is not recognized as an official holiday, many treat it as a nationwide day of strike with
thousands turning out for peaceable protests and marches in Seattle.17 Other groups, such as anti-
capitalists, anti-fascists, radical environmentalists and anarchists plan May Day events too with chaos
and violence often resulting in arrests, infrastructure damage and interruption to transportation services.
These aren’t the only groups to demonstrate on May Day. In the 1970s, anti-war protesters took to the
streets of Seattle. Anti-police brutality activists joined anarchists in 2015.18
The ultimate severity of any civil disorder event will depend on the magnitude of the event and its
location. The more widespread an event is, the greater the likelihood of excessive injury, loss of life and
property damage. Additional factors, such as the ability of law enforcement to contain the event, are
also critical in minimizing damages.
Against this backdrop and historical precedence, King County will continue to experience civil disorder
stemming from civil disturbance in which participants turn violent and antagonistic toward civil
authority in Seattle and other communities. However, based on King County’s experience with such
disturbances, the probability that such incidents will develop into mass violence of civil disorder remains
low.
15 Burton, Lynsi. February 16, 2015. Looking back: Mardi Gras riots of 2001. The Seattle Times. Accessed online on
8/26/19 from https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/Looking-back-Mardi-Gras-riots-of-2001-6084162.php.
16 Watts, Amanda and Lindy Royce-Bartlett. May 2, 2013. 17 arrested as Seattle May Day protests turn violent. CNN.
Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.cnn.com/2013/05/01/us/seattle-may-day-protests/index.html.
17 Mirfendereski, Taylor. April 30, 2017. What is May Day? King 5 News. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/what-is-may-day/281-435393398.
18 Guevara, Natalie. May 1, 2019. May Day: A primer on the labor, immigrant rights rally and its history in Seattle. The
Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/May-Day-
Seattle-protest-immigration-labor-anarchy-13808200.php.
65
Scenario Drivers
Civil Disorder can arise from many situations and be triggered by a specific issue or by combination of
causes. Instances of police violence have often been a scenario trigger for civil disorder (e.g. 2009
Oakland police shooting of Oscar Grant).19 In King County, the 2008 video of a King County deputy
assaulting a teen girl in a holding cell was referenced in a Seattle 2010 ‘March Against Police Brutality’
flyer.20 During the Capital Hill demonstration Seattle police arrested five individuals for investigation of
crimes ranging from trespassing to inciting a riot.
While demonstrations and protests can occur throughout King County, these civil actions often involve
free speech rights in public places and do not evolve into chaos and violence. Civil disorder within King
County remains centered in the Seattle area. For planning purposes, civil disorder occurs in areas of
government buildings, military bases, schools/universities, city council meetings, state/city parks and
within a downtown core.
The lines between civil disorder, civil disobedience, civil unrest and protest/demonstrations are often
times blurred and encompass a wide range of actions from peaceful to violent, from legal to illegal and
from spontaneous to highly planned. Further, while a group of people may organize and bring attention
to a specific cause through peaceful protest/demonstrations, a smaller, separate group may engage in
illegal tactics. This group of anarchists are seen as purveyors of violence and destruction.21 Typically,
criminal anarchists employ a common mode of dress which is part of a tactic frequently called "Black
Bloc." In the "Black Bloc" stratagem, throngs of criminal anarchists all dress in black clothing in an
effort to appear as a unified assemblage, giving the appearance of solidarity for the particular cause at
hand. This tactic is particularly troubling for law enforcement security forces, as no anarchist rioter can
be distinguished from another, allowing virtual anonymity while conducting criminal acts as a group.
Black Bloc gained attention in the United States in 1999 after violent protests at a meeting of the World
Trade Organization in Seattle, according to a 2001 history of the tactic on the anarchist news website,
A-Infos. Hundreds of people were arrested in the Seattle riots, which involved anarchists vandalizing
businesses.22
Not every public protest or demonstration will attract an element of criminal anarchists. The types of
demonstrations unlawful anarchists most commonly attend include those against environmentally
harmful practices, those against gentrification, and anti-police rallies.
19 Associated Press. June 13, 2011. Ex-BART Officer Johannes Mehserle Released From Jail. KPIX CBS SF Bay Area.
Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/06/13/ex-bart-officer-johannes-mehserle-
released-from-prison/.
20 JSeattle. April 9, 2010. Protest against police brutality starts at Seattle Central. Capitol Hill Seattle Blog. Accessed online
on 8/26/19 from https://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2010/04/protest-against-police-brutality-starts-at-seattle-central/.
21 Flowers, Kory. January 30, 2015. Understanding the Black Block. Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine. Accessed online
on 8/26/19 from https://www.policemag.com/341767/understanding-the-black-bloc.
22 Rossman, Sean. February 2, 2017. G-20 summit protests: What is a Black Bloc? USA Today. Accessed online on
8/26/19 from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/02/02/what-black-bloc/97393870/.
66
Priority Vulnerabilities
Government facilities
Civil disorder incidents often target government organizations or visible
images of the government such as police vehicles, city halls, or court
facilities.
Businesses
Businesses such as banks, businesses in downtown areas or along
transportation routes, and other commercial establishments are often
targeted during looting or may be targeted for political or racist reasons such
as ownership by an immigrant group in the case of anti-immigration riots or
because they are associated with an industry being targeted by the
manifestation (banks, abortion clinics, oil company offices, etc.).
Minority and immigrant
communities
There have been multiple incidents in recent years of white-supremacist
organizations holding events that turn violent, including the Charlottesville,
VA marches that resulted in the death of a woman at the hands of a white
supremacist terrorist who drove his vehicle into a crowd.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
All King County residents can be impacted, though those who live or work in downtown
areas tend to be more exposed and impacted by civil disorder incidents.
Vulnerable
populations
Ethnic minority and immigrant communities are historically targeted by civil disorder
events. While rare in our region, the United States has a long history of racially-motivated
riots that burn and destroy minority-owned businesses and homes.
Property Much of the impact from civil disorder is to property, secondary only to economic
impacts. During the World Trade Organization protests in 2000, over $20 million in
damage was recorded by businesses and $9 million in costs to the city.
The economy Economic impacts caused by loss of business, destruction of businesses, and business
interruption can exceed the property damage dollar figures by a factor of two or more.
Lost sales and uninsured losses can permanently destroy many businesses. Areas can also
become perceived as unsafe or unwelcoming for business, further hurting the economy.
The
environment
Civil Disorder will have a minimum impact on the environment; unless, hazard material
facilities such as petroleum, chemical, and recycling are targeted in arson fires or
vandalism. The impact on the environment in such cases could be significant.
Health
systems
Health systems can be overwhelmed by civil disorder incidents, such as when large
numbers of demonstrators are brought to the hospital due to exposure to tear gas or due
to clashes with counter-demonstrators or with police.
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Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Major incidents can bring government services to a standstill. In King County, with both
City of Seattle and King County offices are in the same area, along with court facilities. A
major incident in this area would prevent employees from getting to work or home.
Furthermore, government buildings are often targeted and can be damaged or destroyed.
Responders Responders are often on the front line of events. Responders can be targeted, causing
injury to personnel, damage to facilities, and the loss of equipment. Responders are often
injured during major incidents and, even when events are brought under control, may be
seen as an enemy of the community causing long-term trust issues.
Infrastructure
systems
• Energy: Pipelines carrying oil are a potential target for demonstrators. Oil trains
have been targeted frequently in Washington; however, these protests do not
tend to turn violent.
• Water/Wastewater: Water systems are rarely the primary target of a
demonstration and may only be peripherally impacted.
• Transportation: One of the largest impacts from a major incident is disruption to
transportation. Transit facilities and assets like busses may be destroyed. Roads
can be closed for hours or days.
• Communications: Communication systems are redundant and are unlikely to be
severely impacted by a civil disorder incident.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
Major incidents can cause long-term damage to public confidence in the jurisdiction or,
especially, public safety elements of jurisdiction governance. This can cause either
alienation or, when response is proactive, help rebuild confidence and trust. To best
preserve and grow confidence, a jurisdiction must respond quickly and effectively but
without excessive force. The general public expects a quick restoration of order and
protection of property while activists may demand accountability from officials and safety
for peaceful demonstrators.
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Regional Risk Profile: Cyber Incident
Hazard Description
Information technology has become embedded in the ways we conduct business, work and live. In a
government context technology is fundamental to public services such as providing healthcare, public
transportation, law enforcement, citizen engagement, public utilities, and supporting tax and rate payers.
A cyber-incident can have a severe impact on technology and therefore local government’s capability to
deliver services and conduct daily operations.
A cyber incident is defined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the 2016 National Cyber
Incident Response Plan as “an event occurring on or conducted through a computer network that
actually or imminently jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity or availability of computers, information
on communication systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or
information systems, or information resident thereon23.
• Confidentiality refers to the ability to preserve authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.
• Integrity speaks to guarding against improper information modification or destruction and
ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.
o Data Integrity – The property that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner.
Data integrity covers data in storage, during processing, and while in transit.
o System Integrity – The quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in
an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system, whether
intentional or accidental.
• Availability refers to the ability to ensure timely and reliable access to and use of information24
The nature of a cyber-incident differs from other hazards such as a landslide or an earthquake because it
often lacks physical presence or evidence. The Ponemon Institute estimates the average time to identify
a data breach is 206 days. When the breach is discovered it has already occurred or is still ongoing.25 The
average time it takes to fully contain a breach, after it has been identified, is 73 days. Organizations have
seen an increase in the identification and containment mean time over the last few years, which has been
attributed to the increasing severity of criminal and malicious attacks.26
Wherever information technologies exist and are used, cyber incidents can occur. As the County
becomes more and more dependent on its IT infrastructure it also becomes more vulnerable to IT
related disruptions. Most cyber incidents can be categorized as malicious attacks, human errors or as
23 National Cyber Incident Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, December 2016 p. 8
24 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800 -12r1.pdf 10/14/19
25 IBM 2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report: Global Overview. p 50
26 IBM 2019 Cost of a Data Breach Report: Global Overview. p 50
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system glitches. More than 50% of the incidents are estimated to be caused by malicious or criminal
attackers.27
Cyber incidents based on actors with malicious intent can be driven by criminal motives for profit,
extortion, and theft or to damage, destroy or interfere with infrastructure systems. Organizations
worldwide experience malicious attacks on a daily basis. Most of the attacks are unstructured with little
to no organization behind them such as a phishing attack or malware hidden in a downloaded file.
Attacks are carried out with tools aiming to take advantage of well-known flaws and are often detected
by security tools such as antivirus programs before they cause harm. However, an undetected attack can
cause significant harm to an organization before it’s detected and fully contained. More sophisticated
attacks with a specific target are less common, harder to detect and take longer to contain. These attacks
are more likely to have a catastrophic impact on an organization causing disruptions over some or all of
the network. Over the last few years attackers have been targeting organizations using sophisticated
ransomware, which encrypts the organizations’ data and demands a ransom to decrypt it. Other attacks
include cyber terrorism, aiming to cause sufficient destruction or disruption, to generate fear or
undermine entities such as an organization, a region, a sector or a country.
Cyber incidents due to human errors or system glitches can occur because of negligence, lack of
implemented policies and/or process, unclear roles and responsibilities, insufficient training,
misconfigurations etc. Such incidents are often identified and contained faster than disruptions caused
by malicious actors28. Human errors and system glitches can expose confidential data, decrease
availability and put data integrity at risk.
Data centers, physical IT infrastructure and hardware are vulnerable to other hazards such as long
lasting power outages, flooding, earthquakes and fires. In the event of such hazards it is likely that the
disruption to information technology will slow down the recovery time of critical communication
systems, essential services and hardware.
Unshielded electronic and electrical equipment is sensitive to electromagnetic pulses (EMP). An EMP is
an intense burst of electromagnetic energy resulting from natural (e.g. solar storms or space weather) or
man-made (e.g. nuclear or pule-power device). An EMP can temporarily affect or permanently damage
electronic equipment. Solar storms which affects electronic equipment are rare but have occurred in the
past impacting GPS satellite systems and signals sent to ground-based receivers29.
The impact of a cyber-incident ranges from minimal to catastrophic depending on factors such as;
magnitude of internal and external impact, affected systems, length of the incident, the nature of the
data and so on. A small earthquake, a misconfiguration which was discovered early without any
implications or a stolen encrypted laptop without sensitive data could have a minimal impact on the
County. Whereas a ransomware attack which encrypts all or most of the County’s data could have a
27 IBM 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Report: Global Overview. p 6
28 IBM 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Report: Global Overview. p 9
29 NASA Solar Flares, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/sunearth/news/X -class-flares.html 2019-10-14
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catastrophic impact on the organization leading to loss of County operational capability, economic and
reputational loss as well as life, health and safety risks and financial loss for individuals who live, work or
visit the region.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Regardless of the nature of the cyber incident, any area where an IT system supports the County
services can be vulnerable. In order to reduce the risk of cyber incidents it is important to manage
threats and vulnerabilities, have established backup systems, incident response plans and exercises,
disaster recovery and continuity of operations. The magnitude of a cyber-incident varies greatly based
on the extent and duration of the impact. The extent varies based on which specific system or data is
affected, possible warning time, the ability to preempt the incident and activate a well-known and
effective incident response plan.
Minor cyber incidents which are identified early and are recoverable may have some impact on daily
operations before fully contained but won’t have any significant effect on the County. A significant
incident can have a major impact not only to the County but the region. Such incidents may result in
safety and health risks, financial losses for the County and the region, reputational damage and inability
to comply with regulatory requirements including penalties and fines. It may also affect the County’s
ability to achieve critical strategic objectives and fulfill Executive priorities.
The County’s business essential services are critical to support life, health and safety in the region. Cyber
incidents affecting those systems and services can have catastrophic impact on people who live, work or
visit the region if they’re not available within 0-72 hours after the initial disruption. The business
essential services also include functions with legal requirements.
The County manages public, sensitive and confidential data on behalf of people who live, work and visit
the region. Some of the data is regulated by federal law, Revised Code of Washington and national or
global compliance regulations. Unauthorized, unanticipated, or unintentional disclosure of confidential
data could result in loss of reputational damage, or legal action against the County and can, amongst
other things result in identity theft or financial loss for impacted individuals. Personal Health
Information (PHI) is more valuable on the black market than regular Personally Identifiable
Information (PII). Therefore, there is a higher incentive for malicious attackers to target PHI than
sensitive data such as PII. Loss of critical system or data availability, functionality and operational
effectiveness, for example, may result in loss of productivity, thus impeding the end users’ performance
of their functions in supporting the County’s operations. If hardware, computer systems, networks,
servers and backups are damaged due to other hazards or accidental or deliberate damage, it can cause
additional delays. System and data integrity is lost if unauthorized changes are made to the data or IT
system by either intentional or accidental acts. If the loss of system or data integrity is not corrected,
continued use of the contaminated system or corrupted data could result in inaccuracy, fraud, or
erroneous decisions.
King County has services relying on SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems.
SCADA systems are industry control systems which are used to control infrastructure and facility based
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processes such as wastewater treatment and airports. Cyber incidents affecting those type of services can
have severe impact on areas such as the environment, health, safety and financial consequences for the
region.
Not all IT systems utilized by the County are owned or managed by the County. The County relies on
numerous third party vendors and partners who are also exposed to cyber incidents and can therefore
be vulnerable to cyber disruptions in other organizations.
Cyber incidents occur daily across the globe. The quantity of information being stolen by malicious
attackers, destroyed or exposed as a result of a human error or made unavailable due to a system glitch
is growing each year. King County is the recipient of a constant variety of attacks ranging from scans for
weaknesses in our defenses, malware, phishing, and internet based attacks, as well as insider threats. The
timeline below comprises state, national and international events and exemplifies consequences of a
cyber-incidents.
Year Location Description
2006 United States Geomagnetic storms and solar flares disabled the Global Positioning System
(GPS) signal acquisition over the United States.
2007 Estonia Dispute regarding movement of a Russian statue led to a cyber-attack that
crippled websites for government services, banks, media outlets etc.
2008 Turkey Hackers disabled communications, alarms, and caused a crude oil refinery on
the Turkish pipeline to explode, destroying operations and facilities.
2013 United States Hackers stole credit card information from over 40 million Target customers.
2014 Washington State Washington State experienced a six hour long 911 system outage due to
human error.
2014 United States 280 000 AT&T accounts was breached by insiders who accessed user
information with malicious intent.
2015 United States The Office of Personal Management experienced a malicious attack resulting
in over 20 million compromised personnel records.
2016 Global Over 1 billion Yahoo user accounts were compromised in 2013 and was
discovered and communicated in 2016.
2017 Global Geomagnetic storm affected power grids and radios.
2017 Sweden Due to human error the National Transport Agency exposed its entire
database including military secrets and personal identifiable information of
individuals in the witness protection program, military personnel, and police
officers.
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2017 Global WannaCry, a ransomware virus affected over 200 000 computers across 150
countries.
2017 Washington State The University of Washington suffered a HIPAA data breach exposing
information of nearly 1 million patients due to human error.
2018 United States The City of Atlanta, Georgia and the Colorado Department of transportation
suffered a ransomware attack named SamSam.
2018 United states The City of Valdez in Alaska was targeted by a ransomware attack that
remained dormant for weeks before doing any damage.
2019 Washington State The City of Sammamish was targeted by a ransomware attack that shut down
many city online services, requiring the city manager to declare an emergency
and request support from law enforcement and King County IT and hire a
tech company to help resolve the crisis.
Scenario Drivers
Cyber incidents can occur at any time, with or without pervious warnings. Cyber incidents based on an
actors malicious intent can be driven by criminal motives for profit, extortion, and theft or to damage,
destroy or interfere with infrastructure systems. Cyber incidents due to human errors or system
glitches can occur because of negligence, lack of policy and/or process, unclear roles and
responsibilities, insufficient training, misconfigurations etc.
Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT)
An attack in which the attacker gains access to a network and remains
undetected. APT attacks are designed to steal data instead of cause
damage.
Adware A form of software that displays advertising content in a manner that is
potentially unexpected and unwanted by users, which may also include
various user-tracking functions (similar to spyware).
Denial-of-Service Attack
(DoS)
Attacks that focus on disrupting service to a network in which attackers
send high volumes of data until the network becomes overloaded and
can no longer function.
Drive-by Downloads Malware is downloaded unknowingly by the victims when they visit an
infected site.
Electro Magnetic Pulse
(EMP)
Intense burst of electromagnetic energy resulting from natural (e.g. solar
storms or space weather) or man-made (e.g. nuclear or pule-power
device) which can temporarily affect or permanently damage electronic
equipment.
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Hazards Earthquakes, flooding and extreme weather can cause a verity of cyber
incidents including loss of data and system availability and
communications.
Malvertising Malware downloaded when the victim clicks on an affected ad.
Malware Software that can destroy data, affect computer performance, cause a
crash, or even allow spammers to send email through an account.
Man-in-the-Middle MITM attacks mirror victims and endpoints for online information
exchange. In this type of attack, the MITM communicates with the
victim who believes is interacting with the legitimate endpoint website.
The MITM is also communicating with the actual endpoint website by
impersonating the victim. As the process goes through, the MITM
obtains entered and received information from both the victim and
endpoint
Password Attacks Third party attempts to crack a user’s password and subsequently gain
access to a system. Password attacks do not typically require malware,
but rather stem from software applications on the attacker’s system.
These applications may use a variety of methods to gain access,
including generating large numbers of generated guesses, or dictionary
attacks, in which passwords are systematically tested against all of the
words in a dictionary. Due to users reusing the same password for
different systems a password attack targeting an unrelated system can
give the attacker access to a more sought after system.
Pharming Arranging for a web’s site traffic to be redirected to a different,
fraudulent site, either through a vulnerability in an agency’s server
software or through the use of malware on a user’s computer system.
Phishing Malicious email messages that ask users to click a link or download a
program. Phishing attacks may appear as legitimate emails from trusted
third parties.
Physical damage Intentional or unintentional damage to physical infrastructure such as
data center, hardware, power grids etc.
Ransomware Malware that locks a person’s keyboard or computer to prevent them
from accessing data until you pay a ransom, usually in Bitcoin. A
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popular variation of this is ransom crypto ware, which corrupts files
using a private key that only the attacker possesses
Social Engineering In the context of cyber-security, this refers to an effort to
psychologically manipulate a person, especially through
misrepresentation or deception, to gain access to information. The
manipulation often relies on the trusting nature of most individuals, or
makes use of many persons’ natural reluctance to offend others or
appear too mistrustful. The ruse may involve creating impressions that
make things appear more benevolent, trustworthy, and reliable than they
actually are. Some schemes are very complex, and involve several stages
of manipulation over a substantial period of time.
Social Engineered Trojans Programs designed to mimic legitimate processes (e.g. updating
software, running fake antivirus software) with the end goal of human-
interaction caused infection. When the victim runs the fake process, the
Trojan is installed on the system.
Spear Phishing A form of phishing that targets a specific individual, company, or
agency, usually relying on an accumulation of information to make
subsequent ruses more effective when further probing the target, until a
successful security breach finally becomes possible.
Spoofing Attempting to gain access to a system by posing as an authorized user,
synonymous with impersonating, masquerading, or mimicking.
Attempting to fool a network user into believing that a particular site
was reached, when actually the user has been led to access a false site
that has been designed to appear authentic, usually for the purpose of
gaining valuable information, tricking the user into downloading
harmful software, or providing funds to the fraudsters.
Spyware Software that allows others to gain private information about a user,
without that person’s knowledge or consent, such as passwords, credit
card numbers, social security numbers, or account information.
Structured Query
Language injection (SQLi)
Attackers use malicious SQL code for backend database manipulation to
access information that was not intended to be displayed.
Virus A program or code that attaches itself to a legitimate, executable
program, and then reproduces itself when that program is run.
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Worm A self-contained program (or set of programs) that is able to spread
copies of itself to other computer systems, usually through network
connections of email attachments
Zero-day exploit An attack which occurs the same day a vulnerability is discovered in the
software. The vulnerability is exploited by the attacker before it can be
fixed by a patch or a permanent solution.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Essential Services The County has identified a number of essential services which are
critical to support life, health, safety and legal requirements in the
region.
Critical SCADA Systems Industrial control systems which are used to control infrastructure and
facility based processes such as wastewater treatment and airports.
Critical facilities Facilities such as data centers and incident response facilities.
Critical devices Smart devices paired to essential services such as medical devices.
Communication system Although separate communication systems can be utilized in the event
of a severe incident the County still relies on its communications
systems for daily operations.
Priority Impact Areas
King County residents Anyone who is present in King County during a cyber-incident can be
impacted. Impact on residents may include: delayed services such as
transportation, impaired or cancelled healthcare services, decreased or
no availability of public services, information, and financial loss and
exposed or lost information.
Vulnerable populations
Individuals who have a direct dependency on King County for health
and safety reasons are vulnerable to cyber incidents impacting their
needed services. Other vulnerable populations include individuals and
organizations who depend on an income from the County if payments
can’t be processed, who are dependent on critical public services or
County provided transportation.
Property Cyber incidents can cause physical damage if property such as facilities,
devices, infrastructure, or end consumers are affected by the disruption.
An incident including utilities, life support devices, transportation or
telecommunications may lead to extensive property damages.
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The economy The financial impact of a cyber-incident ranges from little or minimal to
significant depending upon duration, scale, affected systems, devices
and users. A significant, extended cyber incident affecting most or all of
the County’s operations would likely impact the local and possibly
regional economy for some time. An incident of that magnitude would
likely creates significant, potentially long-term or ongoing challenges to
the County's ability to fund essential services and activities related to
Executive priorities.
Organizations who experiences cyber incidents which leads to data
breaches of sensitive or confidential information can be subjects to legal
fines and financial penalties if, for example, Personal Healthcare
Information (PHI) is lost or exposed or personal identifiable
information including social security numbers, credit card information
or driver’s license information is breached. Organizations who fail to
meet regulatory and contractual obligations due to a cyber-incident may
have significant cost for legal fees, settlements and fines.
The environment The loss of control or availability of the County’s SCADA systems
could potentially impact the environment in the region if, for example,
it causes the release of hazardous materials or improper disposal of
waste water.
Health systems Last years’ cyber incidents including ransomware attacks, distributed
denial of service attacks, system glitches and human error in healthcare
systems all demonstrate that cyber incidents, are capable of triggering
emergencies that impact patient care and public health. If an agency
cannot access its own EHR, patient care could be delayed or hindered.
Furthermore if other critical healthcare related systems and devices can’t
be accessed or data integrity guaranteed patient safety will be at risk.
Government operations
(continuity of operations)
Minor cyber incidents which are identified early and are recoverable
may have some impact on daily operations before fully contained but
won’t lead to significant loss of operations. A significant incident
impacting one or more functions and businesses can severely affect the
County’s capability to perform critical operations. However, not all daily
operations are critical. The County has defined its essential services,
which need to become operational within 0-72 hours after disruption to
ensure the organizations capability to maintain critical healthcare, safety
and legal and regulatory needs.
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In the event of a cyber-incident which render a non-critical service
unavailable the County may lose revenue, experience loss of
productivity and risks losing data over time.
Responders Emergency responders may not be able to access their mission critical
system, experience delays or performance issues. If data confidentiality
is lost the public may lose their trust in organization and system. If data
integrity is lost it may put patients and first responders at risk. King
County may experience a prolonged incident response if the disruption
is long lasting, complexed and exhausting internal resources.
Infrastructure systems • Energy – Information technology has a direct dependency to
energy. A hazard impacting the power system can therefore have a
secondary effect on the County and lead to a cyber-incident due to
loss of power to devices rendering systems and data unavailable,
loss of power to cooling systems which can cause overheating and
fires in server rooms and data centers. Critical infrastructure have
backup generators. Ensuring fuel delivery during long lasting power
outages for the generators is critical.
A cyber incident impacting King County and no other organization
should not have an effect on the energy system.
• Water/Wastewater – Both water and wastewater facilities and
infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber incidents on their SCADA
systems, which can result in the release of hazardous material and
malfunctioning systems. Such scenarios can result in environmental
impact and create health and safety risks in the region.
• Transportation – Transportation systems are vulnerable to attacks
on their SCADA systems, which may result in trains and vehicles
not operating as planned, airport functionality issues, delays,
cancellations which can result in a secondary economic impact in
the region due to loss of productive if people can’t access public
transportation to and from work.
• Communications – The County relies on different types of
technology based communications methods such as its website,
VOIP and email to conduct its daily operations. A cyber incident
impacting the VOIP or email system would quickly result in a loss
of productivity, a negative consumer experience and could
potentially halter or delay some of the County’s operations.
Public confidence in
jurisdiction’s governance
and capabilities
Recent cyber-incidents involving government agencies such as the
ransomware attack on the City of Atlanta shows that such large scale
disruption generate National media interest; third party actions;
jeopardizes perceptions of effective operations, Executive priorities, and
public confidence.
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Regional Risk Profile: Dam Failure
Hazard Description
Dam failure is an uncontrolled, oftentimes, rapid release of water from an impoundment.30 The impact
of failure varies on factors such as impoundment size, steepness, land use downstream of the dam, and
speed of failure. For larger dams, failure is characterized by a flood wave with high velocities. Smaller
dams may only raise water levels slightly and slowly. The result of a dam failure can result in loss of life,
property, infrastructure damage, public health impacts, safe drinking water, and environmental
degradation within the inundation zone, but may have secondary effects on populations outside of the
flooded area.
To better understand the threat locally of dam failure, the planning team worked with our own Dam
Safety Officer who manages the King County Emergency Management’s Dam Safety program. The
program consists of creating response plans for high hazard dams in the community, educating at-risk
populations of the threat of dam failure, and connecting poor condition dams to resources that are
available for repair or removal of the dam. The King County Emergency Management Dam Safety
30 Tetra Tech. 2017. King County Dam Safety Emergency Planning Gap Analysis Report. Page 10.
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Officer works closely with Washington State Department of Ecology’s Dam and Wells Manager to
share information and create a regional effort to heighten dam safety in the County. The information on
dams in the hazard profile are from the State Department of Ecology’s Inventory of Dams.
The Washington State Department of Ecology Dam Safety Office is the regulating body over non-
federal dams that impound at least 10-acre feet of water in the State of Washington. The DSO permits
all new dam construction, inspects all high and significant hazard dams every 5 years, and requires that
all deficiencies be remedied.
Dams serve the County in a variety of ways, agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, flood control,
and recreation. King County has 127 dams located in the County. All but eleven of these dams are
embankment-type dams. Contrary to the popular images of dams like Hoover, these dams are smaller
and are typically made of a mixture of compacted materials such as soil, clay, and rock. A semi-pervious
outer covering with a dense impervious core gives embankment dams their ability to resist seepage and
water pressure. The other dams are made of concrete.
While there are 127 dams in King County, there are 21 other dams situated in neighboring counties that
impact the County if they were to fail. Out of the 147 total dams, 94 threaten human life. A full list of
dams that impact King County can be found at the end of this section.
Hazard Class Number
1A = High – Greater than 300 lives at risk 10
1B = High – 31 to 300 lives at risk 18
1C = High – 7 to 30 lives at risk 42
2* = Significant – 1 to 6 lives at risk 17
2D = Significant – 1 to 6 lives at risk 7
2E = Significant – Environmental or economic impact 3
3 = Low – No lives at risk 50
* Legacy classification, parsing all 2's into 2D's and 2E's 31
Dams fail for a variety of reasons, but the four most common are:32
• Overtopping, 34% - caused by the reservoir reaching capacity and water spilling over the top of
a dam
• Foundation defects, 30% - caused by settlement and slope instability
• Piping and seepage, 20% - when water travels through the dam and causes internal erosion
• Conduits and valves, 10% - Piping of embankment material into the conduit through joints or
cracks
31 Washington State Department of Ecology - Water Resources Program - Dam Safety Office. 2019. Inventory of Dams
Report.
32 Washington State Department of Ecology – Water Resource Program – Dam Safety Office. Accessed 8/28/2019.
https://ecology.wa.gov/Water-Shorelines/Water-supply/Dams/Emergency-planning-response/Incidents-failures.
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33
Dam failure events are infrequent and may coincide with other events, such as earthquakes, landslides,
excessive rainfall, wildfires, lahars and snowmelt. The average age of dams in King County is 47. As
infrastructure ages, increased spending is needed to maintain its integrity.
Following are a selection of events that may cause a dam to fail.
Earthquake34
Earthquakes can result in damage or failure of a dam. Earthquake effects on
dams mainly depend on dam types. For example, the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake
damaged 48 dams, causing one embankment type dam to fail35. Safety concerns
for embankment dams subjected to earthquakes involve either the loss of
stability due to a loss of strength of the embankment and foundation materials or
deformations such as slumping, settlement, cracking and planer or rotational
slope failures. Dams are engineered to withstand the Maximum Considered
Earthquake, but older dams may have been engineered before we fully
understood the earthquake risk in the region.
Climate Change36
While dam failure probabilities are low. The chance of flooding associated with
changes of dam operation in response to weather patterns is higher. Dam
designs and operations are developed in part from hydrographs and historical
records. If weather patterns experience significant changes over time due to the
impacts of climate change, the dam design and operations may no longer be
valid for the changed condition. Release rates and impound thresholds may have
33 Washington State Department of Ecology – Water Resource Program – Dam Safety Office. 2018. Status of High and
Significant Hazard Dams. Page 6.
34 KUOW. Seattle’s Faults: Maps that Highlight Our Shaky Ground. Accessed 8/29/19.
http://archive.kuow.org/post/seattles-faults-maps-highlight-our-shaky-ground
35 International Commission on Large Dams. 2013. The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Dams. Page 9.
36 Climate Impacts Group - University of Washington. 2018. New Projections of Changing Heavy Precipitation in King
County. Page 40.
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to be changed. This would result in increased discharges downstream, thus
increasing the probability and severity of flooding.
Landslides37
The integrity of a dam or reservoir can be affected by a landslide if they fail or
move. Landslides can be triggered by heavy rainfall, snowmelt, reservoir
drawdown, or earthquakes. Landslides can occur upstream in the reservoir, in a
canyon downstream of a dam, or within the abutment of a dam. A landslide into
the reservoir can generate a wave large enough to overtop a dam. Sloshing back
and forth in the reservoir can result in multiple waves overtopping the dam. If
the waves are large enough, there could be downstream consequences can just
from a wave overtopping the dam even if it doesn’t fail. If enough large waves
overtop an embankment dam or a concrete dam with erodible abutments, a
failure could potentially result38. Some dams in the County have been built
abutting a landslide. Often, these are ancient landslides that have stopped
moving or are moving very slowly. However, if a landslide moves far enough, it
can crack the core of an embankment dam, resulting in pathways for internal
erosion to initiate, or disrupting the abutment support of a dam, resulting in
failure.39
Wildfires40
Many of the County’s highest hazard dams lie within wildfire-prone areas.
Wildfires can damage dams, such as Eightmile dam near Leavenworth, directly
by burning the surface of the dam or spillway and damaging other facilities at the
dam. But the main threat from wildfires is how the surrounding watershed
behaves. Heavy rains in a burned area can create:
• More and faster runoff from rainfall events, especially high-intensity
storms.
• Large amounts of sediment, which may reduce storage capacity in a
reservoir.
• Debris flows (mudslides) or downed timber, which may obstruct access
to the dam.
• Debris flows from hill slopes near spillways, which may obstruct
spillways.
• More floating debris (dead trees, branches, sticks) in a reservoir, which
may obstruct spillways41
37 Washington State Department of Natural Resources. Geological Portal Information. Accessed 8/28/2019.
https://geologyportal.dnr.wa.gov/#natural_hazards
38 U.S Department of the Interior: Bureau of Reclamation. 2015. Risk Management: H-2 Landslide Risks. Page 1.
39 Quartz. 2015. The World’s Biggest Hydro Power Project May Be Causing Giant Landslides in China.
https://qz.com/436880/the-worlds-biggest-hydropower-project-may-be-causing-giant-landslides-in-china/
40 NW News Network. 2019. Eightmile Dam Near Leavenworth Has New Spillway, Is Being Monitored.
https://www.nwnewsnetwork.org/post/eightmile-dam-near-leavenworth-has-new-spillway-being-monitored
41 Washington State Department of Ecology - Water Resources Program - Dam Safety Office. 2015. Focus on Dams
and Wildfires. Page 1.
82
Additionally, new development, outside of the 100 year flood plain, continues in dam inundation zones,
meaning the population-at-risk from dam failure will continue to rise. Below shows development
outside of the floodplain, but within a dam failure inundation area.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
King County has high hazard 1A dams that sit on the Green, White, Cedar, and Tolt Rivers.
Additionally, Culmback dam in Snohomish County would flood parts of the Lower Snoqualmie Valley.
The Green, White and Lower Snoqualmie Valleys are the areas of greatest concern for dam failure.
Smaller privately owned and government dams are also a concern, as they may not have access to
funding streams that other larger municipal governments do.
Four dam failure incidents have occurred in King County; they account for all lives lost due to dam
failure in Washington State:42
• December 1918 - Masonry Dam near North Bend had excessive seepage, which caused a
mudflow, destroyed a railroad line and damaged the village of Eastwick; no lives lost.
• February 1932 - Eastwick railroad fill failed. A slide caused railroad fill to back up and fail,
destroyed a railroad line and damaged the village of Eastwick; 7 lives were lost.
• July 1976 - Increased discharge from Mud Mountain Dam caused a surge in flow killing two
children playing in the White River near Auburn.
• January 1997 - N. Boeing Creek Dam in Shoreline failed due to excessive seepage, poor
hydraulics, and no emergency spillway during a large storm event; no lives were lost.
Other notable dam incidents in King County:
• In January 2009 two depressions were discovered in the right abutment of the United States
Army Corps of Engineers’ Howard Hanson Dam. While repairs were being conducted, there
42 Washington State Department of Ecology - Water Resources Program - Dam Safety Office. 2019. Washington State
Notable Dam Failures and Incidents.
Green River 2009
Green River 2012
100-Year Floodplain
83
was a 1 in 3 chance of a 25,000 cfs release down the Green River which would have caused
significant flooding. The USACE was able to fully fix the dam by 2011 before a substantial
flood ensued. King County and local jurisdictions spent $30 million on flood protection that
wasn’t reimbursed by FEMA.43
• In January 2009, Mud Mountain Dam, owned and operated by the USACE, released a higher
than usual flow down the White River during a heavy rain event. As a result, 100 homes were
flooded. Since then, King County Flood Control District, Washington State, and Pierce County
jointly funded a levee setback to reduce the risk of flooding and increase habitat restoration44.
Scenario Drivers
Howard A
Hanson
Howard Hanson, constructed in 1961, is a federally owned and operated dam by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers. Its primary purpose is to provide flood
control in the winter and fish enhancement in the summer. It dramatically reduced the
amount of flooding that the Green River Valley experienced before its construction.
The right abutment of the dam is the toe of a large landslide. Seepage problems can
occur for dams built into landslides. As mentioned previously, landslide activity can
pose a serious risk to dams. Many mitigation actions have been taken to reduce risk at
the dam, such as a gravel blanket and additional vertical and horizontal drains in the
drainage tunnel have all drastically improved the safety of the dam. If preventative
actions are not taken, internal erosion could fail the dam.
South Fork Tolt
Dam
The South Fork Tolt Dam is owned and operated by the City of Seattle. It is a
hydroelectric dam that also provides drinking water for 30% of 1.3 million people
across the greater Seattle area. South Fork Tolt Dam is a large embankment type dam,
equipped with a morning glory spillway.
The Tolt dam has known landslide hazards below the dam, and above the reservoir. If
a slide were to occur below the dam, the slide may create a dam of its own. Engineers
would need to evaluate what action should be taken. The Tolt Dam would have to
lower the amount of flow downstream why the risk is being assessed. Additionally, if a
slide were to occur in the reservoir, an overtopping wave may be generated that could
cause the dam to fail or send a flood wave downstream.
Mud Mountain
Dam
Mud Mountain Dam is a United States Army Corps of Engineer owned and operated
dam on the White River. Its primary purpose is to provide flood control for nearly
43 Seattle Times. 2011. FEMA won’t pick up $30 million tab to prepare for flooding.
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/fema-wont-pick-up-30-million-tab-to-prepare-for-flooding/
44 King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks – Water and Land Resource Division. 2018. Lower White
River Countyline Levee Setback Project. https://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/dnrp/wlr/sections-programs/river-
floodplain-section/capital-projects/lower-white-river-countyline-a-street.aspx
84
400,000 residents in King and Pierce Counties. Typically, there isn’t a reservoir being
impounded by the dam. During heavy rains or times of snowmelt, engineers will
impound the water and slowly release it downstream to avoid flooding residents.
The White River is a glacial river fed by Mt. Rainier. This leaves the possibility that a
lahar, triggered by an earthquake, volcanic activity, or heavy rains could cause a debris
flow that would block the intake structure on the dam. Such an event would decrease
the storage capacity of the reservoir and cause flows to travel over the spillway. The
loss in flood control capabilities on the White River would leave the Green, White, and
Puyallup River Valleys susceptible to flooding.
Culmback Dam
Situated in Snohomish County, but inundating a portion of the King County’s Lower
Snoqualmie Valley, the Culmback Dam is owned and operated by Snohomish Public
Utility District One. Culmback offers hydroelectric power generation, flood control,
drinking water, and recreational benefits to the region.
Culmback’s morning glory spillway is designed to maintain adequate levels of
freeboard in maximum probable flood events. Changes in hydrology affect the amount
of water a dam would need to convey downstream to keep it from failing. Culmback
Dam’s watershed lies within a densely forested area that slows the speed in which
water enters the reservoir, prevents sediment from entering the reservoir, and prevents
debris flows. A wildfire around the dam would increase the hydrologic strain on the
dam. An increased flow could be compensated with larger releases from the dam, but
would result in flooding of the Town of Sultan. If not enough water could be
discharged, an overtopping scenario at the dam would prove very dangerous.
Lake Tapps
Lake Tapps is a reservoir that sits in Pierce County made up of a system of dikes. If
particular dikes were to fail, they would inundate Auburn and portions of the Green
and White River Valley. Lake Tapps was built by Puget Sound Energy in 1911 and ran
a hydroelectric program until 2004. Lake Tapps was purchased by Cascade Water
Alliance in 2009 who currently owns and operates the reservoir. Its primary function is
to provide drinking water to a group of contracting King County cities and water
districts.
In addition to providing drinking water, Lake Tapps is also a residential community,
many of whom use the Lake for recreational purposes. While residents are instructed
to stay off the dikes, there is no physical security to keep individuals from accessing
the structure. Many dikes have publically accessible roads. Acts of terrorism or
sabotage could provide a serious threat to the integrity of the levees.
85
Madsen Creek
Flow and Water
Control Pond
Madsen Creek Pond is a King County-owned dam. Constructed in 2008, its primary
purpose is to provide flood control in extreme rainfall events. There is oftentimes no
impoundment behind the dam in summer months when there isn’t consistent rainfall.
Madsen Creek Pond is designed to store runoff from a 100-year 24-hour storm and
still maintain freeboard necessary to prevent flooding downstream. While the dam is
comparatively very young as climate patterns become more unpredictable, Madsen
Creek Pond and other dams may need to be retrofitted to accommodate the change in
probable maximum precipitation. If actions were not taken to adjust to the new
hydrology, chances of failure from an overtopping situation or an uncontrolled release
would become higher.
Cedar Falls
Project Masonry
Dam
The Masonry Dam within the Cedar Falls Project is one of the oldest dams in the
County. It was built in 1914 and currently is owned and operated by the City of Seattle.
The dam serves two purposes, hydroelectric power generation and water supply. The
dam is a concrete gravity dam with an emergency spillway, service spillway, power
tunnel intake, and a low-level outlet.
While there have been fewer failures of concrete dams than earthen dams in general45,
this doesn’t mean that failure is unrealistic. The Masonry dam sits near the Rattlesnake
Mountain Fault. While concrete dams have escaped failure in earthquake scenarios,
minor damage has been observed. The Masonry Dam would need to be assessed for
damage after an earthquake for cracking or other deficiencies in the structure or
supporting structures. If deficiencies are noted, action must be taken to ensure that the
dam doesn’t fail. Earthquakes can also trigger landslides around the dam. Finally, large
earthquakes can devastate communities, created a resource-scarce environment,
potentially making it more difficult to find resources.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Small Local Government
and Privately Owned
Dams
These dams may not have access to funding, or have employees dedicated to
dam safety. This means that there is a higher chance that maintenance and
deficiencies go unmediated. Thus, leading to a higher chance of dam failure.
Lack of Public
Knowledge
Most dams use a “For Official Use Only” designation on their inundation
maps. This means that inundation maps only be shared on a need to know
basis. A lack of public knowledge about dams, their presence in the
community, and their failure potential creates an added challenge in creating
a resilient community.
45 Association of State Dam Safety Officials. 1989. Failure of Concrete Dams. Page 4.
86
Out of Date or Missing
Emergency Action Plans
High and significant dams are required to have Emergency Action Plans in
Washington State. Missing EAPs and out of date EAPs pose a risk if owners
are unequipped to deal with an emergency at their dam.
Poor and Unsatisfactory
Dams
Any dam that is designated as “poor” or “unsatisfactory” by the Washington
State Dam Safety Office should be brought to a higher standard.
Priority Impact Areas
With all the dams in the county, only a small amount of information can be shared here due to “For
Official Use Only Designation”. Another reason is that there is a lack of in-depth study done on dam
failure impacts to King County. The best and most available estimates for dam failure damages/impacts
are from the potential high release scenario at Howard Hanson Dam in 2009. Examples provided here
relate to those studies.
King County
residents
Dam Name Estimated Impacted
King County Population
(Full Pool Failure)
Estimated Impacted
King County Population
(Sunny Day Failure)*
Mud Mountain 24,480 2,031
Howard Hanson 20,845 6,235
South Fork Tolt 2,291 N/A
Lake Youngs 2,744 2,139
Culmback 145 N/A
Other Dams Combined
(Estimate)**
5,295
N/A
46
*Sunny day failure assumes a regular pool
**Hazard class median reach of range
Populations are based on census data. Areas such as the Green River Valley experience
drastic differences in day time/night time population being an economic hub. The
46 Tetra Tech. 2017. King County Dam Safety Emergency Planning Gap Analysis Report. Page 27.
87
number of people that would need to be evacuated could drastically differ from the
numbers identified in the hazard classification. An estimate in 2009 put a 25,000 cfs
release from Howard Hanson triggering an evacuation on the scale of 200,000 to 300,000
people.47
Vulnerable
populations
Dam inundation areas consist of some of the highest Limited English Proficiency
populations in the County. Spanish, Vietnamese, African Languages, and Mandarin are
all spoken in high percentages in dam inundation areas.
Auburn, Kent, and Riverview School District, as well as private schools, have locations
that are vulnerable to dam failure. Riverview school district practices an evacuation of
Carnation Elementary School and Tolt Middle School every September in the City of
Carnation. Both of these schools would need to be evacuated if the South Fork Tolt
Dam failed.
Preliminary studies indicate that there are at least 15 assisted living facilities within dam
inundation areas.48 Evacuation will take longer for this population than most.
A 2019 report indicates that there 11,199 individuals experiencing homelessness in the
County.49 Alert and warning can be especially challenging for this population as they may
not be tied to a geo-coded database.
47 Seattlepi. 2019. 300,000 might have to evacuate if Green River Floods.
https://www.seattlepi.com/seattlenews/article/300-000-might-have-to-evacuate-if-Green-River-889468.php
48 FEMA Region X. 2009. HAZUS Analysis for the Green River Valley. Page 168.
49 All Home. 2019. Seattle/King County Point-In-Time County of Persons Experiencing Homelessness.
88
Property Dam Name Residential Buildings
Impacted in King County
(Full Pool Failure)
Estimated Impacted in
King County (Sunny Day
Failure)*
Mud Mountain 9,992 829
Howard Hanson 8,508 2,545
South Fork Tolt 935 N/A
Lake Youngs 1,120 873
Culmback 59 N/A
Other Dams Combined
(Estimate)
N/A
N/A
50
*Sunny day failure assumes a regular pool
2009 modelling of a high release from Howard Hanson.
Structures impacted Lower
Green
In 17,000 cfs impact
area
In 25,000 cfs impact
area
Residential 3,486 1,743 1,937
Commercial 16,798 12,245 13,667
Industrial 7,839 6,549 6,644
51
The economy The Green River Valley is an economic powerhouse in the region. Flood damage
prevented in the valley by Howard Hanson Dam since the January 2009 flood is
50 Tetra Tech. 2017. King County Dam Safety Emergency Planning Gap Analysis Report. Page 168.
51 FEMA Region X. 2009. HAZUS Analysis for the Green River Valley. Page 166.
89
estimated at $6 billion alone52. The economic impact of a failure would devastate the
region. With large employers, such as Boeing, and economic centers like the South
Center Mall, in the Valley, a dam failure would leave the local economy crippled.
Commutes, roadways, and rail lines would all be impacted by a high release from
Howard Hanson. Unemployment may follow after areas that experience a dam failure.
2009 Hazus modeling for a high release from the Howard Hanson Dam show impacts:53
• At 17,600 cfs flows from a dam failure: - $1.34 billion in economic losses
• At 19,000 cfs flows from dam failure: - $1.97 billion in economic losses
• At 25,000 cfs flows from dam failure: - $3.75 billion in economic losses
An economic analysis is needed to quantify how much impact a complete failure would
have on the local economy.
The
environment
The primary environmental impact from dam failure is natural and manmade debris from
the inundation. Silt, wood, rocks and gravel, hazardous materials, construction debris,
vehicles, dead animals may be carried by inundation waters to locations that may be
spawning areas for local fish, wetlands for birds and reptiles, or inhabited areas that the
County has invested in heavily. While recovery and impact will vary with each inundation
area.
• At 17,600 cfs – 84,000 tons of debris
• At 19,000 cfs – 208,000 tons of debris
• At 25,000 cfs – 280,000 tons of debris 54
Isolating the potential environmental impact of dam failure is obscured by the likelihood
that another hazard, like an earthquake, may have triggered the dam failure.
Health
systems
MultiCare Auburn Medical Center lies within a dam failure inundation area, but further
study is needed to fully understand the impacts on health systems from dam failure.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Auburn, Kent, Tukwila, Carnation, Pacific, and Algona all have city halls within
inundation areas. Courts, the County Elections office, King County Regional Justice
Center in Kent where Superior Courts, Adult Detention, and other county agencies are
located within dam failure inundation areas as well.
Responders Kent, Pacific, Seattle, Renton Regional Fire Authority, Valley Regional Fire Authority,
and Eastside Fire and Rescue all have fires stations within dam inundation areas.
52 USACE. Howard A. Hanson Dam. Accessed 8/28/2019. https://www.nws.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-
Works/Locks-and-Dams/Howard-Hanson-Dam/
53 FEMA Region X. 2009. HAZUS Analysis for the Green River Valley. Page 166.
54 FEMA Region X. 2009. HAZUS Analysis for the Green River Valley. Page 169.
90
Auburn, Algona, Pacific, Kent, Seattle, State Patrol Crime Lab, and King County Sherriff
all have stations in dam failure inundations.
Infrastructure
systems
Infrastructure impacts vary dramatically based on the individual dam and type of failure.
• Energy- While there are dams that generate power in the County, they provide a
relatively small amount of power. The Cedar, Snoqualmie, Twin Falls and, Tolt
projects account for only 126 max MW output55. Power outages may be long
term in areas where there has been a failure.
• Water/Wastewater – Drinking water availability would be drastically impacted by
a failure of the Masonry, Lake Tapps, Lake Youngs, and Howard Hanson Dams.
A failure of one of the many of the reservoirs around the County would also
challenge water systems. The King County South Treatment Plant also lies
within a dam failure inundation area.
• Transportation- Rail lines (commercial and commuter), LINK Light Rail, bus
routes, numerous state highways, and numerous bridges can be impacted by dam
failure.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction
governance
and
capabilities
A dam failure may cause the public to lose confidence in dam owners to manage local
dams. Depending on the success of the response, the public may also lose confidence in
first responders.
Full List of Dams That Impact King County
Dam Name NIDID
Max
Storage
(acre-
feet)
Age
(Years)
Hazar
d
Classif
icatio
n
Lat,Long County
ISSAQUAH HIGHLANDS
WSDOT DETENTION POND
WA007
07 53 11 1A 47.541919,-
122.013939 King
MADSEN CREEK WEST
BASIN DAM
WA018
62 27 11 1A 47.45887,-
122.146561 King
GREEN LAKE RESERVOIR WA002
12 25 109 1A 47.681486,-
122.314571 King
55 Bonneville Power Administration. 2018 Transmission Plan. 2018. Page 77.
91
HOWARD A HANSON DAM WA002
98 136700 57 1A 47.27797,-
121.78603 King
MASONRY DAM WA002
55 175000 105 1A 47.41221,-
121.75259 King
YOUNGS LAKE OUTLET
DAM
WA002
54 18908 98 1A 47.402843,-
122.124665 King
MUD MOUNTAIN DAM WA003
00 156000 71 1A 47.139329,-
121.931859 King
TOLT RIVER - SOUTH FORK WA001
77 67200 57 1A 47.693158,-
121.689555 King
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 1 WA004
18 22000 108 1A 47.241348,-
122.184894 Pierce
CULMBACK DAM WA002
08 200000 36 1A 47.974825,-
121.687897
Snohomi
sh
PANTHER LAKE
BALLFIELD DAM
WA017
37 102 25 1B 47.293417,-
122.337225 King
LAKEMONT STORMWATER
POND
WA016
51 30 27 1B 47.557275,-
122.111876 King
ISSAQUAH HIGHLANDS
REID POND DAM
WA006
80 69 17 1B 47.537831,-
122.027253 King
PANTHER LAKE
DETENTION DAM
WA017
33 339 25 1B 47.295169,-
122.338302 King
PANTHER LK. FIRST AVE.
DETENTION POND
WA017
47 18 19 1B 47.293334,-
122.336049 King
VOLUNTEER PARK
RESERVOIR
WA002
10 69 118 1B 47.629988,-
122.316676 King
HIGH POINT
REDEVLOPMENT
STORMWATER DAM
WA018
69 22 13 1B 47.549375,-
122.371263 King
LAKE FOREST PARK
RESERVOIR
WA002
17 208 57 1B 47.770339,-
122.278611 King
HIRAM M. CHITTENDEN
LOCKS & DAM
WA003
01 458000 103 1B 47.667639,-
122.39853 King
92
BITTER LAKE RESERVOIR WA002
13 31 61 1B 47.7311,-
122.348669 King
RADAR LAKE (OBRIAN)
DAM
WA001
86 68 46 1B 47.730511,-
122.024173 King
JOHNSON POND DAM WA019
99 25 7 1B 47.66287,-
122.050033 King
CRYSTAL LAKE DAM WA001
95 6 88 1B 47.775751,-
122.107419 King
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 6 WA004
23 43000 108 1B 47.238839,-
122.163482 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 5 WA004
22 40000 108 1B 47.240926,-
122.167596 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 4 WA002
96 58340 108 1B 47.240789,-
122.170259 Pierce
NEWCASTLE VISTA
DEVELOPMENT POND 3
WA019
08 13 13 1B 47.5347,-
122.161437 King
CEDAR WAY STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM
WA014
04 34 1B 47.778205,-
122.289697
Snohomi
sh
REDMOND RIDGE EAST
POND SRN 2 NO.1
WA018
92 52 11 1C 47.697463,-
122.013921 King
ISSAQUAH HIGHLANDS
SOUTH POND DAM
WA006
88 67 16 1C 47.541353,-
122.000025 King
SPRINGWOOD
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA016
68 50 27 1C 47.361671,-
122.170302 King
TALUS P5 STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM
WA018
44 12 17 1C 47.534487,-
122.06288 King
SNOQ. RIDGE DOUGLAS
AVE. POND D1 DAM
WA018
04 18 21 1C 47.527247,-
121.880358 King
SOUTH 336TH STREET
STORMWATER DAM NO. 1
WA017
54 46 23 1C 47.295591,-
122.317872 King
PETERSON STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM
WA013
37 90 31 1C 47.665661,-
122.021473 King
93
REBA LAKE STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM
WA006
18 105 27 1C 47.467583,-
122.317944 King
MILL POND STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM
WA017
16 16 25 1C 47.268797,-
122.219347 King
YELLOW LAKE OUTLET
DIKE
WA005
59 220 33 1C 47.568281,-
122.009515 King
SOUTH RIDGE
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA018
20 25 17 1C 47.545498,-
122.035664 King
TROSSACHS DETENTION
POND PC-3
WA017
87 18 20 1C 47.601051,-
121.975774 King
TROSSACHS DETENTION
POND PC-2
WA018
33 55 17 1C 47.594216,-
121.972376 King
GARRISON CREEK - 98TH
AVENUE DETENTION DAM
WA006
50 8 23 1C 47.394045,-
122.209814 King
MILL CREEK CANYON
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA014
43 18 37 1C 47.383155,-
122.222898 King
UPPER MILL CREEK
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA005
82 100 29 1C 47.362116,-
122.201882 King
SOUTH 336TH STREET
STORMWATER DAM NO. 2
WA017
67 49 23 1C 47.29782,-
122.316762 King
WEYERHAUSER-
ENUMCLAW FLOOD
CONTROL DAM
WA006
36 140 26 1C 47.188673,-
121.929254 King
ISSAQUAH HIGHLANDS
NPE POND
WA018
67 36 16 1C 47.555811,-
121.998433 King
REDMOND RIDGE CEDAR
DAM
WA018
02 62 21 1C 47.690857,-
122.04408 King
REDMOND RIDGE DRIVE
EC 4N ROADWAY DAM
WA018
37 148 16 1C 47.67683,-
122.026237 King
PORT OF SEATTLE -
LAGOON #3 EXPANSION
WA006
71 256 18 1C 47.432537,-
122.31332 King
94
ISSAQUAH HIGHLANDS
NP2 POND DAM
WA018
58 28 17 1C 47.548397,-
122.000606 King
ICON MATERIALS AUBURN
SEDIMENT POND
WA006
83 200 22 1C 47.271936,-
122.206424 King
BOEING CREEK
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA004
83 41 36 1C 47.752036,-
122.360075 King
SNOQUALMIE MILL POND
DAM
WA003
07 396 102 1C 47.529342,-
121.819312 King
WELCOME LAKE DAM WA001
94 260 60 1C 47.724532,-
122.048251 King
TUCK LAKE DAM WA001
80 290 53 1C 47.764918,-
122.03081 King
YOUNGS LAKE NEW INLET
DAM
WA004
15 16836 93 1C 47.420921,-
122.102904 King
MARCEL LAKE DAM WA002
00 350 55 1C 47.692486,-
121.918558 King
LOREENE LAKE DAM WA001
93 86 56 1C 47.31269,-
122.385452 King
MARGARET LAKE DAM WA002
36 1200 86 1C 47.766978,-
121.901433 King
DES MOINES CREEK
REGULATORY DETENTION
FACILITY WEST BERM
WA006
92 160 11 1C 47.428554,-
122.312781 King
DES MOINES CREEK
REGULATORY DETENTION
FACILITY EAST BERM
WA006
93 53 11 1C 47.427034,-
122.311192 King
ICON MATERIALS
SEDIMENT POND 6
WA007
41 1200 4 1C 47.268341,-
122.193221 King
SOUTHWEST GENESEE
STREET DETENTION DAM
WA003
80 52 45 1C 47.564882,-
122.36751 King
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 11 WA004
27 38000 108 1C 47.238152,-
122.147596 Pierce
95
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 3 WA004
21 28000 108 1C 47.249352,-
122.177817 Pierce
KAYAK LAKE DAM WA001
99 230 54 1C 47.782211,-
121.931649
Snohomi
sh
REDMOND RIDGE EAST
POND SRS 1 No. 1
WA019
22 39 6 1C 47.685272,-
122.008553 King
SEATAC AIRPORT POND M WA020
38 27 8 1C 47.464811,-
122.309788 King
SILVER FIRS DETENTION
POND NO. 3
WA017
92 36 21 1C 47.858218,-
122.163964
Snohomi
sh
DES MOINES CREEK
STORMWATER DETENTION
WA016
49 23 31 2 47.426777,-
122.305916 King
204TH STREET
STORMWATER DETENTION
BASIN
WA018
19 17 18 2 47.419722,-
122.30375 King
NEWCASTLE RAILROAD
EMBANKMENT DAM
WA006
48 200 119 2 47.522983,-
122.173869 King
QUADRANT EAST CAMPUS
PARCEL 1 DAM
WA018
15 13 19 2 47.311672,-
122.289382 King
SNOQUALMIE FALLS
DIVERSION DAM
WA002
95 818 121 2 47.54149,-
121.837891 King
TOLT RIVER REGULATED
BASIN WEST DAM
WA002
37 35 57 2 47.70383,-
121.791131 King
YOUNGS LAKE CASCADES
DAM
WA002
09 12320 69 2 47.419569,-
122.10876 King
LAKE KITTYPRINCE DAM WA002
01 96 52 2 47.519114,-
121.894508 King
TOLT RIVER REGULATING
BASIN SOUTH DAM
WA002
38 1100 57 2 47.699823,-
121.782893 King
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 8 WA004
24 34000 108 2 47.239469,-
122.160082 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 9 WA004
25 26000 108 2 47.239893,-
122.157987 Pierce
96
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 2B WA004
20 28000 108 2 47.250305,-
122.186157 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO.10 WA004
26 32000 108 2 47.240913,-
122.155031 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 2A WA004
19 20000 108 2 47.249683,-
122.187505 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO.13 WA004
29 10000 108 2 47.190787,-
122.164775 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 12 WA004
28 25000 108 2 47.229823,-
122.14456 Pierce
LAKELAND SOUTH POND
NO.1
WA018
45 12 16 2 47.247554,-
122.226014 Pierce
BOEING CREEK M1
DETENTION DAM
WA017
82 14 21 2D 47.755515,-
122.363653 King
MUTH STORMWATER
POND
WA018
83 37 12 2D 47.411031,-
122.277469 King
KLAHANIE STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM NO. 2
WA014
85 14 35 2D 47.564342,-
122.019611 King
KLAHANIE STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM NO. 13
WA006
02 56 29 2D 47.565061,-
122.001408 King
KLAHANIE STORMWATER
DETENTION DAM NO. 1
WA014
84 28 35 2D 47.567181,-
122.024633 King
GARRISON CREEK
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA005
77 45 28 2D 47.406392,-
122.203895 King
CONNER JARVIS EAST
POND
WA020
62 14 1 2D 47.573849,-
122.024296 King
SEATAC AIRPORT POND G WA019
72 27 10 2E 47.459923,-
122.321072 King
SEATAC AIRPORT SE POND WA019
01 14 12 2E 47.433611,-
122.300306 King
CEDAR HILLS LANDFILL
CSW POND
WA020
61 53 3 2E 47.457243,-
122.05295 King
97
ECHO LAKE DAM WA012
64 900 84 3 47.50649,-
121.871224 King
FOSTER WATERSKI POND WA005
99 80 29 3 47.635375,-
121.929033 King
FRATT DAM WA017
00 30 63 3 47.688042,-
122.061542 King
BEAR CREEK FAIRWAY
ESTAE DETENTION POND 1
WA014
35 43 18 3 47.724374,-
122.07023 King
BELLEVUE DETENTION
POND (133)
WA004
77 90 36 3 47.61931,-
122.14265 King
BELLEVUE DETENTION
POND (149)
WA004
76 92 36 3 47.581056,-
122.167666 King
BELLEVUE DETENTION
POND (104)
WA014
40 25 36 3 47.581056,-
122.167666 King
I-405 COAL CREEK
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA016
47 40 32 3 47.566555,-
122.180361 King
LINDSLEY DAM WA017
49 13 69 3 47.58387,-
121.980395 King
STAR LAKE CONTROL
WORKS
WA011
76 70 69 3 47.352621,-
122.286532 King
LANDSBURG DIVERSION
DAM
WA015
43 15 84 3 47.375929,-
121.961535 King
TAYLOR DAM WA014
74 10 69 3 47.45545,-
122.025472 King
HIGH WOODLANDS
STORMWATER DETENTION
DAM
WA006
13 29 28 3 47.730592,-
122.194303 King
PRESTON MILL POND WA012
97 10 72 3 47.521821,-
121.92759 King
QUADRANT LAKE NO. 1 WA017
40 113 25 3 47.298433,-
122.315121 King
98
SAWYER LAKE OUTLET
STRUCTURE
WA011
77 1116 67 3 47.335379,-
122.045013 King
REDMOND RESERVOIR
DAM
WA006
18 33 92 3 47.713047,-
122.056138 King
SOUTH 120TH STREET
RESERVOIR
WA013
45 15 43 3 47.494916,-
122.315985 King
SNOQUALMIE RIDGE
GOLF COURSE POND M1
WA006
56 70 22 3 47.538501,-
121.863171 King
TROSSACHS STORMWATER
DETENTION POND
WA017
53 14 24 3 47.584739,-
121.971619 King
BOEING AUBURN
DRAINAGE DITCH
DETENTION DAM
WA016
75 7 25 3 47.291489,-
122.251231 King
QUEENS BOG DAM WA016
33 132 32 3 47.579896,-
122.017182 King
WETZEL FAMILY LLC WA020
15 19 39 3 47.213244,-
122.041401 King
VERDANA POND C WA019
07 11 12 3 47.335,-
122.180556 King
BELLEVUE DETENTION
POND (179 NORTH)
WA013
98 26 42 3 47.62593,-
122.146391 King
WILDWOOD POND WA011
64 29 67 3 47.400369,-
122.492826 King
REDMOND RIDGE
DETENTION POND BC-2,
NO.2
WA018
43 12 17 3 47.6959,-
122.031538 King
REDMOND RIDGE
DENTION POND ECC-1B-1
WA018
26 13 15 3 47.682759,-
122.028926 King
REDMOND RIDGE
DETENTION POND ECW 1B1
WA018
32 18 17 3 47.682345,-
122.041503 King
TUKWILA SOUTH PROJECT
SOUTH POND
WA007
27 164 8 3 47.420628,-
122.269055 King
99
ALDARRA POND DF-R1 WA018
18 53 18 3 47.587773,-
121.954399 King
CEDAR HILLS REGIONAL
LANDFILL STORMWATER
POND
WA020
60 40 3 3 47.456374,-
122.052682 King
CARNATION WASTE POND
NO. 2
WA013
41 25 38 3 47.667648,-
121.948802 King
WEST CAMPUS DAM NO. 6 WA014
18 18 45 3 47.290947,-
122.325197 King
WEEKS FALLS HYDRO
PROJECT
WA015
84 10 33 3 47.432483,-
121.645884 King
BELLEVUE DETENTION
POND (197)
WA004
78 11 36 3 47.63173,-
122.152261 King
MORSE LAKE DAM WA002
56 75000 115 3 47.409604,-
121.725455 King
GREEN RIVER DIVERSION
DAM
WA015
83 10 69 3 47.300919,-
121.840592 King
BELLEVUE DETENTION
POND (165)
WA004
79 12 36 3 47.624358,-
122.171261 King
MARTINDALE LAKE DAM WA010
89 10 59 3 47.378439,-
122.311706 King
RAVENSDALE PIT WA003
39 165 47 3 47.347285,-
121.996183 King
JEAN LAKE DAM WA001
92 12 56 3 47.311983,-
122.380264 King
BLACK DIAMOND
AERATED LAGOON
WA015
61 15 38 3 47.303243,-
122.010413 King
LOUTSIS DAM WA001
87 97 49 3 47.721992,-
121.979478 King
WEYERHAEUSER DAM WA001
91 80 49 3 47.297176,-
122.29882 King
KEEVIES LAKE DAM WA004
98 500 59 3 47.314814,-
122.050117 King
100
DEJONG DAIRY WASTE
POND NO 1
WA018
66 16 20 3 47.211114,-
122.096129 King
NORTH CLEAR ZONE
DETENTION DAM
WA013
21 33 46 3 47.468754,-
122.314808 King
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 14 WA004
30 400 108 3 47.196489,-
122.132892 Pierce
TAPPS LAKE DIKE NO. 15 WA004
31 400 108 3 47.194076,-
122.13531 Pierce
56
56 Washington State Department of Ecology Dam Safety Office. 2019. Inventory of Dams Report.
101
Regional Risk Profile: Earthquake
Hazard Description
Puget Sound has a high risk of experiencing damaging earthquakes. The most common damaging quake
is deep M6+ event, six of which occurred over the past ~100 years. In comparison, the Seattle Fault has
been active three-four times in the past 3000 years and a subduction zone quake occurs approximately
every 200-600 years, with a 10-20% chance it will rupture in the next 50 years, according to the Pacific
Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN). With many potentially active faults in the area, Earthquake
impacts can occur anywhere in King County, with earthquake risk focused near faults and in areas with
less stable soils. Washington has the second-highest earthquake risk in the United States, after
California. According to the USGS, there is a 5% chance of a Seattle Fault and a 10-15% chance of a
Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake striking the region by 2055. This equates to an up to 20% chance
of a major earthquake striking King County with potentially catastrophic damages in the next 35 years.57
Earthquakes can last from a few seconds to over five minutes. Earthquakes may also be accompanied by
a series of foreshocks, or aftershocks in the weeks to months leading up to and following the
earthquake, which can cause additional damage and injury. The actual movement of the ground in an
earthquake is seldom the direct cause of injury or death. Casualties generally result from falling objects
and debris as the shaking damages or demolishes buildings and other structures. Disruption of
communications, electrical power supplies and gas, sewer and water lines, and transportation routes
should be expected. Earthquakes may cause, or lead to fires, dam failures, landslides, tsunamis, or
releases of hazardous materials, compounding their disastrous effects. An earthquake on the Cascadia
Subduction represents the largest potential risk to the entire Pacific Northwest. However, local sources
such as faults immediately beneath King County may have a much more intense shaking over a shorter
period of time leading to focused damage on the area. The earthquake hazard presents the greatest
regional potential for damages, casualties, economic, and social impacts.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
The impact of an earthquake on structures and infrastructure is largely a function of ground shaking and
secondary impacts. Ground shaking, or earthquake intensity, measured by the modified Mercalli scale,
depends on distance from the source of the quake, and the soil type. A shallow earthquake that is
relatively small, but nearer to populated areas with a hypocenter closer to the surface, is potentially more
damaging than a much larger earthquake that is farther away. Even when an earthquake is distant,
unconsolidated soils, such as sands, clays, or gravels, found in many floodplains or river valleys, amplify
shaking, leading to more potential damage.
Secondary impacts of earthquake shaking include things like soil liquefaction and landslides.
Liquefaction is a secondary effect of an earthquake in which soils lose their shear strength and flow or
57 LaForge, Gordon. 2019. Critical but Not Urgent: Seattle Prepares for the Big One. Innovations for Successful
Societies, Princeton University.
102
behave as liquid, thereby damaging structures that derive their support from the soil. Liquefaction
generally occurs in soft sedimentary soils. Landslides, or ground failures, are also a common hazard that
can occur with ground shaking, ranging from singular rocks falling down a hill, to mass movements of
land large enough to dam rivers. Landslides falling into bodies of water, can potentially generate
tsunamis, as occurred in the Tacoma Narrows during the 1949 Puget Sound Earthquake.
Earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone, and on the Seattle Fault are also capable of producing
Tsunamis. Tsunamis are a destructive movement of the ocean involving at least one ‘wave’, and strong
currents. Even a relatively ‘small’ tsunami could be devastating to port and maritime infrastructure
within Puget Sound.58 There is evidence that an earthquake on the Seattle Fault that occurred around
900 AD produced a 16-foot tsunami. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
recreated this tsunami using a model.
Soil type impacts ground Shaking. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)
creates maps based on soil characteristics to help identify locations subject to amplification and
liquefaction during earthquakes. . Areas with NEHRP soils classes D, E and F are prone to shaking
amplification, and structures in these areas experience greater damage during earthquake shaking. These
also tend to be more susceptible to liquefaction.
NEHRP Soil Classification System
NEHRP SOIL TYPE DESCRIPTION MEAN SHEAR
VELOCITY IN METERS
PER SECOND
A Hard Rock 1500
B Firm to Hard Rock 760-1500
C Dense Soil / Soft Rock 360-760
D Stiff Soil 180-360
E Soft Clay <180
F Special Study Soils (liquefiable soils, sensitive
clays, organic soils, soft clays > 36 meters thick)
58 Seattle Office of Emergency Management. Tsunamis and Seiches. Accessed online on 11/12/19 from
https://www.seattle.gov/emergency-management/hazards/tsunamis-and-seiches.
103
King County has a long history of documented earthquake activity. The most recent significant activity
was the Nisqually Earthquake – February 28, 2001. This earthquake, with an epicenter 10 miles
northeast of Olympia in Thurston County (over 40 miles from Seattle), resulted in statewide losses
exceeding $2 billion and injured 700 people, many in King County.59 A slide in King County generated
from the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake partially blocked the Cedar River – flooding several homes.
The 6.8 magnitude Nisqually earthquake was centered under Anderson Island in south Puget Sound.
The most extensive damage occurred along the Interstate-5 corridor, where river sediments led to
shaking amplification and liquefaction impacts. Some damage was experienced in 300,000 households,
many from settling foundations. Buildings built prior to 1950 located in the south downtown area and
Pioneer Square in Seattle were the most impacted; structural damage to chimneys, walls, foundations
and nonstructural elements accounted for two-thirds of all damage reported.60 Insured losses were
59 EQE International – Seattle Nisqually Washington Earthquake Feb 28, 2001;
http://www.propertyrisk.com/refcentr/seattleeq.pdf
60 Hazard Mitigation Survey Team Report, Nisqually Earthquake, February 28, 2001, DR -1361-WA, Federal Emergency
Management Agency and Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division.
104
recorded as $305M with $2B in losses overall. Of those impacted, 21% had earthquake insurance but
did not meet the deductible. 75% of retail businesses in Seattle that were impacted closed for some
period for cleanup or repairs. The average closure was 4.8 days in Pioneer Square. Of those businesses
impacted, 50% were financially threatened with closure. Harbor Island saw 69 businesses impacted for
an average of $30,900.
The Nisqually Earthquake led to a new emphasis in Washington, and King County especially, on the
importance of retrofitting historic, unreinforced masonry buildings that were the most serious casualties
of the event. The loss of historic buildings is not only costly in financial terms but can alter the social
fabric of a community and fundamentally change its feel and sense of place.
Seattle-Tacoma Earthquake – April 196561 At magnitude 6.5, the earthquake killed seven people and
caused $12.5 Million in damage (1965 dollars). Severe shaking was felt in Seattle and as far as Issaquah
and beyond. Most damage was in the Pioneer Square area and waterfront. Older masonry buildings were
most impacted. Damage patterns experienced in 1949 were repeated. Eight schools were closed for
inspections and repairs; two were severely damaged. Areas along the Duwamish River experienced
severe settling. Three water mains failed in Seattle.
Olympia Earthquake – April 194962 The 7.1 magnitude earthquake was centered along the southern
edge of Puget Sound. Eight people were killed and property damage in Olympia-Tacoma-Seattle
amounted to about $25 Million in 1949 dollars. In Seattle, a sixty-inch water main ruptured, a radio
tower collapsed, power lines and gas lines were broken in over 100 places. Three damaged schools
needed to be demolished and one rebuilt.
Scenario Drivers63
The Juan de Fuca plate is moving northeastward with respect to the North American plate at a rate of 3
to 4 centimeters per year. 64 The boundary where these two plates converge, the Cascadia Subduction
Zone, lies approximately 50 miles offshore and extends nearly 700 miles from Northern Vancouver
Island in British Columbia to northern California. The collision of these two tectonic plates produces
three types of earthquakes: Subduction Zone Earthquakes, Deep/Benioff Zone Earthquakes, and
Shallow Crustal Earthquakes. 65
61 Seattle Earthquake History; http://seattle.about.com/od/localgovernment/a/Seattle -Earthquakes.htm
62 Earthquake History of Washington. 5 Aug. 2003. U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geologic al
King County Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment – November 2016 Page 86.
Survey. 5 Oct. 2003 http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/states/washington/history.php
63 Earthquake Hazards in Washington and Oregon – Three Source Zones. U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S.
Geological Survey. 2 Oct. 2003 http://www.ess.washington.edu/SEIS/PNSN/CascadiaEQs.pdf
64 Understanding plate motions, USGS; http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/dynamic/understanding.html.
65 Earthquake Hazards in Washington and Oregon – Three Source Zones. U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S.
Geological Survey. 2 Oct. 2003 http://www.ess.washington.edu/SEIS/PNSN/CascadiaEQs.pdf.
105
Cascadia Subduction
Zone Earthquakes
A subduction zone earthquake would originate from the Cascadia Subduction
zone off the coast of Washington and Oregon. Such earthquakes typically have
minutes of strong ground shaking and are quickly followed by damaging
tsunamis and numerous large aftershocks. The potential exists for large
earthquakes along the Cascadia Subduction Zone, up to an earthquake measuring
Magnitude 9 or greater on the Richter scale. This would produce a tsunami all
along the fault line from British Columbia to Mendocino, California. Such an
earthquake would last several minutes and produce catastrophic damage locally
from the earthquake and distantly from the generated tsunami.
106
Benioff Zone (Deep)
Earthquakes (e.g.
Nisqually Earthquake)
Deep, or Benioff Zone earthquakes are the most frequent damaging earthquakes
occurring within the Puget Sound area. They occur within the Juan De Fuca
plate as it sinks into the mantle. These earthquakes occur, 16 to 60 miles in
depth. Due to their depth, aftershocks are typically not felt in association with
these earthquakes. These earthquakes are caused by mineral changes as the plate
moves deeper into the mantle. Minerals that make up the plates are altered to
denser, more stable forms as temperature and pressure increase. This
compression results in a decrease in the size of the plate, and stresses build up
that pull the plate apart. Deep earthquakes generally last 20 to 30 seconds and
have the potential of reaching 7.5 on the Richter scale. The last major one in the
Puget Sound region was the 6.8 magnitude Nisqually Earthquake on February
28, 2001.
Shallow (Crustal)
Earthquakes (e.g.
Seattle Fault
Earthquake)
Shallow crustal earthquakes occur within the North America plate at depths of
18 miles or fewer. Shallow earthquakes within the North America plate account
for most of the earthquakes in the Puget Sound region, though most are small
and not felt. The potential exists for major shallow earthquakes as well.
Generally, these earthquakes are expected to have magnitudes less than 8 and last
from 20 to 60 seconds. Of the three types of earthquake, the timelines and
recurrence intervals of crustal events are the least understood. Ongoing research
suggests that Magnitude 7 or greater events have occurred on at least eight faults
in the Puget Sound basin. FEMA estimates using HAZUS show that events on
these faults have the potential to cause greater loss of life and property in King
County than any other disaster likely to affect the area. Evidence of a fault
running east-west through south Seattle (the Seattle Fault) suggests that a major
earthquake with a magnitude of 7 or greater affected the Seattle area about 1,100
years ago.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Unreinforced buildings,
especially those built
during pre or low-code
eras (pre 1973)
Brick and masonry buildings that characterize areas like Pioneer Square in
Seattle are extremely susceptible to even minor earthquakes. Unreinforced
masonry buildings are likely to collapse or partially collapse and be a leading
source of fatalities due to falling debris.
Structures, including roads
and bridges, structures,
built on vulnerable soils.
Structures on vulnerable or less stable soils are more likely to buckle or
collapse. High risk areas cover the region, but are especially common in
historic river valleys where sediment has been deposited over time.
Public facilities built to
“life safety” codes that
Public facilities, such as city halls, schools, etc. are not required to be built to
“immediate occupancy” standards. A major earthquake would render many
of these facilities inoperable, leading to difficulties in organizing the recovery
in affected jurisdictions.
107
will be unusable after a
major earthquake
Structures and
populations on or near
steep slopes
Steep slopes greater than 40% grade are likely to fail in an earthquake. This
likelihood increases when the ground is saturated. Buildings on or below
these slopes will be damaged or destroyed in these events.
Dams, especially older,
less regulated dams
Dams are responsible for most of the region’s electricity and are extremely
important to any future recovery. A major event may damage these dams
and require repair before they can resume electricity generation. Total failure
of the major dams is unlikely. In addition to the large dams, however, there
are many lower-priority dams that nevertheless meet the standards of high-
hazard. These dams are scattered throughout King County and may not even
be recognized by the jurisdictions in which they are located. A failure of
some of these dams would likely result in numerous fatalities and the
inundation of property and infrastructure.
Hazardous materials sites,
especially those in aging
warehouses or with
weakened containment
systems
Hazardous materials, or Hazmat, sites dot the region and FEMA has
recognized hazardous materials as a community lifeline due to experiences
dealing with recovery after recent disasters. Hazmat releases are likely to
occur at industrial facilities, on pipelines, and elsewhere around the region.
The cocktail of potential contaminants is likely to threaten the public,
responders, and the environment, and to delay recovery in parts of the
region for years.
Port facilities built on
unstable soils
Ports, are almost always built on fill and other extremely unstable soils.
Major earthquakes will damage and potentially destroy port facilities. Any
seiche or tsunami will also have a greater impact on port facilities than inland
facilities.
Rail systems
Rail systems require tracks to be perfectly aligned and will fail during an
earthquake as the ground shifts and buckles. Landslides may also deposit
material on the tracks. Trains traveling at high speeds during an earthquake
have a significantly greater chance of de-railing, potentially injuring
passengers, or spilling cargo, which may cause additional hazardous material
incidents.
Water and sewer
transmission lines,
especially those built of
cast iron, concrete, or
wood
Water lines throughout the region are currently being replaced by ductile
iron. Nevertheless, most special purpose districts undertaking this work are
decades from completing it. Water systems will likely fail throughout the
region and will be difficult to restore due to limitations in transportation
108
capacity. Even systems able to complete conversion to ductile iron will
experience failures, especially in areas of unstable soils.
Populations without the
means to care for
themselves over multiple
weeks, especially those
with Access and
Functional Needs
The response and initial recovery following a catastrophic earthquake will
take weeks. Homebound populations, those requiring medications, the
chronically ill, or others with access and functional needs may need to
sustain themselves for an estimated two weeks in some places.
Populations without
insurance, especially those
without renters insurance
or homeowner insurance
earthquake riders.
According to the Office of the Insurance Commissioner, which conducted a
major earthquake insurance study in 2017, residential earthquake coverage in
western Washington is 13.8%. Commercial coverage rates are much higher
than residential, with 43.2% of insurance policies having some sort of
earthquake coverage. A key finding is that, for both residential and
commercial customers, insured properties have a much higher assessed value
than uninsured properties, indicating that it is higher-income people that are,
in general, purchasing earthquake insurance coverage.
Earthquake insurance coverage rates are a good measure of resilience
because insurance is the primary source of disaster recovery funding after an
earthquake. Low levels of insurance coverage have stymied recovery efforts
in major disasters, such as hurricanes, where hazard coverage is not
automatically included in homeowner’s policies.
Populations
communicating in
languages other than
English
Information from responders, notifications, and other information will likely
be communicated predominately in English. Special care will need to be
taken to ensure that non-English speakers have access to relief supplies from
established points of distribution.
Levees, dikes, and other
flood control structures
Flood control structures are usually earthen and built on highly unstable
soils. An earthquake during the winter months when these systems are
running close to capacity could cause major failures and widespread
flooding.
Priority Impact Areas
The severity of an earthquake is different depending on the conditions under which it occurs. Also,
different sectors of the population, economy, or government will have different levels of exposure and
vulnerability that impact their susceptibility to an earthquake. This risk assessment looks at impacts of
various earthquake scenarios to a series of critical sectors. The impact data for physical structures is
generated using the Hazus-MH tool for three different Seattle Fault M7.0 scenarios, a Tacoma Fault M
7.1 scenario, and a Cascadia M9.0 scenario. These scenarios are chosen based on their probability and
109
potential impact. This earthquake model also includes information on liquefaction potential of soils and
the age of buildings (as an instrument for building code levels).
This assessment considers impacts to physical and human elements of each of 11 impact areas. For
example, for health systems, the locations of key facilities identified by Public Health Seattle – King
County will be assessed against data on high hazard areas. The impacts to first the health system overall,
including employees and existing patients, will also be examined.
The HAZUS scenarios used in this section were generated by the FEMA RiskMAP team for the 2018
King County Risk Report.66
King County
residents
The entire population of King County is potentially exposed to the direct and indirect
impacts from earthquakes. The degree of exposure is dependent on many factors,
including the age and construction type of residence, the soil type homes are
constructed on, the proximity to the fault, etc. Business interruption could keep
people from working, road closures could isolate populations, and loss of utilities
could impact populations where no direct damage was experienced.
Hazus estimates there are over 600,000 people living in 250,000 households on
NEHRP Class D or E soils locally. This represents about 30% of the county
population. The population over 65 and the population are the most vulnerable
because of their concentration in areas with Class D and E soils.
Impacts to the population are not restricted to displacement and sheltering. People
may be injured, lose their jobs, schools may be closed from their own damages,
government services may be interrupted, health facilities and care may also be
interrupted or be completely unavailable. Family members may be separated,
including children, institutionalized elderly and the infirm, may be moved to alternate
facilities – and unaccounted for. Deaths of homeless and unidentified people may
require burial before family can claim their remains.
Following the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake, the total city population took over 10
years to recover. The population count of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina
still has not recovered to pre-storm levels. King County’s population is extremely
mobile and many are relatively recent arrivals, drawn by the booming economy. A
large earthquake may reverse this growth trend as people lose jobs, face housing
recovery costs without insurance, and seek less hazard-prone areas after the trauma of
a large earthquake.
66 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018. King County Risk Report.
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/gispublic/AppResources/SEA/RiskMAP/King/KingCounty_RiskReport.pdf
110
Vulnerable
populations
Vulnerable populations are more likely to suffer losses during an earthquake and are
likely to take longer to recover after. Factors influencing likelihood of damage include
living in higher hazard areas, living in older buildings, being less likely to have
emergency supplies, and having a higher rate of persons with disabilities. Slower
recovery is exacerbated by poorer populations likelihood of not having access to
institutions leading recovery, not having insurance, not having a stable job, wealth, or
savings, being more likely to be renters who are ineligible for many federal recovery
programs, and having a lower-level of education on average, making it more difficult
to find a new job and to navigate the complex post-disaster system.
In many catastrophic disasters, most notably Hurricane Katrina, poor communities
may never recover.
Property Lack of damage to structures built since the 1949 and 1965 earthquakes have
demonstrated the value of building standards that resist earthquake damages.
Overwhelmingly, damages in the Nisqually Earthquake of 2001 were to unreinforced
masonry and buildings built before the 1949 earthquake. This held equally true for
damages to roads and bridges. The FEMA project team completed an analysis to
identify how many buildings were built to specific building codes. In the table below,
“pre-code” refers to buildings built before 1950, low-code is 1951-1974, moderate is
1975-2003, and high is after 2003.
Countywide, nearly 50% of buildings were built to pre or low code standards. This
level of vulnerability is significant, especially for more intense earthquakes, such as the
Seattle Fault M7.2.
The economy King County alone contributes around 50% of Washington’s gross domestic product.
The county has a diverse economy, which has made it especially resilient to other
forms of disruption but is heavily dependent on a high degree of global
interconnectedness. Losses to lifeline infrastructure, especially port facilities,
communications hubs, and major highway corridors would be crippling if the loss was
total and links could not be quickly restored. Some of western Washington’s key
industries, such as Amazon and Microsoft, may be insulated somewhat from damage
due to the highly global nature of their work and redundancy in their systems, while
others such as Boeing would be severely impacted as rail and highway routes
necessary for the transport of materials is restored. I-5, for example, suffers from
limited redundancy and carries over 233,000 vehicles through Seattle, a number that
has been steadily growing.
Economic risk from a major earthquake is multi-faceted. Economic impacts from an
earthquake include immediate loss of facilities and inventories, ongoing loss of
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employees and customers, and loss of businesses. Ongoing impacts will depend on
the speed of infrastructure restoration, levels of insurance coverage, international
economic conditions, and the ability of jurisdictions to develop and implement a long-
term recovery strategy.
The
environment
Impacts to the environment from an earthquake include the creation and disposal of
large quantities of debris, releases of hazardous materials, the disruption of
environmental conservation programs, and the relaxing of environmental programs
during the cleanup and recovery. The greatest potential for environmental damage is
from hazardous materials releases as fuel and waste pipelines rupture, underground
fuel storage tanks fail, trains, including oil trains, may derail, port facilities are
damaged by any tsunami or seiche, and other chemicals, including household items,
are spilled. The multi-source nature of materials releases, the scale of potential
releases, and the lack of resources for cleanup all complicate the scenario.
While most common after rain and wind event hazards (approximately 75% of all
disaster-triggered releases), hazmat releases after earthquakes are responsible for large
releases over a wide area.67 Earthquake-triggered hazmat releases have included
hundreds of gas line ruptures and pipeline breaks, and releases of ammonia, chlorine,
and sulfuric acid during the Northridge and Loma Prieta earthquakes.68
67 Sengul et al, 2012. Analysis of Hazardous Materials Releases Due to Natural Hazards in the United States.
68 Young, Stacy; Balluz, Lina; and Malilay, Josephine, Natural and Technologic Hazardous Material Releases During and After
Natural Disasters: A Review (2004). Public Health Resources. 90.
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Health systems Health system impacts from a
major disaster include
disruptions to emergency
services, community health
clinics, pharmacies, and
hospitals. While new hospitals
are required to meet criteria for
seismic resilience and may
engage in supply-chain and
patient evacuation planning,
much of the rest of the network
is likely to be shut down after a
disaster. This is an especially
high threat to populations
needing regular medical services,
such as kidney dialysis and
insulin injections (which require
refrigeration). In Hurricane
Maria in 2017, Puerto Rico was
left without power for months
and the majority of fatalities
recorded due to the storm were from the elevated death rate among medically-fragile
populations.
In order to function, hospitals require significant infrastructure inputs, including
power and water that are likely to be disrupted after an earthquake. Backup services
are available; however, may be insufficient to meet the need if infrastructure recovery
takes too long.
Health system impacts therefore include large-scale disruptions to supply chains,
disruptions to ongoing care regimens for certain medically-vulnerable populations,
disruption of community care networks of pharmacies and local clinics, loss of trained
staff, and potential damage to hospitals or loss of hospital functionality due to
infrastructure damage.
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Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Any damaging earthquake has the potential to impact delivery of essential government
services in the days, weeks, months, and even years following the earthquake. The
damages to infrastructure and residential or business locations may curtail or even
prevent government employees from reaching their work locations or may prevent
services from reaching populations in need scattered around the county. Even after
initial short term repairs have been made, the impact on the taxable value of
properties in the county may cause a revenue shortfall that reduces available services
from budgetary impacts.
Collection of available tax
revenue, the revaluation
process (including
documentation), and appeals
process might produce a
further burden on already
stretched government
obligations.
Earthquakes have the
possibility of damaging any
fixed facility at which
services are provided. This
may include: adult and
juvenile detention facilities,
waste water treatment
facilities, solid waste disposal
systems and facilities, the
court system, health and
medical institutions and
clinics, fire and police
stations or equipment,
public transportation, schools, and libraries.
Responders First responders experience personal and professional impacts from an earthquake.
Since responders are also local residents, they will be personally impacted by the
disaster. Professionally, emergency services will be called upon to help with life safety
operations while also seeking to restore day-to-day services.
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Infrastructure
systems
Energy: Dams are the primary source of electricity generation for the region and may
be impacted by a major earthquake, even if failure is relatively unlikely. Pipelines cross
the region carrying fuel and are susceptible to earthquakes. Since Washington is home
to the Northwest’s only refineries, damage to this conveyance system will have far
reaching, regional consequences. A major concern for maintaining power in facilities
while the power grid is down after an earthquake is fuel distribution. With
transportation networks seriously impacted, it will be difficult to ensure a supply of
fuel is distributed to hospitals, public facilities, and communications centers. Without
this fuel, systems are likely to fail after a few days of operation.
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Water/Wastewater: Water and
wastewater systems are among
the most vulnerable to an
earthquake of all lifeline
infrastructure. Pipelines,
especially those over NEHRP
class D, E, and F soils, are
vulnerable to rupture. King
County maintains a wastewater
treatment system that is
connected to dozens of smaller
systems and operates multiple
water treatment plants. There
are also many separate water
systems that operate their own
conveyance systems and
reservoirs.
Transportation: Transportation lifelines are
both state and local responsibility.
According to a Regional Resiliency
Assessment Program (RRAP) report
published by DHS,
WSDOT has operated a seismic retrofit
program since 1991 and has been steadily
retrofitting bridges through a three-stage
process of stabilizing the bridge
superstructure, strengthening single-
column bridge supports, and reinforcing
multi-column piers. In response to the
2012 Resilient Washington State report,
WSDOT began a program to completely
retrofit three identified lifeline routes for a
total cost in excess of $1B (2015 dollars).
As of 2019, there are 17 state-responsibility
bridges in King County that are in poor condition.
Bridge Seismic Lifeline Routes (green) (WSDOT, 2015)
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King County has 177 bridges in its bridge program. At least every two years, those
bridges are inspected and recommendations are made for their repair or replacement.
Between 2006 and 2016, 32 bridges were replaced and many more repaired. In 2008,
the bridge program concluded a 14-year seismic retrofit, improving 115 bridges for
$22 million. This retrofitting has substantially improved the survivability (likelihood of
collapse) of bridges in the King County inventory.
One category of bridges is fracture critical truss bridges. The average age of these
bridges in unincorporated King County is 42 years. Of the 11 bridges in this group,
the Miller River Bridge was closed from damages in the January 2011 flood event and
the Alvord “T” was closed June 2013. The Stossel Bridge is the lowest rated of those
remaining in the inventory. Each carries thousands of vehicles daily.
Bridges, however, are only part of the transportation puzzle. Bridge approaches, and
pavement crossing unstable soils, are major threats. The WSDOT Seismic Lifeline
route discussed above is only considering bridges, not pavement or approaches.
Railways are another highly-vulnerable piece of transportation infrastructure. Tracks
can become misaligned and require repair before train travel is possible. Even in the
relatively small 2001 Nisqually Earthquake, rail travel was disrupted for several days.
Port facilities are seriously threatened by a major earthquake due to liquefaction
potential of port areas and tsunami threats. It is likely a major earthquake would
completely destroy port facilities, requiring years of investment to completely recover.
As with the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake, port operations may never again reach pre-
disaster levels.
Airports are also vulnerable to earthquakes. In the 2001 Nisqually Earthquake, the air
traffic control tower at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport was damaged, drastically
reducing takeoff and landing capacity. Runway damage is also common as the ground
shifts and would require repair before large jets could land. While the region has a
number of airports, many of them will also be critical facilities for disaster response,
medical patient evacuation, and food and fuel deliveries.
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Communications: While the public sector maintains critical radio communications
networks, the networks on which most residents depend is privately owned. While
cell towers are equipped with backup generators, these generators may only have
enough fuel for a few days of continuous operation.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance and
capabilities
Disasters of the magnitude we can expect from a damaging earthquake have the
potential to shake public confidence in government’s ability to maintain law and
order, provide essential services, repair or replace needed infrastructure for
employment, processing of building permits and inspections, clearing of debris and
other needs. Restoration efforts may well take longer than the public is willing to
accept. Amendments to zoning and building standards may not be embraced by those
seeking to rebuild. If rapid restoration is not possible, the area may lose employers
and the population may relocate to other areas of the country in search of
employment.
Earthquake hazards specifically have been the subject of significant reporting in
recent years. Articles in the Seattle Times, the New Yorker, and on local television
have argued that the Pacific Northwest is unprepared for the level of destruction
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expected following a Cascadia Subduction Zone 9.0 event.69 These articles have led to
both stepped-up state and local action on earthquake preparedness and to more
public awareness.
69 Schulz, Kathryn, “The Really Big One,” The New Yorker (July 20, 2015).
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Re gional Risk Profile: Flood
Hazard Description
Flooding is King County’s most persistent and recurrent natural hazard. Flooding affects tens of
thousands of families and properties owners in communities across the county, with life safety,
economic, and workplace impacts on tens of thousands more. The communities within King County
take flooding seriously; the King County Flood Control District was established in 2007 to regionally
manage flood hazards and reduce risk, in partnership with the Department of Natural Resources and
Parks’ River and Floodplain Management Section. The King County Flood Hazard Management Plan
drives much of the work that both the District and King County do to reduce flood risk and manage
flood-related hazards.
Flooding is the inundation of normally dry areas by overflowing rivers, increased coastal waves, or other
accumulation of surface waters. A number of conditions can cause flooding from too much rainfall in a
river’s watershed to sustained offshore wind driving a high tide inland, but flooding can also be caused
by events such as liquefaction of levees during an earthquake that release water the levees hold back.
Other causes of flooding include dam failure, landscape changes after wildfires that exacerbate flooding,
rapid snowmelt, channel migration, and debris in streams causing water to backup.
Typically, King County sees
at least minor flooding ever
year in the fall and winter
and big events are often
driven by atmospheric river
where moisture is picked up
from the Pacific Ocean and
brought by the jet stream to
drop as prolonged heavy
precipitation in western
Washington.
A variety of factors affect
how flooding occurs and its
severity. One main factor for
riverine flooding is the
“hydrology,” which includes
how much rain falls, how fast it falls, how fast it reaches the stream, and the amount of water already in
the stream. The second main factor for riverine flooding is the “hydraulics” of the watershed, which
includes characteristics like the topography, stream channel dynamics, and the overall slope of areas of
the watershed.
Figure 2. Flooding along the Snoqualmie River in 2015
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Flooding is a natural phenomenon and many ecosystems thrive because of the natural floodplain
functions that rivers and coastlines provide. Flooding is considered a “problem” when humans
construct buildings and infrastructure in the path of floodwater. The many aspects of natural floodplain
functions help reduce impacts, slow floodwaters down, and preserve important habitat for endangered
species.
Figure 3. Map showing mapped 1% annual chance floodplains and floodways. Note that Lake Washington does not have
an identified floodplain because its levels are controlled by the US Army Corps of Engineers operated Chittenden Locks.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Flooding, no matter the source, causes widespread and long-lasting damage. The force of moving
floodwaters can tear homes from their foundations, sweep cars off the road, and destroy public
infrastructure. Houses and businesses damaged by flooding can take many months to repair and are
often unsuitable to live in during the repairs. Certain types of flooding can leave buildings inundated for
several days, which can further worsen property damage. Flood-damaged buildings can pose health risks
including mold, contaminated food and drinking water, and mental health stresses from the traumatic
experience.
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The velocity, depth, and amount of floodwaters impact how dangerous riverine flooding can be. A
floodplain where the velocity is more than 3 feet per second and the depth is more than 3 feet is an area
dangerous for people to be living or working since those flood conditions can be fatal to someone
walking through floodwaters. King County code, for example, prohibits buildings in unincorporated
areas to be built in fast-flowing and deep floodplains. Rivers in King County also carry substantial
debris, from fallen trees to boulders and sediment, and debris impacts can add to the severity of
flooding.
Rivers are dynamic systems and can
shift significantly during high flow
events or gradually through erosion of
streambanks. This risk is called
“channel migration hazards,” and is a
prevalent feature in northwest river
systems. The scale of channel
migration depends on the severity of
the high flow event, geology of the
banks and streambed, and
characteristics of the surrounding
land. King County regularly maps
channel migration zones and has
applicable development standards for
proposals within these zones.
In coastal floodplains, wave action is the most dangerous aspect of flooding. Buildings are required to
be specially designed to withstand powerful wave actions and can only be built on open foundation
systems, like piers or posts.
King County covers six large drainage basins and costal flood hazard areas.
1. The South Fork Skykomish River basin lies primarily in the northeast portion of King County
and flows into neighboring Snohomish County. The basin drains 234 square miles of
mountainous terrain within King County and includes major tributaries such as the Foss, Tye,
Miller, and Beckler Rivers. The cities of Skykomish, Baring, and Gold Bar as well as many
unincorporated area neighborhoods are located near or on the banks of the rivers and
frequently experience impacts from flooding. The basin features steep slopes in the upper
portion, so significant runoff can cause major flooding relatively quickly. The rivers in the basin
are also very prone to channel migration and it is a significant hazard that communities are
focused on.
2. The Snoqualmie River basin drains much of the northeast and north-central part of King
County and is typically divided into two areas: the Upper Snoqualmie and the Lower
Snoqualmie, above and below Snoqualmie Falls, respectively. The basin also encompasses
tributaries such as the Tolt River, the Raging River, Tokul Creek, Griffin Creek, Harris Creek,
Patterson Creek, among others. The Upper Snoqualmie River and some of the major tributaries
are characterized by steep gradient headwater systems and some lower gradient floodplains near
the incorporated communities of North Bend and Snoqualmie. The Lower Snoqualmie River
Figure 4. House destroyed due to channel migration along the Raging River.
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features wide floodplains along the low gradient channel. The cities of Carnation and Duvall
and the unincorporated community of Fall City all lie within the broad Lower Snoqualmie
Valley.
3. The Sammamish River basin originates at Lake Sammamish and drains a 240 square mile
watershed, including the tributaries of Bear, Little Bear, North, and Swamp Creek basins. The
river has been channelized since the construction of the Lake Washington Ship Canal and is
partially regulated by a weird outlet downstream of the mouth of the lake, which reduces
frequency and severity of flooding.
4. The Cedar River basin stretches from the Cascade Mountains to Lake Washington, where the
Cedar River terminates. The basin has been heavily altered from its natural condition, with
major projects constructed including Masonry Dam and the Landsburg Diversion, both to serve
as water supply infrastructure. Along the Cedar River are many unincorporated community
neighborhoods as well as cities like Maple Valley and Renton. Naturally-occurring large wood is
a prevalent hazard in the basin.
5. The Green River originates in the Cascade Mountains at an elevation of 4,500 feet and flows
through many cities including Auburn, Kent, Renton, Tukwila, and Seattle. The basin is divided
into four major sub-basins: the upper watershed above the Howard Hanson Dam, the middle
Green below the dam and upstream of Auburn, the lower Green that flows through the
incorporated cities, and the Duwamish estuary. The Green River basin features many large
structural elements including Howard Hanson Dam, which provides flood control, and large
levee and revetment systems on the lower Green River.
6. The White River originates in glaciers on the northeast face of Mount Rainier. The White River
drains an area of about 490 square miles, approximately one third of which lies within King
County. Major tributaries join the White River along its path like the Greenwater River and
Boise Creek. Over one hundred years ago, the White River was diverted to flow into the
Puyallup River in Pierce County. Mud Mountain Dam is a major flood control dam that has a
significant effect on reducing flooding in the basin. Additionally, water is diverted from the river
for hydropower generation near Lake Tapps. Along the river are a number of small
unincorporated neighborhoods in addition to the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe Reservation and
portions of the city of Auburn.
7. Coastal flood hazard areas pose potential risks to approximately 100 miles of shoreline, about
half of which is on Vashon Island in unincorporated King County and the other half is the
incorporated shoreline through the cities of Shoreline, Seattle, Burien, Des Moines, and Federal
Way. Storm surge and wave action are significant flood hazards facing development along
shorelines. Coastal erosion also is a prevalent hazard, including along the steep bluff areas
around the shoreline in King County. Many miles of shoreline are variably armored by
bulkheads and other structures. Coastal flooding will be exacerbated by sea level rise and other
impacts of climate change.
Flooding is a prevalent threat during the fall and winter months due to atmospheric rivers, heavy rain,
and king tides. Major floods occur on average every two to five years. Major river flooding has typically
not caused fatalities, but rather significant property damage. Flooding along multiple rivers in 2006 and
2009 were the most recent major floods to cause many millions of dollars in damage. Flooding in 1990
is considered the largest flood of record for most of the county except for the Lower Snoqualmie and
Tolt Rivers. There have been 28 flooding events since 1965 that have resulted in federal disaster
declarations. At least minor flooding occurs every winter. Climate change is likely to have a significant
effect in changing the patterns of flooding in the river basins.
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Scenario Drivers
Most types of flooding caused by extreme weather are cyclical and are measured by their probability of
occurrence in a given year based on the factors that drive flooding. The larger a flood event, the less
likely it is to happen in a year. A flood with a 10% chance of occurring in a year is sometimes called a
“10-year flood,” and that flood event will have less river flow and likely fewer impacts than a 1% annual
chance flood event, or a “100-year flood.” These flood events can be modeled and maps created to
show their extents.
The 1% annual chance flood, or 100-year flood, is the most important scenario because floodplain
regulations and federal flood insurance are based on this flood event. This flood event represents the
mapped floodplain on FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps and forms the basis for community
regulations for participating communities in the National Flood Insurance Program. In King County
communities, all new or substantially improved buildings must be constructed with their lowest floor at
least one foot higher than the expected elevation of the 1% annual chance flood.
While the 1% annual chance flood is scenario most often discussed, the 10%, 2%, and 0.2% annual
chance floods are often used for planning and certain regulatory purposes. The extents of the flood
events are not consistently mapped throughout the county, but engineering data in flood models can be
used in project planning or regulatory compliance.
Typically the recurrence interval floods are driven by cyclical natural factors like atmospheric rivers
bringing heavy rain or severe winter storms and king tides. Other factors can drive flooding scenarios in
different ways. For example, levee or dam failures may happen due to problems caused by inadequate
maintenance. Flooding damage from earthquakes will likely only be seen if an earthquake damages a
levee, for example, during times of high water.
King County has a long-established Flood Warning Program that has been monitoring river systems for
over 50 years. The King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks’ River and Floodplain
Management Section operates a Flood Warning Center that opens 24 hours a day when flooding occurs
on any of the river systems with gages. For the Flood Warning Program, the rivers are measured by a
“flood phase” system based on real-time flow information. When a river reaches flood phase 2, the
Center opens, coordinates with local, state, and federal agencies, and accepts calls from the public
requesting information about flooding. When a river reaches flood phase 3, patrol teams are sent out to
monitor flood protection facilities and any potential flooding impacts. When a river reaches flood phase
4, additional staff are brought in to the Flood Warning Center, sent on flood patrols, and begin to
collect damage information in case of a disaster declaration.
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Heavy rain and
atmospheric rivers
Most riverine and urban flooding is caused by heavy rain and atmospheric
rivers that drive significant weather systems into the Pacific Northwest.
Intense rainfall can overwhelm rivers’ ability to carry flows in their banks
and cause inundation of the adjacent floodplains. These factors not only
drive riverine flooding, but also urban flooding issues that can overwhelm
local stormwater infrastructure and can cause flood damage.
Severe winter storm, storm
surge, king tides
Severe winter storms that have strong winds combined with king tides can
cause significant coastal flooding, as seen in the 1982 king tide event that
battered much of the shoreline in King County. Intense coastal storms and
high tides can cause damage to coastal properties and damage infrastructure
like roads and ferry docks.
Sea level rise
As sea level rises in Puget Sound, the stillwater elevation level, or the water
level without effect of waves, rises and pushes more water inland during
times of severe storms. While the actual increase in flood risk will differ
based on the localized geography and wind patterns, sea level rise is certain
to worsen flooding along the coastlines in King County.
Channel migration Rivers natural erode banks and soils due to the energy of moving water.
This erosion causes rivers to migrate or move laterally across a floodplain.
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A channel can also move abruptly over a large distance in a single flood
event. This can threaten development located in channel migration zones,
some of which are mapped.
Dam failure and
overtopping
If dams fail, the water held back will rush out quickly, potentially causing
catastrophic flooding downstream. Dams both large and small can pose
significant impacts. The potential for Howard Hanson Dam’s failure in
2009 brought to light the incredible flooding, loss of life, and property
damage that could happen if dams fail. Smaller structures that might be in a
neighborhood can also lead to deaths and significant property damage.
Dam failure can be caused by too much water for a structure to handle or
by lack of maintenance that causes the dam to fail.
Levee failure and
overtopping
Levees act as flood protection facilities, but only offer protection to a
certain recurrence interval. They also are manmade earthen structures that
require maintenance. Flooding can exceed a levee system’s capacity or flaws
in the structure can cause it to fail, and both would cause rapid inundation
behind the levee. Water can seep through levees and cause weaknesses that
lead to collapse.
Landslide and mudflow
Landslides can rapidly fill in rivers, causing a blockage in the river and
immediate overflowing. This threat is particularly present on the Cedar
River. Landslides can also add significant material to a river, causing a
mudflow and rapid damage to property, similar to the Oso Landslide event
in 2014 in Snohomish County.
Earthquake
Earthen levee systems are prone to liquefaction in an earthquake, which can
cause major failure of the levee structures. If floodwaters are being held
back at the time of an earthquake, the levees can fail and flooding could
occur very quickly.
Volcanic eruption
In the event that Mt. Rainier erupts, lahars can fill river valleys and
drastically change the course of rivers, streams, and shorelines. The amount
of materials brought downstream in a lahar would affect the severity of
impacts in future flooding.
Tsunami
Tsunamis are powerful waves that are caused by an earthquake or
displacement of water from an underwater land feature collapse. Specific
scenarios are outlined in the Tsunami and Seiche Risk Assessment. A
tsunami that affects King County would cause significant wave action and
likely major damage to properties on the coast.
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Humanmade watershed
changes
One major factor in understanding flood risk is the underlying land that
floodwaters flow over. Harder and more impervious surfaces carry
floodwater faster, so as humans continue to build buildings, roads,
sidewalks, and other impervious features, floodwaters travel faster to
streams, which can increase the severity of flooding.
Climate change
While climate change has an effect and influence on many of the factors
already identified, it is a specific scenario driver because of the potential to
change flooding in King County. Research is currently ongoing to better
analyze, quantify, and understand the effect of certain emissions scenarios
that could drive flooding in multiple ways. King County is likely to
experience higher intensity rainfall events, which have the potential to cause
more impactful flooding.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Families living in
floodprone areas
Families with limited budgets are the top concern for flooding. Because
flood damage can be very expensive and disruptive, families have a difficult
time recovering from the effects of flooding. Without flood insurance,
families must take money from savings; and even with flood insurance, flood
damaged homes may not be livable for many months. Renters are
particularly vulnerable since they often are lower income and do not have
flood insurance. Additionally, families that don’t speak English as a primary
language can be more vulnerable to flooding because most flood warning
systems are in English and much of the flood insurance, floodplain
regulations, and any mitigation programs are made up of materials in
English.
Major roads and sole-
access roads
The many bridges, major roads, cross-valley roads, and sole-access
neighborhood roads that cross floodplains are a top priority during flooding.
Many people in Duvall, Carnation, and other communities in the Snoqualmie
valley can be entirely cut off during major flooding since SR 203 and the
cross-valley roads are often underwater. During high tide flooding events on
Vashon Island, many coastal roads are underwater as well and can limit
access via Vashon Highway.
Critical facilities
Schools, hospitals, nursing homes, hazardous materials storage facilities, and
other critical facilities operations are threatened during flooding. Schools will
be inaccessible and hospital operations and access routes vulnerable.
Facilities like nursing homes house populations that cannot easily leave
floodprone areas. And hazardous waste, sewage, or animal waste storage
facilities threaten water quality and pose health risks during flooding.
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Farms
There are many agricultural operations in King County’s floodplains
including major production areas in the Snoqualmie Valley, Green River
Valley, Sammamish River Valley, and parts of the Enumclaw Plateau.
Flooding can particularly affect harvest time in October and November as
well as making it difficult to start planting in the spring. Farms with livestock
faced significant losses in the 1990 floods, but now many dairy or other
livestock operations have farm pads that offer refuge for animals in times of
flooding.
Linear infrastructure
Linear infrastructure such as water and natural gas pipelines, sewage systems,
and utility transmission lines cross rivers, streams, and floodplains.
Significant water pipelines take water from protected watersheds down to
Seattle, Renton, and other cities and often are threatened by flooding. A
major capital project completed in 2019 added flood protection for the Tolt
Pipeline, which is part of Seattle’s water supply. Additionally, as sea levels
rise and worsen coastal flooding,
Flood protection facilities
Levees and revetments are part of the flood protection facility systems in
King County. During flood events, levees and revetments are tested by the
force of floodwater. Revetments are intended to protect against channel
migration, but if the flood is too large, they can fail and rivers can avulse.
Levees similarly are put under serious pressure during flood events and a
number of issues from seepage to sloughing can undermine levees and cause
them to fail.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
Flooding can affect anyone who lives in or near floodplains. Most flood hazards are
mapped and families living in these mapped 1% annual chance floodplains can expect at
least a 26% chance of seeing floodwaters over 30 years, the length of a typical mortgage.
Flooding can threaten lives, particular in areas where flooding can happen quickly and
with little warning, in addition to those driving on flooded roads. Most deaths occur from
people driving through floodwaters and being swept away in their cars.
Flooding also causes significant property damage and, on average, one foot of water in an
average size home can cause over $50,000 in damage. Without flood insurance, this level
of damage can overwhelm a family’s finances. And those without many financial
resources will be severely impacted by flood damage to their home and/or belongings.
Flooding also affects those who work in floodplains or commute through them. Many
farmworkers are employed on farms in the Snoqualmie or Sammamish Valleys and when
flooding inundates or ruins crops, farmworkers can find themselves without jobs.
Businesses in floodplains also will shut down during flooding, particularly if buildings and
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access roads are damaged. After the 1993 Midwest Flooding, FEMA found that over 40%
of small businesses don’t reopen after being flooded.
Vulnerable
populations
Flooding is a complicated hazard to understand and accessing flood warning, flood
insurance, and other information often requires command of English, understanding of
government bureaucracy, and access to financial resources. Populations that don’t speak
English, don’t have access to government resources, and those that cannot afford or
don’t have flood insurance are particularly vulnerable to the long-term impacts of
flooding.
Renters can be particularly vulnerable to the impacts of flooding. Families that rent make
up over 50% of the households in the floodplain, whereas they make up approximately
37% of households in the entire County. Renters are more often vulnerable because
they’re far less likely to have a flood insurance policy. Out of the many thousands of
families that rent, there are less than 300 renters flood insurance policies, according to
data from FEMA, and some of those may be business properties that the data cannot
distinguish. Renters often have less wealth or savings to draw from to pay for uninsured
losses.
Property Flooding particularly impacts property and often causes many millions of dollars in
property damage in major flooding events. Even a small amount of water inside a
building can cause significant property damage and leave building owners with large
repair bills. For families, damage to homes may mean difficult financial decisions,
displacement for weeks, and lost belongings. For business owners, flood damage may
mean lost economic output from shutdowns, destroyed inventory, and inability to pay
employees.
Throughout King County, there is at least $5 billion of building value in floodplains.
Federal flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program is the primary
way building owners financially protect their property in floodprone areas. As of June
2019, flood insurance policies cover over $2 billion worth of property throughout King
County. Many larger commercial or industrial facilities are insured through private
contracts, the value of which is not available to government agencies.
Community Repetitive Loss Properties
Auburn 0
Bellevue 3
Burien 6
Carnation 0
Duvall 2
Issaquah 14
Kent 2
King County 108
Kirkland 1
129
Mercer
Island 1
North Bend 4
Redmond 0
Renton 0
Skykomish 4
Snoqualmie 134
Woodinville 2
Most of these structures are residential. King County attempted to assess the use type of
these properties; however, none of the available data sources on RL/SRL properties from
the CRS or FEMA contained use types. Even the property-specific forms required to
evaluate under CRS did not include use.
The economy In 2007, an economic study was conducted to understanding the economic impact of
flooding. The study found that 6% of the region’s jobs are located in the floodplain and
nearly 7% of the county’s wages and salaries are generated in the floodplain ($3.7 billion).
20% of the county’s manufacturing employment and 30% of the county’s aerospace
employment are found in floodplains. A major flood that would shut-down economic
activity in floodplains would result in at least $46 million per day in lost economic output.
Flooding will affect certain industries like agriculture, aerospace, manufacturing, and
distribution more heavily because of their presence and reliance on floodplain locations.
In the lower Snoqualmie valley, there are nearly 200 farms that produce a wide range of
products from dairy to herbs and row crop vegetables. The Sammamish River valley
supports a number of wineries and other small farms. And the Green River valley hosts
many large fields of row crops as well as a large County-owned farm leased out by a
diverse group of farmers. Flooding can negatively impact these operations, particularly if
it occurs before harvest or late into the spring planting season. Farmers cannot sell food
products from flood-damaged fields. Flooding, however, also provides nutrients to the
soil that supports productive agriculture.
While some agricultural sectors are dependent on natural floodplain functions, other
economic sectors have located in the floodplain over decades for other reasons. Large
warehouses in the Green River valley, many in the floodplain, make the region one of the
largest logistics hubs in the nation. But, the square footage of warehouse and aerospace
facilities means that billions of dollars are at risk of flooding every year as well as
thousands of jobs.
The
environment
Flooding is a natural process and supports unique ecosystems and habitats. Many riparian
and aquatic ecosystems depend upon some amount of regular flooding or high water
events. Various salmonid species use high water events to seek refuge as juveniles or
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access more favorable habitats, which makes flooding an important part of recovery for
the endangered salmon species in Puget Sound.
Natural floodplain functions typically result in slower-moving floodwaters with less
intense flood height peaks. When upland forest areas are logged or burned, rain and
snowmelt reach streams faster, which can cause flooding to be more intense and push
water through the floodplain more quickly.
King County often incorporates natural functions into the design of projects, which helps
reduce flood risk as well as protect and restore ecosystems. Reconnecting rivers and
coastlines to their historic floodplains through levee setbacks, creating side channels, and
removing obstructions help restore natural functions and bring flood risk reduction
benefits as well. The large Countyline project near Auburn restored 121 acres of
floodplain along the White River and reduce flood risk for over 200 residential properties.
Health
systems
Of the 127 medical facilities throughout King County, only 5 are located in the 0.2%
annual chance floodplain (which includes the 1% annual chance floodplain) and of those,
only 1 is located in the 1% annual chance floodplain. No hospitals are located in the 0.2%
annual chance floodplain. While these 5 facilities are certainly at risk, the risk from
flooding to the overall healthcare and medical system is low.
One area of concern is the ability of residents in certain areas of the County, in particular
sole-access neighborhoods and the lower Snoqualmie Valley, to evacuate for medical
reasons during times of flooding. Neighborhoods with roads that are inaccessible during
flooding are particularly vulnerable. The lower Snoqualmie Valley can also be isolated
when the river reaches beyond a flood phase 4 level.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Because few government facilities are located in floodprone areas, flooding does not pose
a substantial risk to the continuity of government operations. Certain city buildings in
Snoqualmie, North Bend, and Carnation are in floodprone areas, but some are elevated
and others are outside floodprone areas.
Responders Police, firefighters, and paramedics play key roles in the response to flooding. Police
officers often help shut roads down to prevent people from driving through floodwaters;
firefighters often rescue people trapped by flooding; and paramedics transport people
hurt by flooding, often from hypothermia or other causes. If any of these first
responders’ buildings are in the 0.2% annual chance floodplain, their ability to respond is
seriously threatened.
Of the 64 police stations in King County, 3 are located in the 0.2% annual chance
floodplain (in Skykomish, Redmond, and Issaquah).
Of the 161 fire stations in King County, 6 are located in the 0.2% annual chance
floodplain (in Skykomish, Seattle, North Bend, Renton, Issaquah, and near Enumclaw).
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Additionally, neighborhoods with roads that are inaccessible during flooding pose
challenges to first responders. They may not be able to drive to homes and may require
helicopters or boats to access.
Infrastructure
systems
• Energy systems: most overhead powerlines are not susceptible to impacts from
flooding unless the power poles are not resistant to flooding. Buried cables
typically aren’t affected by flooding very often.
• Water/Wastewater: flooding, particularly from king tides and coastal storm
systems can damage wastewater infrastructure such as the County’s West Point
Treatment Plant. Some city wastewater treatment plants are also located in
floodprone riverine areas. Where these linear systems cross rivers, flooding can
pose issues. The Tolt Pipeline, a water supply line for Seattle, was at risk from the
Snoqualmie River migrating further toward its alignment. In 2019, a project was
completed to provide some protection from that risk.
• Transportation: roads through the Snoqualmie Valley are particularly susceptible
to flooding and close regularly during high water events. Valley residents are
often isolated. King County Road Services Division closes roads and will be
working on an effort to study the impacts of flooding on various county roads.
• Communications: most communications infrastructure is not vulnerable to
flooding.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
Flooding occurs frequently enough in King County that residents often turn to the King
County River & Floodplain Management Section for help and information during
flooding events. Confidence is high in the government’s ability to respond to flooding
events. The multiple iterations of the Flood Hazard Management Plan have featured
robust stakeholder involvement processes, which has inspired confidence in King
County’s ability to manage floodplains with higher regulatory standards and other
programs to keep people and property safe from flooding.
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Regional Risk Profile: Hazardous Materials
Hazard Description
Hazardous materials releases are one of the most common incident types. They can occur due to an
accident or also be secondary to other primary hazards like: terrorist attack, earthquake and volcanic
activity, severe flooding, and fires. Hazardous materials releases occur from leaking containers or
pipelines when corrosion or a puncture occurs, accidental overflow of vessels when being transferred,
loading dock and warehouse accidents, careless handling, illegal activities like drug labs, and traffic
accidents. The person who dumps paint down a sewer is releasing a hazardous material. The illegal drug
lab is using hazardous materials and leaving hazardous waste. The car accident that leaves a pool of fuel,
oil, and anti-freeze has left hazardous materials to clean up. A growing source of materials releases is
from electronic waste dumping, releasing chemicals like lead, zinc, nickel, flame retardants, barium, and
chromium into the environment.
There are nine classes of hazardous materials.
1. Explosives
2. Gases
3. Flammable Liquid and Combustible Liquid
4. Flammable Solid, Spontaneously Combustible, and Dangerous When Wet
5. Oxidizer and Organic Peroxide
6. Poison (Toxic) and Poison Inhalation Hazard
7. Radioactive
8. Corrosive
9. Miscellaneous
Examples of common hazardous materials include anhydrous ammonia (used as a refrigerant), gasoline
and diesel (used as transportation fuels), paints and dyes (for homes and clothing), and many corrosives
(used in the local aircraft manufacturing industry).70 Pipelines and rail lines transport crude oil to
refineries and finished fuels to homes (natural gas) and retail fueling stations for vehicles.
The risk of a CBRNe event (an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nerve agent) is low, if
one were to occur this would have widespread impacts. There is little known day-to-day risk of an event,
though this is a major focus of federal, state, and local counterterrorism planners. More information on
hazardous materials in terrorist events will be provided in the terrorism hazard profile.
Although the likelihood of large numbers of fatalities from a single materials release is low, the effects
can be devastating to impacted communities, the economy and the environment. A major oil spill in
Puget Sound would destroy the fishery, including $4.5 billion in commercial fishing, plus tourism, and
sport fishing. The Puget Sound is also a culturally-sacred and environmentally-critical resource that
70 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Nine Classes of Hazardous Materials. Accessed online on 7/2/19 from
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Nine_Classes_of_Hazardous_Materials-4-
2013_508CLN.pdf.
133
cannot be replaced or valued in dollars. In this way, the hazardous materials incident hazard is one of
the most complex. It includes frequent spills and releases from day to day human activities, a threat of a
major release from a massive spill or accident, and the threat of an intentional release from an attack.
The impacts from hazardous materials are also complex, including slow-acting releases that kill people
and the environment over years and
catastrophes that kill thousands, such as in
Bhopal, India in 1984.
Between July 1, 2015 and March 31 2019
Washington State Department of Ecology
received 748 reports of oil spills of one
gallon or more reaching a water source,
including both running into storm drains
and running directly into a waterway. This
only includes reported spills and only
includes oil spills. This does not include the
uncountable quantity of micro-spills that
occur and are later washed into waterways
by rain. For example, the rough spot of
pavement in a parking lot that is the result
of fluids dripping onto the pavement from parked vehicles is
an oil spill.71
In Washington, the state Department of Ecology is the lead agency for hazardous materials. Local
response is led by fire services.
71 Washington State Department of Ecology. Coastal Atlas. Accessed online on 7/2/19 from
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/coastalatlas/storymaps/spills/spills_sm.html.
Class 1, 3, and 4 Spills Program-Regulated Facilities (WA
ECY)
134
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
King County hosts a variety of unique transportation and
geographic conditions, including one of the largest deep
water seaports on the west coast, an International Airport in
SeaTac that handles cargo from all over the world, as well as
fuel pipelines running south from Whatcom County through
King County and down into Portland carrying jet fuels,
diesel, gasoline, etc. An estimated 18,833 oil tank cars travel
through King County each quarter.72 Additionally, local
highways like Interstate-5, Interstate-90, Interstate 405, US
Highway 2, State Route (SR) 18, SR 516, SR 167, US
Highway 99 and others transport hazardous materials
throughout the region.
In the City of Seattle alone there are thousands of facilities
with hazardous materials regulated under the fire code.73
Other areas with high concentrations of hazardous materials
usage include Auburn, Redmond and the Kent Valley.
Business types that commonly use hazardous materials include: hospitals, schools and universities, metal
plating and finishing, the aircraft industry, public utilities, cold storage companies, the fuel industries, the
communication industry, chemical distributors, research, and high technology firms. Each of these
facilities is required to maintain plans for warning, notification, evacuation and site security under
various regulations.
While the majority of incidents tend to involve petroleum products, a significant number involve
extremely hazardous materials. Extremely hazardous materials include chemicals like chlorine, ammonia,
sulfuric acid, nitric acid, some pesticides (EHS is a technical designation, so not pesticides- although the
chemistries used as pesticides might be on the EHS list), and other chemicals that can cause immediate
death or injury when inhaled, ingested, or come in contact with skin. Approximately 200 local facilities
with extremely hazardous materials report to the county under Community Right to Know Act
provisions. (plug with time and description of LEPC Seattle and King) These sites report their
inventories annually with records being retained in databases in multiple locations.74
Though they occur every day, many spills are not reported or go undetected. Some industrial spills from
the 1970’s and 1980’s are still being cleaned up in the Kent Valley, Harbor Island, Duwamish corridor,
72 Washington State Department of Ecology. Coastal Atlas. Accessed online on 7/2/19 from
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/coastalatlas/storymaps/spills/spills_sm.html.
73 National Fire Protection Association. Materials Management Codes and Standards. Accessed online on 6/25/19 from
https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-
standards?mode=code&code=400.
74 King County Local Emergency Management Planning Committee. 2015. Tier II Reports.
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and Seattle/South Park as federal Superfund cleanup sites. There are currently 10 active Superfund
cleanup sites in King County.75 At least five other Superfund sites have completed cleanup and have
been closed since the program began. Currently active sites include:
1. Harbor Island – groundwater contains benzene, ethyl benzene, xylene, mercury, cadmium, lead
and zinc with poly chlorinated bi-phenols (PCB) sediments. 18
2. Lockheed West Seattle – heavy metal contaminants: arsenic, chromium, copper, lead, silver, and
zinc with butyl tins and PCBs.
3. Lower Duwamish Waterway – River sediments are contaminated with mercury, arsenic, PCBs,
dioxins, furans, and phthalates.
4. Midway Landfill – Ground water contaminated with heavy metals and volatile organics.
5. Pacific Car and Foundry – Soil is contaminated with heavy metals, PCBs and solvents.
Approximately 37,000 obtain drinking water from wells within three miles.
6. Pacific Sound Resources – Soil and ground water contaminated by PCBs and heavy metals from
former wood treatment operations.
7. Queen City Farms – the site is a former landfill. Ground water, surface water, and sludge
contaminated by volatile organic compounds. Soil contaminated with PCBs and metals.
8. Quendall Terminals – Soil and ground water contaminated with benzene and creosote from
former manufacturing plant. Contaminants release to Lake Washington.
9. Seattle Municipal Landfill (Kent Highlands) – Landfill contains volatile organic compounds like
toluene, xylene, vinyl chloride, and others – plus heavy metals.
10. Western Processing – former industrial processing facility ground water and sediment contains
volatile organic compounds, PCBs, phenols, and heavy metals
An example of the cleanup costs for a Superfund site is illustrated by the Harbor Island Cleanup. The
former owner, RSR Corporation agreed to pay $8.5 million in fines toward the cleanup that will cost
(when completed) over $32 million.76 The cost to cleanup an illegal drug lab (in a home) can cost
between $5,000 and $100,000 depending on the size of the home. Often the occupants vacate or
abandon the sites – leaving a bank or credit union holding the mortgage and cleanup costs.77
Scenario Drivers
It is difficult to find a home, school, hospital or place of business that isn’t without chemicals, solvents,
pesticides, lawn chemicals, cleaners and/or paints.
Pipeline rupture
Washington State hosts the only oil refineries in the Northwest. Multiple
pipelines traverse the state, such as the Olympic Pipeline. Failures or
shutdowns in the pipeline can cause fuel shortages and price increases. An
explosion on the Olympic Pipeline in 1999 killed three people and cost over
$58 million in property damage.
75 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Superfund Sites Where You Live. Accessed online on 6/25/19 from
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/search-superfund-sites-where-you-live
76 U.S. Department of Justice. 2006. Former Harbor Island Smelter Operator to Pay $8.5 Million in Superfund Cleanup
Costs. Accessed online on 6/25/19 from https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/January/06_enrd_047.html.
77 Dewan, Shaila and Robbie Brown. July 25, 2009. When an ex-meth lab is home. The Seattle Times. Accessed online on
6/25/19 from https://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/when-an-ex-meth-lab-is-a-home/.
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Chemical/oil train
derailment
An oil spill in 2016 in Moser, Oregon along the Columbia River very nearly
caused the destruction of the entire town and an ecological catastrophe in
the river. The community was saved by luck of the weather and because
most of the oil that spilled flowed into a water treatment plan, where it was
safely contained.
Oil tanker spill
An oil tanker spill in the Puget Sound would devastate marine life and
potentially cause a permanent shut-down in oil tanker traffic due to public
outcry. A major spill would close the fishery economy leading to $4.5 billion
in losses for Washington alone and permanent, incalculable damage to tribal
cultural resources.
Storage facility failure in a
populated area
A facility failure, including an explosion or release of chemicals, could
endanger or kill many people. In Waco, Texas in 2013, an ammonium nitrate
explosion occurred at a distribution facility, leveling a neighborhood and
killing 15 people. A train derailment in 2013 in Lac Megantic in Quebec,
Canada killed 60 people and destroyed much of the town.
Vehicle accident on a
major roadway
Vehicle accidents that release fuel and oil occur every day on Washington
roads. A major incident, especially at an interchange, such as the I-5 and I-
405 interchange in Tukwila/Renton would potentially close both freeways
for an extended period while cleanup occurs.
CBRNe Attack
Another lower-risk, but high-intensity hazardous materials event is from a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nerve agent (CBRNe) attack.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Low-income communities
in or around industrial
facilities
Low-income communities are more likely to be impacted from major
releases due to the proximity of affordable housing to industrial areas and
historic environmental injustices.
Individuals with
respiratory issues
Individuals with respiratory issues are more likely to succumb quickly to an
airborne release of a chemical.
Major transportation
facilities such as the Port
of Seattle
Major transportation facilities store huge amounts of chemicals and fuel in
depots. A failure or fire at one of these facilities could damage or destroy
these assets.
Rail facilities Rail facilities transport chemicals and fuels, including highly combustible
crude oil. There have been multiple derailments and spills. In Moser, Oregon
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in 2016, a train derailed causing a fire that nearly destroyed the town and the
fuel was prevented from leaking in large quantities into the Columbia River
by luck.
Interstate highways
Interstate highways are a major artery carrying chemicals. Accidents happen
every day and major chemical spills can shut down a roadway for an
extended period of time. (oil slicks contribute to traffic injuries and fatalities
when it rains)
Oil tankers in Puget
Sound
Oil tankers are expected to traverse Puget Sound in growing numbers due to
Canada’s approval of a major pipeline and terminal in Vancouver, BC. When
this occurs, it will significantly raise the risk a spill that could destroy much
of the aquatic life in Puget Sound.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
Potential Impacts to the public from a hazardous materials spill can vary widely.
Temporary or even permanent displacement through evacuation from an unsafe area can
result in relocation/displacement of populations. Employment disruption, school closure,
impacts to private and community wellheads and other impacts can change whole
communities. Long term exposure to toxic chemicals can cause birth defects and
temporary or permanent health problems – especially for the young, old and infirm.78
Vulnerable
populations
Vulnerable populations often live in closer proximity to facilities with the risk of
hazardous materials release. In King County, this includes residences near the Duwamish
industrial area, in Kent, Renton, and south Seattle. These are also the locations of the
superfund sites in the region. In cases of major releases or system failures, the most
impacted populations are frequently lower-income, often ethnic minority communities
that live nearby. Populations with respiratory issues are also at a heightened risk of
impacts due to an airborne release of chemicals.
Property Spills of hazardous materials to soil or buildings can result in extensive and costly cleanup
efforts. Cleanup standards are established by federal (U.S. EPA), state (Washington State
Department of Ecology), and local standards (fire agencies and environmental agencies).
Until a site is cleaned up to those standards, residential or business occupancy can be
denied under the Health Code. The responsible party (property owner) may be required
to pay for the cleanup. Often this can lead to bankruptcy and clean up by state or federal
agencies and contractors. Contaminated property can drastically reduce the value of the
property and the King County subsequent property taxes available to local and state
78 U.S. Centers for Disease Control. Health Effects of Chemical Exposure. Accessed online on 6/25/19 from
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/emes/public/docs/Health%20Effects%20of%20Chemical%20Exposure%20FS.pdf .
138
government. Similar impacts can be expected for transportation accidents with hazardous
material spills.
The economy Small spills can close businesses and rather large impact on employment and land use
including the properties of neighbors not responsible for the chemical release. Superfund
sites can impact a community for decades until they are cleaned up. The large salmon and
fishing fleet that calls King County home may be impacted when some of a year’s fish
stock – or even the entire run is impacted.
The
environment
Any chemical spill on or along rails, roads, pipelines, fixed industrial facilities or illegal
drug labs/dumping may impact the natural environment. Wetlands, streams and rivers,
lakes, and reservoirs may all be damaged from chemical spills. In some cases these
damages may injure the plant and animal life irreparably. Birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish,
and mammals may all be impacted. Air pollutants may impact human inhabitants as well
as the natural environment. Recreational areas can be closed until a suitable solution can
be found to recover the natural environment.
Health
systems
Hospitals can be overwhelmed by major releases of hazardous materials as populations,
both those exposed and those who feel they may have been, check in at emergency
rooms. Hospitals and pharmacies are also sources of hazardous materials, including some
radioactive materials such as those associated with cancer treatment.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
King County is the operator of several facilities that are vulnerable to hazardous materials
spills. The county has three waste water operations (South Plant, West Point Treatment
Plant, and Brightwater). These expensive facilities are vulnerable to the introduction of
chemicals (when in large volumes) to the sanitary sewer system. The county also has solid
waste (garbage) transfer stations and a major landfill operation at Cedar Hills. While
contaminants are avoided, some material may make its way into the landfill and the
ground water table. Drinking water facilities including private and community well heads
and reservoirs may also be vulnerable to introduction of chemical or biological
contaminants. Any chemical spill that impacts a major roadway or rail line may impact
public transit routes in the county.
Responders Hazardous materials make response and recovery activities in all disasters a threat to the
health and safety of responders. During local events, such as house fires, stores of
chemicals can catch fire and explode, injuring responders. During larger events such as
earthquakes, large-scale releases can surprise and overwhelm responders without proper
equipment. It can also be extremely difficult to determine the chemical or chemicals that
have been released from a given spill, adding to first responder danger.
Infrastructure
systems
With hazardous materials being everywhere in our modern community, it is possible to
impact almost any critical facility in the county. Any roadway or rail line is vulnerable to
the many chemicals transported over them daily. Spills to soils and surface water sources
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can impact drinking water and the environment. Materials dumped into sanitary sewers
can contaminate waste water treatment plants. Airborne chemicals can cause the
evacuation of the area downwind of the spill, including critical facilities. Damage to road
surfaces from chemical spills may require the removal and replacement of the entire road
surface and foundational road bed. Transformers used in power transmission contain
chemicals called PCB (Poly chlorinated bi-phenols) that can be released during wind
storms or lightning strikes and traffic accidents. The impacts to business from interrupted
commute/road or railroads closures can last for hours, days, weeks, or longer. White
powder incidents have closed postal facilities and government buildings until the
substance was identified and removed
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
The Community Right to Know Act, and other related legislation, resulted from serious
breaches in public confidence following massive releases, explosions, or other failures in
hazardous materials systems. Any major incident in and of itself seems to offer proof to
the public of a regulatory failure. Maintaining Local Emergency Planning Committees and
a regular structure to report and analyze hazardous materials releases is critical to
maintaining public confidence.
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Regional Risk Profile: Health Incident79
Hazard Description
Disease has been one of the most influential factors in human history. On many occasions, disease has
shaped civilizations and altered the course of history. Throughout the 20th century great strides in
medicine have produced many treatments and cures for the deadliest diseases. Many of these medical
advances have given us a false sense of security that all diseases can be treated or cured in a timely
manner, even though the potential for a devastating disease outbreak continues to threaten our
community.
The impact of these diseases varies based on the virulence of the disease, duration of the illness,
susceptibility of the population to the disease, and spread within the community.
An outbreak can be characterized by the extent of spread of the disease. Epidemic refers to an increase,
often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that population in
that area. Pandemic refers to an epidemic that has spread over several countries or continents, usually
affecting a large number of people. More common diseases are classified as endemic, as they are at
baseline levels within a community. New or emerging diseases can quickly become an
epidemic/pandemic if there is little or no immunity in the population.
Common disease outbreaks include influenza, norovirus, pertussis, hepatitis A, Salmonella, and E. coli..
Novel strains of influenza are a great risk to King County, because of lack of immunity to a new
influenza virus stain, the potential for severe illness, and the high degree of transmissibility from person
to person.
For King County, the Communicable Disease Epidemiology & Immunization Section within Public
Health – Seattle & King County investigates and coordinates the surveillance of communicable disease
cases and outbreaks.
The impact of a disease can be tracked and characterized using several different indicators. These
indicators can help Public Health assess and respond to potential disease outbreaks.
• Incubation period: The stage of subclinical disease extending from the time of exposure to onset of
disease symptoms.
• Contagious period: The duration after infection during with the person can transmit the infection
to others.
• Infectivity: The proportion of exposed persons who become infected.
• Pathogenicity: The proportion of infected persons who develop clinically apparent disease.
• Virulence: The proportion of clinically apparent cases that are severe or fatal.
79 This risk profile was developed for the Seattle and King County Hazard Mitigation Plans by Public Health Seattle &
King County.
141
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Epidemics directly affect the health of people who live, work, and visit a community. They have the
potential to be one of the deadliest hazards a community can face. Sickness is the most visible
consequence of an epidemic, but outbreaks can also severely impact the community as schools,
businesses, government agencies and non-profit organizations curtail operations due to employee illness
or as countermeasures. The effects of these curtailments grow the longer the disease persists.
In many epidemic and pandemic situations, disease spreads quickly throughout a community. There are
many factors that can increase King County’s vulnerability to disease spread:
• Rapid population growth, such as is occurring in King County, increases the potential for
acquisition and spread of infectious diseases.
• King County’s large international air and seaports (including an active cruise ship industry)
increase the number of visitors to our area and the risk for importation of infectious diseases.
Diseases that are not endemic to Washington have the potential for introduction and spread
among our residents. Vaccine preventable diseases (e.g., acute viral hepatitis, measles, and
influenza) are significant contributors to morbidity and potential mortality in international
travelers and can cause local outbreaks among susceptible persons.
• Persons experiencing homelessness often also have limited access to medical care, so many
people living homeless and with health problems have difficulty getting prompt treatment.
Living conditions – like crowding and fewer opportunities for personal hygiene – can contribute
to the spread of disease. If someone has an underlying medical condition, alcohol or drug use,
or weakened immune system, they are even more susceptible. In 2017 and 2018, CD-Imms
responded to increases in several infectious diseases among persons experiencing homelessness;
new infections and outbreaks in this population continue to be reported and might continue to
rise given the increase in persons experiencing homelessness in King County.
Disease often affects those most vulnerable in our communities. Young children, the elderly, the poor
and those with underlying health conditions are often the hardest hit by disease.
King County has a large concentration of healthcare resources, but in an epidemic or pandemic these
resources can be stretched or overwhelmed by the outbreak situation. The area also provides specialized
medical care for a large geographic area, including one of the area’s only pediatric hospitals and the only
Level 1 Trauma center for Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Alaska. In addition, Airlift Northwest
located at Boeing Field is the only life-flight agency serving the same four-state region.
Other resources, such as food and water, are also a concern when planning for disease outbreaks. King
County has many open reservoirs that provide water to the city. These reservoirs could become
contaminated and be a source of infection for area residents. Food sources can become contaminated
by improper food handling practices or ill food workers. Public Health conducts ongoing surveillance
for food- and waterborne illnesses to identify and quickly control outbreaks.
Although it is impossible to predict the next disease outbreak, history has shown that outbreaks are not
uncommon and can produce devastating effects on a community. While the revolution in medicine in
the past century has increased our ability to counteract disease, increases in the number of people
without adequate healthcare, the evolution of antibiotic resistant bacteria and globalization help make
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outbreaks spread more quickly and increase their magnitude. Disease outbreaks not only cause
increased morbidity and mortality in the community, but also put a greater strain on the healthcare and
infrastructure system that could prevent the operation of critical services.
Throughout the 20th century several epidemics and pandemics have affected our community.
Influenza. 1918-1919: The influenza pandemic of 1918 was especially virulent, killing a large number of
young, otherwise healthy adults. The pandemic caused more than 500,000 deaths in the United States
and more than 40 million deaths around the world. The 1918 pandemic first arrived in Seattle in
October 1918; over the next six months the virus claimed 1,600 lives.
Influenza. 1957-1958: The influenza pandemic of 1957 was less severe than the 1918 pandemic and
caused a total of 70,000 fatalities nation-wide.
Influenza. 1968-1969: The influenza pandemic caused more than 34,000 deaths in the U.S. and cause
severe morbidity and mortality around the world.
E. coli. 1993: E. coli-contaminated hamburger meat from a local Jack in the Box caused illness in 400
people and led to the death of two people within one month in the Washington area. Cases were seen in
California, Idaho, and Nevada as well.
Pertussis. 2002-2005: Between 2002 and 2003 Public Health reported an 82% increase in the number of
Pertussis infections in infants, and a three-fold increase in the number of cases in children <6 months.
The occurrence of Pertussis in adolescents and adults has been on the rise since 1990, culminating in a
national epidemic in 2005 when 25,616 reported cases nation-wide. Outbreaks within healthcare
facilities can occur quickly because the bacterial infection is highly contagious.
Influenza. 2009: Like the 1918 pandemic, the H1N1 outbreak of 2009 affected the young and healthy
populations as well as those with chronic diseases. This increase in morbidity caused strain on the local
healthcare system. Although the H1N1 virus was not as virulent and there were not nearly as many
fatalities as previous pandemics, the outbreak caused a larger than usual amount of disease in the
community than seasonal influenza virus does.
Scenario Drivers
The most likely scenario that activates the region’s emergency management system would be a disease
outbreak that just exceeds our public health system’s capacity. We have chosen hepatitis A outbreak for
the Most Likely Scenario. In 2017, several state and local health departments responded to hepatitis A
outbreaks, spread through person to person contact, that occurred primarily among persons who use
injection and non-injection drugs, and/or person who experienced homelessness and their close
contacts. Multistate outbreaks of hepatitis A infections have also been linked to food products (i.e.
143
strawberries in 2016 and pomegranate seeds in 2013).80 A large outbreak centered in Seattle would cause
a strain on the public health system and potentially have strong impacts on local businesses, especially
any that the public perceives as responsible for the outbreak.
Hepatitis A Outbreak
Seattle is the center of a hepatitis A outbreak that kills 20 people and makes
hundreds severely ill, including hundreds of hospitalizations. The emergency is
complicated, and infections are spreading among people who are living homeless
who have limited access to adequate hygiene and prompt medical care.
Pandemic Flu
The most severe disease outbreaks would involve pathogens that would infect a
large percentage of an exposed population and hospitalize or kill many people.
Pandemic influenza has the potential to cause this great a disaster. It poses a great
threat to the health of our local community as well as the national/international
community. In addition to human morbidity and mortality, pandemic influenza
can have many socio-economic consequences. Cancellations of schools, work
and public gatherings may be enacted to attempt to halt the spread of disease.
Staff absenteeism can create a strain on government and healthcare systems
causing limitations of services and care. The 2009 H1N1 flu outbreak showed
how potentially easy it is to overwhelm the healthcare system, even though, as it
happened, H1N1 was an influenza that caused less severe disease than a typical
seasonal flu. A pandemic influenza that caused moderate or severe disease would
have a much larger impact on the community. The following table outlines
expected disease rates based on Center for Disease Control modeling.
Characteristic Moderate (1958/68 - like) Severe (1918 - like)
US
King
County US King county
Illness 90 million 540,000 90 million 540,000
Outpatient Care 45 million 270,000 45 million 270,000
ICU Care 128,750 733 1,485,000 8,910
Mechanical
Ventilation 64,875 389 742,500 4,455
Deaths 209,000 1,254 1,903,000 11,418
80 Centers for Disease Control. Hepatitis A Outbreaks in the United States. Accessed online on 6/28/19 from
https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/outbreaks/hepatitisaoutbreaks.htm .
144
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism is another potential cause of on a catastrophic disease outbreak. The
maximum bioterrorism scenario is estimated by Public Health – Seattle & King
County to have impacts similar to the pandemic flu scenario identified above.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Old and young people People who are either old or young have weaker immune systems and are
usually more likely to succumb during an outbreak.
Healthcare staff
Healthcare staff come into regular contact with sick patients and are likely to
be exposed both before the illness is identified and during treatment.
People with compromised
immune systems
People with compromised immune systems are most likely to become
infected and succumb from a serious disease.
People without health
insurance
People without health insurance are more likely to delay getting care,
allowing the disease to spread farther before it is identified.
Health system
The health system is likely to be overwhelmed in any serious epidemic. In
especially serious outbreaks, it may be inadvisable for patients to even come
to the hospital and treatment may have to occur outside of hospital facilities.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
As many as 11,418 deaths are estimated to occur during the most severe pandemic
scenario. Thousands more would be hospitalized, and hundreds of thousands sickened.
As of May 4, 2019, there were 45 influenza fatalities in the 2018-2019 flu season.
Vulnerable
populations
In 2017-2018 flu season, there were nearly 1,000,000 hospitalizations and 79,400 deaths.
The most at-risk group is adults over 65 years of age (70% of hospitalizations).81 Older
adults account for nearly 90% of deaths. During a serious epidemic, older adults,
individuals with compromised immune systems, children, people without health
insurance, people who speak a language other than English, and people who are recent
immigrants to the country are likely to be the most at-risk and suffer the worst impacts.
Property There are no direct impacts to property.
The economy The economy may come to a virtual standstill for weeks on end during severe outbreaks
as people avoid public places. Many small businesses may lose too much revenue and be
81 Centers for Disease Control. Estimated Influenza Illnesses, Medical visits, Hospitalizations, and Deaths in the United
States — 2017–2018 influenza season. Accessed online on 6/28/19 from
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/2017-2018.htm.
145
forced to close. Nationally, the economic impact of seasonal influenza has been estimated
as high as $166 billion (2012 dollars).82
The
environment There are no expected impacts to the environment.
Health
systems
Health systems will be overwhelmed and many nurses and doctors potentially sickened.
As facilities become unable to take additional patients, it may be possible to treat people
in outpatient facilities. During the worst-credible scenario, nearly 300,000 residents of
King County would require treatment. This would be far beyond the capacity of the
public health system.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Many government operations may cease to function on a normal basis during the most
severe outbreaks. Agencies may have to adopt work from home policies and take other
steps to protect employees. Due to employee illness, many non-essential functions may
have to be curtailed.
Responders Emergency services would be severely impacted during a serious outbreak because they
are likely to be exposed early due to public contact. As responders become sick, response
times and capabilities would be severely limited.
Infrastructure
systems
• Energy: There are no direct impacts, outside of employee absenteeism, to the
energy sector.
• Water/Wastewater: There are no direct impacts to the water and wastewater
system from most outbreaks, although this system is a potential target of
bioterrorist activities.
• Transportation: A disease would not cause any direct damage to the
transportation system, but high absenteeism would affect it. Public transit,
shipping, and other services may only function at 50% during especially severe
outbreaks.
• Communications: There are no direct impacts, outside of employee absenteeism,
to the communications sector.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
The public understands that an outbreak is a severe natural event; however, restrictions
on public gatherings are not popular and create frustration. Some people may believe they
are not getting enough attention from the medical community. Others may begin to
doubt the efficacy of treatment options if the disease worsens. In the most extreme cases,
confidence in the medical system can be shaken.
82 Mao, Liang, Yang, Yang, Qui, Youliang, and Yan Yang. 2012. Annual economic impacts of seasonal influenza on US
counties: Spatial heterogeneity and patterns. International Journal of Health Geography vol. 11 no. 16. Accessed online on
6/28/19 from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3479051/.
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Regional Risk Profile: Landslide
Hazard Description
The term “landslide” covers a range of geomorphic processes in which masses of soil, rock, debris (a
mixture of soil and rock) become detached and move downslope. This mass is usually wet, saturated, or
suspended in water. This movement can happen quickly or slowly; displaced material can remain solid
or move as a liquid. Landslides can range in size from a few cubic yards to millions of cubic yards. The
detailed character of movement is referred to herein as the landslide style. The style of landsliding
depends on the local geology, topography, and hydrology in the vicinity of the failure. Five general styles
of landslide phenomenon have been identified in King County:83
• Deep-seated landslides (including rotational slides, liquefaction spreads, debris flowslides,
• debris avalanches, and rock compound slides),
• Shallow debris slides,
• Processes that build depositional fans (including debris flows and debris floods),
• Rock fall, and
• Rock avalanches.
Landslides are usually a secondary hazard, typically driven by precipitation. Smaller and shallower
landslides are often triggered by storm events lasting hours or days. Large deep-seated slides may be
triggered by wetter than normal conditions that persist for months. Historical records and geologic
evidence also show that large earthquakes, while relatively infrequent can be significant landslide
triggers. Landslides can also be triggered by ill-advised clearing, grading, or stormwater discharge.
Landslides tend to happen in areas where there is a history of previous occurrences. Another major
determinant of landslide risk is local geology. King County’s landscape is very young and is largely a
product of multiple glacial advances over the last two million years, with the most recent advance
approximately 14,000 years ago. Landslides are most common where post-glacial erosion has created
steep slopes in glacial deposits, primarily along beach bluffs, ravine slopes, and river valley walls. In
addition to areas of steep slope some areas of lower slope are actually old, deep-seated landslides which
may be at risk of reactivation. Characteristics of landslide hazard areas include:8485
• A slope greater than 40 percent
• Landslide activity or movement in the last 10,000 years
• Stream or wave action with erosion or bank undercutting
83 King County. 2016. Mapping of Potential Landslide Hazards along the River Corridors of King County, Washington.
Prepared by River and Floodplain Management Section, Water and Land Resources Division, Department of Natural
Resources and Parks. Seattle, WA. August.
84 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2018. King County Risk Report: Landslide Exposure Assessment. Page 52.
85 Washington State Emergency Management Division. 2018. Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan Risk
Assessment. Page 308.
147
• The presence of a depositional fan that may indicate a history of debris flows, debris floods, or
rockfall
• The presence of impermeable soils, such as silt or clay, which are mixed with granular soils such
as sand and gravel
Landslides are dangerous and unpredictable. Some landslides may show indications of impending or
incipient movement; others may happen suddenly without any warning signs. Warning signs of a
potential or impending landslide include:86
• Rapidly growing cracks in the ground; downslope movement of rock, soil, or vegetation.
• Sudden changes in creek water levels, sometimes with increased sediment, especially during or
right after large or protracted storm events
• Sounds of cracking wood, knocking boulders, groaning of the ground, or other unusual sounds,
especially if the sound increases
• A hillside that has increased spring and (or) seep activity, or newly saturated ground, especially if
it was previously dry
• Formation of cracks or tilting of trees on a hillside
• New or developing cracks, mounds, or bulges in the ground
• Sagging or taut utility lines; leaning telephone poles, deformed fences, or bent trees
• Sticking windows or doors; new and (or) growing cracks in walls, ceilings, or foundations
• Broken or leaking utilities, such as water, septic, or sewer lines
• Separation of structures from their foundation; movement of soil away from foundations
• Changes in water well levels or water wells that suddenly run dry
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
The most significant landslide risk in King County is during the rainy season from November through
January.
Areas in the County most at risk from landsliding include those on or near coastal bluffs, ravine and
valley slopes, and in steep mountainous topography. Parcels on slopes greater than 40 percent are at an
elevated risk of landsliding compared with more level sites. The landslide risk assessment used WA
DNR Landslides and Landforms digital data identifying historic landslide areas, potentially unstable to
intermediate-sloped areas, and potential deep-seated landslide areas.
Since 2006, there have been seven disaster declarations impacting the county, including DR-4168 for the
SR 530 (Oso) landslide in Snohomish County. Landslides occur during virtually every major storm event
and earthquake. Landslides are especially likely in areas where they have been recorded before. A good
method of assessing likelihood of a future landslide is to know if the area has had a history of landslides.
86 Washington State Department of Natural Resources. 2017. Landslide Hazards in Washington State. Accessed online
on 6/7/19 from https://www.dnr.wa.gov/publications/ger_fs_landslide_hazards.pdf?h283k .
148
• 2001 – DR1361 – Nisqually Earthquake triggers landslides around the state. $66.7M in Public
Assistance was authorized.
• 2006 - DR-1737 – Severe storms trigger flooding and landslides. $29.5M in Public Assistance
(statewide) was authorized along with $5.4M in Individual Assistance.
• 2007 – DR-1734 – Severe winter storms trigger landslides. $61.3M in Public Assistance was
authorized along with $21.2M in Individual Assistance.
• 2009 – DR-1817 – Sever winter storms trigger flooding and landslide.
• 2011 – DR-1963 – Severe winter storms trigger flooding and landslides.
• 2014 – DR-4168 – A slope along SR 530 in Snohomish County fails, bringing with it an entire
neighborhood and killing 43 people. This is one of the deadliest disasters in Washington State
History. There is a long history of landslides in this area and the tragedy leads the state to invest
in a new landslide mapping program.
• 2012 – DR-4056 – Severe winter storms trigger flooding and landslides. $30.1M in Public
Assistance was authorized.
• 2017 – DR-4309 – Severe winter storms trigger flooding and landslides. $12.5M in Public
Assistance was authorized.
149
Scenario Drivers8788
For planning purposes, King County looks at three common or particularly deadly landslides. These
usually result after major weather events or due to human activities or other disturbances such as a
major wildfire.
Deep Landslide
Deep-seated landslides are those that fail below the
rooting depth of trees and vegetation. They are
often slow moving but can also move rapidly.
Deep-seated landslides can cover large areas and
devastate infrastructure and housing developments.
These landslides usually occur as translational slides,
rotational slides, or large block slides. Deep-seated
landslides are typically much larger than shallow
landslides, in terms of both surface area and
volume. A deep-seated landslide may appear stable
for years, decades, or even centuries. These long-
lived features can be partially or entirely reactivated
for a variety of reasons.
Debris Flows
Debris flows usually occur in steep gullies, move
very rapidly, and can travel for many miles. Slopes
where vegetation has been removed are at greater
risk for debris flows and many other types of
landslides. The figure shows a series of flows
located in the Cedar River Watershed. The ages of
these slides are unknown, but they are geologically
very young as they overlap (and therefore post-date)
the entire suite of river terraces present here. The
exact trigger for this assemblage of large, closely
spaced landslides is unclear.
87 King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks. Landslide Hazards Program website. Accessed online on
6/7/19 from https://www.kingcounty.gov/services/environment/water-and-land/flooding/maps/river-landslide-
hazards/landslide-types.aspx#Debris.
88 Washington State Geologic Survey. Landslide Hazards Program website. Accessed online on 6/7/19 from
https://www.dnr.wa.gov/programs-and-services/geology/geologic-hazards/landslides#types-of-landslides.8
150
Shallow Landslides
Shallow debris slides (also known as shallow
landslides) are a common style of slope movement
both in the Puget Lowland and Cascade Mountains.
Shallow debris slides are characterized by failure of
a relatively shallow layer of soil typically sliding on a
surface of more competent material, either bedrock
or dense glacial sediments. Shallow debris slides are
typically 3 to 6 feet (1 to 2 meters) and translational.
Shallow colluvial soils on slopes are formed through
a variety of processes, including breaking up of the
underlying in-place substrate (either bedrock or
Quaternary sediments) by freeze/thaw,
wetting/drying, bioturbation, and chemical
weathering. Soils on steep slopes in King County
vary significantly with respect to soil thickness, soil
strength, and hydraulic properties; this variability
presents the central challenge in assessing their
stability across a landscape.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Homes built above, on, or
below bluffs or slopes
Homes built on bluffs or other slopes apply addition weight to a slope and
increase the likelihood of slope failure. Homes built below bluffs have also
been destroyed by slope failure.
Transportation corridors,
including on I-90 and
Seattle-Everett BNSF rail
line
Transportation routes are often cut through steep areas or travel through
valleys with a history of landslides.
Debris flows after
vegetation removal
Coseismic Landsliding
Vegetation removal due to logging, land development, view clearing, or
wildfire reduces the root strength that often anchors and reinforces shallow
soils. Shallow landslides often increases following vegetation removal and if
debris from such a slide enters a hillside swale it may transition into a debris
flow that can have devastating impacts far below and distant from the initial
failure.
This Risk Profile addresses primarily landsliding for which our region has
significant collective experience. This includes of landslides triggered by
weather events and human disturbance. Geologic evidence is clear that this
region is subject to earthquakes from several sources larger than those that
have been well documented in the historical record. Widespread landsliding
151
is likely to be a secondary but significant and potentially catastrophic
consequence of a future occurrence of such a large earthquake xx.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
While the total number of people exposed to landslides is relatively small, and the risk of
a rapid slope failure has tended to be low, many homeowners do not carry insurance to
cover losses from landslide hazards. The total number of people exposed to the landslide
hazard is unknown since landslide hazards are spatially limited and do not align with
population information in Census data.
Vulnerable
populations
No additional impacts to vulnerable populations are expected from this hazard.
Property In total, 2.6 percent of structures in King County are identified as being within a landslide
hazard area, resulting in an estimated $9.8 billion in exposed value. The City of Lake
Forest Park has the highest percentage of structures exposed in a landslide hazard area at
16.4 percent. The cities of Bellevue and Seattle and unincorporated King County are
estimated to each have over $1 billion of estimated exposed value within landslide hazard
areas.89 The slopes of Magnolia, West Seattle, Burien, Des Moines, Vashon Island,
Newcastle, Federal Way and many areas of Bellevue have long been developed for their
magnificent views of
Mount Rainier, the Cascade and Olympic Mountains, and Puget Sound. Homes with
vistas of the Olympic Mountains provide sunsets that are breathe taking – and expose a
risk of land movement damages to property build on poor soils.
The economy There have been direct and indirect impacts to the greater King County community from
landslide activity. Residential housing in the greater Puget Sound area that have been built
to enjoy the spectacular mountain of the Olympics and Cascade ranges and water views
of Lake Washington, Lake Sammamish, and Puget Sound are vulnerable to land
movement. Loss of transportation can also have economic impacts. In November 2008,
State Road 410 was closed as the result of a debris flow east of Enumclaw. A landslide
caused damage to the Green River Bridge on State Route 169 that resulted in the bridge
being closed for repairs for eight months. These incidents resulted in SBA loans to
89 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2018. King County Risk Report: Landslide Exposure Assessment. Page 52.
xx A scenario study of seismically induced landsliding in Seattle using broadband synthetic seismograms
Allstadt, K., Vidale, J.E., and Frankel, A., 2013, A scenario study of seismically induced landsliding in Seattle using
broadband synthetic seismograms, Bull. Seism. Soc. Am., 103(6), 2971-2992
152
impacted businesses. The SR 530 Oso landslide caused a complete reroute of the main
highway between Everett and Darrington, devastating the local economy and forcing
residents to commute several hours longer to work each day.
The
environment
Landslides that fall into streams may significantly impact fish and wildlife habitat, as well
as affecting water quality. Hillsides that provide wildlife habitat can be lost for prolonged
periods of time due to landslides. However, landslides also provide integral resources for
many ecosystems. They contribute needed gravel and sediment or wood for building
complex in-stream habitats, estuarine marshes, and beaches that are important for
fisheries, wildlife and recreation. The Cedar River was partially dammed by slide debris
from the Nisqually Earthquake in 2001. Similarly, in March of 2004, a landslide near
Renton partially dammed the Cedar River again. All major rivers in King County support
salmon and/or steelhead spawning populations.
Health
systems No special impacts to health systems are expected from this hazard.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Most impacts to King County delivery of essential services are indirect. Roadways closed
may impede the county work force from reaching work locations. Transfer stations for
solid waste management and sewer lines and lift stations feeding the Metro South Plan,
West Point Treatment facility or Brightwater facility may be impacted by slide activity.
Only a small number of bus routes use roadways with the potential for impacts by slide
activity. Slide activity has resulted in first responder access issues and diverted road and
infrastructure maintenance resources. Resulting detours have also impacted the commute
of essential workers to their normal work locations. Some slide activity has caused
temporary access issues for solid waste transfer stations and to the Cedar Hills Landfill
locations.
Responders Most commonly, homes are isolated and ready access to communities by first responders
is impeded by slide activity. Access to schools, businesses, and public services may be
impeded by road blockages from slide activity. While no recent deaths or injuries have
been reported in King County from land movement, the incident in Snohomish County
referred to as the SR 530 Slide or the Oso Slide, 43 people were killed (2014).
Infrastructure
systems
• Power: Landslides pose some risk to transmission lines that cross unstable slopes.
Otherwise, landslides are not a primary concern for this sector.
• Water/Wastewater: Landslides or debris flows in and around reservoirs or
waterbodies that support water systems can cause disruptions in water services
and the loss of infrastructure. Water supply pipelines may cross unstable areas
and be damaged by slope movement. Even if not directly impacted by earth
movement, systems that pull water directly from impacted waterbodies will have
to deal with increased turbidity or a loss of supply if the water is temporarily cut
off by earth damming or rerouting a river. Finally, failures in water system
transmission mains can actually saturate a slope and trigger landslides.
153
• Transportation: Transportation routes can be closed for long periods by
landslides and rockslides. The following are some documented incidents. In
November 2008, State Road 410 was closed as the result of a debris flow east of
Enumclaw. A landslide caused damage to the Green River Bridge on State Route
169 that resulted in the bridge being closed for repairs for eight months. These
incidents resulted in SBA loans to impacted businesses. In May 2005, 11 homes
were isolated after a small slide on Mercer Island. That September, two lanes of I-
90 west of Snoqualmie Pass were closed after a rockslide. A January 15, 1997
slide at Woodward in southern Snohomish County derailed five cars of a freight
train. Passenger and cargo rail traffic was interrupted for nine days. Cargo traffic
resumed first. Amtrak remained concerned for passenger safety and did not travel
on this section of track for several weeks. This type incident can happen almost
annually and sometime more than once each year.
• Communications: There is limited risk to communications systems as a whole
from landslides. Given the redundancy in systems and proliferation of cell towers,
which tend to be less vulnerable, landslides are not a primary concern.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
The 2014 SR 530 Oso landslide demonstrated some of the major weaknesses in
emergency management capabilities. It also demonstrated a lack of regulation and
foresight on the part of government in the permitting of development in the area, which
was a known slide area. Local critical areas ordinances do require mitigation for
construction in slide hazard areas, but in the Oso slide, this proved to be inadequate. A
failure by develops, the government, and residents to properly account for slide risk and
protect people from it led to multiple lawsuits and a general lowering of public
confidence in government’s ability to properly regulate land development.
154
Regional Risk Profile: Severe Weather
Hazard Description
Severe weather events occur annually in King County, especially between October and April. Severe
weather can include heavy rain, snow, and ice; drought; extreme heat and cold; and high winds.
Secondary effects of severe weather can include avalanche, flooding, landslides, power outages, and
increased demand on medical services such as during extreme heat events. Many of these events are
expected to increase in frequency, duration, and/or intensity as the climate changes, and new weather
hazards are growing in importance, especially heat and drought. The most frequent impacts from severe
weather events are in the rural or suburban parts of the county, where it can take days or weeks to clear
roads or restore power; however, events such as extreme cold or heat have a greater impact on urban
parts of the county, where there are large unsheltered populations.
The most common source of damaging/severe weather is the Pineapple Express or atmospheric river
event. This phenomenon results from moisture picked up by the jet stream over warm areas of the
Pacific Ocean that drops as intense precipitation when the moisture-laden air rises over the Olympic
and Cascade Mountains. Atmospheric river events are a significant contributor to river flooding in
King County.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Though known for being wet, the Seattle metro area has around the same average annual precipitation
as Dallas, Texas, and much less than New York City, Houston, Atlanta, or New Orleans. Higher
amounts of rainfall occur as you move closer to the Cascades. King County owes its mild climate to the
influence of Puget Sound and the Pacific Ocean, which moderate the climate, and to the protective
barrier of the Cascade mountain range, which blocks cold air from the interior.
155
Given the rarity of extreme snow events, King County maintains a relatively low budget for snow
removal services. When major incidents do occur, vehicles and drivers can be stranded almost anywhere
in the county. Impacts from unusually heavy snowfalls and severe winter weather in King County tend
to be short-lived, although there are exceptions. A well-known example is the 2008 winter storm, the
largest event since 1996. In the 2008 ‘Seattle Snowpack,’ snow blanketed Seattle and much of King
County and remained on the ground from December 13 to December 27 due to a prolonged period of
cold temperatures. At the time, Seattle did not use salt to clear roadways, due to environmental
concerns. This decision was reversed after the storm event.
Climate change is a major concern for King County. Climate change is projected to lead to drier, hotter
summers and more heavy rain events. The consequences of these events can include floods, landslides,
avalanches, droughts, and wildfires. The economic consequences can be serious since communities
generally are not prepared for extreme weather events, and some events (such as flooding and wildfire)
can have widespread impacts on public and private infrastructure. Extreme weather can also affect
public health. For example, some climate scenarios project that hundreds of Seattleites could die in each
extreme heat event if global temperatures rise 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit over pre-industrial levels.90
The majority of disaster declarations in King County are from severe weather events. Disasters are
usually declared for a combination of severe storms or winter storms, mudslides, heavy rains, and
straight-line winds. The primary impacts and costs triggering these declarations include emergency
protective measures for, and damage to, utilities, roads, and bridges, and for costs associated with debris
removal.
Major Weather Disaster Declarations Including King County
DECLARATION NUMBER DESCRIPTION FEMA-APPROVED
DAMAGES (KING
COUNTY ONLY)
852 1990, Jan - Flooding $5,246,411
883 1990, Nov - Flooding $3,694,824
896 1990, Dec – Flooding $477,737
981 1993, Jan – Inaugural Day Wind Storm $1,927,837
1079 1996, Jan – Winter Storm $3,031,519
1100 1996, Feb – Flooding $4,226,719
90 Bush, Evan. June 14, 2019. Seattle unprepared for deadly heat waves made worse by global warming, researchers sa y.
The Seattle Times. Accessed online on 6/17/19 from: https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/heat-
waves-could-kill-hundreds-more-in-seattle-as-globe-warms-researchers-say/.
156
1159 1997, Jan Winter Storm $3,576,309
1172 1997, April – Flooding $1,266,446
1499 2003, Nov – Flooding $4,400,000
1671 2006, Nov Flooding $16,000,000
1682 2006, Dec – Hanukkah Eve Windstorm $29,000,000
1734 2007, Dec – Winter Storm $72,500,000
1817 2009, Jan – Winter Storm $17,000,000
1825 2009, Mar – Winter Storm $5,500,000
1963 2011, Feb – Winter Storm $8,697,563 (Statewide)
4056 2012, Feb – Winter Storm $32,345,445 (Statewide)
4309 2017, Feb – Winter Storm $26,612,080 (Statewide)
King County Drought Declarations
YEAR DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION
1919 Water Shortage Dry summer
1928-30 Statewide drought Rainfall was 20% of
normal
1952-53 Water shortage Lack of winter
precipitation
1977 Severe to Extreme Drought Low Precipitation
1965-66 Water shortage Dry throughout state
1967 Water shortage Dry summer
2001 Moderate to Severe Drought; statewide Low Precipitation
2005 Water shortage, March – King Co Drought
Response Plan Activated
Record Low
Precipitation, low snow
pack, low river levels
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2015 Water shortage record low snowpack Snow pack at 0 in
central Puget Sound by
mid-May
Scenario Drivers
Severe weather can occur in any season. This may include: rain, wind, tornados and funnels clouds, ice,
snow, hail, extreme heat, or extreme cold. Climate change is expected to affect extreme weather
incidents by changing the frequency, intensity, and/or severity of events.
Rain and Snow
Precipitation
The geographical location of northwestern Washington subjects it to several natural
climatic controls: the effects of terrain, the Pacific Ocean, and semi-permanent high-
and low-pressure regions located over the North Pacific Ocean combine to produce
significantly different weather conditions within short distances. Rainfall in King
County varies widely from city to city and area to area. The City of Seattle has an
average of 37 inches annually, while Enumclaw has an annual average of 57.9 inches
and Snoqualmie/North Bend has 61+ inches of precipitation. The majority of this
precipitation occurs as rain in the lowlands between October and early May with
substantial snow pack in the Cascades during the same time frames. Precipitation on
Snoqualmie Pass in the unincorporated community of Hyak (2800 feet) average 410
inches of snowfall from October to May.
Snow accumulations in King County at elevations below 2,000 feet are uncommon. On
average, Seattle will have one or two snow storms during a winter season with
appreciable accumulations. Snow accumulation rarely remains two days after such a
storm. Heavy local snows and associated cold conditions have resulted in power
outages, transportation system impacts, school closures, and adverse impacts to the
regional economy.
Wind
High wind events in King County are fairly common and are usually experienced as
part of a winter weather pattern. Annually, wind gusts of 40-45 miles per hour are
recorded locally (NOAA) with severe wind incidents recording speeds of 90 miles per
hour and greater. Winter wind incidents often include: widespread power outages, road
and bridge closures, tree damage, airport closures/re-routing, hospitalizations or
fatalities related to carbon monoxide poisoning, and injuries to utility workers, first
responders, and the public. One of the best known wind events was the Inaugural Day
Windstorm on January 19, 1993. Winds began mid-morning, lasted five hours and
reached over 90 miles per hour in downtown Seattle. The Hanukkah Eve Windstorm
of December 15, 2006 heavily damaged the Seattle area power grid, affecting hundreds
of thousands in the subsequent weeks. Usually, these damaging winter winds are from
the south.
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Tornado
King County and the Puget Sound region do experience tornado activity. Tornados
have reached F3 designation within the region, but the slower F0 and F1 class tornados
are more common. In September of 2009 the Enumclaw area experienced a class F1
tornado. Though wind speeds of up to 110 mph were estimated, the most substantive
damage recorded was the uprooting of trees and damage to roofs, much of which
could be attributed to the preceding storm. Tornados are a result of strong weather
systems and often times accompany serve wind, rain, and hail. It is not unusual to have
funnel clouds spotted during the winter season.
Extreme Cold
and Ice
King County’s marine climate results in very few extreme cold/ice events. Regionally,
temperatures below freezing occur for extended periods for 10-14 consecutive days in
January or February each winter. Transportation impacts to buses, trains, roads, bridges
include snow routes, shelter needs, and power outages. The December 26, 1996 storm
lasted 11 days. Multiple consecutive freezing days can threaten the lives of unsheltered
and lower-income individuals, requiring the opening of additional shelter beds or more
heating assistance funding.
Extreme Heat
Climate change is expected to lead to warmer winters and hotter summers. Health
sensitivity to heat events is higher in the Puget Sound region due to the lack of air
conditioning in our region. Public Health Seattle-King County will activate cooling
centers and public messaging for multiple days in the mid-80s.
Drought
With the anticipation that higher winter temperatures reduce our snowpack, drought
conditions in the summer following low snowpack rises dramatically. Lower snow pack
and drier summers can result in lower reservoirs and increased calls for water
conservation, reduced water availability and higher mortality for salmon and steelhead
runs (due to high water temperature and low river flows), impacts on local crops and
livestock, and increased emergency room visits due to heat stress. Some degree of
drought conditions exists where precipitation is less than 75% of normal. Drought has
become a growing concern in the Northwest both because of variable rainfall patterns
and because of observed increases in temperature in the summer. With a higher risk of
drought and hotter temperatures, wildfire has become a higher risk for King County.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Unsheltered populations
Populations needing shelter are especially exposed during heat and cold
events. Since King County has a moderate climate, many of these
populations are unprepared. Cold events may require opening additional
shelter spaces and canvassing areas to offer shelter services.
Rural transportation
corridors
Rural transportation routes are lower priority and may not even be cleared at
all during a snow event.
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Immigrant populations
and those with limited
English proficiency
Populations with limited English proficiency or who are inexperienced with
Northwestern climate are more likely to take risky actions, like operating a
generator or grill indoors for heat. These populations are also less likely to
receive information and warnings about weather systems and to know where
to go for help.
Power transmission
systems
Power transmission systems, especially power lines, are frequently damaged
during storms with high winds by falling trees. During major wind events, it
is not uncommon to have hundreds of thousands of residents without
power.
Low-income and
minimum-wage
populations
Populations working in low-wage professions such as extractive industries
and service industries can be severely impacted from multi-day weather
events that impact transportation systems. These events can trigger a long-
term decline in living standards or even homelessness in these populations.
Service industry during
peak periods
Many service businesses, especially retail, are heavily dependent on income
earned during certain months of the year. A major event around the
Christmas holidays, for example, can threaten the viability of many
businesses.
People dependent on
public transportation
Public transit moved to the most restrictive routes ever recorded during the
February 2019 snowstorm. These cutbacks had apparent disproportionate
impacts on underserved areas, including some areas with populations
dependent on transit. When transit services are cut, it can be impossible for
these populations to get to work or appointments.
People with chronic
medical conditions
People requiring regular care from doctors are negatively impacted by severe
weather events. During heatwaves, people with chronic illnesses, especially
heart and respiratory conditions, are also disproportionately impacted.
All residents during multi-
day events
Although campaigns recommend having two weeks of food and supplies
available, few residents follow this guidance, regardless of income. After
more than a few days, many residents will run out of food for themselves
and any pets.
Residents down private
roads
Private roads are not eligible to be cleared by public snow removal services.
Many homeowner’s associations contract with the same set of snow removal
companies. These companies may become overwhelmed during long-
running events.
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Water and wastewater
systems facilities
Damage to water and wastewater facilities can occur due to a secondary
hazard, flooding and tidal surge. These facilities are often built in low-lying
areas. The severe damage and release of untreated water that occurred at
King County’s West Point Treatment Plan occurred during a severe weather
event.
Buildings on slopes of
greater than 40% grade
Landslides are a major secondary hazard of severe precipitation events.
Buildings on or near slopes of greater than 40% grade are most at-risk.
Travelers at airport
facilities
Airport facilities are frequently impacted by severe weather events, but often
have plans and procedures to contain disruption. During multi-day events,
however, passengers can be stranded and there can be a shortage of hotel
rooms since many airlines contract with the same hotels.
Waste Management Garbage pickup can be delayed for weeks. This causes significant public
frustration.
Priority Impact Areas
King County residents Anyone present in King County at the time of a weather incident is subject
to the potential impacts of severe weather incidents. While the likelihood of a
winter weather incident is high, the likely of direct and significant impacts is
Moderate.
Impacts to residents may include: personal property damages, interruption of
sports and recreation, extension of the daily business commute, impacts to
daycare and school closures, injuries, and sheltering needs from power
outages. Avalanche control may be needed to reduce the impact to alpine
and cross-country skiing enterprises. Injuries and deaths do occur from
avalanche impacts to recreational skiers. Impacts from drought take time to
materialize as water shortage cause restrictions to water usage and issue of
burn bans to reduce the threat of wildfires, especially in suburban areas. Only
the most severe weather incidents have an impact on local employment.
Vulnerable populations
Severe weather events, while usually concentrating impacts on infrastructure
and agriculture, can seriously threaten the lives of vulnerable people. Cold
and hot weather events can lead to an increase in fatalities among the elderly
and homeless populations. Immigrant and low-income populations also have
been known to succumb by carbon monoxide poisoning that can occur
when generators or grills are lit indoors and without proper ventilation. Snow
can trap people indoors for days, something especially threatening for people
with food insecurity or chronic health conditions that require access to
medical services. Any disruption to the economy is also especially threatening
to those who are low-income or who work in hourly work or in the service
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sector. When those jobs are not open, they frequently do not pay wages,
which can threaten the entire livelihood of a low-income family.
Property All structures in the county are subject to the direct impacts of severe
weather incidents. These same structures are subject to flood impacts where
they may be in the flood plain. Structures along the coastline (seawalls) may
be eroded. Local urban flooding also occurs from storm debris clogged
sewers.
High winds that accompany winter weather fronts often cause infrastructure
damages, power outages, and communications interruptions. Rain saturated
soils may cause mudslides that close roadways, damage bridges, and buried
rail service interruptions
Private property damages to homes and vehicles from floods, trees downed
from wind and saturated soils are regular occurrences. Private property
experiencing repeated flood damages may require elevation of the structure
or offers of buy outs (mitigation efforts).
High winds, snow, and icy conditions can close airports or cause flight delays
and rerouting. Mountain pass conditions may be so severe that they are
closed to all traffic for days at a time. The floating bridges over Lake
Washington (I-90 and SR 520) experience closures for sustained winds over
45 miles per hour. These closures extend the business commute with
increased traffic on surface streets and routes around Lake Washington.
Impacts to emergency medical services from impacts to the roadways of the
county can delay response times, restrict emergency room staff and supplies,
and result in under staffing EMS and hospitals during severe weather
emergencies.
The economy There are several local ski areas important to King County: Crystal Mountain
(Chinook Pass); Alpental, Hyak, and Ski Acres (Snoqualmie Pass); and
Steven’s Pass (Steven’s Pass). Ski area closures can occur from both large
snowfalls and where snow is too light or melts off. This can impact seasonal
employment at the ski areas.
Also associated with the passes, as outlined in the avalanche chapter, a
WSDOT study claimed that a four-day closure at Snoqualmie Pass in the
winter of 2007/2008 cost the state $27.9M in economic output, 170 jobs,
and $1.42M in state revenue (2008 dollars).
Businesses can be severely impacted when weather events impede mobility
during high seasons, such as around the holidays. Since a large percentage of
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annual personal spending is spent during the November-December season,
negative weather limits access to stores and can cause stores to close.
Drought conditions can impact the regional agricultural output of fruits,
vegetables, and flowers grown in all the major river basin areas of King
County. Regional drought conditions can impact generation of hydroelectric
power and drive up electric rates as well as increase usage during hot
summers.
The most serious and longest-lasting impacts may be to low-income
individuals and families who may lose jobs or days of wages due to snow
closures. Debt traps caused by missed bills due to lost wages can damage a
family for months or years.
The environment Severe weather can have impacts to the environment through flooding and
floodplain damages to salmon and steelhead habitat, wetland impacts to
amphibians and reptiles, and bird sanctuaries. Oddly, this can occur from
both too much water (flooding or dam failure) or too little snow pack and
resulting drought conditions. Hillside destabilization can occur where soil
geology and saturation of soils occur.
The moisture content of vegetation drops throughout the summer. Dry
conditions can result in an increase in the threat of wildfires from lightning
strikes, unattended campfires, fireworks, sparks from automobiles, cigarettes
thrown from cars on roadways and other heat sources.
The dilemma of drought conditions is the balance between human water
needs and the protection of the environment including plants, wildlife, and
fish that require minimum stream flows to support their annual spawning
migrations. Dry conditions also contribute to higher water temperatures,
which causes increased salmon mortality.
Health systems Severe weather disrupts the regular schedule of patient visits and regularly-
scheduled appointments for chronic care. Severe weather also can cause
more demand on the health system as people are injured or are unable to
leave the hospital to return home. Any disruptions to electricity and water
supply also can be a threat, though hospitals generally maintain backup
generators.
During severe cold or warm spells, public health may be required to provide
additional patient transport services and to canvass for homeless populations
that may be in need of shelter. During the February 2019 snowstorm,
hospitals suffered major staffing shortages as doctors and nurses were unable
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to get to work. Staff had to work longer than normal hours and potentially
stay temporarily at or near the hospital.
Although both requiring the expansion of sheltering services, heat and cold
differ because older and less health populations are especially at risk to hot
temperatures. One of the most famous examples is the 1995 Chicago heat
wave, during with 739 people lost their lives, with the city unprepared to
provide support to residents who may be home bound or offer sufficient
cooling centers to support residents. In Seattle, where few residents have air
conditioners, deaths from heat events is a growing threat.
Government operations
(continuity of operations)
During the February 2019 snowstorm, King County took the unprecedented
step of closing many government offices to protect employee safety. After
two days, due to the growing amount of snow and the need to resume
services, offices were reopened. Even with the reopening, many employees
chose to telework due to safety concerns. An earlier activation of the EOC
for the 1996 snow/ice storm saw activations for 11 days – 2 shifts per day
when 16 inches of snow came and stayed for weeks. During that time frame,
buses were on snow routes, up to 40% of the employees for King County
government were either unable to get to work or arrived very late. A major
improvement from 1996 to 2019 is that it is now much easier to telework,
meaning that non-public-facing positions can work remotely for days.
Hospitals, courts, detention facilities, businesses, law enforcement, fire and
emergency medical services were all severely impacted. Search and Rescue
volunteers transported medical personnel, emergency management staff, and
other essential employees to work and between hospitals for the duration of
the incident. During the February 2019 snowstorm, busses were on the most
restrictive service routes ever seen. These routes were established in response
to previous snow events. Similar impacts were observed for the January 2011
snow storm that impaired King County government operations for 8 days.
Some damages were experienced at crucial facilities around the county. See
FEMA Disasters 1079 and 1817 above. The recent February 2019
snowstorm did not receive a disaster declaration.
During that time frame, most regional public services were impacted by
absenteeism, access restrictions to critical facilities, and damage to vehicles
like buses, police cruisers, and aid units. Busses and other vehicles that use
tire chains are especially vulnerable to breaking down, which can delay a
return to full service, even once the snow has melted.
Responders Portions of the population may be stranded or isolated from the results of
severe weather, like roads blocked by trees and power lines, snow- and ice-
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covered roads, water or slides over roadways. Closure of the mountain passes
for heavy snow conditions or avalanche control is a fairly common
occurrence.
Excessive heat that extends over days or weeks or cold conditions for similar
timeframes may result in the need for cooling or warming shelters. These
especially impact the poor, elderly, young, and infirmed.
First responders will be impacted by limited road access, impacts of heat and
cold on operations. Conditions will require monitoring efforts during
incident response.
Infrastructure systems • Power: Downed trees caused by high winds and rain saturated soils
can damage transmission lines and cause power outages in local areas
for hours to days when multiple occurrences are experienced. Utility
crews from Puget Sound Energy, Bonneville Power and Seattle City
Light work around the clock to restore services. The Inaugural Day
Windstorm left 750,000 customers without power. The Hanukkah
Eve Windstorm winds and subsequent heavy rains cut electricity to
more than 1.8 million customers, hundreds of thousand remained
without power for days. Downed power lines pose an electrocution
hazard to motorists, pedestrians and any unsuspecting by-standers.
During extremely hot temperatures, demands on the power system
can increase, especially as more residents install air conditioning. As a
winter-peaking system, however, this power demand will still likely
be lower than current winter demand.
• Water/Wastewater: Water and wastewater systems are vulnerable to
a multi-day loss of power as well as to serious flooding. In February
2017, as a result of heavy rains, high tides, and other severe weather,
an equipment failure at King County’s West Point Wastewater
Treatment Plan led to the dumping of over 235 million gallons of
untreated wastewater into Puget Sound. Drought can also impact
water systems as water levels in reservoirs and groundwater wells
drop.
• Transportation: Events that impact transportation can include severe
snow, ice, wind, and rain. Storms may cause downed trees and snow
or ice that temporarily blocks roadways or can cause large floods that
can wash out or undermine roads and bridges. For many parts of the
state and county, such as around the town of Skykomish, the loss of
a single route due flooding can completely cut the community off
from the rest of the county. This is especially a problem in the
eastern parts of the county that are more rural and have fewer
transportation route options.
• Communications systems can be knocked out by high winds or loss
of power transmission. While the move to cell phones has reduced
the vulnerability of telephone lines to outage caused by trees, a multi-
day loss of power can still shut down a cell transmission site.
Furthermore, high winds can damage or destroy critical equipment
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on cell towers. Most equipment is built to withstand inclement
weather; however, especially severe conditions could still lead to
outages.
Public confidence in
jurisdiction’s governance
and capabilities
The 2008 and 2011 snowstorms highlighted the shortage of snowplows and
the management of the general response to the snow incident in the City of
Seattle.
The February 2019 event can be regarded by many as much more successful
on the public perception front. Successful coordination of a regional call
center in the EOC to support other county departments and take snow
plowing requests helped ensure the public always had someone to call. The
county also maintained substantial engagement with media outlets. The
County Executive was fully involved as well, helping to boost awareness and
public perception that county government was engaged in the storm
recovery effort.
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Regional Risk Profile: Terrorism
Hazard Description
Title 18 of the United States Code defines terrorism and lists the crimes associated with terrorism. In
Section 2331 of Chapter 113(B), defines terrorism as: “…activities that involve violent… or life-
threatening acts… that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and…
appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and…(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States…” . Within the government, combating terrorism is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s top investigative priority. The FBI further defines terrorism as either domestic or
international:
• Domestic terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with
primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social,
racial, or environmental nature.
• International terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with
designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).
The terrorism threat has evolved significantly since the September 11, 2001 series of coordinated attacks
by the Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda against the United States. The threat landscape (referring to
identified threats, trends observed, and threat actors) has expanded considerably. Three factors have
contributed to the evolution and expansion of the terrorism threat landscape:91
• Internet: International and domestic threat actors have developed an extensive presence on the
Internet through messaging platforms and online images, videos, and publications, which
facilitate the groups’ ability to radicalize and recruit individuals receptive to extremist messaging.
• Social Media: Social media has allowed both international and domestic terrorists to gain
unprecedented, virtual access to people living in the US in an effort to enable homeland attacks.
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in particular, encourages sympathizers to carry out simple
attacks where they are located against targets—in particular, soft targets. This message has
resonated with supporters in the US and abroad. Several recent attackers have claimed to be
acting on ISIS’ behalf.
• Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs): The FBI defines HVEs as global-jihad-inspired
individuals who are based in the US, have been radicalized primarily in the US, and are not
directly collaborating with a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). HVEs may assemble in
groups but typically act independently in attacks or other acts of violence.
91 Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2019. Terrorism Webpage. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism.
167
Domestic terrorists can be ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’ extremists such as white supremacists, anti-
government militias or anarchists. Domestic terrorists can also be ‘single-issue’ groups such as animal
rights or environmental rights extremists. And, domestic terrorists can also be ‘lone wolves’ with a
personal agenda or grievance and prepares, commits violent acts alone outside of any group support.
According to FBI Director Senate testimony in July 2019, the bureau has recorded about 100 domestic
terrorism arrests since December 2018 compared to about 100 international terrorism arrests.92 The
FBI, according to the director’s testimony, is most concerned with “lone offender attacks, primarily
shootings.” Earlier, at a congressional hearing in May 2018, the head of the FBI counterterrorism
division testified that the bureau was investigating 850 domestic terrorism cases and of that
approximately 350 of the cases involved racially motivated violent extremists93. Most in that group, he
said, were white supremacists.
In 2015, the Seattle division of the FBI revealed 70-100 active cases possibly linked to terrorism across
the state.94 In the years since revealing the breadth of terrorism investigations in Washington State,
domestic terrorism arrests outpaced jihad-inspired terrorism arrests nationwide.95 The US government
acknowledged the problem in its October 2018 ‘National Strategy for Counterterrorism’. "Notably,
domestic terrorism in the United States is on the rise, with an increasing number of fatalities and violent
nonlethal acts committed by domestic terrorists against people and property," the strategy paper says.96
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
Terrorism events can be distinguished from other types of man-made hazards by three important
considerations:97
92 Zapotosky, Matt. July 23, 2019. Wray says FBI has recorded about 100 domestic terrorism arrests in fiscal 2019 and
many investigations involve white supremacy. The Washington Post. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/wray-says-fbi-has-recorded-about-100-domestic-terrorism-arrests-
in-fiscal-2019-and-most-investigations-involve-white-supremacy/2019/07/23/600d49a6-aca1-11e9-bc5c-
e73b603e7f38_story.html.
93 Zapotosky, Matt. July 23, 2019. Wray says FBI has recorded about 100 domestic terrorism arrests in fiscal 2019 and
many investigations involve white supremacy. The Washington Post. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/wray-says-fbi-has-recorded-about-100-domestic-terrorism-arrests-
in-fiscal-2019-and-most-investigations-involve-white-supremacy/2019/07/23/600d49a6-aca1-11e9-bc5c-
e73b603e7f38_story.html.
94 Kim, Hana. December 11, 2015. FBI investigating 70 to 100 cases in Washington State with possible ties to terrorism.
Q13 Fox News. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://q13fox.com/2015/12/11/fbi-investigating-up-to-a-100-cases-
possibly-linked-to-terrorism-in-washington/.
95 Barrett, Devlin. March 9, 2019. Arrests in domestic terror probes outpace those inspired by Islamic extremis ts. The
Washington Post. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/arrests-
in-domestic-terror-probes-outpace-those-inspired-by-islamic-extremists/2019/03/08/0bf329b6-392f-11e9-a2cd-
307b06d0257b_story.html.
96 Dilanian, Ken. August 9, 2019. There is no law that covers 'domestic terrorism.' What would one look like? NBC
News. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/there-no-law-covers-
domestic-terrorism-what-would-one-look-n1040386.
97 Mid-America Regional Council. 2015. Regional Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.marc.org/Emergency-Services-9-1-1/pdf/2015HMPdocs/HMP2015_Sec4-HAZ-Terrorism.aspx.
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• In the case of chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, there presence may not be
immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they were released, who
was exposed, and what danger is present for first responders.
• Terrorist events evoke very strong emotional reactions, ranging from anxiety, to fear to anger,
to despair to depression.
• Even failed attacks have long-term economic impacts for the targeted government and critical
infrastructure sector disproportionate to the cost of the attack itself.
The form and locations of many natural hazards are identifiable and, even in some cases, predictable;
however, there is no defined geographic boundary for terrorism. Based on previous historical events, it
is presumed that critical facilities, services, and large gatherings of people are at higher risk.
King County is the most populous county within Washington State and is ranked 12th most-populous in
the US according to the US Census Bureau. King County is geographically diverse characterized by
high-density urbanization along the shores of Puget Sound, suburban communities to the east, and rural
communities to the southeast. King County is the largest labor market in the state. In 2018, nearly 42
percent of all nonfarm jobs in Washington State were reported from King County-located businesses.
Within King County, the Washington State Fusion Center tracks over 800 annual large-gatherings that
encompass public assembly and outdoor events. These events include a diverse range of sites that draw
large crowds of people for shopping, business, entertainment, sports or lodging, as well as for fireworks,
marathons, festivals and parades.
English-language terrorist media continues to identify similar gatherings as “soft targets” and promote
them as potential attack sites. For example, Inspire #12 magazine published online by Al Qaeda,
suggested targeting locations “flooded with individuals, e.g., sports events . . . election campaigns,
festivals, and other gathering [sic]. The important thing is that you target people and not buildings.”98
Attacks targeting these types of events will continue to present security challenges to public safety
personnel, because attendees are anonymous and generally unscreened for prohibited items. Violent
extremist propaganda continues to urge lone actors to attack soft targets using small arms, knives, and
vehicles because they are simple and effective. Foreign terrorist organizations implore followers to kill
with whatever means available “whether an explosive device, a bullet, a knife, a car, a rock, or even a
boot or a fist.”99
Prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001, there were less than a dozen major terrorist events in
Washington State. Since then, violent extremism has become commonplace, on a global and national
98 National Counterterrorism Center. 2018. Planning and Preparedness Can Promote an Effective Re sponse to a
Terrorist Attack at Open-Access Events. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/First-Responders-Toolbox---Planning-
Promotes-Effective-Response-to-Open-Access-Events.pdf.
99 Farivar, Masood. July 18, 2016. New, Low-tech Terror Tactics Simple and Deadly. Voice of America. Accessed online
on 8/26/19 from https://www.voanews.com/europe/new-low-tech-terror-tactics-simple-and-deadly.
169
scale, and the number of local terrorism and violent extremism cases continue to rise.100 Some of the
most notorious terror cases in Washington State include the arrest of Ahmed Ressam, the “Millennium
Bomber,” in December 1999, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) firebombing of University of
Washington’s (UW) horticulture center in May 2001, and the foiled Seattle Military Entrance Processing
Station attack plot in 2011.
• On March 26, 2018, Thanh Cong Phan from Everett was arrested after mailing at least 11
suspicious packages to multiple military and government facilities in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area, which contained potential destructive devices. He was charged with shipping
of explosive materials, after the packages were found to contain small amounts of black
explosive powder.101
• On March 31, 2017, Muna Osman Jama of Reston VA and Hinda Osman Dhirane of Kent WA
were sentenced to 12 years and 11 years respectively, after being found guilty of conspiracy to
provide material support to al-Shabaab. The two reportedly organized an all-female fundraising
group, called the “Group of Fifteen,” who provided monthly payments to al-Shabaab;
facilitating and tracking money sent through conduits in Kenya and Somalia.102
• On August 25, 2017, Melvin Neifert from Selah was arrested and charged with receiving
incendiary explosive device materials—specifically, potassium nitrate and other materials to
make a potassium nitrate-sugar bomb—that were to be used in connection with the 2016 May
Day events. Federal authorities seized evidence and questioned Neifert on May 1, the same day
anti-capitalist demonstrations took place in Seattle.103
• On September 4, 2016, a fire was intentionally set at the Planned Parenthood clinic in Pullman,
WA. Authorities recovered a video from inside the clinic showing a flammable object had been
thrown through the window. While no injuries were reported, and no suspects identified, there
is a history of domestic terrorism against the Pullman clinic.104
• On April 9, 2015, Blake Heger was arrested after attempting to place two shrapnel-laden pipe
bombs near a high foot-traffic area outside a hardware store in Puyallup, WA. Police were called
after a concerned citizen saw him sharpening large knifes in the parking lot. He was found with
100 United Nations Development Programme. 2016. Prevent Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive
Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/Discussion%20Paper%20-
%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf .
101 Shayanian, Sara. March 28, 2018. Man charged with sending explosives to D.C. military sites. United Press Internationa.
Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2018/03/28/Man-charged-with-sending-
explosives-to-DC-military-sites/5591522255789/.
102 Department of Justice. Friday, March 31, 2017. Two Women Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Terroris ts.
Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-women-sentenced-providing-material-support-
terrorists.
103 Meyers, Donald W. August 31, 2016. Bail decision delayed in Selah explosives case. The Seattle Times. Accessed online
on 8/26/19 from https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/bail-decision-delayed-in-selah-explosives-case/.
104 The Associated Press. September 10, 2015. Video shows object thrown in Planned Parenthood arson. The Seattle
Times. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/video-shows-object-thrown-in-
planned-parenthood-arson-in-pullman/.
170
two additional pipe-bombs, four large knives, and a screwdriver that he had sharpened into a
dagger.105
• On January 1, 2014, Musab Masmari attempted to set fire to a gay nightclub on Capitol Hill in
Seattle, WA by spilling gasoline down a set of stairs and lighting it, while 750 people packed the
club's New Year’s Eve event. According to investigative documents, Masmari told a friend that
“homosexuals should be exterminated.” In July 2014, he was sentenced to ten years in federal
prison for arson.106
• On July 18, 2014, Ali Muhammad Brown was arrested after killing four people in WA and a
college student in NJ, as part of a personal vengeance against the U.S. government for its
actions in the Middle East. In 2004, he was arrested and prosecuted for his role in a bank fraud
scheme to finance fighters traveling abroad, and had known links to a disrupted terror cell in
Seattle, WA and Bly, OR in 1999.107
• On October 27, 2012, Abdisalan Hussein Ali, a 22-year old born in Somalia but raised in Seattle
and Minnesota, was the third American killed as an al-Shabaab suicide bomber in Mogadishu.
Ali was reportedly one of two bombers in an attack that killed “scores of African Union
peacekeepers.” He arrived in Seattle in 2000 and moved to Minneapolis before being recruited
into al-Shabaab and travelling to Somalia in 2008.108
• On September 8, 2011, Michael McCright was arrested and charged with second-degree assault
for a July 2011 incident where he intentionally swerved his vehicle at a government-plated
vehicle occupied by two U.S. Marines in Seattle. Known on the Internet as “Mikhail Jihad,”
McCright had ties to Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, a man convicted of plotting to kill federal
employees and military recruits in Seattle, WA.109
• On June 22, 2011, Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh were arrested for planning to
attack the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) in Seattle with machine guns and
grenades after previously planning, but discounting, an attack at Joint Base Lewis McChord
(JBLM). According to FBI investigators, “Abdul-Latif said that ‘jihad’ in America should be a
‘physical jihad,’ and not just ‘media jihad’.”110
• On May 11, 2011, Joseph Brice of Clarkston WA was arrested for assembling, practicing, and
detonating explosive devices after an incident that occurred on April 18, 2010, when an
105 McCarty, Kevin. August 10, 2015. Man arrested after 2 bombs discovered outside Pierce County hardware store.
KIRO 7. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.kiro7.com/news/man-arrested-after-two-bombs-discovered-
outside-pi/28802706.
106 Carter, Mike. July 31, 2014. Man who set fire in Capitol Hill nightclub sentenced to 10 years. The Seattle Times.
Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/man-who-set-fire-in-capitol-hill-
nightclub-sentenced-to-10-years/.
107 Collins, Laura. September 18, 2014. Revealed, one man's terrifying 'jihad' on U.S. soil: Extremist 'executed four in
revenge for American attacks in the Middle East and carried out bank fraud for the Cause'. Daily Mail Online. Accessed
online on 8/26/19 from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2759901/Revealed-terrifying-one-man-jihad-U-S-
soil-Extremist-executed-four-revenge-American-attacks-Middle-East-carried-bank-fraud-Cause.html.
108 Kron, Josh. October 30, 2011. American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia . The New York
Times. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-
american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html?_r=0.
109 Carter, Mike. May 29, 2012. Felon admits he tried to run Marines off I-5. The Seattle Times. Accessed online on
8/26/19 from https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/felon-admits-he-tried-to-run-marines-off-i-5/.
110 The Associated Press. June 5, 2012. Seattle terror suspect wants evidence tossed. Fox News. Accessed online on
8/26/19 from https://www.foxnews.com/us/seattle-terror-suspect-wants-evidence-tossed#ixzz28jz1MkOE.
171
explosive device he made prematurely ignited, causing him significant injuries. He had a
YouTube channel called “Strength of Allah,” where he posted the videos in an attempt to
support terrorism.111
• On January 17, 2011, Kevin Harpham, an admitted white supremacist, placed a remote-
controlled backpack improvised explosive device (IED), with rat-poison coated shrapnel, at a
park bench near the marching route on the morning of the Martin Luther King Jr. Day Parade
in Spokane, WA. Prosecutors said the device was “constructed with a clear, lethal purpose,” and
Harpham said it was intended to protest social concepts, such as unity and multiculturalism.112
Scenario Drivers
Terrorist attacks continue to take place at open-access events, mass gatherings, and outside the
perimeter of secured events, possibly because of a perceived lack of security, the availability of
publicized schedules, and largely unrestricted admittance. Examples of open-access events include
marathons, parades, protests, rallies, festivals, fireworks displays, farmers markets, and high-profile
funerals and vigils or memorials. Terrorists could also target gatherings located close to ticketed events,
such as tailgating adjacent to major sporting events or concerts113. Judging from previous terrorist plots
and attacks, terrorists will likely remain interested in conducting opportunistic attacks against civilian
targets, most notably mass gatherings. Techniques used in recent terror attacks have included the use of
vehicles as weapons, edged weapons, small arms, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Coordinated
Domestic
Extremist
Attack on
Seattle
The radicalization of Pacific Northwest extremist groups has recently been promoted by
other national terrorism movements which have called for violent resistance to destroy
human life and disable critical infrastructure. Radicalization starts to build in the Winter of
2018. Over the next six months there is an increase in expression of on-line animosity
towards the U.S. Government which calls for action on June 24. In recent weeks there
has been an increase via social media of on-line extremist groups indicating an intense
animosity and a belief of injustice by the U.S. Government. These local online indicators
show lone actors, inspired by extremist ideology, have been able to circumvent security
measures to take up small arms, make vehicle borne and rudimentary standalone
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with the stated intent to attack the Region. In
addition, there are calls for “Leaderless Resistance” making it difficult to locate, mitigate,
or prevent their stated intent. Within the Seattle Region, there is increasing concern about
a number of these groups starting to influence public opinion, which may lead to violent
actions. The on-line information promotes and warms of the need for longer and ongoing
111 Pignolet, Jennifer. Wednesday, June 12, 2013. Clarkston man convicted of trying to aid terrorists The Spokane
Spokesman-Review. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/jun/12/bomb-maker-
sentenced/.
112 Clouse, Thomas. December 20, 2011. MLK bomb maker gets 32 years in prison. The Spokane Spokesman-Review.
Accessed online on 8/26/19 from https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/dec/20/mlk-parade-bomber-seeks-
guilty-plea-withdrawal/.
113 National Counterterrorism Center. 2018. Planning and Preparedness Can Promote an Effective Response to a
Terrorist Attack at Open-Access Events. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/jcat/firstresponderstoolbox/First-Responders-Toolbox---Planning-
Promotes-Effective-Response-to-Open-Access-Events.pdf.
172
acts of violence to achieve superiority over current government authority. On July 3, there
are several online attacks which a precursor to the July 4th physical attacks on an iconic
building are, multiple active shooter events, vehicle borne violence and IEDs, and
unattended small items across the City of Seattle and surrounding areas.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Public events
Terrorists have increasingly targeted mass-gatherings in densely populated or
high profile areas. Consequently any major urban area in Washington State
could be considered at-risk as well as any crowded or high profile critical
infrastructure. The specific motivations of terrorists will largely dictate target
selection.
Terror tactics used by
non-terrorists
A new challenge that is emerging is the increasing use of terror tactics by
non-terrorists. A number of evolved weapons, tactics, and targets have
emerged through the sheer volume of attacks within the last decade. This
normalization of violence has been further exacerbated by extensive media
coverage and the ease by which detailed instruction manuals, ‘how-to’
videos, and online forums dedicated to weapons, explosives, and tactics. It is
“essentially shared community content, easily accessible for extremists of all
stripes to consume and put into action” including those with no affiliation to
foreign or domestic extremism ideologies.114 Lessons learned from past
attempts continue to shape the means by which attackers develop plots—the
push for using small arms, edged-weapons and vehicle ramming against soft
targets—instead of the often failed large-scale attacks.
Critical infrastructure
Infrastructure systems such as dams, water systems, bridges, and public
buildings are high-value targets to terrorists that both stand for government
order and, when lost, can cause significant regional harm to people, property,
and the economy.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents Any King County resident attending a public event could be a victim of a terrorist attack.
Vulnerable
populations
Some populations are more likely to be targeted by extremists than others. Terrorist
attacks and attempted attacks in the northwest have been motivated by white supremacy
(targeting non-white populations), xenophobia (targeting immigrants),
homophobia/transphobia (targeting gathering places of gay, lesbian, and transgendered
people), and anti-religious attacks against Muslims, Jews, Christians, or other religious
groups.
114 Johnson, Bridget. March 21, 2018. The Austin bomber and our new age of open-source terrorism: How Mark
Anthony Conditt likely benefited from Al Qaeda tutorials. The New York Daily News. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/austin-bomber-new-age-open-source-terrorism-article-1.3888244.
173
Property Property, including commercial buildings, venues, vehicles, places of worship, or other
areas are often damaged or destroyed during terror incidents. Trauma from the incident
can prevent the rebuilding of the facility in the same place.
The economy In addition to the economic costs of stepped-up security, attacks can have a huge impact
on a region’s economy. Places seen as less safe are less attractive to investors or visitors.
Often, terrorist attacks attempt to destroy part of the economy by killing tourists or
destroying an important piece of infrastructure.
The
environment
A major attack can pollute the environment and poison water and food sources. This can
have far-reaching, long-term consequences and damage animal and plant life as well as
people.
Health
systems
Health systems can be impacted as a target for attacks, by being overwhelmed with
patients in the aftermath of attacks, and by personnel being injured or killed from
secondary attacks or due to exposure to chemical or biological agents used in the attack.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Government facilities and employees are a common target for anti-government
extremists. These attacks can disrupt day-to-day operations for long periods of time and
require additional security measures to protect facilities and employees.
Responders Responders are often the first on the scene of an incident and therefore can be injured or
killed in shootings or due to exposure of chemical or biological agents. Responder
facilities, such as police stations, are also potential terrorist targets.
Infrastructure
systems
• Energy: Energy facilities, including fuel pipelines, are common targets for
terrorists and saboteurs around the world. Many power facilities, such as
neighborhood substations, are relatively unguarded and, if lost, can have
immediate impacts on people and property in an area. Cyber-attacks are one area
where a large-scale attack on the energy system could cause widespread
disruption.
• Water/Wastewater: Water systems are considered a high-impact potential target.
A chemical attack on a water system, if not immediately detected, could injure or
kill thousands, depending on the size of the water-system targeted.
• Transportation: transportation systems, especially public transit, have been targets
around the world, such as in the Madrid Train Bombings or the London Subway
Bombings. Attacks on busses are also common. These incidents can cause a loss
in public confidence in the transit system. Furthermore, an attack on a tunnel,
such as the I-90 tunnel across Lake Washington, can impede mobility in our
region over the long-term.
• Communications: Communications infrastructure, such as cell towers, are
relatively redundant and so somewhat less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. There is
a huge vulnerability, however, to cyber-terrorism, which can take multiple
facilities offline quickly.
174
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
A failure to protect the public from a terrorist attack, even one that is thwarted at the last
moment, can cause a total failure in public confidence in government. As seen after
9/11/2001 or after attacks by white supremacists against African-American or Jewish
congregations, groups begin to feel isolated, threatened, and isolated from the
community. This is especially true in cases where government fails to quickly reassure
impacted communities and support them morally and with security resources.
175
Regional Risk Profile: Tsunami and Seiche
Hazard Description
A tsunami is a series of fast, powerful, and destructive waves that radiate outward in all directions from
the source. Tsunamis are usually caused by a displacement of the ocean floor from an earthquake or the
collapse of an underwater land feature. Seiches are waves that form in any enclosed or semi-enclosed
body of water (i.e. lakes, bays, and rivers) from wind, atmospheric pressure, or seismic waves. Seiche
action can also affect harbors and canals.
The primary tsunami threat in King County is from a Seattle fault earthquake, or other events
originating in the Puget Sound Lowlands (such as big landslides into the water and possibly other faults).
Not all of King County has been modeled for tsunami hazards but scientists are actively working on it.
The tsunami inundation (flooding) impacts from a magnitude 7.3 Seattle fault event are shown below in
yellow:115 In addition to the Seattle fault, a Pacific ocean sourced tsunami, like a Cascadia Subduction
Zone event, can still affect King County. Wave arrival times for a Seattle fault and Cascadia-derived
tsunami are extremely different. In a Seattle fault event, the first wave arrives within minutes, where in a
Cascadia event, the first wave will arrive in approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes. In both cases, wave
action will persist for multiple hours. An earthquake on the Seattle Fault could generate a seiche in Lake
Washington or Lake
Sammamish that could
impact cities including
Sammamish, Kenmore,
and Kirkland.
There can also be
significant maritime
hazard along the western
United States’ coastlines
associated with smaller
tsunamis. A tsunami from
a local Seattle fault event
would cause major
damage to port
infrastructure and
navigational terminals.
Additionally, powerful
distant tsunamis generated
across the Pacific Ocean
115 Washington Geologic Survey. Geologic Hazards Information Portal. Accessed online on 6/11/19 from
https://geologyportal.dnr.wa.gov/.
176
can cause maritime hazards in the Puget Sound. Although these distant-sourced events generate
relatively smaller tsunamis than local-sourced events, there waves can still cause damage to boats, docks,
piers, and aids to navigation (e.g. channel markers, lighthouses, warehouses and port terminals used for
loading and unloading cargo ships). Moored boats and vessels underway in the harbor may also be
impacted by smaller distant-sourced tsunamis. For example, the 2011 earthquake off the coast of Japan
caused a relatively small eight-foot tsunami in Crescent City, California, which led to one hundred
million dollars in damaged boats and infrastructure. Anything near the shoreline that has the potential to
float or be moved by the wall of water can be carried away – ramming into other structures.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
King County includes the deep-water Port of Seattle and several cities that border Puget Sound,
including Shoreline, Seattle, Burien, Des Moines, and Federal Way. Together with Vashon Island,
unincorporated King County includes a great deal of industry, import/export activity, and commercial
and residential real estate that border bodies of water. These key waterfront areas are vulnerable to a
tsunami or seiche generated from an earthquake up to hundreds, if not thousands of miles distant from
King County.
The most significant documented risks are to port transportation and industrial facilities in the Seattle
waterfront and Magnolia. It is likely a tsunami would impact docks, harbors, and other water-dependent
facilities in communities such as Des Moines and Burien too. The consequences of a tsunami to the
Port of Seattle would likely be catastrophic, causing permanent to semi-permanent harm to the region’s
economy. As described in the earthquake chapter, damage from the Kobe, Japan earthquake in 1995 led
to a permanent reduction in the scale and importance of that port.
The table below summarizes the identified tsunami hazard area, the City of Seattle, following a
magnitude 7.3 Seattle fault earthquake. Approximately 0.6 percent of structures within the city are
exposed to a Seattle fault earthquake-induced tsunami, totaling an estimated value of $5.1 billion (3.5
percent of the total building value within the city). 116 The modeling to show potential impacts from a
Seattle fault tsunami or a Cascadia tsunami for the remaining communities in King County is not yet
complete.
City of Seattle Tsunami Exposure Assessment – Seattle Fault Scenario
STRUCTURES EXPOSED EXPOSED BUILDING AND CONTENT VALUE PERCENT OF EXPOSED VALUE
969 $5.1 Billion 3.5%
Geologic evidence of previous shallow crustal fault-induced tsunami events has been recorded in the
Puget Sound at Cultus Bay on Whidbey Island and at West Point in Seattle.117 This evidence suggests
the last tsunami occurred around 900 AD when the local Seattle fault raised some landmasses around
116 Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2018. King County Risk Report: Tsunami Exposure Assessment. Page 58.
117 Moore, Andrew. Looking for paleotsunami evidence: an example from Cultus Bay, Washington. Accessed online on
6/11/19 from https://serc.carleton.edu/integrate/workshops/risk_resilience/activities/82019.html .
177
the Puget Sound shoreline by as much as 26 feet. A scientific study focused on seismic activity on the
Seattle fault within the last 8,000 years found evidence for an additional earthquake that occurred
~6,900 years ago. This suggests a low probability of a large earthquake to occur on the Seattle fault as
the recurrence interval could be thousands of years. Since 900 AD, tsunami waves in King County have
been less than 18 inches in height and caused little damage to boats and shoreline property.118
Additional verbal accounts among the Snohomish Tribe reported by Colin Tweddell in 1953 described a
great landslide-induced wave caused by the collapse of Camano Head at the south end of Camano
Island around the 1820s.119 No injuries have been reported since the settlement of Seattle in the 18th
century. The value and density of property along the waterfront suggests a potential for moderate
impacts from such an event.
Multiple seiches have been generated in King County from various local and distant seismic events.
Seiche events in the King County have been noted in the following years: 1) In 1891 two earthquakes
near Port Angeles caused water in the Puget Sound to surge onto beaches two feet above the high-water
mark and an eight-foot seiche in Lake Washington. 2) In 1906 the magnitude 7.9 San Francisco
earthquake caused agitated wave activity on the west shore of Lake Washington “so violently that house
boats, floats and bathhouses were jammed and tossed about like leaves on the water,” reported by the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (4/19/1906). 3) In 1949, a magnitude-7.1 deep earthquake occurred in
Olympia that caused seiches within Lake Union and Lake Washington, but no damages were reported.
4) The magnitude 9.2 Great Alaska earthquake of 1964 created global seiches, including in Lake Union
that damaged houseboats, buckled moorings, and broke water and sewer lines. 5) In 1965, a magnitude
6.5 deep earthquake occurred in the Puget Sound which caused a seiche where water “sloshing back and
forth like soup in a shallow bowl” was observed at Green Lake, North Seattle (reported by the Seattle
Times, 4/30/1965). 6) Lastly, in 2002 a magnitude 7.9 Denali earthquake caused seiches in Lake Union
that damaged houseboats, buckled moorings, and broke water and sewer lines.
Tsunamis generated along the Pacific Rim have a hard time reaching Puget Sound with any destructive
force. The tsunamis generated by the 2011 magnitude 9.0 earthquake in Japan and the 1964 magnitude
9.2 earthquake in Alaska did reach Puget Sound, but the maximum wave height recorded was only 0.04
meters (~2 inches) and 0.12 meters, respectively in (~5 inches) in King County.
118 National Geophysical Data Center / World Data Service (NGDC/WDS): Global Historical Tsunami Database.
National Geophysical Data Center, NOAA. doi:10.7289/V5PN93H7 [accessed online on 09/11/2019 from
https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=70&d=7]
119 Koshimura, Shunichi and Harold O. Mofjeld. 2001. Inundation modeling of local tsunamis in Puget Sound,
Washington due to potential earthquakes. ITS 2001 Proceedings, Session 7, Number 7 -18. Accessed online on 6/11/19
from https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/pubs/docs/ITS2001/7-18_Koshimura.pdf.
178
Tsunami Scenario Drivers120121
There are four likely triggers for a tsunami in King County. These include an earthquake on the Seattle
Fault, an earthquake on the Cascadia Subduction Zone, a tsunami caused by a major landslide into
Puget Sound or another major body of water, and an earthquake on the Alaska-Aleutian Subduction
Zone.
Seattle Fault
Tsunami
A tsunami triggered by a rupture of the Seattle Fault would compound damage caused
by the initial earthquake. It would devastate low-lying areas of Puget Sound, but
especially the port and industrial facilities around the Port of Seattle and Magnolia.
Preliminary modeling suggests the first wave arrives within 2 and a half minutes after
the earthquake starts at the Magnolia Bluff area of Seattle and all coastlines within
Elliott Bay experience an average of 20 feet (6 meters) of inundation above Mean
High Water during the first 10 minutes. Harbor Island also experiences major flooding
with at least 13 feet (4 meters) of flow depth above the ground level. South of Elliott
Bay has milder flooding compared to Seattle, but strong currents are prevalent at
Portage Bay.
Cascadia
Subduction
Zone Tsunami
A Cascadia Subduction Zone tsunami would devastate the outer coast and seriously
impact low-lying areas around Everett and the San Juan Islands. The islands and the
strait of Juan de Fuca protect King County from the worst flooding impacts.
Preliminary modeling suggests that little inundation would occur along the coastline of
South King county, though some flooding may be expected in areas of Seattle SODO
and Port. The worst flooding is expected to occur at Portage Bay with estimated wave
amplitudes up to 13 feet (4 meters) above Mean High Water. Strong currents are also
estimated at Portage Bay near spits of land and in the narrows, which can be
hazardous to the maritime community. The first wave is expected to reach Seattle at
approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes. Statewide, this tsunami is expected to cause
over 15,000 fatalities, primarily in coastal communities in the outer coast counties.
Landslide
Tsunami
Verbal accounts among the Snohomish Tribe reported by Colin Tweddell in 1953
describe a great landslide-induced wave caused by the collapse of Camano Head at the
south end of Camano Island around the 1820s. The slide itself is said to have buried a
small village, and the resulting tsunami drowned people who were clamming on Hat
120 King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks. Landslide Hazards Program website. Accessed online on
6/7/19 from https://www.kingcounty.gov/services/environment/water-and-land/flooding/maps/river-landslide-
hazards/landslide-types.aspx#Debris.
121 King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks. Landslide Hazards Program website. Accessed online on
6/7/19 from https://www.kingcounty.gov/services/environment/water-and-land/flooding/maps/river-landslide-
hazards/landslide-types.aspx#Debris.
179
(Gedney) Island, 2 miles to the south. Bathymetry between Camano Head and Hat
Island could have contributed to the size and destructive power of the wave.122
Alaska-Aleutian
Distant Source
Tsunami
An Alaskan-Aleutian subduction zone earthquake can be as large as a magnitude 9.2
event, as experienced in 1964. A tsunami generated from Alaska is a distant-sourced
tsunami for Washington state. The preliminary tsunami modeling results for a
potential worst-case scenario magnitude 9.2 Alaska earthquake to King County is
estimated to be somewhat similar to the Cascadia Subduction Zone event, but half as
strong. The highest wave amplitudes can be up to 7 feet (2 meters) and predicted to
occur inside Portage Bay, but not predicted to overtop the northern spit. Additionally,
it is probable for some unsafe currents for the maritime community to occur, with the
highest risk being at Portage Bay. The first wave is expected to reach Seattle’s coastline
approximately 6 hours after the earthquake.
Lake
Washington or
Lake
Sammamish
Seiche
A Seattle Fault earthquake could generate a seiche on Lake Washington that would
impact low-lying areas of cities along the lake, including Sammamish, Kenmore,
Kirkland, and others.
Priority Vulnerabilities
Port and harbor facilities Tsunamis are expected to devastate near-shore port infrastructure, boats, and
piers. This is the largest economic consequence of a tsunami.
Low-lying and waterfront
homes and businesses
Homes and businesses along the many waterfronts would be damaged or
destroyed by a mid-sized tsunami and devastated by a local crustal
earthquake and tsunami.
Wastewater treatment
facilities
West Point treatment plan is in the inundation zone for a Seattle Fault
tsunami. Historical records also suggest tsunamis have impacted this area
before.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
While it would take a rather sizable tsunami along the shoreline of King County,
precautionary evacuations from houseboats, live aboard pleasure craft, cruise ships, and
property immediately adjacent to waterfronts of Puget Sound and lakes Washington,
Sammamish, and lake Union may be recommended.
122 Koshimura, Shunichi and Harold O. Mofjeld. 2001. Inundation modeling of local tsunamis in Puget Sound,
Washington due to potential earthquakes. ITS 2001 Proceedings, Session 7, Number 7 -18. Accessed online on 6/11/19
from https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/pubs/docs/ITS2001/7-18_Koshimura.pdf.
180
Vulnerable
populations
There are no additional anticipated direct impacts from tsunami to vulnerable
populations. As always, any disruption to services, the economy, and infrastructure would
cause more harm to lower-income and marginalized communities.
Property Tsunami and seiche threats were not defined until recently. Most of the early 19th and
20th century structures located near the water were probably not engineered to withstand
impacts from a tsunami, seiche, or earthquake. The properties along the entire Seattle
Waterfront and those in Shoreline, Des Moines, Federal Way, and Vashon Island are at
risk from tsunami activity.
The economy A tsunami or seiche that impacts port facilities, such as one triggered by the Seattle Fault
would have any sizable impact on the economy of the region. Damage would run
potentially in the billions and have far-reaching consequences for Washington’s export-
based economy.
The
environment
It is possible for a tsunami or seiche to have an impact on the natural environment
immediately adjacent to Puget Sound through the release of fuels and hazardous materials
or their storage facilities around the waterfront. This may include fish habitat or natural
and farmed shellfish beds, wetlands, estuaries, and marsh areas.
Health
systems There are no major health centers located in the mapped tsunami inundation areas.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
It is possible that Sounder traffic between Everett and Seattle or Tacoma and Seattle
could be impacted by any large tsunami in Puget Sound. Otherwise, it is unlikely that
King County governmental operations would be directly impacted by a tsunami or seiche.
Responders Along the shoreline of King County, precautionary evacuations from houseboats, live
aboard pleasure crafts, cruise ships, and property immediately adjacent to waterfronts of
Puget Sound and lakes Washington, Sammamish, and Lake Union would cause impacts
to the public. The volume of search and rescue efforts along waterfronts affected from
the tsunami may pose potential issues to first responders (police, fire, EMS).There are
only small number of scenarios where this is a likely issue.
Infrastructure
systems
• Power: Little to no impact directly from tsunami is expected.
• Water/Wastewater: Tsunami may impact the West Point treatment plant. The
damage would depend on the height of the tsunami and a significant event would
be required. If such an event were to occur, the plan would be rendered
inoperable.
• Transportation: damage to port facilities and ferry terminals are the primary
threat to infrastructure from a tsunami. Even relatively small tsunami surges, such
as the aforementioned example from Crescent City, have caused tens of millions
181
of dollars. Damage to low-lying rail and roads is also likely, but less of a concern
since it would not impact primary transportation routes.
• Communications: There is limited risk to communications systems as a whole
from tsunami.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
Coverage from major news outlets, including the Seattle Times and the New Yorker
magazine, have argued that Washington is highly underprepared for a major seismic event
large enough to generate a tsunami. Both media coverage and reports from state
emergency management has led Washington’s governor to convene a Resilient
Washington Subcommittee to look into mitigation actions out of concern for the
apparent low-level of public confidence in state and local ability to manage major
disasters. Data is available from Japan and New Zealand that clearly demonstrate that
policy level decisions and direct communication to the public will greatly influence the
public confidence in King County government.
182
Regional Risk Profile: Volcano
Hazard Description
Volcanic eruptions are the result of geological activity, and may include lava, rock fragments, gases, and
ash ejected from a vent on the surface. Deposits of rock, lava, and ash create the structures we call
volcanoes. Washington State has five active volcanoes, four of which have been classified as “Very
high” threat by the U.S. Geological Survey, and one considered “High” threat. Mount Rainier would
cause the most significant local disruptions in the event of an eruption, but any of them could cause
major disruptions due to ash or impacts on the transportation system.
Volcanoes can lie dormant for hundreds or thousands of years between eruptions. Hazards from
eruptions are typically divided into near-volcano hazards, those which impact areas immediately on the
slopes of the volcano, and distant hazards, which can put areas miles away from the volcano at risk.
Near-volcano hazards include pyroclastic flows (hot avalanches of gas, ash, and rock fragments), lava
flows, rock (tephra), debris flows, and landslides. Distant hazards, include Lahars – volcanic mudflows,
183
and volcanic ash. Lahars may travel tens of miles down river valleys, picking up debris and inundating
floodplains, and leave a cement-like deposit of sediment where they stop. They are a hazard at all five of
Washington’s volcanoes, and the only personal protective action available to avoid a lahar is evacuation
to higher ground. Volcanic ash – made up of tiny particles of glass – may be extremely widespread, as it
travels in the direction of the wind. The fine particles may travel hundreds of miles or more downwind.
Even in tiny quantities, volcanic ash can be very disruptive, as it lowers air quality, makes roads slippery
to drive on, is abrasive, poses risks to aircraft, motor vehicles and electronics, and is extremely difficult
to clean up, as it easily remobilizes into the air. Volcanic ash is also dense, and quite heavy when wet – 4
inches of wet volcanic ash is heavy enough to collapse most roofs.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
There are multiple hazards from a volcano, including lahars that could impact communities in the south
of the county to ash that could impact the entire region and come from any of Washington’s five active
volcanoes.
Lahars, mudflows that can have the consistency of wet cement, are historically the most damaging
element of a volcanic eruption. These flows pick up large and small debris like trees, houses, boulders –
anything in its path. Lahars can move 20-40 miles per hour down slopes. They slow down once they
reach floodplains, but are still an unstoppable mass of mud and debris, often pushing a flow of water
ahead of it. While the lahar risk to King County is limited to a major eruption of Mt. Rainier and
impacts primarily the cities of Algona, Pacific, and Auburn, the regional impacts would include a
complete disruption of regional transportation routes, including through airport closures, damage to I-5,
and damage to the Port of Tacoma.
The best examples of potential local damages from volcanic activity are from the Mt. St. Helens
eruption in 1980. This eruption had significant ash-fall over eastern Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and
Montana, with trace amounts falling over the Dakotas, Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado, Oklahoma, and
Minnesota as well as Canadian provinces. A long history of volcanic eruptions in the cascades is
recorded by the Native Americans in the area. Volcanic activity occurs in geological timelines these
events are spaced over hundreds if not thousands of years, during which time the number of exposed
inhabitants and inventory of infrastructure has changed greatly. Even the difference between 1980 and
today (39 years) has seen a marked increase in population and infrastructure in the possible impact area
for volcanic activity. The Mt. St. Helens eruption in 1980 damaged or destroyed 200 buildings, ruined 44
bridges, and buried 17 miles of railway along with 125 miles of roadway. Community water supplies and
sewer systems were disabled and reservoirs partly filled with silt and debris.
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Mt. Rainier, however, is much closer (60 miles to Seattle) and poses a much more direct threat. Modern
Mount Rainier started erupting 500,000 years ago and has had numerous eruptions and mudflows since
then. About 5,600 years ago, an eruption created a massive debris avalanche, called the Osceola
Mudflow, poured down from the summit of Mount Rainier, picking up sediment and anything else in its
path as it traveled down the White River valley and into the Puget Sound. The mudflow filled valleys
with up to ~400 feet of sediment and moved at speeds of 40 to 50 miles an hour. Following the Osceola
Mudflow, many smaller volcanic eruptions and lahars occurred as the volcano continued to show signs
of unrest. The most recent major mudflow, called the Electron Mudflow, began as a part of a crater
collapse and traveled
down the Puyallup River
into Sumner in ~1502. It
is estimated that Mount
Rainier has generated
about 60 of these lahars in
the last 10,000 years, with
about 10 large enough to reach the Puget Sound. Many communities, including Orting, Puyallup, and
Auburn, between Mount Rainier and the Puget Sound are built on top of these deposits. 123
An eruption of Mt. Rainier, or any other Cascade volcano, is likely to be preceded by warning signs,
such as series of earthquakes, and deformation of the volcano. This volcanic “unrest” may last for days
before an eruption, or possibly for weeks, to months, to years or more. Monitoring networks are in
place to provide advanced warning. This advance warning is critical to communities downstream from
the volcanoes, because Even a relatively small eruption could melt glaciers significantly, generating
lahars that will reach heavily populated areas.124
A lahar should not be seen as a singular event, but a mass movement of sediment requiring significant
time to recover from. Deposition of feet to tens of feet of sediment through a watershed and over a
floodplain creates long-term changes to the river environment. After a lahar, mitigation measures may
be necessary to prevent continued sedimentation over the decades following the eruption, such as the
sediment retention structure built following the Mt. St. Helens 1980 eruption. In lieu of this solution,
dredging may be required to prevent shipping channels from filling with sediment. Deposition of a large
amount of sediment within a floodplain may also change floodplains to a point where floods now occur
in areas which were previously safe from flooding.
123 Washington State Emergency Management. 2018. Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan: Volcano Risk Assessment, page
470-472.
124 United States Geologic Survey. 2018. USGS Volcano Hazards Program website. Accessed online on 6/12/19 from
https://volcanoes.usgs.gov/volcanoes/mount_rainier/geo_hist_future_eruptions.html.
185
Summary of Hazard Effects
Major types of volcanic hazard, their effects and extents are listed in the table below. The occurrence
and scale of volcanic hazards are inversely related, with small events occurring more frequently (10-20 a
month), and larger events occurring every hundred years or so.125
Hazard Threat to Life Threat to Property Areas Affected
Ash and tephra fall
Low except near vent;
high for aviation
Depends on size of
particles and amount of
ash; can
lead to roof collapse,
bomb damage, fire
Local, Regional,
National, International
Pyroclastic flows
Very high – Near vent and
on slopes; low in King
County
Very high Local, Regional, National,
Lava flows
Low except near vent. Very High Local
Lahars High to moderate High Local, Regional
Flooding (post-lahar) Moderate High Regional
Gases/acid rain Low to moderate Moderate Local, Regional
Priority Vulnerabilities126
Communities in the path
of lahar hazards
Communities in the vicinity of Rainier, including the King County
communities of Algona, Pacific, and Auburn, are most vulnerable from a
large lahar generated by an eruption of Mt. Rainier.
Populations vulnerable to
respiratory distress
brought on by ash
Ash from any volcanic eruption can lead to disruption of daily life and is a
major threat to people with medical vulnerabilities.
125 Washington State Emergency Management. 2018. Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan: Volcano Risk Assessment, page
463
126 Clark County Emergency Management. 2007. 2006 Volcanic Ashfall Exercise After Action Report / Impr ovement
Plan.
186
Populations in the
immediate vicinity of a
volcano
Populations that use Mt. Rainier National Park or work in the area around
the mountain are most susceptible to the immediate impacts. Although
advanced warning is likely, it will be impossible to predict the exact moment
of eruption. Residents from the town of Orting have approximately 45-
minutes to evacuate following activation of their lahar sirens.
Roof collapse caused by
ash fall Buildings can collapse following large ash accumulation.
Electrical systems and the
energy sector
Electrical systems may short out due to ashfall and power generation can be
curtailed as generation systems are shut off to protect sensitive components.
Communications
equipment
Communications equipment has the same vulnerability as general electrical
systems and is subject to failure due to ash damage.
Air travel Airports would likely be closed for the duration of major ash dispersal.
Roads and transportation
systems
Traffic signals would likely short out during ashfall. Ash is also creates a very
slippery driving surface. Ash can also damage vehicle engines, and scratch
windshields when wipers are being used – Driving is not recommended
during heavy ashfall.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
Cities in the south of the county, including Algona, Pacific, Auburn, and Kent all may be
impacted by a lahar. The sedimentation zone spreads throughout the Green River Valley.
This area includes some of the largest and fastest-growing cities in the county. The
distance from Mt. Rainier makes direct impact of eruption from a pyroclastic event
extremely unlikely. Prevailing winds make ash fall in the county unlikely or at least minor.
Lava flows and landslide activity would impact Pierce County but are unlikely to reach
any portion of inhabited King County. Indirect impacts from a major eruption might
include a cooling climate from atmospheric suspended ash clouds but this too is unlikely.
Fine ash may cause regional health impacts – especially respiratory for the duration of ash
fall. Impact to vehicles and air handling systems in homes and work places may have an
employment impact to the King County population.
Vulnerable
populations
Impacts to individuals with access and functional needs will be extremely serious.
Transportation will be impacted, resulting in difficulty accessing appointments.
Individuals with chronic respiratory vulnerabilities will be most negatively impacted by
ash. While there are limited numbers of King County residents in the path of the lahar,
the communities that are most impacted have higher rates of disability and poverty than
the statewide average.
187
Property The cities of Algona and Pacific are the most at risk from a Mt. Rainier lahar event, with
over 90 percent of their structures exposed to the lahar. While the percentage of
structures is not as high, the City of Auburn has the highest potential dollar-value losses.
Other damages would include the loss of HVAC and air filtration systems, electrical
systems shorting out, and the danger of roof collapse from ash accumulation since ash is
heavier than snow. Furthermore, following rains, ash hardens to a concrete-like
consistency, which can clog gutters and drains and cause them to fail or collapse.
Businesses that operate electronic systems will require decontamination rooms to prevent
ash from getting inside and damaging electrical equipment.
The economy Many of the impacts from a Mt. Rainier eruption to humans and the environment would
also impact the economy of King County. Aviation interruption would likely occur from
airborne ash. A lahar event would impact rail and port service from direct damages to
infrastructure like bridges, rails, and roadways, or from inaccessibility to ports. Ash would
cause interruption of all internal combustion engines or vehicles that require filters would
impact the workforce and movement of food and supplies as well as repair crews.
Abrasion from fine ash on all mechanical parts would cause longer term damages to
industrial operations and the ports. Health and respiratory issues would make both indoor
and outdoor professions difficult. Medical facilities and the patients that rely on them
would have difficulty operating. The cost of debris removal following a lahar would be
enormous, even similar to efforts from a major earthquake.
The
environment
Any significant volcanic activity on Mt. Rainier would have an impact to the environment.
Lava flows, tephra, ash, and lahar activity would directly impact birds, fish, mammals,
reptiles, amphibians, trees, and vegetation. Sediment deposition would impact rivers that
support salmon and steelhead spawning. Debris and lahar may change the course of
rivers entirely. Lahars may cause hazardous materials releases that harm birds, fish and
other wildlife. Recreational use of ski areas and hiking trails would also be impacted. It
has been four decades, and Mt. St. Helens timber and wildlife have not yet returned to
pre-1980 levels.
Health
systems
Health systems would be impacted by an expected dramatic rise in demand for services as
ash causes people to seek care for respiratory distress. Health systems would also be
hindered by transportation system impacts. First responder vehicles should have air filters
changed every 35 miles during volcano ash events and there are not enough air filters on
hand to meet this requirement.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Potential impacts to county delivery of services from a Mt. Rainier eruption would be the
result of damages to infrastructure, equipment including machinery and vehicles,
inaccessibility to service areas, impedance to transportation routes used by the county
workforce, and health impacts to residents and the workforce. County services that might
be interrupted might include: Medic One response, King County Sheriff’s Office services
188
like 9-1-1 dispatch, search and rescue and marine or aviation unit response, adult
detention, solid waste and waste water services. Services provided by other government
agencies and basic service providers might include interruption of: power, phone and cell
phone service, emergency medical service, fire and law enforcement, water systems, and
health/medical facilities.
Responders Responder vehicles need regular air filter changes during ashfall. Air filters in the quantity
required are likely not available. Responders will also be taxed by high numbers of calls
and dangerous roads caused by slick ash.
Infrastructure
systems
• Power: Ash can short out electrical systems and cause widespread power failure.
Ash accumulation may also cause issues with power generation dams. Generation
facilities may be shut down to prevent damage to sensitive components.
• Water/Wastewater: Water systems, including reservoirs, could quickly clog with
ash, potentially polluting water supply.
• Transportation: volcanic ash is very slick and roadways would become
treacherous. Vehicles would need regular air filter replacements and there are not
sufficient air filters in the region to offset the need. Airports in the region would
have to close, potentially for months. Any lahar could potentially destroy major
transportation routes, including I-5. Traffic signal systems and communications
systems could short out due to ashfall.127
• Communications: Electrical and communication impact can be severely impacted
during ashfall. Ash getting into electrical systems can cause systems to short out.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
The 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption revealed that even heavy monitoring of a volcano,
while effective, cannot predict exactly how the volcano will behave. Since that time,
investments and public information have created confidence that USGS and local
emergency management is capable of providing public warnings and evacuations in time
to save lives. Continued investment in risk assessment and warning systems, for example,
around Orting, WA, continue to build public confidence. An event could either
undermine or strengthen this confidence, depending on losses and the speed of warning.
A potential public confidence issue is from false positives that trigger evacuations. There
have been numerous cases outside of the US where communities are evacuated, only for
the volcano not to erupt at that time. Communities can become inured to warnings.
When this happens, and an event does occur, there are much higher losses. A false alert is
unlikely in the USGS monitoring system for Mt. Rainier as the danger of a false alert has
been a central consideration in the design of the system.
127 Clark County Emergency Management. 2007. 2006 Volcanic Ashfall Exercise After Action Report / Improvement
Plan.
189
A period of unrest, leading to heightened monitoring and public awareness could last days
or years before anything (or nothing) happens. Sharing information with the public on the
uncertainty of volcanoes and the potential for long-term monitoring is important.
Additionally, in the event of unrest and a potential lahar, the local jurisdiction are the only
ones who can actually order the evacuation and so much be prepared to assess risk,
inform the public, and act when needed.
190
Regional Risk Profile: Wildfire
Hazard Description
King County and Western Washington in general have historically been at a low risk from major
wildland and wildland-urban interface fires. The historic return period for the heavily forested areas of
the slopes of the Cascades in eastern King County is between 200 and 300 years. Western Washington
fires are not unheard of, however – in 1902, dozens of wildfires burned nearly 239,000 acres in what is
now the Yacolt Burn State Forest, causing 38 deaths. This
occurred after an extended period of hot, dry weather, high
wind, and an over-accumulation of timber harvest slash.128
Climate change is shortening this interval, though it is still
unknown by how much. By 2040, a four-fold increase in the
annual area burned by fires in Washington is projected.129 Of a
more immediate concern is the amount of new development
in areas close to the wildland-urban interface. This new
exposure is the primary driver of risk in the short and medium
term.
Wildfires can occur when the necessary combination of
weather (low humidity, low precipitation, high temperatures, high wind), topography (steeper slopes,
gulches, canyons, and ridges), and fuel (higher amounts, higher concentration, continuous across the
landscape, low in moisture) are brought together with an ignition source (lightening or human-caused).
In the western United States, we have seen an increase in large wildfires due to more than a century of
fire prevention efforts, rising temperatures, declining forest health, and increased development.
Wildfires can spread quickly when burning in areas with dense, dry, uninterrupted fuels. This is
particularly true in areas with steep slopes and ridges and in windy weather with high temperatures and
low humidity. This mix of requirements has meant that there have been very few serious fires in King
County.
The wildland fire season in Washington usually runs from July through September. Drought, low snow
pack, and local weather conditions can lengthen the fire season. Many of the worst fire years on record
have occurred in the past decade. Suppression costs alone cost $60 million for the Carlton Complex fire.
Economic costs were estimated at $98 million for that fire.130
128 Washington State Department of Natural Resources. Yacolt Burn State Forest website. Accessed online on 6/19/19
from https://www.dnr.wa.gov/Yacolt.
129 King County. 2018. King County Strategic Climate Action Plan 2018 Biennial Report.
130 Washington State Emergency Management. 2018. Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan Risk
Assessment. Pp. 493-495.
191
Washington State Department of Natural Resources lays out the scale of the problem in the new, 10-
year strategic plan.131 “In 2018, wildland fires burned more than 350,000 acres in Washington state and
cost more than $112 million dollars to suppress—all before the end of August….Yet, 2018 was not the
state’s worst for fire. In recent years, hotter, drier summers and longer fire seasons have led to a trend in
increased fire starts and area burned. Fires in 2014 and 2015 burned approximately 425,300 and
1,064,100 acres and cost state and federal agencies nearly $182 million and $345 million in firefighting
expenses, respectively. In addition to the significant structural and economic losses, three firefighter
lives were lost in 2015.”
The largest fires in Washington State are usually sparked by lightning in wilderness areas. Small fires
(often ignited due to human activity) can also be damaging, however. For example, a small 400-acre fire
in Thurston County in 2017 led to the evacuation of nearly 100 homes and the loss of four homes.
Human-caused ignition sources may include chains dragging behind trucks, cigarettes, arson, or the loss
of control of fires set for recreational purposes.
Washington State Department of Natural Resources is leading an effort including King County to
complete a statewide map of all wildland-urban interface areas. Once the mapping is complete, RCW
19.27.560 will take effect, adopting the ICC’s 2018 International WUI Code. The following map is a
draft map developed using United States Forest Service land cover data and King County parcel data.
Interface areas are at the boundary of urban and vegetated areas. Intermix areas are areas where
structures and vegetation are mingled.
131 Washington State Department of Natural Resources. 2018. Washington State Wildland Fire Protection 10 -Year
Strategic Plan. Accessed online on 8/26/19 from
https://www.dnr.wa.gov/publications/rp_wildfire_strategic_plan.pdf?ivvzxs.
192
Draft Wildland-Urban Interface Areas: red = interface/intermix areas with high structure density (Source: DNR WUI
Mapping Program, 2018)
Wildfire hazards include the fire itself, but also smoke and post-wildfire erosion and flooding. Wildfire
smoke is made up of particulate matter, carbon monoxide and other harmful pollutants from burning
trees, plant materials, and combustion of plastics and other chemicals released from burning structures
and furnishings. Exposure to fine particulate matter (2.5 micrometers and smaller) is a significant health
concern, because the small size of the particle allows people to inhale it deep in the lungs where the
particles can directly enter the blood stream. The effects of smoke exposure range from eye and
respiratory tract irritation to more serious health problems including reduced lung function, bronchitis,
and exacerbation of asthma, heart failure, and premature death. People with existing heart and lung
diseases, older adults, children and pregnant women are especially at risk of smoke-related health
problems.132
Post-wildfire flooding, landslides, and mudslides is a deadly secondary hazard to extreme wildfires in
areas with steep slopes. Soils in areas burned by fire not only lose their stabilizing vegetation but can
also become hydrophobic (water repelling), leading to massive water runoff that carries debris down
slopes and into nearby waterways. In Montecito, CA more than 17 people died, 100 homes were
destroyed, and hundreds of people were rescued from a series of mudslides and mudflows that hit
following heavy rains that drenched areas burned over earlier that summer.133 Mudslides were a serious
MAP SUBJECT TO CHANGE
BASED ON CONTINUED
WORK BY WA DNR
193
threat in Eastern Washington following the 2014 and 2015 wildfires, and destroyed irrigation systems,
roads, and bridges.
One aspect of post-fire flooding is that it can be predicted. King County would likely have weeks to
months to prepare and plan for flooding events resulting from a major fire. The Department of Ecology
maintains a post-fire flooding calculator to estimate runoff and prepare communities for flooding. In
Montecito, for example, emergency managers had already evacuated thousands of people and it was
those who chose to not heed the warnings that were most likely to be impacted by the mudslides.
Vulnerability Characteristics and Previous Occurrences
King County communities are rarely threatened by major wildfires, though roadside brush fires can still
threaten even the most urbanized areas.134135 This has meant that land use and building codes in King
County are not adapted to current and future wildfire risk. As the climate changes, there is a greater
likelihood that high temperature and dry conditions will be present along with the already-existing
topographic, wind, and fuel conditions necessary to support a large fire
Smoke has received the bulk of recent attention in King County due to multiple years of wildfire smoke
in the Puget Sound region from wildfires in British Columbia, Oregon, and Eastern Washington. Air
quality deteriorated to hazardous conditions in some parts of King County in 2017 and 2018. Recent
studies of wildfire smoke exposure in Washington found a significant relationship between exposure to
PM2.5 from wildfire smoke and an increase in emergency room and outpatient visits for asthma.
Especially impacted were those with pediatric asthma and other childhood respiratory and chest
symptoms, as well as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease across all age groups, and all respiratory
outcomes.136 Smoke will likely be an ongoing concern for the region and may represent a “new normal”
though it will not occur every year.
Post-fire flooding is a serious threat to King County. A fire in one of the foothills communities could
cause major mudflows and devastating flooding in communities in the watershed impacted by the fire
and through which rivers and creeks pass. Communities with existing flood risk, such as along the
Snoqualmie River, are especially vulnerable. Damage to homes caused by debris flows is typically not
covered by regular homeowner’s insurance.
132 Washington State Emergency Management. 2018. Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan Risk
Assessment. Pp. 493-495.
133 Queally, James, Etehad, Melissa, and Brittny Mejia. Jan 10, 2018. Death toll rises to 17 in Montecito; 100 homes
destroyed by mudslides. The Las Angeles Times. Accessed online on 6/18/19 from
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-montecito-storm-mudflow-20180110-htmlstory.html.
134 Headwater Economics. 2018. Communities Across the US Are Experiencing Threats from Wildfires. Accessed online
on 6/18/19 from https://headwaterseconomics.org/dataviz/communities-wildfire-threat/.
135 KIRO 7 News Staff. July 27, 2011. Brush fires shut down portion of SR 509. KIRO 7. Accessed online on 8/27/19
from https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/brush-fires-shut-down-portion-of-sr-509/970676697.
136 For more information, see Washington State Department of Health/Chelan-Douglas, Grant, Kittitas and Okanogan
Counties (2015), Surveillance Investigation of the Cardiopulmonary Health Effects of the 2 012 Wildfires in North
Central Washington State; Gan, R. W., B. Ford, W. Lassman, G. Pfister, A. Vaidyanathan, E. Fischer, J. Volckens, J. R.
194
Scenario Drivers137138
Wildland-Urban Interface Fire
Although fires are currently rare in Western
Washington, they are not unheard of and are expected
to increase as climate change leads to warmer
temperatures. Prolonged summer heat, combined with
high density forests and areas of poor forest health, is
increasing fire risk at the same time that people are
building more and more into the wildland-urban
interface. The building patterns in these areas are not in
accordance with FireWise principles and many
communities have limited ingress and egress routes.
Smoke
Source: Greg Gilbert, Seattle Times
In 2017, and especially 2018, smoke from wildfires
inundated Seattle, causing unhealthy air quality. This
was due to wind patterns that blew smoke from fires in
British Columbia, Oregon, and Eastern Washington.
Warmer summers will increase the number of fires and
with more fires, more smoky days are likely.139
137 King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks. Landslide Hazards Program website. Accessed online on
6/7/19 from https://www.kingcounty.gov/services/environment/water-and-land/flooding/maps/river-landslide-
hazards/landslide-types.aspx#Debris.
138 Washington State Geologic Survey. Landslide Hazards Program website. Accessed online on 6/7/19 from
https://www.dnr.wa.gov/programs-and-services/geology/geologic-hazards/landslides#types-of-landslides.8
139 Gilbert, Greg. August 14, 2018. Smoky Seattle summers: expect more of them, scientists say. The Seattle Times.
Accessed online on 6/19/19 from https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/smoky-seattle-summers-expect-more-of-
them-scientists-say/.
195
Post-fire flooding and debris flows
Wildfires burn vegetation on steep slopes, not only
destabilizing the slopes but also making the soil
hydrophobic in high-intensity fires. This can lead to
large debris flows and mudslides when heavy rains
occur that damage infrastructure and communities
downstream for several years after a fire. USGS can
conduct assessments on burned areas to determine the
likelihood of major debris flows from a burned area.140
Priority Vulnerabilities
Structures built in
interface or intermix areas
Structures built in interface or intermix areas are more susceptible to fires,
including from spotting and embers ahead of a fire. This is especially true for
buildings with less than 100 feet of defensible space.
Foothills and interface
communities
Communities in or around areas at a higher risk of fire, such as those in the
foothills of the Cascades, are more susceptible to fire.
Communities in or near
the floodplain,
downstream of potential
burn areas
Major wildfires can cause the soil to become hydrophobic. When rains come,
large quantities of water and debris and rush down hillsides and destroy
homes and infrastructure while causing flooding in downstream
communities.
Communities built
without multiple ingress
and egress routes
Communities with a single ingress and egress route are much more difficult
to protect and evacuate. Roads that are less than 24 feet wide, especially
those less than 20 feet wide, and those driveways without a turnaround are
highest risk.
Buildings built with
flammable materials and
with vegetation close to
the structure
Buildings not meeting FireWise principles, including defensible space, are
most at risk to wildfire. This includes proximity of dense brush or timber,
flammable composition of structure roof, and siding.
Communities on slopes or
hills
Fires tend to burn up slopes and ridges, endangering structures in those
areas. Buildings less than 30 feet from a slope of greater than 30% grade are
most vulnerable.
140 USGS. 2018. Miriam Fire Preliminary Hazard Assessment. Accessed online on 6/19/19 from
https://landslides.usgs.gov/hazards/postfire_debrisflow/detail.php?objectid=224 .
196
Areas with more frequent
severe fire weather days
and winds
Fire weather, including low humidity and wind, is a major predictor for when
ignitions, which are common, will spread and become a major fire. Areas
prone to this weather are expected to expand due to climate change.
Areas greater than five
miles from a fire station
and with limited water
source availability
Buildings more than five miles away from fire services and with limited
pressurized fire hydrant access are more vulnerable.
Priority Impact Areas
King County
residents
King County residents are most likely to experience fire impacts from smoke. Smoke can
cause respiratory issues and prevent people from taking part in outdoor activities. There
are limited populations exposed to wildfire hazard in interface areas, though this risk is
growing due to climate change and new development.
Vulnerable
populations
Populations suffering from respiratory ailments are at the greatest risk from wildfire since
smoke from fire. People with existing heart and lung diseases, older adults, children and
pregnant women are especially at risk of smoke-related health problems.
Property The level of exposure of property and potential impacts to property from wildfire is not
yet known in detail. The communities with the highest levels of exposure include
Snoqualmie, North Bend, and unincorporated areas of the county in the foothills of the
Cascades. King County is working on a better estimate of overall risk to property and will
update this plan with that information when it is available. Likely impacts to property
include smoke damage to total loss of facilities. Communities built with many homes
close together and constructed of flammable materials can be completely burned in a
short time, as seen in Fort McMurray, Canada, Paradise California, and Santa Rosa,
California.
The economy At present, there is relatively little economic impact from wildfires in most of King
County. The fires are predominately a risk in the more rural parts of the county. There is
some impact from smoke and fire to transportation systems; however, it is likely to be
limited and temporary. The largest impacts are likely to be indirect, including losses in
work days because of poor air quality, loss of capital required for suppression efforts,
interrupted access, and losses in tourist income.
The
environment
While fires are often beneficial to the landscape when regular and not intense, a major
wildfire can be damaging in the near term. Fires can pollute water systems and destroy
old growth habitat. They can burn over springs and increase evaporation. Following
extreme fires, hydrophobic soils make it difficult for plants to regrow in and the runoff
over these soils increases the turbidity of local streams, endangering fish and other water
animal populations.
197
Health
systems
Exposure to fine particulate matter (parts per million 2.5) is a significant health concern,
because the small size of the particle allows people to inhale it deep in the lungs where
the particles can directly enter the blood stream. The effects of smoke exposure range
from eye and respiratory tract irritation to more serious health problems including
reduced lung function, bronchitis, exacerbation of asthma and heart failure, and
premature death.141 During extreme smoke pollution events, public health systems are
likely to be overburdened by populations suffering respiratory distress.
Government
operations
(continuity of
operations)
Most King County operations and facilities are in the more urban areas of the county and
unlikely to be directly impacted by wildfires. Smoke, however, can cause an increase in
employee absenteeism as employees may need to stay home to avoid smoke exposure.
Another risk is that a wildfire might occupy most of the region’s firefighting capabilities,
leaving less capability to continue regular structure fire and emergency medical missions.
Responders Growing numbers of wildfires will increase risk to firefighters. Firefighters in the Puget
Sound mostly respond to structure fires. With an increase in wildland or WUI fires,
firefighting becomes more complex and dangerous. Also, communities without proper
ingress/egress routes further increase risk to firefighters who may be called upon to
attempt evacuations in such communities. According to the Washington State Enhanced
Hazard Mitigation Plan, there are less than five first responder facilities exposed to
wildfire.142
Infrastructure
systems
• Energy: Washington’s transmission lines run through wildland areas. Wildfires in
King County could damage or destroy these systems, although brush is usually
kept clear of the largest transmission facilities. Rural and other interface power
lines would be burned in any fire, as has been seen in numerous communities in
Eastern Washington. Utilities in California are increasingly powering down
transmission systems during “red flag” fire conditions, affecting energy
customers.
• Water/Wastewater: Many water reservoirs are in forested areas and could be
impacted by wildfire that may burn power supplies to pump stations or the pump
stations themselves. Furthermore, post-fire flooding could damage or pollute
reservoirs.
• Transportation: Fire can cause road closures due to visibility concerns. A greater
risk, however, is post-fire flooding and debris flows that can damage or destroy
roads and bridges downstream or downslope from a burned area after a rain.
Additionally, SeaTac Airport was forced to cancel flights in 2018 due to poor
visibility during smoke events.
141 Washington State Emergency Management. 2018. Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan Risk
Assessment. Pp. 493-495.
142 Washington State Emergency Management. 2018. Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan: Wildfire Risk
Assessment. Page 533.
198
• Communications: Cellular communications sites can lose power or be damaged
by wildfire. During these events, it may be necessary to deploy cellular on wheels
capabilities.
Public
confidence in
jurisdiction’s
governance
and
capabilities
Wildfire hazards have gained renewed importance in recent years due to the smoke
problems of 2017 and 2018. Numerous articles in the Seattle Times and other media
describe a “new normal” of smoke and fire danger in the Northwest. State and local
jurisdictions have been working to prepare public information messaging due to health
concerns and public interest. Government will need to be proactive in managing this
hazard in order to maintain public confidence.
199
Hazard Mitigation Strategies
The primary focus of this plan update was the development of comprehensive, operationally viable
hazard mitigation strategies and the establishment of a capability to supervise and promote their
implementation. Plan strategies were developed using the following structure:
Hazard mitigation strategies were developed by each participating jurisdiction, supported by a series of
workshops, described in the planning partner engagement section of the introduction. The workshops
were hosted by King County Emergency Management and included state and FEMA staff associated
with the RiskMAP program.
The half-day workshop series took participants from developing risk problem statements (December
2018), through identifying community assets and strategies to protect those assets (July 2019), to funding
projects (August 2019). Using problem statements developed in the first workshop, participants
identified assets and then developed strategies that could protect their assets in workshop 2. Participants
were also guided through a strategy prioritization exercise using the King County method described
below. They left the second workshop with a list of strategies drafted and prioritized. For the third
workshop, participants learned about potential funding sources and how to seek funding for high-
priority strategies and eligible projects that they could not fund internally.
For those unable to attend workshops in-person, the planning team provided handouts and met in-
person over through Skype to walk jurisdictions through the same process. Unless indicated otherwise,
this is the method planning partners used to develop and prioritize hazard mitigation strategies.
Mitigation Plan Goals
Mitigation Plan
Strategies
Mitigation Projects
•These match the 14
Determinants of Equity,
from King County's Equity
and Social Justice Program
•Support community
resilience.
•These are broad approaches
to address a problem and
support the Plan goals.
•These may live on from
plan to plan.
•These are the specific
actions to be taken in
support of the Plan
Strategies.
•These are on either a 2 year
or 5 year timeline.
200
Each planning partner also convened those internal stakeholders who were responsible for projects or
programs that supported or implemented mitigation along with those stakeholders with funding available
or funding needs. In King County, the primary hazard mitigation agencies include:
• Department of Natural Resources and Parks – Water and Land Resources
• Department of Natural Resources and Parks – Wastewater Treatment
• Department of Local Services – Permitting
• Department of Local Services – Roads
• King County Information Technology
• Department of Executive Services - King County International Airport
• Department of Executive Services – Facilities Management Division
• Public Health Seattle – King County
The planning team met with each department individually, with each developing and submitting a list of
potential hazard mitigation strategies and projects.
Departments attended the July Mitigation Strategy Workshop and August Mitigation Funding Workshop
along with the local jurisdiction partners.
Mitigation Plan Goals:
Goals are broad policy statements of the community’s vision for the future. They help describe the
contribution each strategy makes toward major objectives that reach beyond any individual department
or discipline. In alignment of this and with the Plan’s purpose, King County’s Regional Hazard
Mitigation Steering Committee adopted King County’s Determinants of Equity143 as Mitigation Plan
Goals:
Mitigation Plan Goals - 14 Determinants of Equity
1. Access to Affordable, Healthy Food
2. Access to Health and Human Services
3. Access to Parks and Natural Resources
4. Access to Safe and Efficient Transportation
5. Affordable, Safe, Quality Housing
6. Community and Public Safety
7. Early Childhood Development
8. Economic Development
9. Equitable Law and Justice System
10. Equity in Government Practices
11. Family Wage Jobs and Job Training
12. Healthy Built and Natural Environments
13. Quality Education
143 Office of the King County Executive. 2016. Equity and Social Justice Strategic Plan. Accessed online on 7/24/19
from https://kingcounty.gov/elected/executive/equity-social-justice/strategic-plan.aspx.
201
14. Strong, Vibrant Neighborhoods
Supplemental Goals:
15. Resilient and safe high and significant-hazard dams
16. Proactive and innovative floodplain management to reduce Repetitive Loss and Severe
Repetitive Loss properties
Mitigation strategies will be categorized according to these 16 factors.
Mitigation Plan Strategies
Mitigation Plan Strategies will be developed based on threats to essential assets and capabilities from
hazards within cities and unincorporated areas of King County. In the past these have included strategies
for risks such as land movement and flood impacts and projects such as bridge seismic retrofits and
generators for critical facilities. For this plan, hazard mitigation strategies are sets of coordinated actions
that, taken together, address a risk or vulnerability. They are comprehensive, long-term, and designed to
be regularly updated as actions are completed.
The updated strategy format will be used going forward in order to better support long-term tracking of
mitigation actions and strategies. The updated strategy template is displayed below.
Lead Points of
Contact (Title)
Partner Points of Contact (Title)
Who else outside your jurisdiction benefits
from the strategy or will help implement the
strategy?
Hazards Mitigated
/ Goals Addressed
Funding Sources
and Estimated
Costs
Strategy Vision/Objective
Long-term objective and vision for the strategy
Mitigation Strategy
Describe the program/proposed program
2-Year Objectives 5-Year Objectives Long-Term Objectives
202
Implementation Plan/Actions
This can provide a timeline, indicate partners, discuss implementation stages, etc. Use this to discuss how the
strategy/program will be implemented over the long term.
Performance Measures
This template will be built into a database where strategies can be entered, updated, and projects can be
prioritized consistently and effectively. The goal is for strategies to remain in place through future plan
updates, while implementation plan actions are changed.
Mitigation Plan Projects
Mitigation Plan Projects represent the specific work to be done and actions to be taken to mitigate a risk
or hazard. Candidate projects will be developed and considered for and by each participating jurisdiction,
with a process to engage the public in the prioritization of projects. Projects will be prioritized using the
scoring method established by the Steering Committee to ensure alignment with the Plan Strategies and
Goals and in keeping with the following values:
➢ Equity, Social Justice, and Vulnerability
➢ Collaborative
➢ Adaptation and Sustainability
➢ Multiple-Benefit
➢ Effectiveness
➢ Urgent
➢ Shovel-Ready
Prioritizing Hazard Mitigation Projects
King County developed a prioritization process based on criteria taken from national best practices144
and priorities identified by the King County Executive. These criteria are used to prioritize projects
within strategies. Strategies are also prioritized in this way to identify those areas of emphasis for KCEM
and the mitigation steering committee, though this may not impact which strategies are implemented
since many depend on exclusive funding sources. The below criteria will be used to establish priorities.
These priorities will be applied to projects annually for submission to the FEMA BRIC program.
144 Washington, District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency. 2018. District Hazard
Mitigation Plan, Discussion Draft.
203
King County uses the below matrix, scoring each factor from 0 (unsatisfactory) to 4 (outstanding) with
the option of a score of -4 (actively harms the factor). Identifying projects that harm, and giving harmful
factors more weight in the formula, is designed to encourage project proponents to modify their
proposed design to better resolve any issues.
• -4 Project actively harms or is detrimental to this factor.
• 0 Unsatisfactory for this factor
• 1 Minimal level of standards for this factor
• 2 Satisfactory level of standards for this factor
• 3 High level of standards for this factor
• 4 Outstanding or beyond expectations for this factor.
Strategy:
Factors for Consideration Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4
Equity, Social Justice, and Vulnerability
(project is designed to benefit, account for,
and include vulnerable populations,
especially those in the community most
likely to suffer harm from a disaster and
those likely to take longest to recover after a
disaster)
Collaborative (project is supported by
multiple jurisdictions or agencies)
Multiple-Benefit (project has benefits
beyond hazard risk reduction, including
environmental, social, or economic benefits)
Adaptation and Sustainability (project helps
people, property, and the environment
become more resilient to the effects of
climate change, regional growth, and
development)
Effectiveness (project is designed to attain
the best-possible benefit-cost ratio)
204
Urgent (project is urgently needed to reduce
risk to lives and property)
Shovel-Ready (project is largely ready to go,
with few remaining roadblocks that could
derail it)
Total Scores
Process Note: Once a jurisdiction has prioritized projects within that jurisdiction, those projects will be
advanced to the regional plan. If ever there is competition between projects advanced from different
jurisdictions, the RHMP Steering Committee, consisting of representatives from county departments and
jurisdiction partners, will establish the order of priorities based on the values identified above. The
Steering Committee will also organize priority projects with corresponding strategies. It should be noted
that while prioritized projects will be included in the plan, they may not all receive funding. The Steering
Committee may also seek to promote a diversity of projects so that all plan goals receive some benefits.
In the case of a tie between projects during scoring, the higher prioritization may go to the less-
represented mitigation strategy.
In addition to regular ranking of mitigation projects, the steering committee ranked mitigation strategies
using the above tool to identify the highest priority strategy within each department and then the highest
priority strategies for the county overall. These priorities are reported in the mitigation strategy section of
this plan.
Crosswalk with the Strategic Climate Action Plan
Several strategies appear in some form in both the SCAP and this plan. This was done to ensure multiple
avenues of implementation and monitoring and to help relevant actions gain a higher profile with other
departments. Below are strategies that appear in some form in both plans.
Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan Strategy Strategic Climate Action Plan Action
Wildfire Preparedness and Risk Reduction Wildfire Preparedness and Risk Reduction
Accelerate Floodplain Acquisitions Accelerate Floodplain Acquisitions
Public Information Flood Activities Increase Technical Assistance to Property
Owners for Flood Risk Reduction
Flood Risk Mapping Flood Risk Mapping
205
Reduce Flood Impacts to King County Roads Maintain Quick Response Budget for Emergency
Repairs
Stormwater and Surface Water Risk Reduction Stormwater and Surface Water Risk Reduction
Climate Integration Training Engage Partners on Climate Preparedness
Opportunities
Sea-Level Rise Resilience in Wastewater Facilities Sea-Level Rise Resilience in Wastewater Facilities
Ongoing Plan Maintenance and Strategy Updates
King County leads the mitigation plan monitoring and update process and schedules annual plan check-
ins and bi-annual mitigation strategy updates. Updates on mitigation projects are solicited by the county
for inclusion in the countywide annual report. As part of participating in the 2020 update to the Regional
Hazard Mitigation Plan, every jurisdiction agrees to convene their internal planning team at least
annually. Partners will convene at least biannually to update hazard mitigation strategies. For the 2020
plan, progress updates will be due in 2022 and 2024, in advance of plan expiration in 2025.
In addition to the biannual strategy updates and annual planning check-ins, mitigation strategies that
address flooding will be reviewed, revised, and updated annually. Special focus is warranted for flood
hazards since flooding has historically been the most damaging hazard and the majority of Federal
Disaster Declarations including the county are due to flooding.
Given the emphasis on plan integration described in the introduction, plan check-ins for all planning
partners will include updates on integrating comprehensive, capital improvement, and other local and
regional plans with hazard mitigation plans and data. This effort is already beginning with the integration
of hazard risk and vulnerability information into the 2020 update of the countywide planning processes.
As part of leading a countywide planning effort, King County Emergency Management will send to
planning partner any federal notices of funding opportunity for the Hazard Mitigation Assistance Grant
Program. Proposals from partners will be assessed according the prioritization process identified in this
plan and the county will, where possible, support those partners submitting grant proposals. This will be
a key strategy to implement the plan.
The next plan update is expected to be due in April 2025. All jurisdictions will submit letters of intent by
2023, at least two years prior to plan expiration. The county will lead the next regional planning effort,
beginning at least 18 months before the expiration of the 2020 plan.
To update and maintain the mitigation strategies, KC EM has worked with the King County Risk
Management Services department to develop a reporting tool that will allow for easier updates on 2 and
5-year objective progress. These updates will be collected electronically and feed into a program that can
track progress over time for each mitigation strategy. The strategy progress can then be reported out.
206
Alternatively, progress made on strategies can be organized according to mitigation plan goals. This will
be done to show how projects undertaken by agencies and jurisdictions are supporting the 14
Determinants of Equity. Data parsed both in terms of the mitigation plan goals and by strategy will be
reported to the County Executive and Council biannually in the annual report of the department.
In addition to the updates for mitigation strategies, the expected publication of data from several
programs may trigger an update.
• Publication of the Department of Homeland Security Regional Resiliency Assessment Program
report
• Publication of the countywide landslide susceptibility map from Washington Department of
Natural Resources
• Publication of the Wildland Urban Interface wildfire risk map from Washington Department of
Natural Resources
• Publication of tsunami inundation data from Washington Department of Natural Resources
207
Plan Approval and Adoption
The King County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan is submitted first to Washington State Emergency
Management for review and then to FEMA for final review and preliminary approval. Each jurisdiction,
along with the base plan, must meet all FEMA requirements outlined in the FEMA Local Hazard
Mitigation Plan Review Guide. If requirements are found to not be met, the jurisdiction involved must
revise the plan and resubmit. Once preliminary approval is secured, FEMA will send a notice of
Approval – Pending Adoption.
The RHMP is adopted by each participating jurisdiction, primarily through a resolution passed by the
council or commission responsible. The King County Council adopted this plan on DATE, following
notice of approval, pending adoption from FEMA and Washington State Emergency Management. This
plan is effective upon adoption and will expire 5 years to the day after adoption.
208
Mitigation Strategy Status Updates from the 2015 Plan
The format for hazard mitigation strategies has been completely changed in the 2020 plan update. All
actions previously identified have been removed and/or incorporated into new mitigation strategies. The
updated strategy format will better support tracking and implementation of mitigation strategies and
their constituent actions. Strategies that are preparedness focused have been removed, as well as those
that are ongoing in nature and do not have specific targets or responsible entities.
The following tables are taken from the 2018 annual progress report for the 2015 King County Regional
Hazard Mitigation Plan. This list only includes strategies submitted by King County departments and
countywide strategies. Individual jurisdiction action progress reports are included in each annex. The
new statuses for strategies include:
• Removed – Strategy is not carried forward into the new plan
• Complete – Strategy is complete and not carried forward into the new plan
• Updated – Strategy is updated and carried forward into the new mitigation plan.
209
CURRENT PROGRESS ON 2015 ACTION PLAN INITIATIVES
Progress
(Yes/No) Timeline
Update
Status Comment (Describe progress or changed priority)
2018
Status
CW-1—Continue to participate in and support the “Resilient King County” initiative.
Yes Long-
Term
Removed King County is continuing work towards developing a
Regional Recovery Framework. Recent efforts to vet
content with King County’s Department Directors
and Executive Office have been made to start to
formulate a governance structure.
Ongoing
CW-2—Continue to maintain a website that will house the regional hazard mitigation plan, its progress
reports and all components of the plan’s maintenance strategy to provide the planning partners and
public ongoing access to the plan and its implementation.
Yes Long
Term
Removed King County’s Regional Hazard Mitigation plan and
all updated documents will continue to be posted to
the website.
Ongoing
CW-3—Continue to leverage/support/enhance ongoing, regional public education and awareness
programs (such as “Take Winter by Storm” and “Make it Through”) as a method to educate the public
on risk, risk reduction and community resilience.
Yes Long
Term
Removed We continue to enhance public education campaigns
and have now added climate resilience as part of our
educational presentations.
Ongoing
CW-4—Continue to support the use, development and enhancement of a regional alert and
notification system.
Yes Short
Term
Removed King County deployed a new Regional Alert and
Notification System. Many King County departments
and cities have signed on.
Complete
CW-5—Strive to capture time-sensitive, perishable data—such as high-water marks, extent and
location of hazard, and loss information—following hazard events to support future updates to the risk
assessment.
Yes Long
Term
Removed KC DNRP has updated landslide hazard maps (see
DNRP – WLR 3 & DNRP – WLR 4)
Ongoing
CW-6—Encourage signatories for the regional coordination framework for disasters and planned
events.
Yes Long
Term
Removed New signatories were added in 2016. Ongoing
CW-7—Continue ongoing communication and coordination in the implementation of the King
County Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan and the 2013 King County Flood Hazard Management Plan.
210
Yes Long
Term
Removed Ongoing communication and coordination was
completed through the linkage process of Lake Forest
Park and Kenmore, grants coordination for various
applications, and ongoing communication for
progress reporting.
Ongoing
DNRP-SWD-1—Seismic Design Standards. Continue to design and build facilities to meet or exceed
seismic standards, including redundant essential equipment. Apply current seismic standards to all
renovation or replacement of existing facilities and/or equipment.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Design standards exist and we will continue to design
and build facilities to meet or exceed seismic
standards, including redundant essential equipment.
Apply current seismic standards to all renovation or
replacement of existing facilities and/or equipment.
Complete
DNRP-SWD-2—Vulnerability Assessment of Cedar Hills Landfills Structures. Conduct a vulnerability
assessment of buildings at the Cedar Hills Landfill to ascertain readiness.
Yes Long-
term
Removed Structural integrity to be addressed through seismic
design standards; to be removed as part of standard
work. Additional work completed to reduce
vulnerability at the landfill includes: completed
Emergency Action Plan, Dam Break Analysis,
Potential Inundation Area Mapping for the
Contaminated Stormwater (CSW) Pond dam and the
SW Stormwater Pond dam (both state registered dams
at Cedar Hills Regional Landfill). The SCADA system
is being updated to monitor and automate operation
adjustments for pumping at the CSW facility. The area
8 stockpile slope was regraded Q3 2018 in response to
a Q4 2017 slope failure (a.k.a., landslide or land
movement) and to mitigate future failure prior to the
rainy season. Coordination between SWD and OEM
enhanced, including use of mass notification system
for incident response, support and community
notification.
Complete
DNRP-WLR-1—Flood Insurance Program. Continue to maintain compliance and good standing
under the National Flood Insurance Program. This will be accomplished through the implementation
of floodplain management programs, at a minimum, will meet the minimum requirements of the NFIP,
which include the following:
• Enforcing the adopted flood damage prevention ordinance.
• Participating in floodplain identification and mapping updates.
• Providing public assistance and information on floodplain requirements and impacts.
Yes Long-
term
Removed Met minimum requirements of the NFIP by
providing public assistance and information on
Ongoing
211
floodplain requirements, enforcing the adopted flood
damage reduction ordinance and participating in
floodplain mapping updates. Maintain a CRS Class 2
rating, which verifies that King County meets and
exceeds FEMA NFIP minimum requirements.
DNRP-WLR-2—Landslide Hazard Coordination. Form an interdepartmental landslide hazard
committee that includes DNRP, DPER, DOT, and OEM. The committee will address broad policy
issues, including capital projects, communication, code changes, etc.
No Long-
term
Updated Form an interdepartmental landslide hazard
committee that includes DNRP, DPER, DOT and
OEM. The committee will address broad policy
issues, including capital projects, communication,
code changes, etc.
Ongoing
DNRP-WLR-3—Proposed Hazard Mapping Phase I. Update the current landslide hazard map with
information that has been collected to date.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Low priority now that map is complete.
Status: Complete for areas within major river
corridors and Vashon-Maury Island.
Comment: A Phase 1 map was completed in October
2014. Phase I mapping along river corridors was
completed by Water Land Resources Division as the
service provider to the King County Flood Control
District and Phase 1 mapping for Vashon-Maury
Island was provided by KC DPER. Areas outside of
major river corridors were not included in this map.
Complete
DNRP-WLR-4—Proposed Hazard Mapping Phase II. Create a geo-database with detailed information
on landslide types, run out, landslide dams, etc. Database will be searchable and updatable as new
information is acquired.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Phase II mapping along river corridors was completed
by Water Land Resources Division as the service
provider to the King County Flood Control District
(KCFCD). Areas outside of the major river corridors
(including Vashon-Maury Island) are not included in
the geo-database. This mapping along river corridors
includes five general landslide types, each of these
were mapped separately to illustrate potential hazard
areas. This mapping has been completed along with a
supporting technical report, database and a user-
Complete
212
friendly web tool. It is anticipated that this mapping
will be publicly available in August 2016. This
mapping will be available in a GIS format. No
suitable methodology was identified to predict future
landslide runout beyond area of current landslide
debris deposition. Therefore, neither such landslide
runout, nor the resulting formation of landslide dams
was mapped. At this time funding has not been
secured for ongoing database management or further
updates to the river corridor landslide mapping
information.
DPER completed a separate landslide hazard
mapping project covering unincorporated King
County largely outside of the forest production
zone. This was an expansion of the Phase 1 mapping
and was needed to identify areas for further
geotechnical investigation during building and land
use permit application reviews. This mapping does
not distinguish between different landslide
processes. The DPER mapping is complete to
current specifications and is presently undergoing
internal review. DPER’s map of potential landslide
hazards will be available in a GIS format. It will be
updated at appropriate intervals as needed following
receipt of new data.
Landslide hazards in incorporated areas outside of
major river corridors are not included in the Phase I
or Phase II products. At this time no work is funded
or planned to conduct landslide hazard mapping for
incorporated areas that are outside of the major river
corridors.
DNRP-WLR-5—Flood Protection Facility Maintenance. Maintain and repair damaged structural
elements for King County’s extensive inventory of flood protection facilities.
Yes Long-
term
Updated County staff completed 421 inspections on 332 levees
and revetments during the reporting period. Of these,
143 were routine inspections and 279 were post-flood
inspections following the 2015-2016 flood season.
Resulting in identification of damages to flood
protection facilities and repairs or emergency
management plan.
Ongoing
213
Maintenance of more than 70 sites included irrigation,
signage, hazard tree mitigation, debris removal,
planting, mulching, mowing and installation of a
device to prevent beavers from blocking two large
culverts which could result in flooding homes and
roads in the North Bend area.
Resulting in reduced potential for flooding.
DNRP-WLR-6—River Corridor Restoration. Remove, slope back, or set back County-owned flood
protection facilities and other structural features to allow for improved riparian habitat, greater channel
diversity and migration, reclaimed flood storage and enhanced open space or recreational/ interpretive
uses.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Completed projects allowing for river corridor
restoration include the Sinnema Quaale Revetment
project on the Snoqualmie River. This revetment
repair was completed in the summer of 2016 and has
significantly decreased the risks to the Snoqualmie
Valley Trail, regionally significant fiber optic lines and
SR203. The Countyline to A Street levee setback on
the White River is currently under construction.
Additional setback projects are planned for
construction in 2017.
Ongoing
DNRP-WLR-7—Flood Hazard Mitigation. Acquire repetitively damaged homes, purchase
underdeveloped land to prevent future development in flood prone areas, and, where cost-effective
and feasible, elevate residential homes that sustain recurring deep, low-velocity flooding.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Non-structural mitigation efforts are ongoing in flood
prone areas. Eleven at-risk homes were elevated in
the Snoqualmie basin during the reporting period;
another 13 home elevations are underway. Elevating
homes eliminates flood damage to living space,
resulting in a more resilient community. Acquisition
of the last at-risk parcel in the San Souci
neighborhood along the Tolt River completed 20
years of effort to acquire 18 parcels from willing
landowners. These actions have completely eliminated
flood risks to the entire neighborhood and eliminated
emergency monitoring and response to the
neighborhood.
Ongoing
214
DNRP-WLR-8—Critical Facility Retrofit. Retrofit the Black River Pump Station by updating the fuel
pumps to meet seismic requirements. Currently, the fuel supply tanks for King County flood facilities
cannot withstand a moderate to major quake.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Recent improvements include:
• Replacing the single-walled fuel system
with double-walled tanks and lines to
handle all diesel fuel in accordance with
current code requirements
• Replacing the pumphouse roof
• Installing safety rails on the roof
Sediment had accumulated in the pump inlet bays,
hindering operation of pump screen systems.
Accumulated sediment was emptied from the bays
and inlet apron in 2016 to allow continued operation
of the screens and pumps. This improves the certainty
of flood protection the station provides too much of
Renton and parts of Tukwila and Kent.
Staff have completed update of Emergency Action
Plans for 10 state registered dams in compliance with
Washington Dam Safety Office. Improvements to
these plans include automated notification applying
King County Alert and King County Inform
emergency notification platforms; upgrades to dam
break analysis and Potential Inundation Area
mapping; and enhanced coordination between
operations and emergency planning.
Ongoing
DNRP-WLR-9—Flood Hazard Reduction Programs. Conduct activities that are vital to the mitigation
of the natural hazards impacting King County, such as hazard identification, warning, information
dissemination and public outreach.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Expansion of the King County Flood Warning
System to include the South Fork Skykomish River. A
four-phase warning system is being developed in time
for the 2016–2017 flood season, following review and
approval by the District. This system is expected to
provide flood warnings to people who live, work or
travel through the town of Skykomish and the
surrounding area.
Ongoing
215
In October, the annual flood warning brochure was
mailed to 19,222 addresses in the King County river
floodplain.
Significant outreach efforts during the reporting
period include preparation for flood season, outreach
about multiple construction projects, as well as
outreach about floodplain planning, technical studies
and maps, and other public engagement efforts.
DNRP-WLR-10—Critical Facility Upgrade. Continue to update flood warning telemetry and gauging,
computers, software applications, emergency power, and other response facilities.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Updates to the King County Flood App for iOS,
Android, and Windows phones were completed for
release by October 2015. All King County websites
were migrated to a new "mobile responsive" template
which adapts to a wide range of screen sizes, from
small smartphone displays to big screen desktop
displays. In addition, improvements were made to the
back-end systems that manage the flood data used on
the websites, apps and automated phone systems.
Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-1— Seismic Design Standards. Continue to design and build facilities to meet or exceed
seismic standards, including essential equipment. Apply current seismic standards to all renovation or
replacement of existing facilities and/or equipment.
Yes Long-
term
Updated This is an ongoing process- we apply current seismic
standards to all renovation and/or replacement of
existing facilities or equipment.
Ongoing
216
DNRP-WTD-2—Vulnerability Assessments. Conduct vulnerability assessments of WTD treatment
plant facilities and conveyance system structures for flooding, earthquakes, large-scale power outages,
and hazardous material spills into the conveyance system (accidental or deliberate, i.e. terrorist action).
The assessments should include the following:
• Review existing earthquake vulnerability assessments and identify facilities and structures that
need further assessments.
• Review existing emergency power generation capacities at treatment plants, offsite facilities and
interceptors (pipelines) to identify vulnerabilities and response & restoration protocol
enhancements.
• Review existing spill response procedures and protocols for hazardous materials spills (both
accidental and intentional releases) that impact flows into the WTD system. Update and
coordinate emergency procedures with key fire departments and the Office of Emergency
Management.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Request for Proposal issued on 7/12/2016 Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-3—Modification of Existing Facilities. Use the data gathered by the earthquake
vulnerability assessments to identify capital projects that increase the resistance of the division’s
structures and conveyances to damage or that allow a rapid recovery from damage. Projects may
include seismic bracing of equipment and piping, removal of z-beam structures, access road
reinforcement for the West Point Treatment Plant, or seismic upgrade of underwater interceptors.
No Long-
term
Updated This task is driven by the results of the above
vulnerability
assessments which have yet to be conducted. See item
2 above
Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-4—Sea Level Rise Vulnerability Assessments. Implement cost-effective measures to
address, through capital improvement and asset management programs, the vulnerability of 20 facilities
at risk of saltwater inflow. The facilities were identified by a WTD analysis of the wastewater system to
identify facilities at risk for saltwater inflow from future sea level rise, existing and predicted high tides,
and storm surges.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-5—Control System/ Cyber Security Vulnerability Assessment and Procedure Audit.
Implement the Ovation project—a multi-year, multi-million-dollar upgrade of the Wastewater
Treatment Division’s legacy control systems. WTD is in the process of updating its control systems.
Vulnerability assessments are designed into the Ovation project. When the system is operational, a
security audit would be conducted to ensure that policies and procedures are in place to protect the
system.
No Long-
term
Updated This assessment will be conducted when the system is
operational
Ongoing
217
DNRP-WTD-6—Emergency Communications Vulnerability Assessment. Perform an assessment to
determine the number of radios necessary to support operational readiness in the event of a widespread
telecommunications failure. Currently all key operational facilities and offsite operation and maintenance
vehicles are equipped with 800 MHz radios, constituting WTD’s core emergency communications
method. The analog equipment currently deployed is first generation and is being sunsetted as the
system is converted to a digital format. All the division’s analog radios will need to be replaced in the
next 3 to 5 years. Perform a further assessment of the reliability and deployment of other
communications devices: cell phones, smart phones, iPads, text messaging, and the emergency
notification system (MyState/AlertSense).
No Long-
term
Updated Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-7—GIS Emergency Response Mapping and Real-Time Flow Data. Update the
WTD/DNRP Emergency Response map with the current priority roads, bridges, earthquake
liquefaction, inundation and landslide zones and gas/petroleum pipelines, under-laid with WTD
facilities and conveyance lines and emergency outfalls to facilitate emergency response and continuity
of operations. Make this information available through a password-protected website for select users.
Explore connecting the map to real-time flow data.
Yes Short-
term
Updated A GIS emergency mapping site is now operational on
the WTD intranet that shows facilities and
conveyance system. Working on moving it to an
internet site so that it can be accessed 24/7 by off
duty personnel.
Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-8—Emergency Event Management System. Determine the best method for WTD to
manage and share emergency response and continuity of operations activities across the division’s five
treatment plants and the division headquarters in the King Street Center. Determine if the Regional
Information System can fulfill this function and, if not, what alternative systems are available
(WebEOC, CodeRed, etc.).
No Long-
term
Updated Tested the KC OEM SharePoint site during the CSZ
exercise. Assessing the need for a separate WTD
system
Ongoing
DNRP-WTD-9—Emergency Response/ Damage Assessment/FEMA Cost Tracking. To ensure
maximum FEMA reimbursement for disaster repair/mitigation, implement a system to capture and
track emergency response activities and expenses form the beginning of incidents through damage
assessment and restoration. Use this tracking system for all out-of-the-ordinary emergency events.
Include labor, equipment, mileage, supplies, expendables, and outside contracting associated with
response and repair.
No Short-
term
Updated Ongoing
218
DOT-1—Updated response plans to address terrorism preparedness, including the following:
• Improve existing systems to address new technologies that are available for early weapons-of-
mass-destruction detection.
• Leverage existing resources and partnerships (Securitas, King County Sheriff’s Office, Seattle
Police Department, Seattle Fire Department) to train and exercise together for continuity
during real-world events.
Yes Long-
term
Removed Ongoing
DOT-2—Update messaging, response plans, and procedures to address winter weather, including the
following:
• Outreach to vulnerable and at-risk populations for transportation for individuals who need to
get to life-saving medical appointments (dialysis, chemotherapy).
• Coordination with healthcare and transportation partners to ensure access to medical care.
Yes Long-
term
Removed Complete
DOT-3—Update and improve plans to address continuity of transportation services, provision of
medical care, and infrastructure resiliency, including the following:
• Plans and procedures for workforce continuity and service provision.
• Coordination with local partners on evacuation and responder routes, lifeline routes, and
transportation routes.
• Technical systems and IT infrastructure (e.g. computer programs, SCADA systems).
Yes Long-
term
Removed Ongoing
DOT-4—Install security cameras on public buses to deter crime associated with civil unrest and
terrorist acts.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Metro will have at or near 100% of their fleet
equipped with cameras by the end of 2018.
Complete
DPER-1—Continue inspection of existing and new construction.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Inspection to ensure code compliance of both new
and existing building and sites are conducted for all
permit work.
Ongoing
DPER-2—Provide plan reviews for noted construction.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Inspection to ensure code compliance of both new
and existing building and sites are conducted for all
permit work.
Ongoing
DPER-3—Work with schools and fire service public educators to deliver public safety messages.
Yes Long-
term
Updated Operational (annual) fire safety inspection of schools
was initiated this past year after several years of
inaction.
Ongoing
219
FMD-1—Replace Alder Tower, Alder Wing and Youth Detention Facility with a new modern juvenile
justice center meeting all seismic standards. Planning is underway for the new, voter-approved $210
million Children and Family Justice Center. Completion of the new facility is expected in 2019.
Yes Long-
term
Removed New facility is now expected in 2019 rather than 2018. Complete
FMD-2—Mitigate structural damage at King County Facilities. This initiative also involves training to
determine structural damage during and after hazard events.
Yes Long-
term
Updated The Facilities Management Division has undertaken
replacement of some fire protection systems which as
a result, will reduce fire damage during hazard events.
Ongoing
FMD-3—Mitigate non-structural facility damage at King County facilities. This initiative also involves
training to determine non-structural damage during and after hazard events.
Was an
action
taken?
Short-
term
Updated The Facilities Management Division recently received
a report about serious deficiencies at the King County
Courthouse. We will be updating the response to this
issue outside of the cycle of this report.
Ongoing
KCIT-1—Enterprise Server Optimization Project. Implement a standard virtual environment at the
King County Data Center to set the foundation for the King County Public Cloud Services to expand
infr2astructure service offerings.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Complete
KCIT-2—King County TV High-Definition Upgrade. Replace obsolete station infrastructure with
industry standard high-definition and digital equipment, allowing for delivery of the highest level of
service to the citizens of King County.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Complete
KCIT-3—Countywide Telephone System Replacement. Replace obsolete telephony infrastructure and
telephone systems with a modern and feature-rich communications solution.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Complete by end of 2010. Ongoing
KCIT-4—Business Empowerment and User Mobility. Improve the King County wide area network to
meet business requirements and provide a solid foundation for growth within a resilient and stable
network.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Complete
KCIT-5—Administration Building Rewire. Upgrade network cabling in King County Administration
Building to meet infrastructure standards, provide a more robust network connecti2vity to the services
provided at the facility, and take advantage of technological advancements.
220
Yes Short-
term
Removed Complete
PH-1— Inform the public on risk-reduction techniques for a communicable disease event. “Stop
Germs, Stay Healthy” public education campaign increases awareness of healthy behaviors, including
hand washing and “cover your cough”.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Public Health promotes infection control prevention
every day as well as during outbreaks and flu season.
Current focus is on fact sheets with pictograms for
outbreaks such as hepatitis A and measles as well as
guidelines for encampments and homeless service
providers. Also actively using social media and blogs
to promote messages.
Ongoing
PH-2—Update response plans to address emerging infectious disease outbreaks, including the
following:
• The allocation of resources (antivirals, vaccine, personal protective equipment) from the
strategic national stockpile.
• Improvements to surveillance systems to address new technologies
• Leverage existing private and public partnerships (CBO, healthcare, pharmacies) to serve as
medication centers and increasing access to medications for hard-to-reach communities.
• Risk communications and messaging, including use of social media.
Yes Short-
term
Removed A number of response plans were updated including
medical countermeasures, equity response plan, risk
communication plan, and workforce mobilization
plan. Tested new systems for surveillance and plans
during hepatitis A and measles outbreaks, including
easy to understand visual display of cases and
vaccination efforts.
Completed
PH-3—Update response plans and procedures to address winter weather, extreme heat, and other
climate-related events including the following:
• Outreach to vulnerable and at-risk populations for carbon monoxide poisoning prevention.
• Transportation for individuals who need to get to life-saving medical appointments (dialysis,
chemotherapy).
• Coordination with healthcare providers and NW Healthcare Response Network to ensure
access to medical care.
• Coordination with shelter providers for first aid teams and access for people to re-charge
medical equipment.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Consolidated weather events into one extreme
weather plan, updated winter weather transportation
plan and added wildfire smoke protocols. Tested
winter weather plans, including medical appointment
protocol during 2019 snow events.
Completed
221
OEM-1—Inform the public on personal and community preparedness actions they can take to lessen
their need for immediate response following a disaster. “Take Winter by Storm” and “What to Do to
Make It Through” are two outreach campaigns designed to get the message across to the whole
community. These campaigns include trainings, presentations, and tools to facilitate increased
community preparedness.
Yes Long-
term
Removed Strategy is ongoing by nature and preparedness-
focused. Removed.
Ongoing
OEM-2—Create a program to facilitate training for small businesses to increase their resilience to all
hazards. Training content would include employee preparedness, business continuity, and recovery
planning. Methods of training would include workshops, tools, and one-on-one help.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Initial steps to create Business EOC and conduct pilot
test were taken in June during Cascadia Rising. As a
result of early coordination with Seattle and King
County, 7 companies representing more than 150,000
employees participated and were able to make faster
operational decisions that could protect company
resources and staff in a real event. Examples include
early evacuation notifications, avoiding traffic
disruptions, and setting up alternate modes of
communication. Continuing to work with City of
Seattle, WAEMD, and FEMA on building a Regional
BEOC model.
Ongoing
OEM-3—Manage and facilitate the Resilient King County initiative, a countywide planning process for
crafting a comprehensive long-term recovery strategy following an earthquake or major catastrophe.
Develop the Resilient King County final report and the long-term recovery plan.
Yes Short-
term
Updated Conducted facilitated discussion with Executive
Leadership Team as part of Cascadia Rising Exercise.
Will vet plan content over summer and fall 2016.
Ongoing
OEM-4—Take advantage of technological and procedural improvements in regional alert and warning
systems to provide the most effective, efficient, and cost-effective messaging to residents, businesses,
and government, especially during emergencies.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Completed launch for new Alert & Notification
system in May 2016. As a result, King County not
only has the ability to provide alerts to all 2.1 million
residents but also, 16 new cities have signed up and
have direct ability to message their residents for local
events. This allows a reduction in hazard impact as
people will have more time to prepare themselves and
their property by receiving alerts during an
emergency.
Complete
222
OEM-5—Continue to update and improve the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)
and the Continuity of Operations Plan.
Yes Short-
term
Removed The CEMP has been updated in 2018/2019. Complete
OEM-6—Integrate the hazard mitigation plan into other plans, ordinances or programs to dictate land
uses within the jurisdiction.
Yes Short-
term
Updated Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan has been
incorporated into the King County Strategic Climate
Action Plan. Will also serve as a reference for
recovery.
Ongoing
OEM-7—Continue to support the countywide initiatives in this plan.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Ongoing
OEM-8—Coordinate and actively participate in the plan maintenance strategy of this plan.
Yes Short-
term
Updated County is implementing additional support for grant
administration and outreach to promote mitigation.
Ongoing
OEM-9—Continue to encourage community participation in incentive-based programs such as CRS,
FireWise, and StormReady.
Yes Short-
term
Removed Ongoing
2020 King County Hazard Mitigation Strategies
King County identified the following strategies through meetings among county departments. These
strategies were scored by each department using the prioritization criteria outlined earlier in this section.
The highest priority from each department is highlighted below. From the list of top priorities for each
department the highest countywide priorities were selected. These are:
• Integrate equity and social justice into planning, outreach, mitigation, response, and recovery
• Integrate hazards and vulnerability information into comprehensive planning
• Establish a resilient seismic transportation lifeline
STRATEGY PRIORITY (SCORE) LEAD AGENCY KEY OUTCOMES
Reduce Flood Impacts
to Unincorporated
King County Road
System 18 DLS - Roads
Lower road damage from repeated
flooding, especially in the
Snoqualmie Valley.
223
Increase Seismic
Resilience of Bridges in
Unincorporated King
County 16 DLS - Roads
Seismic retrofits to King County
bridges, especially those supporting
the transportation seismic lifeline.
Stormwater Outfall
Erosion Hazard
Inventory 18 DNPR
Hazard inventory of stormwater
outfalls and mapping of those areas
in GIS.
Resilience in Design
and Build of Critical
Water Treatment and
Conveyance Facilities 23 DNRP
Improvements, retrofits, and new
construction of water treatment
facilities that meets seismic
resilience needs.
Landslide, Erosion, and
Sedimentation Event
Mapping 19 DNRP
Mapping of hazard areas and
establishment of GIS layers.
Sea Level Rise
Resilience in
Wastewater Facilities 18 DNRP
Measures to move or reduce risk to
wastewater facilities in areas
projected to be impacted by sea-
level rise.
Stormwater and
Surface Water Risk
Reduction 18 DNRP
Retrofits to endangered stormwater
facilities. Focus on those areas at
greatest risk of failure.
Control System
Security and
Performance 16 DNRP
Protection of wastewater system
from cyber-attacks.
GIS Emergency
Response Mapping and
Real-Time Flow Data 15 DNRP
Real time GIS updates to critical
facility information.
Emergency
Communications
Enhancements 12 DNRP
Improvements to, and resilience of,
emergency communications tools.
Emergency Event
Management System 12 DNRP
Improvements to WebEOC,
including training on it.
Flood Warning
Program 18 DNRP - Flood
Flood warning, including public
information about warning system.
Post-Flood Recovery
Efforts 19 DNRP - Flood
Resilient rebuilding following a
flood disaster.
224
Home Elevations 18 DNRP - Flood
Elevations of homes out of base
flood elevation when acquisition is
not feasible.
Home Acquisitions and
Relocations 19 DNRP - Flood
Prioritize acquisition as a tool of
risk reduction and take advantage
of post-disaster acquisition
opportunities.
Protect and Restore
Natural Floodplain
Functions 17 DNRP - Flood
Take advantage of natural systems
to reduce flood risk and restore
flood risk areas to their natural
state.
Flood Risk Mapping 16 DNRP - Flood
Improve and update flood risk
maps, accounting for climate
change.
Public Information
Flood Activities 16 DNRP - Flood
Conduct outreach around flood
hazard information.
Flood Insurance
Promotion 16 DNRP - Flood
Promote flood insurance to all
homeowners, renters, and business
owners.
Enforce Higher
Floodplain
Management
Regulations 13 DNRP - Flood
Enforce King County’s higher
standards to prevent the creation of
new flood risk.
Manage Flood
Protection Facilities 4 DNRP - Flood
Manage flood protection facilities
to ensure they will not fail during a
major flood or earthquake.
Seismic Evaluation of
King County
Courthouse and
Maleng Regional
Justice Center 16 FMD
Evaluate the vulnerability of major
King County justice facilities and
develop a strategy to address
deficiencies.
Integrate ESJ into
Mitigation, Response,
and Recovery Activities 25 KCEM
Fully account for equity and social
justice in all planning and activities
to help ensure that disasters do not
increase inequity.
Seismic Lifeline Route
Resilience 23 KCEM
Establish transportation seismic
lifelines and begin retrofitting
vulnerable segments to a standard
that will enable effective response
225
and recovery following an
earthquake.
Integrate Hazard
Mitigation and
Comprehensive
Planning 21 KCEM
Integrate hazards and vulnerability
information into comprehensive
planning policies, mapping, and
related activities to prevent the
creation of new risk through
development in high hazard areas.
Engage Community
Organizations in
Emergency
Management 20 KCEM
Leverage existing community
capabilities and engage with
communities to promote
emergency preparedness and
catalogue potential needs.
Climate Integration
Training 18 KCEM
Train local jurisdictions on how to
integrate climate change
information into planning, projects,
and emergency management.
Disaster Skills Risk
Reduction Training 18 KCEM
Train communities on what to do
in a disaster and how to protect
themselves and their families.
Dam Failure Risk and
Impact Reduction 16 KCEM
Identify and remove or rehabilitate
high hazard dams and conduct
outreach on dam safety for good
condition dams that will not be
removed.
Wildfire Preparedness
and Risk Reduction 15 KCEM
Convene partners engaged in
wildfire planning activities to
coordinate community outreach
and reactions to new mapping and
potential building codes.
Hazard Mitigation
Assistance Grant
Support 15 KCEM
Support local jurisdictions who
have little experience in developing
applications for FEMA HMA.
Public Assistance
Grant Support 15 KCEM
Support local jurisdictions and
county agencies with PA following
a disaster declaration and expand
the use of PA Mitigation funds.
Language Accessible
Video Emergency
Messaging 26 PHSKC
Develop video and other
emergency messaging that is
accessible to non-English speakers
226
and those who are blind or hearing
impaired.
King County Facilities
Indoor Air Quality
Monitoring Network 16 PHSKC
Monitor and mitigate air quality in
King County facilities.
Medical Gas Seismic
Detection &
Emergency Shut Off 10 PHSKC
Install automatic gas detection and
shutoff systems for hospitals and
medical centers.
227
Reduce Flood Impacts to the Unincorporated King County Road System
Lead
Jennifer Knauer,
King County
Department of
Local Services,
Road Services
Division
Partners
King County Flood
Control District
Cities
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 4, 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
$500,000 (Snoqualmie
Valley study)
Additional design,
construction costs TBD
Vision
Reduce the impacts of major river flooding to the unincorporated King County Road system within
the Snoqualmie Valley and other major river valleys
Description
The Snoqualmie Valley is located approximately 8-10 miles east of Seattle, Washington and chronic
localized and larger-scale flooding regularly impacts and closes roads within the floodplain. During
major flood events, King County has identified that countywide, eleven roads are frequently closed, of
which ten are located in the Snoqualmie River Basin.
During major flood events, cross-Snoqualmie Valley routes are not passable and approximately
15,000+ residents are cut off from emergency services and accessing other critical destinations during
a flood event. When cross-valley road closures occur, they impact over 25,000 drivers per day. There
is a need for a permanent flood tolerant cross-valley route, in part due to growth in eastern King
County cities and increasing traffic volumes on unincorporated King County roads. In addition to
selecting, designing and constructing one cross-valley flood tolerant route, there is a vital need for
improved resiliency across other unincorporated King County roads in flood prone portions of the
Snoqualmie Valley, as well as other unincorporated King County floodplain locations. A joint study is
proposed to be completed by the King County Road Services Division and the King County Flood
Control District. The purpose of the study is to evaluate a subset of primary cross-valley routes for the
purpose of identifying a cost-effective option that can be built to withstand major flood events and
provide east-west access across the valley during major flood events.
Improving the flood resiliency of existing county roads, as well as designing and constructing a flood
tolerant cross-Snoqualmie Valley route will be complex and costly. King County Road Services
Division continues to struggle to meet its preservation service goals for unincorporated King County
roads and bridges, due to current and future forecast financial constraints. The activities identified
through this strategy are unfunded needs and a funding strategy will need to be prepared and
successfully implemented.
2-Year Objectives
• Fund cross-valley study
• Scope cross-valley study
5-Year Objectives
• Complete cross-valley study
• Complete planning level cost
estimates for study
• Pursue grant opportunities
Long-Term Objectives
• Obtain grant funds to
design and build a flood
tolerant cross-valley route
• Construct the route
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Fund study to evaluate options to assess which major roadway across the Snoqualmie River Valley
may be improved to withstand chronic river flooding.
• Initiate and complete the study
Performance Measure
• Study completion
• Route selected, as informed by the study
228
Increase Seismic Resilience of Bridges in Unincorporated King County
Lead
Jennifer Knauer,
King County
Department of
Local Services,
Roads Division
Partners
Cities
KC EM
WSDOT
PHSKC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Earthquake
Goal 4, 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
$500,000 (study costs)
TBD design and
construction costs
FEMA BRIC Grants
Vision
Improved seismic stability for unincorporated King County lifeline route bridges
Description
Evaluate the seismic stability of unincorporated King County lifeline route bridges and complete
seismic retrofits as informed by the results of the study. Seismic improvements to unincorporated
King County lifeline route bridges were completed from 1995 through 2008, to retrofit these bridges
to level 2 standards, the standard adopted by the King County Council that reflected the
contemporary standards of that time. Subsequent to completion of these retrofits, seismic evaluation
standards have changed. This strategy involves evaluating all unincorporated King County lifeline
bridge routes to a retrofit level 3 (highest level), which reflects the current evaluation standard.
Bridges retrofitted to a seismic level 3 would likely withstand a seismic event and still be in serviceable
status. Outcomes from this strategy includes a prioritized list of lifeline bridge seismic retrofit needs
and total program cost estimates. This strategy also involves securing the funding and completing the
seismic retrofits identified within the prioritized needs list. King County Road Services Division
continues to struggle to meet its preservation service goals for unincorporated King County roads and
bridges due to current and future forecast funding constraints. The activities identified through this
strategy are unfunded needs and a funding strategy will need to be prepared and successfully
implemented.
2-Year Objectives
• Fund UKC bridge seismic
assessment study
• Complete seismic assessment
study
5-Year Objectives
• Secure capital funds
Long-Term Objectives
• Complete seismic
upgrades to UKC
lifeline route bridges
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Secure funds for the study
• Complete the study and produce prioritized list of lifeline route bridge seismic retrofit needs and
costs
• Prepare funding strategy
• Secure capital funds in support of seismic retrofits
• Complete seismic retrofits
Performance Measure
• Study completed
• Funding strategy prepared and successfully implemented
• Bridge seismic retrofits completed
229
Stormwater Outfall Erosion Hazard Inventory
Lead
DNRP Water and
Land Resources
Division
Partners
N/A
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Goal 6
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
SWM Fee; FCD Grant;
FEMA Hazard
Mitigation
Vision
To minimize risk to public safety, properties, and water quality/aquatic health associated with
landslides, severe erosion, and sediment deposition caused or threatened by discharges from
stormwater system outfalls, both public and private. There are hundreds of stormwater system
outfalls throughout unincorporated King County that discharge onto slopes or into ravines that are
prone to landslides or severe erosion, or where sediment deposition is a hazard downstream. Many
of these are known from past events but are not inventoried in any organized way. Many others are
not known without an inventory effort to identify them.
Description
1. Establish a GIS mapping layer/database to inventory locations where the discharges from
stormwater system outfalls have caused or pose a risk of causing landslides, severe erosion,
and/or sediment deposition impacts downstream. Include in the inventory a description of the
landslide and erosion processes at play if known or determined through geotechnical evaluation.
Include potential causal agents such as slope, soil composition, drainage area, and discharge rates.
Include descriptions of observed or potential impacts to structures, facilities, roads, driveways,
water quality, and fish habitat. Include a description of the potential mitigation improvement
(e.g., tightline, channel stabilization, settling facility, etc.) and its approximate cost.
2. Populate the GIS database with known incidents of erosive problems downstream of outfalls. If
additional information is needed on an incident, conduct a field investigation to collect it. In
addition to known incidents, review existing stormwater system maps, landslide hazard area
maps, erosion hazard area maps, and steep slope hazard area maps to identify outfalls that are
potentially at risk of causing erosive problems downstream. Conduct field investigations of these
outfalls and their drainage path downstream to determine the nature of any hazards that might
exist. If hazards do exist, inventory the location and record the information mentioned above in
the GIS database.
3. Use the GIS inventory information to identify and prioritize hazard mitigation projects for
feasibility analysis to determine an updated cost and other information needed for ranking against
other competing projects. This information can also be used to provide technical assistance to
affected property owners if funding is not readily available for a mitigation project. In addition,
the information would be beneficial to setting mitigation requirements during the County’s
permit review of new development projects upstream of problematic outfalls.
At this time, funding has not been appropriated for a program that would implement this mitigation
strategy. WLRD Stormwater Services is currently developing a strategic plan that will consider this
along with other along with other program ideas for minimizing risk and optimizing stormwater
management.
2-Year Objectives
• Complete Stormwater Services
strategic plan to determine
support for this program.
5-Year Objectives
If there is support for the
program in the strategic plan, seek
funding for its implementation.
Long-Term Objectives
• N/A
230
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Establish GIS database as described under mitigation strategy.
• Populate GIS database with outfall locations known to be a problem based on past incidents.
• Populate database with outfall locations that could be a problem based on hazards that exist
downstream either mapped or determined in the field.
• Use the GIS database to identify and prioritize mitigation projects for feasibility analysis to
determine an updated cost and other information needed for ranking the project against other
competing projects.
• Implement the highest priority projects as funding becomes available. Until funding becomes
available, implement stop gap measures (e.g., sandbagging) if needed to minimize severity of
hazard.
• Where funding is not readily available for a mitigation project, offer technical assistance to
affected property owners.
Performance Measure
• Number of problematic outfalls inventoried
• Number of problematic outfalls fixed
• Number of property owners to which technical assistance was provided for private solutions
231
Resilience in Design and Build of Critical Water Treatment and Conveyance Facilities
Lead
DNRP Water
Treatment
Division
Partners
Strategic Climate Action
Plan
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Earthquake
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Capital Budget, Revenue
Backed.
Vision
WTD Treatment Plant Facilities and Conveyance system structures are protected against identified
potential vulnerabilities, including but not limited to flooding, earthquakes, large-scale power outages
and hazardous materials spills into the conveyance system (whether those spills are accidental or
deliberate, e.g. terrorist action).
Description
Design, build, and retrofit facilities to meet or exceed seismic standards, including essential equipment.
Apply current seismic standards to all renovation or replacement of existing facilities and/or
equipment.
In April 2018 the division completed a Resiliency and Vulnerability Review of its entire conveyance
system to identify critical structures and facilities. The project which was conducted by an engineering
consultant conducted initial structural earthquake assessments of the key facilities. The report included
recommendations for mitigation projects in order of priority. Work is underway on multiple projects.
2-Year Objectives
• Vulnerability assessment
review.
• Emergency power systems
review.
• Complete retrofit of 3
facilities identified as most
critical/vulnerable.
5-Year Objectives
• Implement changes identified
in the reviews conducted in
the 2-year window.
• Update to spill response
procedures is completed.
• Complete retrofit of 6
additional facilities in order of
priority/vulnerability.
Long-Term Objectives
• Facilities that
are resilient and able
to withstand damage
from earthquakes or
other hazards
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Review existing earthquake vulnerability assessments and identify facilities and structures that
need further assessments.
• Review existing emergency power generation capacities at treatment plants, offsite facilities and
interceptors (pipelines) to identify vulnerabilities and response & restoration protocol
enhancements.
• Review existing spill response procedures and protocols for hazardous materials spills (both
accidental and intentional releases) that impact flows into the WTD system. Update and
coordinate emergency procedures with key fire departments and the Office of Emergency
Management.
Performance Measure
• % of buildings, pipelines and equipment that are built to seismic resilience standards.
• % of identified vulnerabilities and plan priorities addressed with improvements and resolutions.
• % of retrofit projects planned that are completed.
232
Landslide, Erosion, and Sedimentation Event Mapping
Lead
DNRP Water and
Land Resources
Division
Partners
Cooperating agencies
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Goal 4
Goal 6
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
SWM Fee; FCD Grant;
FEMA Hazard
Mitigation
Vision
Develop a GIS mapping layer to establish a record of observed landslide, erosion, and sedimentation
events. Include in the record a description of landslide and erosion processes if available from
geotechnical evaluation. Identify landslide, erosion, and sedimentation events caused by stormwater
discharge. Use this information to identify and prioritize corrections and mitigations to reduce events.
These corrections and mitigations would be prioritized as part of the overall WLRD Stormwater
Services strategic plan (currently development) to ensure the highest risk areas are addressed first. At
this time, funding has not been secured for implementation of a corrective program for stormwater
discharges that cause or contribute to landslides, erosion, and sedimentation events.
Description
Mapping of landslide, and high erosion areas and sedimentation events provides current information
for development review and infrastructure planning, and utility protection measures to be
implemented. Reconnaissance has identified multiple sites of stream ravine slope destabilization due to
stormwater discharge from both public and private stormwater conveyance systems. Multiple
measures are readily available to relocate discharge outfall, dissipate flow erosion potential, and
implement flow control measures to reduce landslide risk and channel erosion. Sediment discharge
and debris flow incidences cause increasing cost of sediment management and property damage and
environmental impact to receiving stream habitat. This effort will also reduce inform the business risk
exposure of assets that drain to locations impacted by past events. This could result in and identify
proper use of different maintenance techniques, effective inspection/maintenance intervals, and the
priority of improvement projects needed seek to avoid emergency repairs.
2-Year Objectives
• Develop mapping to include
landslide prone areas, event
tracking and include highly
erosive process. Identify impact
areas and vulnerability to
stormwater discharges.
5-Year Objectives
• Develop program to correct
stormwater discharges causing
landside activation and high
erosion processes. Provide
assistance to private system
owners to correct stormwater
discharges to unstable slopes
in high impact areas
Long-Term Objectives
• Reduce progressive
degradation of
streams, wetlands and
lake habitats and
reduced conveyance
and flood protection
capacity resulting
from sediment
deposition.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Establish ArcGIS mapping of landslide and erosion hazard areas that identify documented
incidences, type of landslide or erosion processes and impact zones.
• Prioritize local systems with high impacts to community, public infrastructure, and environment.
• Identify corrective actions and mitigation strategies to reduce impacts and emergency response
services provided by King County.
• These actions present opportunities to improve system resilience and capacity buffering from the
impacts of climate change variability.
233
Performance Measure
• Mapping area completed in relation to unincorporated area.
• Identification and prioritization of problematic outfalls
• Strategy to address individual sites.
• Technical assistance to citizens to implement corrective actions
234
Stormwater and Surface Water Infrastructure Risk Reduction
Lead
DNRP Water and
Land Resources
Division
Partners
N/A
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Goal 6
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
SWM Fee; FCD Grant;
FEMA Hazard
Mitigation
Vision
To minimize risk to public safety, properties, and water quality/aquatic health resulting from:
1) The failure of existing stormwater and surface water infrastructure due to aging. Growing
numbers of stormwater and surface water infrastructure assets operated by or under the purview
of the Water and Land Resources Division (WLRD) are at or approaching the end of their
effective life where structural failure could cause flooding, erosion, sedimentation, and/or fish
habitat damage.
2) More frequent overflow or functional impairment of existing stormwater and surface water
infrastructure due to expected increases in rainfall intensities over the next 50 years from climate
change. This too could cause flooding, erosion, sedimentation, and/or habitat damage.
3) The lack of stormwater control infrastructure for managing runoff from lands that were
developed before stormwater controls were required on new developments. Over two thirds of
the developed landscape in King County was built before modern stormwater controls were
required on new developments. This lack of runoff quantity and quality control has been linked
to degraded water quality and aquatic health in numerous streams and other water bodies
throughout King County as documented by a network of monitoring stations. It may also
contribute to existing flooding, erosion, sedimentation, and/or habitat damage.
Description
WLRD is planning to do the following to achieve the vision/objective stated above:
1) Proactively manage existing infrastructure through inspections, maintenance, risk assessments,
and repair/replacement of the highest risk infrastructure components before they fail to avoid the
high cost of emergency repairs and the damages or injuries that can result from component
failure. This proactive management program is already in place for WLRD-operated
infrastructure assets but needs further policy development for assets managed by private parties.
WLRD Stormwater Services is currently developing a strategic plan that should address this
policy development need.
2) Develop a methodology and standards for predicting and designing to future runoff quantities
that will be generated by the increased rainfall intensities expected from climate change. To
ensure new infrastructure is resilient, this methodology and standards will be incorporated into
the County’s stormwater regulations for new development and redevelopment. It will also be
used by the County to assess the need for and design of future infrastructure improvements to
reduce risk. Development of this methodology and standards is a priority of the County’s
Strategic Climate Action Plan (SCAP) and has been started but additional funding will be needed
to finish it.
3) Build new and modify existing stormwater control infrastructure to mitigate for the lack of runoff
quantity and quality controls on older developed lands. Projects that do this are called
“stormwater retrofits” and several pilot projects are currently underway at various locations
across King County. WLRD Stormwater Services is currently developing a strategic plan and
retrofit prioritization framework that will give direction to future planning and implementation of
stormwater retrofits. A formal planning program to identify, prioritize, and steward future
retrofits is currently unfunded.
235
2-Year Objectives
• Implement actions to reduce
risk on 48 high risk facility
assets and continue inspections,
maintenance, and risk
assessments on remaining
inventory of WLRD facility
assets. Complete Stormwater
Services strategic plan to
identify policy direction for
assets managed by private
parties.
• Seek funding to develop
methodology/standards
5-Year Objectives
• Implement actions to reduce
risk on 120 high risk facility
assets and continue
inspections, maintenance, and
risk assessments on remaining
inventory of facility assets.
• Develop
methodology/standards
Long-Term Objectives
• Implement actions to
reduce risk on 192
high risk facility assets
by 2027 and continue
inspections,
maintenance, and risk
assessments on
remaining inventory
of facility assets.
Implement actions to
reduce risk on any
newly identified high
risk facility assets.
• Incorporate new
standards into
stormwater regulation.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Implement actions to reduce risk on high risk facility assets.
• Seek funding to further develop a methodology and standards for predicting and designing to
future runoff quantities generated by the increased rainfall intensities expected from climate
change.
• Continue progress on existing pilot projects to inform future stormwater retrofits. Complete the
Stormwater Services strategic plan and retrofit prioritization framework.
• Complete development of the methodology and standards described at left and vet with elected
officials and community stakeholders (e.g., developers, NGOs, tribes, etc.)
• Obtain funding for and begin implementing a formal planning program to identify, prioritize, and
steward future retrofits.
• Incorporate the new methodology and standards into the County’s stormwater regulations for
new development and redevelopment. Conduct planning efforts to identify and prioritize
predicted infrastructure problems using the new methodology and standards. This can and should
be merged with the planning program described below for stormwater retrofits. Implement
highest priority projects to address predicted infrastructure problems.
• Conduct planning efforts to identify, prioritize, and steward stormwater retrofits. This can and
should be merged with the efforts mentioned above for addressing predicted infrastructure
problems resulting from climate change. Implement highest priority retrofits.
Performance Measure
• High risk facility assets mitigated.
• Climate change infrastructure problems solved
• Acres of developed land retrofitted with stormwater controls
236
Sea Level Rise Resilience in Wastewater Facilities
Lead
DNRP WTD
Partners
PHSKC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Sea Level Rise (Flooding)
Goal 4, 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Capital Budget
Vision
Waterfront wastewater treatment facilities and road networks that will be affected by the rise of sea
level due to global warming are built and enhanced to improve system resilience to these impacts.
Description
Developing and implementing adaptation strategies for cost-effective measures to address, through
capital improvement and asset management programs, the vulnerability of 24 major and 380 minor
facilities and 52 miles of conveyance at risk of saltwater inflow and/or inundation. The facilities were
identified by a recent update to the WTD analysis of the wastewater system to identify facilities at risk
for saltwater inflow and inundation from future sea level rise, existing and predicted high tides, and
storm surges. This update was based on recent (2018) local and probabilistic sea level rise projections
developed by network of governmental and non-governmental organizations and universities.
A parallel effort is necessary for roadways in unincorporated King County, especially on Vashon
Island and with ferry docks that service the islands. This will be addressed through the KC Roads
strategy.
2-Year Objectives
• Work is ongoing
5-Year Objectives
• Work is ongoing
Long-Term Objectives
• Facilities that are
resilient and able
to remain operational
as the sea level rises
Implementation Plan/Actions
• The facilities were identified by a recent update to the WTD analysis of the wastewater system to
identify facilities at risk for saltwater inflow and inundation from future sea level rise, existing and
predicted high tides, and storm surges.
Performance Measure
• % of identified projects to improve resilience to sea-level rise completed.
237
Stormwater and Surface Water Infrastructure Risk Reduction
Lead
DNRP Water and
Land Resources
Division
Partners
N/A
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Goal 6
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
SWM Fee; FCD Grant;
FEMA Hazard
Mitigation
Vision
To minimize risk to public safety, properties, and water quality/aquatic health resulting from:
4) The failure of existing stormwater and surface water infrastructure due to aging. Growing
numbers of stormwater and surface water infrastructure assets operated by or under the purview
of the Water and Land Resources Division (WLRD) are at or approaching the end of their
effective life where structural failure could cause flooding, erosion, sedimentation, and/or fish
habitat damage.
5) More frequent overflow or functional impairment of existing stormwater and surface water
infrastructure due to expected increases in rainfall intensities over the next 50 years from climate
change. This too could cause flooding, erosion, sedimentation, and/or habitat damage.
6) The lack of stormwater control infrastructure for managing runoff from lands that were
developed before stormwater controls were required on new developments. Over two thirds of
the developed landscape in King County was built before modern stormwater controls were
required on new developments. This lack of runoff quantity and quality control has been linked
to degraded water quality and aquatic health in numerous streams and other water bodies
throughout King County as documented by a network of monitoring stations. It may also
contribute to existing flooding, erosion, sedimentation, and/or habitat damage.
Description
WLRD is planning to do the following to achieve the vision/objective stated above:
4) Proactively manage existing infrastructure through inspections, maintenance, risk assessments,
and repair/replacement of the highest risk infrastructure components before they fail to avoid the
high cost of emergency repairs and the damages or injuries that can result from component
failure. This proactive management program is already in place for WLRD-operated
infrastructure assets but needs further policy development for assets managed by private parties.
WLRD Stormwater Services is currently developing a strategic plan that should address this
policy development need.
5) Develop a methodology and standards for predicting and designing to future runoff quantities
that will be generated by the increased rainfall intensities expected from climate change. To
ensure new infrastructure is resilient, this methodology and standards will be incorporated into
the County’s stormwater regulations for new development and redevelopment. It will also be
used by the County to assess the need for and design of future infrastructure improvements to
reduce risk. Development of this methodology and standards is a priority of the County’s
Strategic Climate Action Plan (SCAP) and has been started but additional funding will be needed
to finish it.
6) Build new and modify existing stormwater control infrastructure to mitigate for the lack of runoff
quantity and quality controls on older developed lands. Projects that do this are called
“stormwater retrofits” and several pilot projects are currently underway at various locations
across King County. WLRD Stormwater Services is currently developing a strategic plan and
retrofit prioritization framework that will give direction to future planning and implementation of
stormwater retrofits. A formal planning program to identify, prioritize, and steward future
retrofits is currently unfunded.
238
2-Year Objectives
• Implement actions to reduce
risk on 48 high risk facility
assets and continue inspections,
maintenance, and risk
assessments on remaining
inventory of WLRD facility
assets. Complete Stormwater
Services strategic plan to
identify policy direction for
assets managed by private
parties.
• Seek funding to develop
methodology/standards
5-Year Objectives
• Implement actions to reduce
risk on 120 high risk facility
assets and continue
inspections, maintenance, and
risk assessments on remaining
inventory of facility assets.
• Develop
methodology/standards
Long-Term Objectives
• Implement actions to
reduce risk on 192
high risk facility assets
by 2027 and continue
inspections,
maintenance, and risk
assessments on
remaining inventory
of facility assets.
Implement actions to
reduce risk on any
newly identified high
risk facility assets.
• Incorporate new
standards into
stormwater regulation.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Implement actions to reduce risk on high risk facility assets.
• Seek funding to further develop a methodology and standards for predicting and designing to
future runoff quantities generated by the increased rainfall intensities expected from climate
change.
• Continue progress on existing pilot projects to inform future stormwater retrofits. Complete the
Stormwater Services strategic plan and retrofit prioritization framework.
• Complete development of the methodology and standards described at left and vet with elected
officials and community stakeholders (e.g., developers, NGOs, tribes, etc.)
• Obtain funding for and begin implementing a formal planning program to identify, prioritize, and
steward future retrofits.
• Incorporate the new methodology and standards into the County’s stormwater regulations for
new development and redevelopment. Conduct planning efforts to identify and prioritize
predicted infrastructure problems using the new methodology and standards. This can and should
be merged with the planning program described below for stormwater retrofits. Implement
highest priority projects to address predicted infrastructure problems.
• Conduct planning efforts to identify, prioritize, and steward stormwater retrofits. This can and
should be merged with the efforts mentioned above for addressing predicted infrastructure
problems resulting from climate change. Implement highest priority retrofits.
Performance Measure
• High risk facility assets mitigated.
• Climate change infrastructure problems solved
• Acres of developed land retrofitted with stormwater controls
239
Control System Security and Performance
Lead
DNRP Water
Treatment
Division
Partners
N/A
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Cyber Incident
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Capital Budget
General Fund
Vision
The operational control system for Wastewater Treatment Operations is secure from cyber-attack or
system failure.
Description
The wastewater treatment system is operated from three control centers which monitor the facilities
and conveyance system that flows to the treatment plants. The Ovation project is a multi-year, multi-
million-dollar upgrade of the Wastewater Treatment Division’s legacy control systems. WTD is in the
process of updating its control systems. Vulnerability assessments are designed into the Ovation
project. When the system is operational, a security audit would be conducted to ensure that policies
and procedures are in place to protect the system
2-Year Objectives
• Project is staged to include in
the 2-year timeframe upgrades
to system controls in order of
priority based on assessed
vulnerability.
• Upgraded systems will be tested
in this time frame.
5-Year Objectives
• All control systems are
upgraded and have passed
security testing.
• Completion of project.
Long-Term Objectives
• A secure system.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• This is a multi-year multi-million-dollar project that is being staged by addressing the most
vulnerable systems first and working through the system.
Performance Measure
• % of QA/QC system security tests passed.
240
GIS Emergency Response Mapping and Real-Time Flow Data
Lead
DNRP Water
Treatment
Division
Partners
KCIT-Geographic
Information Systems (GIS)
King County Roads
Services Division
King County Office of
Emergency Management
Public Health SKC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All
Goal 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Operating Budget
Vision
Critical information conveyed in the WTD/DNRP Emergency response map is available and updated
in real time.
Description
Update the King County facilities Emergency Response maps with the current priority roads, bridges,
earthquake liquefaction, inundation and landslide zones and gas/petroleum pipelines, under-laid with
King County facilities and conveyance lines and emergency outfalls to facilitate emergency response
and continuity of operations. Make this information available through a password-protected website
for select users. Explore connecting the map to real-time flow data.
A GIS emergency mapping site is now operational on the WTD intranet that shows facilities and
conveyance system. Working on moving it to an internet site so that it can be accessed 24/7 by off
duty personnel.
2-Year Objectives
• Fully deploy the system where
it can be accessed remotely
without having to log into the
KC computer system.
5-Year Objectives
• System is tested and use in
activations.
• Necessary modifications are
made.
• Project completion
Long-Term Objectives
• Emergency mapping
is reliable and
accessible.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Work is ongoing and includes:
• Work with KCIT to consider improvements that include integration with real-time flow data,
integration with Roads Emergency updates and migration of mapping tool from intranet to
password secured Internet site.
• Testing to ensure access and timeliness and accuracy of information conveyed.
• Use in emergency activations.
• Socialize process and tools with partners such as Public Health Seattle and King County to aid in
environmental health emergency response.
Performance Measure
• % of successful attempts to securely access the mapping tool.
• Ratio of accuracy and timeliness as compared to real life in real time.
241
Emergency Communications Enhancements
Lead
Allen Alston
Partners
PSERN Project
King County Radio
Services/KCIT
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All
Goal 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Operating Budget
Vision
Ability to effectively communicate in large scale emergency situations where the telecommunications
may be disrupted.
Description
The division performed an assessment to determine the number of KC 800 MHz radios necessary to
support operational readiness in the event of a widespread telecommunications failure. Currently all
key operational facilities and offsite operation and maintenance vehicles are equipped with 800 MHz
radios, constituting WTD’s core emergency communications method.
A regional replacement project is underway to replace the entire 800 MHz system. It is managed by a
regional agency Puget Sound Emergency Radio Network. Inventories have been provided to PSERN.
The King County Office of Emergency Management has deployed a communications tool called
KCInform. It has been incorporated into the division’s operational procedures
2-Year Objectives
• Deploy the new radios.
• Train and test the radios and
other emergency
communications.
• Analyze benefits and costs of
FirstNet
5-Year Objectives
• Continue training and testing
of communications to ensure
maximum communications
reliability in emergencies.
Long-Term Objectives
• Redundant emergency
communications are
reliable.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Deploy the new radio equipment and incorporate into the day to day communications protocols.
• Regularly test radios and other emergency communications methods, including KCInform and
FirstNet (if used).
Performance Measure
• % of successful communications systems tests.
242
Emergency Event Management System
Lead
DNRP Water
Treatment
Division
Partners
King County Office of
Emergency Management
King County Information
Technology (KCIT)
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All
Goal 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Operating Budget
Vision
WTD manages and shares emergency response and continuity of operations activities across the
division’s five treatment plants and the division headquarters in the King Street Center using
WEBEOC and other systems as necessary.
Description
Assess WEBEOC’s ability to manage information and communication within the division and with its
34 component agencies, and especially the discrete tracking of multiple incidents.
Continue working with the WEBEOC team, KCIT and others as necessary to explore alternative or
additional solutions if WEBEOC can’t meet all requirements.
2-Year Objectives
• Test current system for a
variety of scenarios.
• Identify and work through
questions and gaps identified.
• Consider alternatives where
WEBEOC doesn’t fulfill
requirements.
5-Year Objectives
• Deploy an operational system
or systems.
• Document, train to and test
the system(s).
Long-Term Objectives
• There is a single
system or integrated
systems (whether
manual or not)
sufficient to manage
emergency events.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Test use of WEBEOC for a variety of scenarios with multiple contributors.
• Identify and work through questions and gaps.
• Consider alternatives where WEBEOC doesn’t fulfill requirements.
• Document progress and final systems approach.
• Communicate systems approach to users and stakeholders.
• Develop and deliver trainings on the use of the system(s).
• Test the system(s).
• Continuously improve the system(s).
Performance Measure
• Post-test system performance ratings.
• Post use (activations) system performance ratings.
243
Flood Warning Program
Lead Points of
Contact
King County
River &
Floodplain
Management
Section, Office of
Emergency
Management
Partner Points of Contact
Cities and special purpose
districts, US Army Corps
of Engineers, NOAA,
FEMA Region 10
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 5, 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Existing resources
Strategy Vision/Objective
When flooding is imminent, having a robust notification system helps people who live, work, or travel
through floodprone areas prepare themselves and their property for the impacts of flooding. It can
also mean fewer flood losses and less damage.
Mitigation Strategy
The River and Floodplain Management Section operates the Flood Warning Program, which includes
a Flood Warning Center that opens when river systems reach specified flows or heights. The Flood
Warning Center gives people that live, work, or travel through floodprone areas early notifications and
the opportunity to call in and receive information about ongoing flooding issues. The Center also
coordinates with local first responders, the Office of Emergency Management, the US Army Corps of
Engineers, and other stakeholders to ensure the region is as ready as possible to respond to flooding
problems.
2-Year Objectives
• Improved outreach efforts.
5-Year Objectives
• Annual exercises are
conducted to prepare the
region for flooding.
Long-Term Objectives
• Smooth operation of
the Flood Warning
Program and
integration with local
communities’
programs.
Implementation Plan/Actions
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Continue monitoring the status of streamgages to ensure they are collecting data accurately.
Streamgages provide the underlying data that are used as the basis for Flood Alert notifications
and openings of the Flood Warning Center.
2. Review on an annual basis the various components of the Flood Warning Program and make
improvements where necessary.
3. Conduct an annual flood response exercise with other agencies to ensure the region is prepared
for flood response and recovery actions necessary. Write up an after-action report.
4. Improve public outreach materials such as flood inundation maps and online interactive map
applications that show the inundation areas of the four flood phases.
Performance Measure
• Subscribers to the Flood Alert app.
• CRS points for Activity 610.
244
Post-Flood Recovery Efforts
Lead Points of Contact
DNRP Water and Land
Resources Division; King
County Office of
Emergency Management;
King County Permitting
Division
Partner Points of
Contact
King County Flood
Control District; FEMA
Region 10; Washington
Department of Ecology;
Washington Division of
Emergency Management
Hazards
Mitigated
/ Goals
Addressed
Flood
Goal 3, 5,
12, 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
King County Flood Control
District; FEMA Hazard
Mitigation Assistance Grants;
Increased Cost of Compliance;
FEMA Public Assistance
Section 406 Mitigation
Strategy Vision/Objective
After a major flood event, there are many opportunities to rebuild in a more resilient way. Being
prepared to rapidly address them is key to realizing those opportunities.
Many mitigation grants, including the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance grants, can take over 5
years from obligation to a property owner having their house acquired. King County is uniquely
positioned to utilize local resources to complete mitigation projects much quicker to help property
owners with flood-damaged property.
Mitigation Strategy
While many other flood mitigation strategies referenced in the Hazard Mitigation Plan will be used to
reduce future flood risk, a separate mitigation strategy for post-flood actions is necessary. Property
owners are often more willing to sell and consider mitigation efforts after a flood. Additionally,
conducting substantial damage determinations quickly is important for flood insurance policyholders
to be able to access Increased Cost of Compliance coverage funds for rebuilding. King County needs
to be prepared before a flood occurs to move mitigation efforts forward quickly.
This strategy should also consider the permitting environment after a major flood and consider short-
term rebuilding moratoriums, permit assistance, and substantial damage letters for Increased Cost of
Compliance claims. Additionally, an update to the comprehensive plan may be needed to address
long-term recovery efforts.
2-Year Objectives
• Communications plan
prepared.
• Substantial damage strategy
prepared and deployable.
5-Year Objectives
• Substantial damage assessments
have either taken place or have
been practiced.
• Communication plan reviewed.
Long-Term Objectives
• Successful mitigation
efforts occur after
major flood events.
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Prepare communications plan prior to a flood event for reaching affected property owner to
inform them of mitigation grant opportunities to purchase their damaged property or elevate their
home.
2. Ready a set of funds to deploy quickly after a major flood event.
3. Create a deployable substantial damage inspection strategy and team, and prepare the team to
rapidly conduct substantial damage determinations after a flood event or other wide-spread
natural disaster.
4. Inspect flood protection facilities and other public infrastructure to ensure public safety is
protected and to also identify opportunities for applying for FEMA Public Assistance Section 406
mitigation funding.
Performance Measures
• Property owners engaged after flood event.
• Employees trained on substantial damage assessments.
245
Home Elevations
Lead Points of
Contact
King County
River &
Floodplain
Management
Section;
Permitting
Division
Partner Points of Contact
King County Flood
Control District, FEMA
Region 10; Washington
Department of Ecology,
Washington Division of
Emergency Management
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 5, 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
King County Flood
Control District; FEMA
Hazard Mitigation
Assistance grants
Vision
Elevating floodprone homes is an important tool in making buildings safer from flooding. The
buildings will be better able to withstand inundation and a family’s, or occupant’s belongings will be
well above the expected level of the 1% annual chance flood. The result will be less risk to people,
pets, and property as floodwater remains below the finished floor of elevated homes.
Description
Home elevations are appropriate in areas where floodwaters are slow moving and relatively shallow,
offer significant warning time, and are not subject to channel migration hazards. In areas of flash
floods, fast-moving floodwaters, and channel migration, the most appropriate mitigation strategy is
acquisition.
King County and the King County Flood Control District have a robust home elevation grant
program for properties in the Snoqualmie River basin that has elevated nearly 80 homes. Elevation
projects, however, are complex and require significant public investments from the County, Flood
Control District, or FEMA. Typically, home elevations cost over $200,000. Current standards require
homes to be elevated to the higher of 3 feet above the 1% annual chance flood elevation and 1 foot
above the 0.2% annual chance flood elevation.
Most homeowners prefer to elevate on enclosed foundations like a crawlspace or full story enclosure.
This technique, when done with proper flood openings, can be a safe alternative, but can lead to
negative consequences such as future owners converting the lower level to finished living space, thus
reducing the benefit of the home elevation. Elevating on post or piling foundation techniques lessens
the likelihood of lower level conversion, although to some, results in a visually less desirable home.
There is a balance that the public elevation grant program needs to weigh between producing homes
that people think look nice and homes that are likely to remain safe from flooding for 50 years.
2-Year Objectives
• Have code compliance strategy
implemented.
5-Year Objectives
• Home elevations grants are
awarded outside of the
Snoqualmie Valley.
Long-Term Objectives
• All homes in shallow
and slow-moving
floodplains are
elevated at least 3 feet
above the 1% annual
chance flood
elevation.
246
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Continue requiring home elevations to have the lowest floor elevated to 3 feet above the 1%
annual chance flood elevation or 1 foot above the 0.2% annual chance flood elevation. Continue
requiring a nonconversion agreement to protect the lower enclosed levels from being converted to
living space.
2. Create a strategy to address potential code compliance issues that make elevated structures more
dangerous, including addressing:
a. Potential to convert enclosed lower level into living space.
b. Potential to install noncompliant utilities in lower level.
c. Potential to block flood openings.
d. Potential to rent out lower level.
3. Complete home elevations in appropriate floodprone areas outside of the Snoqualmie Valley,
including in coastal floodplain areas.
4. Encourage grantees to elevate using post or piling foundation techniques rather than full story
enclosures.
Performance Measure
• Repetitive loss properties elevated.
• Reduced flood insurance claims.
• Number of homes successfully and compliantly elevated.
247
Home Acquisitions and Relocations
Lead Points of
Contact
King County River &
Floodplain
Management Section;
Ecological Restoration
and Engineering
Services Section
Partner Points of Contact
Snoqualmie Watershed Forum,
Snohomish Basin Salmon
Recovery Forum, WRIA 9
Watershed Ecosystem Forum,
WRIA 8 Salmon Recovery
Council, Puget Sound Partnership,
King County Flood Control
District
Hazards
Mitigated
/ Goals
Addressed
Flood
Goal 5, 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
King County Flood
Control District, FEMA
Hazard Mitigation
Assistance grants,
Salmon Recovery Board
Grants, Floodplains by
Design
Strategy Vision/Objective
Acquiring floodprone properties, removing buildings, and restoring the property to a natural state is
the most effective strategy to reduce flood risk in perpetuity. Fewer families living in floodprone areas
and fewer businesses operating in floodprone areas so the region recovers quicker after a major flood.
Mitigation Strategy
Property acquisitions have been a tool that King County has employed for many decades to reduce
flood risk. Acquisitions are done on a willing seller basis and result in the demolition or removal of the
building from the property. Sometimes the seller moves the house to a location outside of the
floodplain. Acquisitions are mostly fee simple purchases.
While acquisition is the most effective tool to eliminate flood risk, many people perceive downsides,
including that acquisitions mean lost tax revenue and that a checkerboard approach leaves
neighborhood with missing pieces. Wherever possible, a neighborhood or area-specific strategy is the
best approach.
Acquisitions also offer many additional benefits including enhanced natural floodplain functions,
floodwater storage, and recreation potential. Because of multiple benefits, acquisitions can be done by
various agencies for different primary purposes. Some are done for ecological restoration or salmon
habitat protection while others are done primarily for flood risk reduction. An area of new
opportunity for flood risk reduction acquisitions is along the unincorporated coast on Vashon-Maury
Island. Very few have been completed for flood risk reduction purposes, but as sea levels rise and
coastal flooding worsens, King County needs to be prepared for coastal shoreline acquisitions.
2-Year Objectives
• Develop prioritized acquisition
list.
5-Year Objectives
• Complete acquisitions in
coastal areas.
Long-Term Objectives
• Acquire as many floodprone
properties as possible.
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Continue proactively purchasing floodprone properties for the purpose of flood risk reduction.
2. Accelerate coastal floodplain acquisitions.
3. Create and maintain a prioritized acquisition list so that properties can be purchased whenever the
opportunity arises.
4. Consider other tools to purchase land over time or future development rights, such as a program
where a property owner receives an upfront payment with an agreement that the County will fully
purchase the property if it’s flooded or the owner seeks to sell.\
5. Purchase and remove infrastructure as part of neighborhood-level acquisitions.
Performance Measures
• Number of acquisitions per year.
• Percentage of flood hazard areas owned by private landowners with buildings.
• Repetitive loss properties mitigated.
248
Protect and Restore Natural Floodplain Functions
Lead Points of
Contact
DNRP Water and
Land Resources
Division
Partner Points of Contact
Snoqualmie Watershed
Forum, Snohomish Basin
Salmon Recovery Forum,
WRIA 9 Watershed
Ecosystem Forum, WRIA
8 Salmon Recovery
Council, Puget Sound
Partnership, King County
Flood Control District
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 3, 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA Hazard
Mitigation Assistance
Grants, Floodplains by
Design, King County
Flood Control District
Vision
Flooding is a natural process. Rivers and coastlines evolve and change because of flooding.
Encouraging the protection and restoration of natural functions of floodplains is key in creating
healthy and resilient systems.
Description
The natural functions of floodplains include storing floodwater and lowering flood heights and
velocities, all of which reduces flood risk. Natural coastlines attenuate waves distribute sediment and
large wood on beaches, and allow coastal erosion, all of which reduce coastal wave energy on
properties in the floodplain. King County has a robust focus on protecting and restoring natural
floodplain functions, but progress still needs to be made to accelerate progress and connect
restoration projects to flood risk reduction projects.
Additionally, upland forested areas provide a source of natural functions that reduces fast runoff,
manages sediment flow, and protects water quality. These upland areas should be considered vital
parts of natural floodplain functions.
2-Year Objectives
• Incorporate floodplain
connectivity and aquatic habitat
improvements in majority of
flood risk reduction projects in
the county.
5-Year Objectives
• Double the amount of
spending on floodplain
restoration and protection by
leveraging local funding to
obtain state and federal grants.
Long-Term Objectives
• Every floodplain
project achieves
multiple benefits such
as endangered species
habitat, salmon
rearing habitat, water
quality improvements,
climate resilience,
agricultural resilience,
and flood risk
reduction.
249
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Proactively acquire floodprone properties to utilize for future restoration projects.
2. Complete restoration projects that reconnect rivers to their floodplains, remove bank armoring,
create side channels, reconnect oxbows, and encourage natural features such as beaver dams and
large wood in channels for increased flood storage and fish habitat. These projects will create
places for flood storage, which will reduce downstream flood heights and provide habitat for
endangered species.
3. Restore coastal shorelines by removing bulkheads wherever possible, creating pocket estuary
habitats, and allowing erosion to nourish beaches. Softening shorelines and creating estuaries will
result in reduced wave energy and fewer negative coastal flooding impacts.
4. Incorporate beaver habitat in restoration projects to provide flood storage and keep instream
water cooler.
5. Continue enforcing regulations that stop negative impacts on habitat and encourage net ecological
benefit. Shoreline management, critical area, and floodplain management regulations that adhere
to FEMA’s Biological Opinion are among the regulations that seek to improve natural floodplain
functions.
Performance Measure
• Acres of floodplain reconnected and/or restored.
• Large wood per mile in large rivers.
• Linear feet of bulkhead removed; and coastal shoreline restored
• Demonstrated losses avoided by increasing flood storage
• Chinook, coho, and steelhead population numbers, including annual adult spawner returns and
juvenile outmigrants.
250
Flood Risk Mapping
Lead Points of
Contact
DNRP Water &
Land Resources
Division; DLS
Permitting
Division
Partner Points of Contact
FEMA Region X,
Washington Department of
Ecology, US Army Corps
of Engineers
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood, Dam Failure
Goal 3, 5, 6, 12, 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA Cooperating
Technical Partners
Program; King County
Flood Control District
Vision
Having updated flood risk data helps government agencies, property owners, and other stakeholders
make better risk-informed decisions. High quality flood data also more accurately ties regulations to
reducing flood risk.
Mitigation Strategy
While updating flood risk maps is an ongoing activity to take into account landscape and hydrology
changes, there are many flood hazards that need robust data and maps:
1. Floodplain maps – update the Flood Insurance Rate Maps used for regulatory and mitigation
planning purposes, including updating the South Fork Skykomish River and various streams that
only have approximate Zone A flood zones with no base flood elevation information.
Additionally, King County should work with incorporated urban communities to better study,
understand, and map urban flood risk.
2. Climate-influenced flood risk maps – King County and the University of Washington have been
collaborating on downscaling global climate models to generate river-basin scale hydrology data
based on the effects of climate change scenarios. King County can also evaluate other climate-
influenced changes in hydrology such as low summer flows, less snowpack, and other effects to
incorporate into maps showing climate-influenced flood risk. These data will be used to generate
maps of predicted changes in flood risk that can be used for planning and regulatory purposes.
3. Sea level rise flood risk maps – as part of the coastal flood hazard study, maps were produced
showing the effect on base flood elevation of a 2-foot rise in sea level around Vashon-Maury
Island. This study shows the broader effects of sea level rise on flood risk. These maps should be
updated with different sea level rise scenarios and also the resulting increased flood risk landward
of the edge of the 1% annual chance mapped floodplain should be considered.
4. Channel migration zone maps – currently 8 river sections have been mapped on the South Fork
Skykomish, Tolt, Cedar, South Fork Snoqualmie, Middle Fork Snoqualmie, North Fork
Snoqualmie, Green, and Raging Rivers. In addition to continually updating these maps, new river
sections need to be studied and mapped, including the Lower Snoqualmie. Channel migration
zone maps will help property owners best understand the risk from channel avulsion and help
keep more development safe.
5. Dam failure maps – every owner of a high hazard dam with the potential in a dam failure for loss
of life or structures must develop a dam inundation map as part of the Emergency Action Plan.
However, many of these inundation maps are out of date and are not accessible to the public.
Levee failure maps – King County will, where possible, study levee failure impacts and produce maps
that show areas of levee failure risk. The data and maps should be made available to the public so
people who live and work behind levees have an understanding of their flood risk.
2-Year Objectives
• Complete detailed flood study
on streams with approximate
Zone A floodplains.
• Complete levee breach analysis.
5-Year Objectives
• Identify a timeline for updated
Flood Insurance Rate Maps
with FEMA Region 10.
Long-Term Objectives
• Flood Insurance Rate
Map and other
regulatory flood data
251
• Create plan for integrating
flood maps and downscaled
climate model data.
• Begin sea level rise scenario
mapping for coastal shorelines.
• Establish plan for using
climate-influenced flood risk
data for planning and
regulatory purposes.
will be updated on a
regular basis.
• Highest quality flood
risk data that
incorporates effects of
climate change.
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Update Flood Insurance Rate Maps to utilize better flood risk data, including the South Fork
Skykomish River and streams with Zone A maps. Also identify a strategy and timeline for
updating other streams/rivers that need updated flood risk data.
2. Create climate-influenced flood risk maps that can be used for planning purposes.
3. Create sea level rise flood risk maps for various sea level rise scenarios to be used for planning and
regulatory purposes.
4. Continue updating channel migration zone maps.
5. Release dam failure maps where appropriate and provide technical assistance to high hazard dam
owners to complete updated inundation maps.
6. Complete levee failure maps and release them to the public where appropriate.
Performance Measures
• Stream miles and linear feet of shoreline with updated flood risk, channel migration, and climate-
influenced flood risk data.
• Properties covered by updated flood risk, channel migration, and climate-influenced flood risk
data.
• Number of dams with updated inundation maps that are publicly available.
• Linear feet of levees with failure analyses publicly available.
252
Public Information Flood Activities
Lead Points of
Contact
King County River &
Floodplain
Management Section,
Office of Emergency
Management
Partner Points of Contact
FEMA Region 10;
Washington Department of
Ecology; Washington
Division of Emergency
Management; King County
Flood Control District
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 5, 6
Funding Sources
and Estimated
Costs
Existing resources
Vision
Flooding is a complicated hazard to understand and a responsibility of floodplain management
agencies is to help people understand it well enough to prepare themselves. A more informed public
means property owners who make decisions based on flood risk and fewer unexpected losses during
flooding.
Description
Effective outreach efforts are a key piece of comprehensive floodplain management. Letters sent
annually, outreach events, project-specific meetings, and providing technical assistance are all
components of effective outreach. Repetition of messages and continued outreach activities are also
important to ensuring that messages are delivered. Engaging as many types of communication
mediums as possible will also ensure that outreach efforts are effective.
2-Year Objectives
• New initiatives are
implemented.
5-Year Objectives
• Documentation that more
floodprone residents are
engaged.
Long-Term Objectives
• An informed public
that is prepared for
the effects of major
flooding.
Implementation Plan/Actions
The following activities should be conducted on an annual basis as a way to make the public more
aware of flood hazards and risks:
1. Flood brochure – sent to every property owner in the floodplain.
2. Repetitive loss letter – sent to properties with known repeated losses.
3. Realtor, insurance agent, and other stakeholder outreach – workshops, meetings, or other
outreach to professionals who need flood risk information.
4. News media outreach – coordinated effort to share stories about flood risk with the news media.
5. Annual event – separate or coordinated event every year that focuses on flood risk .
The following activities are not annual occurrences, but should be maintained to help facilitate the
availability of flood risk information:
1. Videos demonstrating flood risk, flood preparedness, and property protection measures that can
be taken.
2. Technical assistance to property owners on reducing flood risk on their property, including home
elevation support and small actions to reduce localized flood risk.
3. Maintaining a robust website, including an interactive map, with flood preparedness, mitigation,
regulation, and other flood risk information. The website will be updated at least annually and the
interactive map will incorporate new data when available.
• Floodplain management permitting bulletins will be created to help permit applicants understand
the regulations and their purpose.
Performance Measures
• Number of stakeholder groups reached
• CRS points for outreach and public information activities
253
Flood Insurance Promotion
Lead Points of
Contact
King County River
& Floodplain
Management
Section
Partner Points of Contact
Floodprone cities; FEMA
Region 10, insurance
agents, landlords, realtors,
mortgage lenders
Hazards Mitigated
/ Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 5, 12, 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Existing sources
Strategy Vision/Objective
Flood insurance is the most important financial protection tool for a family against flood damage.
Promoting flood insurance is important to help property owners and renters be prepared for flooding
and reduce their financial risk.
Mitigation Strategy
Since homeowners and renter’s insurance policies do not cover flood damage, helping people
understand that flood insurance is the best financial protection tool is an important strategy.
Homeowners with a federally-backed mortgage are required to have flood insurance, so those who are
required most likely have a policy. Renters and those who own their houses free and clear are far less
likely to actively purchase a flood insurance policy. If their homes and apartments are flooded, they
may have to drain savings to pay for the damage.
Of all of the families that live in floodplains in King County, over 50% are renters, 14% own their
house without a mortgage, and 35% own with a mortgage. Families living in floodplains are much
more likely to be renters than those outside of the floodplain (only 40% of families outside of
floodplains rent). Additionally, people of color living in the floodplain are even more likely to rent.
Census data shows that 83% of African American families and 90% of Native Hawaiian or Pacific
Islander families living in the floodplain are renters.
So, promoting flood insurance should be primarily targeted toward renters and those who own their
house outright. The strategy should also strive to incorporate concepts of equity and social justice in
the approach and content of outreach.
2-Year Objectives
• Outreach plan developed via
stakeholder committee.
• Technical assistance contact
identified.
2-Year Objectives
• Outreach plan developed
via stakeholder committee.
• Technical assistance
contact identified.
2-Year Objectives
• Outreach plan developed
via stakeholder
committee.
• Technical assistance
contact identified.
Implementation Plan/Actions
1. Identify and convene stakeholder committee to help assess problem and create strategy for
promoting flood insurance.
2. Develop and implement outreach plan that targets renters/tenants and those who own their home
with no mortgage.
3. Identify a flood insurance technical assistance contact for King County residents and businesses to
be able to ask questions.
Performance Measures
• Number of flood insurance policies in force and percentage of covered buildings.
• CRS points for Activity 370.
254
Enforce Higher Floodplain Management Regulations
Lead Points of
Contact
DLS Permitting
Division; DNRP
Water & Land
Resources
Division
Partner Points of Contact
FEMA Region X,
Washington Department of
Ecology
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood
Goal 5, 12, 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Minimal, on-going
• Permit fees
• Existing resources
Vision
Higher floodplain management regulations play an important role in ensuring future development in
floodplains is as safe from flood risk as possible. For example, requiring that new buildings have their
lowest floor elevated 3 feet above the 1% annual chance flood elevation means fewer flood losses and
safer buildings.
While instituting a regulation prohibiting development in floodprone areas would ultimately reduce
future flood risk potential, the flood portion stakeholder committee decided not to include a
development prohibition mitigation action due to likely political and community opposition.
Description
The King County Comprehensive Plan sets out a policy that regulations should follow the concept of
“no adverse impact,” such that any particular development must not cause any effect to worsen
flooding on another property owner. The key higher standards that do this include a requirement that
all development in the entire floodplain meet a zero-rise requirement and a compensatory storage
requirement for fill and other materials. This approach reduces any potential flood risk from new
development. King County also has higher regulations that protect new or substantially improved
buildings, including a requirement that the lowest floor be elevated to 3 feet above the 1% annual
chance flood elevation.
2-Year Objectives
• Demonstrate that King
County is enforcing its
higher standards by
showing full compliance
with the FEMA floodplain
management audit.
• Establish stakeholder
committee to review potential
higher standards to include in
King County Code.
5-Year Objectives
• Submit to King County
Council flood code
amendments that include
other higher standards.
Long-Term Objectives
• Ensuring all potential
development in
floodplains meet
flood-safe standards.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• King County agencies will continue to fully enforce the higher regulations currently in King
County Code.
• King County will consider the following higher standards in future updates of the King County
Code and will establish a stakeholder committee to evaluate the following:
o Prohibiting hazardous materials storage in the regulated flood hazard area to lessen
potential health impacts from flooding.
o Requiring non-conversion agreement for structures built on crawlspaces or full-story
enclosures to ensure fewer structures converted to unsafe and noncompliant conditions.
o Requiring building restriction agreements for properties that are removed from the
floodplain via a Letter of Map Amendment to ensure freeboard standards are extended to
properties surrounded by or close to the edge of the mapped floodplain.
255
o Establishing a cumulative or lower substantial improvement requirement to encourage
more homes to be elevated.
o Extending 1% annual chance flood requirements to the edges of the 0.2% annual chance
floodplain to account for higher flooding events and the potential for increasing flood
risks due to climate change.
o Adopting standards to regulate development in areas likely to face increasing flood risks
due to sea level rise to protect against future flood risk.
o Establishing coastal high hazard area regulations that require permit applicants to
demonstrate that their proposed action will not cause adverse impacts on other property
owners, including the potential for wave energy reflection on to neighboring shoreline
properties.
• The Floodplain Management Plan update will consider higher regulatory standards.
• Adopt the latest version of the International Building Codes.
Performance Measure
• Fewer and less extensive flood damage during a major flooding event.
• More points in the FEMA Community Rating System category for higher regulatory standards.
256
Manage Flood Protection Facilities
Lead Points of
Contact
DNRP Water and
Land Resources
Division; King County
Flood Control District
Partner Points of
Contact
US Army Corps of
Engineers, local
governments, levee and
dam owners
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Flood, Earthquake
Goal 5, 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
King County Flood
Control District;
Floodplains by Design
Strategy Vision/Objective
Flood protection facilities should be managed in a way that foremostly considers residual flood risk.
Alternative management practices should also incorporate improving natural floodplain functions.
Mitigation Strategy
Flood protection facilities include levees and revetments that provide some degree of flood and
erosion protection depending on their design and maintenance. All flood protection facilities leave
residual risk behind them and above their protection level. In certain areas of King County, flood
protection facilities have reduced flood damage, but they have also facilitated growth in homes,
warehouses, and businesses built behind them. The expanded neighborhoods and business activities
are then more at risk of a 0.2% annual chance flood event or flooding from a levee failure, and if
climate change increases the severity of flooding events, then the flood risk will grow. Thus, it is
important for existing flood protection facilities to be managed well to protect property owners, but
also for King County to where possible reduce areas that need to be protected with expensive flood
protection facilities.
2-Year Objectives
• Updated Floodplain
Management Plan that
reflects these
priorities.
5-Year Objectives
• Flood protection facilities are managed
in way that considers multiple benefits.
• Fewer people face residual flood risk
from being behind a flood protection
facility.
Long-Term Objectives
• Flood protection
facilities are minimally
needed for
communities to be
resilient.
Implementation Plan/Actions
The following are strategies supported by the King County Flood Hazard Management Plan that
should continue:
1. Where possible, King County should remove flood protection facilities and allow rivers to
reconnect to their floodplains.
2. If flood protection facilities cannot be removed, King County should consider setting the
facilities back to allow floodplain storage.
3. Utilize bioengineering in repairs, enhancements, or temporary measures. Bioengineering
incorporates live plants and large wood in an effort to reduce flood velocities while protecting
aspects of flood protection facilities.
4. Create criteria for when these flood protection facility alternatives would be utilized.
5. Create criteria based on King County Code and the Flood Hazard Management Plan for the
conditions to construct a new flood protection facility or a new dam.
6. Ensure levees and dams are designed for earthquakes and are inspected immediately one.
Flood protection facilities should also be continually managed considering seismic risks.
Performance Measures
• Number of properties and buildings in the levee-protected areas.
• Linear feet of flood protection facilities set back or removed.
• Flood protection facilities damaged by earthquakes.
257
Seismic Evaluation of King County Courthouse and Maleng Regional Justice Center
Lead
Aaron Bert,
Deputy Director
Jim Burt, Capital
Projects Section
Manager
Partners
N/A
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Goal 6
Goal 9
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA PDM, KC Capital
Budget, $200,000
Vision
Seismic evaluation of the King County Courthouse and Maleng Regional Justice Center, per the
current standards of FEMA-178 and ASCE 41-13, Seismic Evaluation and Retrofit of Existing
Buildings. An updated assessment of building risks is needed for further seismic hazard mitigation
planning and seismic retrofit, to protect and mitigate against potential loss of life, loss of asset, and
loss of essential function capabilities during and immediately after an earthquake event.
Description
King County last completed a seismic hazard assessment of its essential facilities in 1993, based on
building codes and seismic hazard protection data available at that time. Since then, earthquakes have
produced unexpected and major infrastructure damage and loss of life from relatively small seismic
events and have contributed to new data supporting major revisions to seismic mitigation strategies
and building codes.
An ASCE 41-13 seismic evaluation is the first step toward earthquake hazard mitigation. Evaluation
findings will be used to plan, design, fund and construct needed seismic retrofit projects.
2-Year Objectives
• Seismic evaluations, per the
current standards of FEMA-
178 and ASCE 41-13, Seismic
Evaluation and Retrofit of
Existing Buildings.
5-Year Objectives
• Identify funding for planning,
design and construction of all
needed seismic retrofit
measures.
Long-Term Objectives
• Seismic retrofit to
meet or exceed
current standards of
protection.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Pre-Application submitted to Washington Emergency Management Division for a 2020 FEMA
Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant for Advance Assistance.
• Draft and release RFP for complete building seismic evaluation.
• Based on evaluation findings and available funding, plan and budget building retrofit work and/or
apply for future FEMA Building Resilient Infrastructure & Communities to fund seismic retrofit.
Performance Measure
• Achievement of Pre-Disaster Mitigation Advance Assistance grant, or feedback from WA EMD
on strength of application, achievement of assessment in 2 years, achievement of retrofit project
funding in 5 years.
258
Integrate ESJ into Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Activities
Lead
Preparedness
Senior Manager
Partners
Office of Equity and Social
Justice, Public Health SKC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All Hazards
Goal 2, 6, 10, 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Existing Funding
Vision
King County Emergency Management considers impacts and benefits to populations more likely to
suffer damage or long recovery times during disaster mitigation, response, and recovery activities.
Description
Vulnerable populations, defined here as those more likely to suffer losses during disasters and recover
more slowly afterward, should be a primary focus of an emergency management program. This is fully
consistent with our charge of identifying and addressing the greatest sources of vulnerability. As part
of this strategy, King County Emergency Management will identify vulnerable areas and develop
action plans to ensure that populations more likely to suffer damage are prioritized in accordance with
need. This includes prioritized mitigation projects to reduce risks, identification and prioritization of
resources during response, and additional support and assistance to increase resilience and reduce
recovery times after a disaster.
2-Year Objectives
• Develop a geospatial
tool to ensure that
resources are distributed
equitably and according
to need.
5-Year Objectives
• Implement prioritized
mitigation strategies
benefitting populations
more vulnerable to hazards.
Long-Term Objectives
• Emergency management
activities are prioritized
according to a comprehensive
understanding of vulnerability
and need.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Expand identification sources of population vulnerability and likely impacts to vulnerable
populations from different hazards.
• Use identified priority languages to expand outreach and notification capabilities.
• Compile a database of infrastructure vulnerability/inequity for use in mitigation, response, and
recovery planning activities by working with KC GIS.
• Increase outreach in priority areas with vulnerable populations by engaging with community
partners through the preparedness program. Potentially mimic Seattle’s Ambassadors program.
• Include insurance information in preparedness outreach.
• Build a geospatial tool to track impacts and resource delivery during disaster response activities
and develop ESJ objectives for EOC operations.
• Develop SOPs for use during activations that ensure staff consider population vulnerability with
or without requests from communities. Consider creating an ESJ-specific position or ESJ-specific
position responsibilities for work within the EOC.
• Work with county agency partners to prioritize projects that reduce risk in areas with vulnerable
populations (as defined in this plan), including through planning efforts such as subarea plans.
• Develop an infrastructure equity map.
• Develop a hazard vulnerability component map to use in comprehensive planning.
• Crosswalk climate risk and population vulnerability with SCAP actions.
259
Performance Measure
• # mitigation projects specifically benefitting vulnerable communities/populations
• KCEM did/did not identify potential needs in vulnerable communities, regardless of resource
requests received from those communities.
260
Seismic Lifeline Route Resilience
Lead
KC EM
Partners
DLS
PHSKC
FMD
DNRP
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Earthquake /
Goal 4
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Capital Budget
FEMA HMA
General Fund
Vision
King County is able to conduct life-safety response and recovery operations throughout the county
following a catastrophic Cascadia Subduction Zone or Seattle Fault earthquake.
Description
Following a major earthquake, at least three-quarters of all state-managed bridges will be inoperable
for at least one-three months. This threatens the ability of responders to conduct life safety
operations, for life saving resources to be distributed, and for communities to begin to transition to
recovery. This strategy will build on state and federal assessments of transportation vulnerability to
identify regional lifeline routes for King County and prioritize vulnerable segments for mitigation
investments.
2-Year Objectives
• Convene a multiagency
committee to develop a strategy
• Identify potential lifeline routes
and route vulnerabilities.
5-Year Objectives
• Develop a prioritized list of
lifeline routes and submit to
the Executive and Council
Long-Term Objectives
• Develop, maintain,
and expand the
resilient transportation
lifeline.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• KC EM will work with WSDOT, DLS, and others to review the completed RRAP for critical
transportation and to identify potential seismic lifeline routes. Work with UW to verify RRAP
results.
• Based on identified lifeline routes, identify necessary mitigation to protect and expand those
routes.
• Prioritize investments based in part on population vulnerability and likelihood of self-sustaining
for a longer period of time.
• Continue this effort through the strategy identified by King County Roads to retrofit seismically-
vulnerable bridges.
Performance Measure
• Lifeline routes are identified
• # projects completed to strengthen the seismic lifeline routes
261
Integrate Hazard Mitigation and Comprehensive Planning
Lead
KC EM
Partners
Office of the Executive
DLS
PSRC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All /
Goal 12
Goal 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA HMA Grants
Vision
Comprehensive planning and regional initiatives like Vision 2050 account for hazard risk and the role
that development patterns and climate change play in increasing hazard risk. These plans adopt
policies and land use patterns designed to limit hazard risk.
Description
The most cost-effective mitigation measures are those that prevent the creation of risk through codes
and development standards. At present, hazards are barely mentioned in most countywide/region
wide planning documents. This strategy seeks to increase the integration between mitigation, response,
and recovery concerns and major land-use policies and plans, including the Growth Management Act,
PSRC Visions, and the Comprehensive Plan.
2-Year Objectives
• Provide comments on Vision
2050 updates.
• Provide feedback on 2020
Comp Plan policies
5-Year Objectives
• Fully participate in the next
major update of the
comprehensive plan, ensuring
hazard risk and risk reduction
is represented throughout.
Long-Term Objectives
• Integrate hazards into
desired planning and
development
outcomes.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Work with planning agencies to identify a list of areas where hazard information would be helpful
in designing good policies.
• Socialize the concept of integrating hazard mitigation and comprehensive planning by attending
regional meetings around the GMA and Comprehensive Plan as well as of City Manager and
Planning Director groups.
• Look into developing a land-use tool platform similar to Colorado’s planningforhazards.com page
and that identifies tools that can be used to reduce hazard risk, such as purchase of development
rights.
• Add hazard mitigation policies and strategies to the King County countywide planning policies to
be updated in 2020.
• Integrate concepts of social vulnerability into comprehensive planning efforts in order to promote
the use of comprehensive planning to both reduce hazard risk and build equity.
• Participate in WA Commerce and FEMA-led activities on how to consider hazards in
comprehensive planning.
Performance Measure
• # of countywide planning policies addressing natural and manmade hazards.
262
Engage Community Organizations in Emergency Management
Lead
KC EM
Partners
Public Health SKC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All /
Goal 12
Goal 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA HMA Grants
Vision
Increase the participation of communities to identify local preparedness priorities and opportunities to
do hazard mitigation, risk prevention, and community preparedness activities through the creation of
“community resiliency networks” using a model similar to the Public Health community health
networks. Use feedback from these community groups to influence response planning and
prioritization, including for catastrophic response and recovery planning.
Description
Emergency planning typically underutilizes existing community capabilities and undervalues the
resilience built into many communities, especially those that are marginally represented or of lower-
income. Examples from around the country point out that a partnership with individuals and
organizations from these communities a can result in better emergency management, reduced risk, aid
in more rapid recovery, and even improve day-to-day quality of life indicators. King County
Emergency Management will partner with other agencies to work more closely with communities to
identify opportunities to strengthen the 14 Determinants of Equity through mitigation, establish
response needs, recovery priorities, and account for community capabilities that can be valuable
during disasters.
2-Year Objectives
• Bring together agencies to identify
potential community partners for
emergency management.
• Complete a community capability map.
• Complete an infrastructure equity map.
5-Year Objectives
• Establish community
priorities for each
mission area and
ensure those priorities
are executed through
plans and actions.
Long-Term Objectives
• Sustain a community
equity in emergency
management coalition.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Develop tools to identify areas of inequity in emergency management, including for outreach,
language support, and the quality of public infrastructure and services that may be damaged during
a disaster.
• Investigate developing a community equity committee for emergency management similar to
those used by King County Parks and Metro.
• Work with Public Health SKC and other agency partners to expand the Trusted Partners Network
identify potential community organization partners with whom KC EM could engage to learn
more about capabilities and gaps.
• Record community-identified mitigation and preparedness priorities and invest in them.
Performance Measure
• King County Emergency Management has prioritized/carried out # of community-identified
actions.
263
Climate Integration Training
Lead
KC EM
Partners
DNRP
Local Jurisdictions
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All Hazards
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Existing Staff Time
Vision
All jurisdictions consider climate and climate-induced hazard impacts in their planning.
Description
The King County Hazard Regional Hazard Mitigation Plan provides a framework for local and
regional action to reduce the impacts of natural and human-caused hazards in King County. Many of
the natural hazards covered in the Plan, including flooding, wildfire, and landslides, are exacerbated by
climate change. Building from work initiated in the 2019-20 Plan update, the Office of Emergency
Management will host trainings with partner jurisdictions on incorporating climate change into hazard
mitigation. The trainings will include information on how climate change affects natural hazards in
King County; how to evaluate and adjust hazard mitigation strategies to account for climate impacts,
including the potential for disproportionate impacts on frontline communities; and best practices for
sharing information about climate risks with the public.
2-Year Objectives
• Develop training
plan/curriculum
• Conduct training
5-Year Objectives
• Host periodic trainings and
integrate climate
considerations into classes or
seminars on wildfires, severe
weather, and planning.
Long-Term Objectives
• N/A
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Work with SCAP team to develop climate planning training curriculum.
• Identify and schedule opportunities to host climate trainings for King County and constituent
jurisdictions.
• Host trainings during mitigation plan update meetings, winter weather seminars, wildfire seminars,
and other related opportunities that bring local and county staff together to discuss hazards that
are impacted by climate change.
Performance Measure
• # trainings hosted
264
Disaster Skills Risk Reduction Training
Lead
KCEM Public
Outreach
Program Manager
Partners
Community Outreach
Workgroup
Zone Coordinators
King County Libraries
PHSKC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All Hazards
Goal 6
Goal 14
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
EMPG, UASI, SHSP
Vision
King County Emergency Management delivers the county’s disaster education, and provides year-
round free training and education to county employees, residents, and organizations/businesses via
several programs and activities aimed at promoting personal and community risk reduction.
Description
Disaster Skills Risk Reduction Training will provide education on natural and man-made hazards that
are present and could occur in King County and ways to mitigate and reduce impacts in addition to
increase community disaster preparedness, self-sufficiency, and protection of property.
2-Year Objectives
• Complete one Basic Disaster
Skills Trainings (General
Preparedness/Risk Reduction)
within each
jurisdictions/unincorporated
area in King County.
• Train at least 1,500 residents
through Basic Disaster Skills
Trainings and MYN Facilitator
Trainings.
5-Year Objectives
• Complete Advanced Disaster
Skills Trainings (Fire Safety &
Bleeding Control) within each
jurisdictions/unincorporated
area in King County.
• Train at least 2,500 residents
in advanced skills such as fire
extinguisher and bleeding
control
• Train at least 50 individuals to
serve as instructors for their
respective organization,
community, department, or
jurisdiction.
Long-Term Objectives
• Maintain consistent
outreach to high-risk
communities.
• Maintain consistent
advanced disaster
skills risk reduction
trainings.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Hold two trainings a month at the King County Libraries or with local jurisdictions
• Connect with the Seattle King County Public Health Ethnic-centric boards and ESJ newsletter for
trusted partners to support sharing events and training opportunities.
• Hold four quarterly workshops for public educators to provide continuing education for
community engagement specialists and public education and outreach coordinators.
• Modify outreach efforts to mirror need so that 80% of outreach goes to the 20% of the
population at highest risk.
• Look into partnering with public health to teach post-disaster environmental health risk reduction
skills, including emergency drinking water, toxin exposure reduction, etc.
Performance Measure
• Using sign-in sheets, keep track of how many individuals are attending Basic and Advanced
trainings
• Social Media hits
• Ethnic social media connections
265
Dam Failure Risk and Impact Reduction
Lead
KC EM Dam
Safety Program
Coordinator
Partners
DNRP, WLRD
DNRP, Rivers
WA Depot of Ecology,
Dam Safety Office
WRIA 8
WRIA 7
Salmon Recovery Funding
Board
Tribes
Local Jurisdictions
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Dam Failure /
Goal 5
Goal 6
Goal 12
Goal 14
Supplemental Goal 15
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA Rehabilitation of
High Hazard Potential
Dam Grant Program
King County Flood
Control District
FMA
PDM
Various Salmon &
Environment Recovery
Grants
Vision
Lower the risk and impacts of dam failure in King County.
Description
Washington State Dam Safety Office will identify high and significant hazard dams that are in poor
condition. King County will gather information from other sources about low hazard dams of interest.
King County will assist in seeking alternative funding structures to lower the risk of failure.
Additionally, King County will seek alternative funding structures to decommission identified dams
that threaten environmental resources. Lastly, resources will be sought to strengthen the integrity and
security of high and significant hazard dams in the County that are not feasible to remove.
2-Year Objectives
Identify dams in King County that
are assessed to be in poor condition
by the Washington State DSO and
identify funding structures to
mitigate their risk. Begin dam
removal projects.
5-Year Objectives
Eliminate the risk associated with
all dams in the County assessed to
be in poor condition by the
Washington State DSO.
Long-Term Objectives
Decommission dams that
have outlived their
functional use, but still
remain operational and
pose a threat to the
County.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Washington State DSO will identify poor condition dams in the County and rely them to KCEM.
• KCEM will work with DNRP, local jurisdictions, and tribes to identify potential
funding/mitigation strategies.
• Ensure vulnerable populations are accounted for in outreach and risk assessments.
• Where applicable, KCEM will assist in grant application development and administration.
Performance Measure
• Number of mitigation actions for high hazard and significant dams that are in poor condition
dams.
• Number of dams removed.
• Number of dams with lowered hazard classification through mitigation actions.
266
Wildfire Preparedness and Risk Reduction
Lead
KC EM,
Hazard Mitigation
Partners
DNRP, WLRD, DNRP,
Parks, DLS, Permitting
KC Fire Districts, WA
DNR, King Conservation
District, Tribes, USFS, KC
Climate Preparedness
Public Health Seattle-KC
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Wildfire /
Goal 3
Goal 5
Goal 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
Existing Resources
Vision
As King County grows, and awareness of climate change-driven wildfire risk grows, King County has
a coordinated strategy to support individuals and local jurisdictions in identifying and managing
wildfire risk, including risk to property and public health.
Description
Partner with King County communities, fire districts, and other organizations to develop an integrated
King County strategy for wildfire. The strategy will review current efforts to address wildfire risk in
King County and develop recommendations for addressing identified gaps and opportunities. These
recommendations will be carried out through a coordinated Firewise technical assistance program,
likely led by DNRP. This effort will be coordinated with a SCAP action seeking a similar outcome.
This strategy will be based in part on the results of WA DNR effort to map the Wildland Urban
Interface in King County.
2-Year Objectives
• Convene a multiagency
committee to develop a strategy
• Request funding for outreach
5-Year Objectives
• Implement the strategy
through coordinated technical
assistance between the county
and local communities
Long-Term Objectives
• Maintain consistent
outreach to
potentially-impacted
communities.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• KC EM will work with DNRP, WLRD and the Climate Preparedness team to identify partners.
• Continue to partner with WA DNR and DLS to map WUI areas – ultimately use this map to
target strategy priorities.
• Socialize results of WUI mapping efforts with comprehensive plan staff and look into planning
policies that could limit density or development in fire-prone areas.
• Convene multiagency committee once WA DNR WUI maps are closer to being finalized
• Identify existing preparedness actions and gaps, including areas that are/are not receiving Firewise
outreach and support.
• Develop wildfire preparedness and mitigation coordination strategy and socialize it.
• DNRP to request $150k funding for an additional FTE to support Firewise efforts.
• Look into model codes, ordinances, or other strategies to promote in addition to Firewise.
• Host an annual tabletop at the wildfire workshop held each year by KCEM.
Performance Measure
• KC EM was successful/not successful in convening all the necessary partners to establish a
unified strategy for community wildfire preparedness and risk reduction.
267
Hazard Mitigation Assistance Grant Support
Lead
KC EM
Partners
WA EMD
Local Jurisdictions
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All /
Goal 10
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA HMA Grants
Vision
Hazard Mitigation Assistance grants go to the communities and projects most needed and more
effective at reducing risk, regardless of a community’s internal capacity to administer federal grants.
Description
With the passage of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) in 2018, the amount of federal grant
funding for hazard mitigation will top $300-700 million annually, at least a 3-fold increase over historical
averages. For 2019, grants of up to $4 million, federal cost-share, will be available. The experience-
barrier to seeking these grants has prevented jurisdictions and county departments from applying. King
County Emergency Management is establishing a grant assistance program to lower these barriers by
providing support in administering FEMA grants.
To pay for this service, King County will leverage local management costs, provided to grant
recipients.
2-Year Objectives
• Publish assistance guidelines
and implement at least one test
case.
5-Year Objectives
• Expand local capacity to
administer grants.
• Expand KC EM capacity to
support on application
development
Long-Term Objectives
• Communities that
need grants
consistently are able to
seek them, regardless
of internal capacity.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Administer FEMA grants - King County will administer grants, to include submitting
reimbursements and documentation, completing quarterly reports, and managing grant kickoff
and closeout.
• Provide application technical assistance - King County will, as time allows, provide support and
technical assistance in developing applications. Jurisdictions will take the lead in application
development. King County may provide more support in the future.
• Establish a process to collect documentation and reimburse expenditures - King County will
establish a process to identify and track expenditures, and collect documentation necessary for
submission to FEMA and the State. King County will work with partners to ensure this process is
clear and straightforward.
• Develop an interlocal agreement process - King County will develop and establish an internal sub-
award agreement process that lays out expectations for both parties in successfully administering
the grants and completing mitigation projects.
• Look into other fund sources post-disaster and accelerate projects like flooded home buyouts
before rebuilding occurs.
Performance Measure
• # Grants administered on behalf of other agencies/communities.
268
Public Assistance Grant Support
Lead
KCEM Business
& Finance
Officer
Partners
King County Public
Assistance Team
membership
Hazards Mitigated
/ Goals Addressed
All
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
FEMA 406 Mitigation
Vision
Post-Disaster Recovery following a Presidentially Declared Disaster will include taking full advantage
of the utilization of 406 Hazard Mitigation funding made available exclusively to eligible agencies
within a qualifying jurisdiction.
Description
The federal Public Assistance (PA) Disaster Recovery Grant Program supports governmental and
government-type agencies recovery from major disaster declared by the President. While billions of
PA grants are provided and provide significant support to recovering agencies; mitigating future
occurrences of similar nature supports and strengthens resiliency on a long-term basis. The
recognition of this is carried out through the provision of 406 Hazard Mitigation funds which are only
available to agencies to mitigate damages suffered from a Presidentially Declared Disaster. These
funds are added to Project Worksheets for PA Grant funds. King County Emergency Management
serves as the County’s Applicant Agent for PA and oversees the disaster financial recovery efforts for
King County government agencies. This strategy seeks to increase the number of 406 Hazard
Mitigation projects added to Public Worksheets to increase King County government resilience in all
county agencies.
2-Year Objectives
• Provide the KC PA Team
(KCPAT) education and
outreach on the 406 Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program.
• 50% of all impacted eligible
KC government agencies
will identify at least one
mitigation project for each
PA PWs to mitigate/
prevent/eliminate future
damage directly attributable
to the declared disaster.
5-Year Objectives
• 75% of all impacted eligible
KC government agencies will
identify at least one
mitigation project for each
PA Project Worksheet to
mitigate/prevent/eliminate
future damage directly
attributable to the declared
disaster.
Long-Term Objectives
• 95% of all impacted
eligible KC government
agencies will identify at
least one mitigation project
for each PA Project
Worksheet to
mitigate/prevent/eliminate
the damage directly
attributable to the declared
disaster.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Prepare training materials on 406 Hazard Mitigation Program
• Conduct trainings for the King County Public Assistance Team
• DNRP will train operations and engineering staff in the assessment of earthquake damaged
facilities. A WTD specific ATC- 20 class will be conducted in early 2020 for operations and
engineering staff. Response guides and ATC-20 placards for post-earthquake inspection and
FEMA cost tracking forms are being placed in all offsite facilities.
• Develop a KCPAT Disaster Recovery Financial Management Plan
• Develop KCPAT Disaster Recovery Profiles
• Represent and support each KCPAT agency during post-disaster recovery process
269
• Work with each impacted agency during a declared disaster to identify eligible 406 HM project(s)
Performance Measure
• # of KCPAT members receiving training/outreach
• # of 406 Hazard Mitigation Projects funded
• % of Impacted King County government agencies receiving a 406 Hazard Mitigation Project
• Identify local cost-share opportunities, including the flood control district.
270
Language Accessible Video Emergency Messaging
Lead
Risk Communications
Specialist
Public Health Seattle & King
County, Office of the Director
Partners
King County
OEM
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
All-Hazards
Goal 6
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
$100,000 +
Vision
Increase the inventory of pre-scripted and translated language accessible materials for public health
emergencies to aid in the rapid dissemination of public information and warning for all-hazards. Using
audio-video media, increase the reach of emergency messaging for individuals with English as a
second-language and persons who use American Sign Language (ASL).
Description
28.5% of King County citizens are speakers of a non-English language and in some local language
communities, there is also a low rate of literacy in the spoken language. This mitigation strategy aims
to develop language accessible materials in an audio-video format to assist in public information and
warning for known hazards within King County. By providing emergency messaging in an audio-video
format, King County will be able to provide equitable access to culturally appropriate emergency
messaging for individuals who do not read (in English or in their spoken language) and individuals
with language access needs (including individuals who speak American Sign Language). This
mitigation strategy will aid in the rapid dissemination via web and social media of critical life-
safety/risk reduction emergency messaging to all persons present in King County in the event of an
emergency.
2-Year Objectives
• Secure videographer
• Secure and train ASL
interpreter service and
spokespeople from language
communities
• Develop language accessible
emergency messaging using
audio-video format
• Conduct trial runs for language
accessible emergency messaging
5-Year Objectives
• Implement language
accessible emergency
messaging for public use
• Conduct public awareness
campaign to socialize language
accessible emergency
messaging
Long-Term Objectives
• Reduce delays in
issuing language
accessible/translated
emergency messaging
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Identify, script, and translate/transcreate emergency messaging for key hazards
• Issue request for proposals for content videographer and interpreter services (including American
Sign Language)
• Film and produce language accessible emergency messaging content
• Engage communities in review and testing of language accessible emergency messaging
• Implement language accessible emergency messaging for public use and dissemination
• Conduct public awareness campaign to socialize language accessible emergency messaging
• Develop a social media strategy to support the accessible video tools.
Performance Measure
• Time for issuance/public broadcasting of language accessible emergency messaging during
emergency activation(s)
271
King County Facilities Indoor Air Quality Monitoring Network
Lead
Environmental Health
Emergency Response Planner
Public Health – Seattle &
King County
Partners
King County
Facilities
Maintenance
Division
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Wildfire Smoke
Goal 2, 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
$100,000
Vision
Develop and implement network of indoor air quality monitoring devices in King County operated
facilities to ensure the health and safety of King County employees during periods of poor air quality
due to wildfire smoke inundation.
Description
Procure and deploy 280 Dylos DC1100 true laser particle counters (indoor air quality monitors) across
28 facilities owned and/or managed by King County to aid in continuity of operation decision making
during periods of poor air quality during wildfire smoke events. Indoor air quality network would
enable the county to make informed decisions regarding the health and safety of employees working
in county owned/managed facilities and base facility closure decisions along established state
recommended action thresholds for PM2.5 levels. The Dylos DC1100 systems are portable units that
run at an estimated cost of $260.99 per unit and have the capability of relaying recorded PM levels to a
central computer for active indoor air quality monitoring via integrated system telemetry.
2-Year Objectives
• Procurement of Dylos DC1100
indoor air quality monitors
• Deployment of Dylos DC 1100
indoor air quality monitors
across 28 king county
owned/managed facilities
• Establishment of centralized
computer telemetry system for
active monitoring of indoor air
quality network
• Increase situational awareness
regarding indoor air quality of
King County facilities during
wildfire smoke events
5-Year Objectives
• Assess indoor air quality
performance of King County
facilities during wildfire smoke
events
• Identify mitigation strategies
to further improve indoor air
quality of King County
facilities during wildfire smoke
events
• Improve the overall indoor air
quality performance of King
County facilities during
wildfire smoke events
Long-Term Objectives
• Increase situational
awareness regarding
indoor air quality of
King County facilities
during wildfire smoke
events
• Increase the overall air
quality performance
of King County
facilities during
wildfire smoke events
to aid in maintaining
continuity of
operations during
periods of poor air
quality
272
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Procurement of Dylos DC1100 indoor air quality monitors
• Deployment of Dylos DC1100 indoor air quality monitors across 28 King County Facilities
• Establish centralized computer telemetry system for active monitoring of indoor air quality
monitoring network
• Assess the performance of each King County facility during periods of poor air quality due to
wildfire smoke
• Determine if facility closures are warranted based upon state recommended air quality action
thresholds during periods of wildfire smoke inundation
• Identify subsequent indoor air quality mitigation recommendations for improving facility
performance during wildfire smoke events
Performance Measure
• Prioritization of facilities warranting further indoor air quality mitigation actions to improve
performance during periods of poor outdoor air quality
• Development of indoor air quality mitigation recommendations for prioritized facilities
273
Medical Gas Seismic Detection & Emergency Shut Off
Lead
PHSKC –
Environmental
Health Services
Division,
Community
Environmental
Health Section
Partners
Harborview Medical Center
Hazards Mitigated /
Goals Addressed
Earthquake
Goal 2, 12
Funding Sources and
Estimated Costs
≤$500,000
Vision
Reduce the disruption to level 1 trauma centers in King County following the event of a large
earthquake by retrofitting level 1 trauma centers with medical gas seismic detection and emergency
shut off systems.
Description
Harborview Medical Center is the only level 1 trauma center within King County and the State of
Washington. In the event of a large earthquake impacting the Puget Sound region, disruptions to
medical gas piping and delivery systems can significantly increase the recovery time to resume
operations. This strategy proposes retrofitting the medical gas piping and delivery systems with early
warning seismic detection and emergency shut off valves in order to increase the capability of rapid
restoration of medical services following the event of a large earthquake in order to expedite the
restoration of life saving operational capacity.
2-Year Objectives
• Fund feasibility study
• Select consultants to complete
study
5-Year Objectives
• Update medical gas piping
and plumbing code to require
seismic detection and
emergency shut off valves for
Level 1 trauma centers.
Long-Term Objectives
• Expedite the
restoration of critical
life-saving operational
capacity for trauma
centers with a level 1
designation.
Implementation Plan/Actions
• Allocate funding to conduct a feasibility study for seismic detection and emergency shut off valve
upgrades for level 1 trauma centers in King County
• Issue Request for Proposal to contract conduct of feasibility study
• Biased upon findings of feasibility study, update medical gas piping and plumbing code to require
seismic detection and emergency shut off valves for medical gases for level 1 trauma centers.
Performance Measure
• Completion of a feasibility study assessing cost-benefit outcome for seismic detection and
emergency shut off valve system upgrades
• Update medical gas piping and plumbing code to require seismic detection and emergency shut
off valves for level 1 trauma centers.