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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCouncil Retreat - 31 Mar 2022 - Agenda - Pdf CITY OF RENTON AGENDA - Council Retreat 8:30 AM - Thursday, March 31, 2022 Videoconference 8:30 AM 1. WELCOME 8:35 AM 2. RETURN TO CITY HALL • Recommendation and Discussion on Remote Council Meetings • Virtual/Hybrid Committee Meetings • Future Training 04/04: SCA Workshop with Jurassic Parliament 9:00 AM 3. FINANCE • Presentation • Budget Calendar • How we ended the year for 2021 • Next Steps in Developing a Sustainable Fiscal Strategy: New Funding Sources • Increase B&O Tax Rates • Property Taxes • Bonds • Next Steps in developing a Sustainable Fiscal Strategy: Capital Maintenance and Investment Priorities • REET • Priorities • Human Services 10:30 AM 4. BREAK 10:45 AM 5. PUBLIC WORKS • Transit/Transportation • Sound Transit: Strategic Plan • Funding Sources • CIP Order • Sidewalks • Create Opportunities to increase public transportation and bicycle access • Environmental/Sustainability 12:00 PM 6. LUNCH 1:00 PM 7. PUBLIC SAFETY • Public Use of Illegal Substances • Washington State Supreme Court Blake Decision and 2021 SB 5476 possession of narcotics • Discuss stronger focus on cleaning up trouble spots in the city • First Responder Mental Health Services- Partnership with FD Cares • Priorities and Challenges- Staffing recruitment/retention 2:00 PM 8. BREAK 2:15 PM 9. PARKS & RECREATION • Overview - Upcoming City Events • Senior Center Operations and Improvements • Bond Project Updates • Veterans Programs Update 3:00 PM 10. BUSINESS PLAN • Suggested Changes Currently, due to the spread of COVID-19, all regularly-scheduled committee meetings will be held as necessary via video-conference. City Hall is closed to the public. If you would like to attend this meeting remotely, you can do so by going to https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84217473110?pwd=NjBkRy9pb3I0d3V2TzZ6enYyQzFMQT09 Zoom Meeting ID: 842 1747 3110, Passcode: 249161 You can call through Zoom at (253) 215-8782 and use the Meeting ID. Jassic C H EAT S H EEl WAIT!WAIT!WHAT SHOULD I SAY?- If you are the chair,say...If you are a member speaking about If you are a member speaking about another member,say...the chair,say... BIG MISTAKES speaking twice in a row Members are reminded that no one may speak Point of order...The member has spoken twice Point of order..Jhe chair does not have the a second time until everyone who wishes to while others are waiting to speak.right to dominate the discussion,but must do so has spoken once.speak in turn. not seeking recognition Members will kindly seek recognition before Point of order...Members must seek [not applicable] speaking.recognition before speaking. speaking directly to another Members will kindly address all remarks to the Point of order...Members are supposed to [not applicable] member chair.speak to the chair. interrupting another person Members will kindly refrain from interrupting Point oforder...lnterrupting is not allowed.Point of order...The chair does not have the one another.right to interrupt a member. INAPPROPRIATE REMARKS personal remarks Members will refrain from making personal Point oforder...Personal remarks are not Point oforder...Personal remarks are not remarks,allowed,allowed. insulting language,vulgarity,Insulting or vulgar language is not allowed at Point of order...The language used by the Point of order...The chair is using insulting! attacks our meetings.memberis insulting/vulgar,vulgar language. inflammatory language Inflammatory language is not allowed.Point of order...That remark is inflammatory.Point of order...That remark is inflammatory. criticizing past actions Members may not criticize a past action of the Point of order...Members may not criticize a Point of order...The chair may not criticize a group during a meeting,with two exceptions.*past action of the group during a meeting,past action of the group during a meeting, with two exceptions.*with two exceptions,* remarks that are not germane Members will keep all remarks strictly to the Point of order...ln my view that topic is not Point of order...ln my view that topic is not (relevant)topic under discussion,germane to our discussion,germane to our discussion. *Exceptions:if group as a whole is discussing past action,or if member intends to introduce motion to amend or rescind it at end of speech. Cheat Sheet for Local Government P.O.Box 77553 Seattle,WA 98177 ©Jurassic Parliament 2019.All rights reserved.AGENDA ITEM #2. • Financial Update Council Retreat 2022 AGENDA ITEM #3. • Biennial Budget AGENDA ITEM #3. • Long Range Plan 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Summary ($ in Million)Actual Actual Actual Actual Projected*Projected Projected Projected Projected Beginning Fund Balance 31.6$ 44.7$ 48.2$ 54.5$ 69.1$ 57.8$ 52.3$ 46.8$ 39.6$ Operating Revenue 105.4$ 129.2$ 102.7$ 118.3$ 112.4$ 116.5$ 120.5$ 123.7$ 125.9$ Base Operating Expenditure (89.7) (118.1) (94.8) (97.4) (120.2) (119.5) (123.6) (128.3) (133.2) Operating Surplus (Deficit)15.7$ 11.1$ 7.8$ 20.9$ (7.8)$ (3.0)$ (3.1)$ (4.6)$ (7.3)$ 1X Sources1 0.4$ 1.8$ 9.4$ 3.7$ -$ 0.9$ 0.9$ 0.9$ 0.9$ 1X Uses2 (3.1) (9.5) (11.0) (9.9) (3.4) (3.4) (3.4) (3.4) (3.4) Net Resources - Uses 13.0$ 3.5$ 6.3$ 14.6$ (11.3)$ (5.5)$ (5.6)$ (7.1)$ (9.8)$ Ending Fund Balance 44.7$ 48.2$ 54.5$ 69.1$ 57.8$ 52.3$ 46.8$ 39.6$ 29.8$ Ending Bal as % of Opr Budget (Target=12%)49.82%40.77%57.43%70.94%48.12%43.79%37.83%30.89%22.38% * 2022 Projected values represent budget along with several proposed adjustments which will be brought forward with the Q1 2022 budget adjustment $- $20.0 $40.0 $60.0 $80.0 $100.0 $120.0 $140.0 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Operating Revenue Base Operating Expenditure Ending Fund Balance AGENDA ITEM #3. • Transportation AGENDA ITEM #3. • Parks AGENDA ITEM #3. • Facilities AGENDA ITEM #3. • 2022 Total Annual Budget $263 Million General Fund $115 Million AGENDA ITEM #3. • General Fund Expenditures AGENDA ITEM #3. • Primary Revenue Sources •Property Taxes •Sales Taxes •B&O Taxes •Utility Taxes AGENDA ITEM #3. • Sales Tax 2021 collections year to date are closer to $32M 2018 & 2019 average sales tax $28M AGENDA ITEM #3. • B&O Tax Non-Retail .00085 0.00095 0.0011 0.00121 Revenue Increase 599,037.11 1,497,592.77 2,156,533.59 Retail .0005 0.00055 0.00065 0.0007 Revenue Increase 145,299.88 435,899.65 581,199.54 Revenue Increase 744,336.99 1,933,492.42 2,737,733.13 Business with $1M in sales Current Proposed Increase Non-Retail 850$ 1,100$ Retail 500$ 650$ AGENDA ITEM #3. • B&O Tax Rates and thresholds Quarterly Annual Bellevue 0.001496 0.001496 0.001496 0.001496 $170,000 Burien 0.0010 0.00100 0.0010 0.0010 $200,000 Des Moines 0.0020 0.00200 0.0020 0.0020 $50,000 Everett 0.0010 0.00100 0.0010 0.0010 $5,000 $20,000 Issaquah 0.0012 0.00120 0.0015 0.0012 $25,000 $100,000 Kent 0.0005 0.00046 0.0015 0.0020 $62,500 $250,000 Lake Forest Park 0.0020 0.00200 0.0020 0.0020 $5,000 Mercer Island 0.0010 0.00100 0.0010 0.0010 $150,000 Renton - Proposed 0.0011 0.00065 0.0011 0.0011 $500,000 Seattle 0.00222 v 0.00222 v 0.00427 v 0.00222 v $100,000 Shelton 0.0010 0.00100 0.0010 0.0010 $5,000 $20,000 Shoreline 0.0010 0.00100 0.0020 0.0010 $125,000 $500,000 Tacoma 0.0011 0.00153 0.004 e 0.0010 $250,000 (v) = voter approved increase above statutory limit (e) = rate higher than statutory limit because rate was effective prior to January 1, 1982 (i.e., grandfathered). Local business & occupation (B&O) tax rates^ City Manufacturing rate Retail rate Services rate Wholesale rate Threshold AGENDA ITEM #3. • Property Tax Renton received 9.4 cents for every dollar of property tax paid by our residents AGENDA ITEM #3. • Property Tax City’s tax rate is only $1.01 per $1000 assessed valuation AGENDA ITEM #3. • Property Tax State law allows cities to increase base property tax levy by lower of inflation (September IPD) or 1% State law also allows cities to increase the base property tax levy for new construction AGENDA ITEM #3. • Funding Options AGENDA ITEM #3. • Questions AGENDA ITEM #3. • Human Services Funding AGENDA ITEM #3. • 1590 Funds 2021 Budgeted 2022 Total projected funds not yet allocated Revenues 3,166,400 2,740,000 Adjustment 750,000 Revised Projected Revenues 3,166,400 3,490,000 Less requested commitments: Renton Housing Authority 1,000,000 500,000 Police mental health navigator - 180,000 Projected funds remaining yet to be allocated 2,166,400 2,810,000 4,976,400 Of the projected funds remaining, a minimum of 60% are to be spent on affordable housing, this figure represents the amount remaining from the above figure that is required to be spent on affordable housing at a minimum 899,840 1,594,000 2,493,840 AGENDA ITEM #3. • Questions AGENDA ITEM #3. • SIDEWALK CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING BACKGROUND: • Sidewalks and walkways in the public right-of-way have long been a priority for the City. • The City’s Street Standards require frontage improvements be installed with new subdivisions at the time they are developed. • Nevertheless, many arterial and local streets were constructed in Renton prior to the current standards and lack sidewalks on either one or both sides. • Additionally, annexations have incorporated new neighborhoods into the city that were developed under King County development standards. The newer neighborhoods have sidewalks per current King County Road Standards, but older neighborhoods may have been developed without sidewalks under older King County Road Standards. • An assessment of sidewalk needs was last addressed in the City of Renton – Comprehensive Citywide Walkway Study (March 2008), which did not include most of the Benson Hill annexation (2008). • That Study estimated that of the 463 miles of street edge in the City, only 266 miles of sidewalk were in place. • The City has just completed a comprehensive survey of sidewalks and will be using the new data to prioritize future sidewalk projects. • The City’s current budget for the Walkway Program (the program that provides for the design and construction of high-priority sidewalks (i.e., “missing links”) is $50,000 annually and is used as match funding for grant application to construct projects. CURRENT WORK: • A variety of sources are available to fund sidewalk construction and maintenance programs. In general, funding strategies can be split into two categories: (1) programs that are funded by abutting property owners, and (2) programs funded by community taxes, funds and fees. • In addition, the City has established a fee in lieu program where an individual property owner can pay into a fund instead of building the required sidewalks themselves. This fund is used to build sidewalks where appropriate. NEXT STEPS: • Consider a SEPA base non-motorized fee to better support funding for sidewalks and bicycle paths. AGENDA ITEM #5. • PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND BICYCLE ACCESS BACKGROUND: • Public transportation is provided in Renton by King County Metro and Sound Transit. • Existing transportation network consists of local King County Metro bus routes including RapidRide “F” and other transit options. (link) • WSDOT I-405/SR 167 Corridor Program identifies planned and funded transportation projects along the I-405/SR 167 corridor including Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and regional trails. (link) • Sound Transit 3 (ST3), a voter approved regional transportation package, included transportation improvements within the City as follows: o Sound Transit has acquired the Sound Ford Site located at the NE corner of South Grady Way and Rainer Avenue South to develop a transit center and associated 700-stall parking garage with opportunities for surplus property for redevelopment. o In Sound Transit 3 (ST3) the voters approved a 200-stall Park-and-Ride at I-405/NE 44th Street (Exit 7). (link) o Sound Transit re-alignment process delayed the construction of all parking facilities in Renton from the original deliver date of 2024 to 2034. (link) • Completed a light rail study identifying station locations and routes throughout the city. (attachment) • Planned bicycle routes are included in the Trails and Bicycle Master Plan. (link) • As frontage improvements are installed as a part of site-specific development, incremental installation of bike routes are added to the system. (link) CURRENT WORK: • WSDOT I-405/Renton to Bellevue Widening and Express Toll Lanes Project with BRT improvements are underway along the I-405 Corridor. (link) • Two legislative appropriations have been awarded to Renton totaling $500,000 for improvements to the I-405 NE 44th Street (Exit 7) corridor to provide gateway signage, artwork, and a pedestrian boardwalk to the May Creek Trail network from the new BRT and hopefully the new 200 stall Park-and-Ride site. An additional $200,000 has been provided from the WSDOT Design Build Contractor, Flat Iron Construction for beautification of the gateway. • Working with King County Metro on improvements throughout the City for the addition of the King County Metro RapidRide “I” Line. (link) • Implementation of the Trails and Bicycle Master Plan incrementally via private development. • Development regulations that require bicycle parking for new development. (link) • Downtown streetscape standards providing for bike racks in the downtown business district. (link) • The Legislature included a $6 million “Eastrail South” allocation in the Move Ahead Washington package. This allocation will help extend the Renton segment of Eastrail south to connect with the shared South Coulon Park and Southport entrance and begin the future linkage of Eastrail with other regional trail systems nearby—Cedar River Trail and Lake-to-Sound Trail. (link) AGENDA ITEM #5. • • A 1.2 mile section of the Lake to Sound Trail (Naches Ave. in Renton across the Black River Forest to Ft. Dent in Tukwila) opened to the public in 2020. The Lake to Sound Trail is a partnership between the cities of SeaTac, Renton, Tukwila, Burien, and Des Moines in coordination with King County. (link) • Collaboration with Kent and King County to extend the Soos Creek Trail north into Renton. (link) • Acquisition to help complete the May Creek Trail Corridor, which will ultimately connect Lake Washington to King County’s Cougar Mountain Regional Park. Trail design for the next soft- surface trail segments. NEXT STEPS: • Identify funding for a follow up light rail study to build on previous work. • Develop a SEPA based non-motorized transportation mitigation program. • Continue implementation of the City’s complete streets and bicycle parking standards as a part of new development. • Re-locate Renton Transit Center from downtown to the Sound Ford site at South Grady Way and Rainer Avenue South. • Continue coordination with WSDOT and Sound Transit on the South Grady Way Grade Separation at Rainier Ave South/SR-167 Intersection to improve BRT route time to future transit center at the Sound Ford site. • Complete Rainier/Grady Junction Subarea Plan, Planned Action, aimed to identify multi-modal transportation mitigation for future development in the area. • Continue coordination with Sound Transit to implement I-405 NE 44th Street (Exit 7) Park-and- Ride prior to the deferred 2034 delivery date. • Continue coordination with WSDOT on the planning and implementation of the I-405/N 8th Street Direct Access Ramp Project for transit/HOV from I-405 to The Landing including missing North 8th Street Shared Use Path connection to Houser Way North Shared Use Path. • Continue collaboration with Kent and King County to extend the Soos Creek Trail north into Renton. • Continue collaboration with King County on process to extend the Renton segment of Eastrail South to Coulon Park. • Continue the Lake to Sound Trail partnership between the cities of SeaTac, Renton, Tukwila, Burien, and Des Moines in coordination with King County to make additional trail connections. AGENDA ITEM #5. • IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SHANNON B. BLAKE, Petitioner. NO. 96873-0 EN BANC Filed ________________ GORDON MCCLOUD, J.—Washington’s strict liability drug possession statute, RCW 69.50.4013, makes possession of a controlled substance a felony punishable by up to five years in prison, plus a hefty fine; leads to deprivation of numerous other rights and opportunities; and does all this without proof that the defendant even knew they possessed the substance. This case presents an issue of first impression for this court: Does this strict liability drug possession statute with these substantial penalties for such innocent, passive conduct exceed the legislature’s police power? The due process clauses of the state and federal : February 25, 2021 FILE IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON FEBRUARY 25, 2021 THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON FEBRUARY 25, 2021 SUSAN L. CARLSON SUPREME COURT CLERK AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 2 constitutions,1 along with controlling decisions of this court and the United States Supreme Court, compel us to conclude that the answer is yes—this exceeds the State’s police power. INTRODUCTION We begin with the rule that state legislatures have the police power to criminalize and punish much conduct. But the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions limit that power. The key limit at issue here is that those due process clause protections generally bar state legislatures from taking innocent and passive conduct with no criminal intent at all and punishing it as a serious crime. Unfortunately, that is exactly what RCW 69.50.4013, the strict liability felony drug possession statute, does. And it is the only statute in the nation to do so. We therefore conclude that it violates the state and federal constitutions. To be sure, at one time, it might have been possible for this court to avoid this constitutional issue by interpreting RCW 69.50.4013 as silently including an intent element and thereby saving it from unconstitutionality. But that time has long since passed. First, in 1981, we held that our legislature intended drug possession to be a strict liability felony in State v. Cleppe. 96 Wn.2d 373, 635 P.2d 435 (1981). Then, 16 years ago, and 23 years after Cleppe, we reiterated Cleppe’s 1 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 3 statutory interpretation holding: that our legislature intended drug possession to be a strict liability felony. State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004). Given the interpretive principles of legislative acquiescence and stare decisis, only the legislature, not the court, can now change the statute’s intent. This court, however, is the one that must evaluate whether that statute comports with constitutional due process guaranties. We have been asked to do that today, and we hold that the statute violates those guaranties. Attaching the harsh penalties of felony conviction, lengthy imprisonment, stigma, and the many collateral consequences that accompany every felony drug conviction to entirely innocent and passive conduct exceeds the legislature’s powers. FACTS In 2016, police executed a search warrant in Spokane, Washington, seeking evidence of stolen vehicles. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 19. They arrested three people on the property, including Shannon Blake. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 13; VRP at 40. At the jail, a corrections officer discovered a small baggy containing methamphetamine in the coin pocket of Blake’s jeans. VRP at 47-48. The State charged Blake with possession of a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.4013. CP at 18. At trial, Blake relied on the judicially created affirmative defense of “unwitting possession.” She testified that a friend had bought the jeans AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 4 secondhand and given them to Blake two days before Blake’s arrest. VRP at 76. Blake said she had never used methamphetamine and did not know the jeans had drugs in the pocket. Id. She acknowledged that the drugs had been “on [her]” on the day of her arrest. Id. at 83. Blake’s boyfriend also testified that Blake did not use drugs and that she had received the jeans from a friend. Id. at 89-90. The trial court served as trier of fact. CP at 20. It found that Blake had “possess[ed]” methamphetamine on the day in question. CP at 26. Consistent with the law as interpreted in Cleppe and Bradshaw, it did not make any findings as to whether the State had proved that Blake’s possession was intentional or knowing. It did conclude, however, that Blake had not met her burden to prove that her possession was unwitting. VRP at 108; CP at 26. Accordingly, the trial court found Blake guilty. On appeal, Blake argued that “requiring her to prove unwitting possession to [sic] the charged offense violates due process.” State v. Blake, No. 35601-9-III, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2019) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/356019_unp.pdf. Relying on Cleppe and Bradshaw, the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he crime of possession of a controlled substance does not require a mens rea element” and the defense’s burden to show unwitting possession does not violate due process. Id. at 6 (citing AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 5 Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 532; Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380; State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. 795, 365 P.3d 202 (2015)). We granted review. State v. Blake, 194 Wn.2d 1023 (2020). ANALYSIS I. THE STRICT LIABILITY DRUG POSSESSION STATUTE EXCEEDS THE STATE’S POLICE POWER BY IMPOSING HARSH FELONY CONSEQUENCES ON INNOCENT NONCONDUCT WITH NO MENS REA The basic drug possession statute at issue in this case states, “It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance . . . .” RCW 69.50.4013(1). The State need not prove any mens rea (mental state) element to secure a conviction for this crime. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 534-35. As we have held for nearly 40 years, “if the legislature had intended guilty knowledge or intent to be an element of the crime . . . it would have put the requirement in the act.” Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380. Blake clearly argues that the constitution bars the legislature from penalizing her conduct without requiring the State to prove she had a guilty mind. Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 18 (“[T]he legislature exceeds its power by creating a strict liability offense that lacks a public welfare rationale, has draconian consequences, and criminalizes innocent conduct.”). Amici provide additional support for this argument.2 The concurrence dismisses our discussion of this argument by claiming 2 Br. of WACDL (Wash. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers) & ACLU-WA (Am. Civil Liberties Union of Wash.) as Amici Curiae in Supp. of Pet’r at 4 (“[L]egislatures AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 6 that it was not even briefed. Concurrence at 9-10, 22-24.3 As the citations above and in the footnote below show, the concurrence is incorrect about this and the cited portion of Blake’s brief does place a question of first impression 4 before us: whether the legislature possesses the power to punish Blake for innocent conduct—or, more accurately, nonconduct—without proving any mental state at all. generally have flexibility to define crimes, but due process prohibits a State from defining criminal offenses in a manner that ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977))), 5 (“a legislature does not have unfettered discretion to define the elements of criminal offenses”), 7 (the legislature “never had the power to eliminate the requirement that the government prove the defendant’s mens rea”), 20 (“The statute criminalizes innocent conduct and offends fundamental principles of justice.”). 3 The concurrence accuses our decision of raising “concerns” that are “substantially similar” to the concerns raised in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, __U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1578, 206 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2020). Concurrence at 23. That’s not a fair comparison. In that case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “named three amici and invited them to brief and argue issues framed by the panel” but not presented at all by the briefing and thereby assigned the parties a “secondary role.” Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at 1578. In this case, in contrast, we resolve the issue that Blake has presented and that amici have more fully briefed. 4 This is a question of first impression because neither Cleppe nor Bradshaw addressed this issue. The defendants in Bradshaw argued that Cleppe’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional “because the statute is vague, criminalizes innocent behavior, and adversely affects the right to intrastate and interstate travel.” 152 Wn.2d at 539. But we did not address those arguments on the merits; we rejected them because the briefing provided insufficient analysis. Id. Thus, the constitutionality of this statute’s “criminaliz[ation of] innocent behavior” remains an open question after Bradshaw. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 7 A.Due Process Clause Protections Limit the Legislature’s Police Power To Criminalize Wholly Innocent and Passive Nonconduct “States have a legitimate interest in restraining harmful conduct and are empowered to do so under their police powers.” State v. Talley, 122 Wn.2d 192, 199, 858 P.2d 217 (1993) (citing City of Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786, 797, 435 P.2d 692 (1967); Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45, 41 S. Ct. 425, 65 L. Ed. 819 (1921)). In 1936, we said the police power “is an attribute of sovereignty, an essential element of the power to govern, and a function that cannot be surrendered. It exists without express declaration, and the only limitation upon it is that it must reasonably tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state, and not violate any direct or positive mandate of the constitution.” Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615 (1936) (citing Bowes v. Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 542, 109 P. 369 (1910); State ex rel. Davis- Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 178, 117 P. 1101 (1911); State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 40, 120 P. 861 (1912); State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 584, 135 P. 645 (1913), aff’d, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. Ed. 685 (1917)). But the police power is not infinite. If it were, “the result would be a police state, and the legislative branch of the government would be omnipotent.” Peterson v. Hagan, 56 Wn.2d 48, 53, 351 P.2d 127 (1960). Under both the state AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 8 and federal constitutions, a statute must have “a reasonable and substantial relation to the accomplishment of some purpose fairly within the legitimate range or scope of the police power and [must] not violate any direct or positive mandate of the constitution.” Ragan v. City of Seattle, 58 Wn.2d 779, 783, 364 P.2d 916 (1961)5 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934); State v. Canyon Lumber Corp., 46 Wn.2d 701, 284 P.2d 316 (1955); State v. Dexter, 32 Wn.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906 (1949); Campbell v. State, 12 Wn.2d 459, 122 P.2d 458 (1942); Shea, 185 Wash. 143; City of Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 293, 48 P.2d 238 (1935), overruled in part on other grounds by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019)).6 Though Ragan did not identify the specific constitutional source of this test, it relied on Nebbia; in Nebbia, the Supreme Court explicitly rooted the limits of the police power in “the guaranty of due process” that “the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious” and 5 Ragan and its progeny were overruled by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019), to the extent they “requir[ed] heightened scrutiny in article I, section 3 substantive due process challenges to laws regulating the use of property.” Ragan’s application outside the property use context remains unaffected by Yim. 6 Ragan announced this test in a challenge to a municipal ordinance. 58 Wn.2d at 783.We have since applied the same test to decide the scope of the police power of the state legislature. Markham Advert. Co. v. State, 73 Wn.2d 405, 420-21, 439 P.2d 248 (1968) (quoting Ragan, 58 Wn.2d at 783), overruled in part on other grounds by Yim, 194 Wn.2d 682). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 9 “the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.” 291 U.S. at 525. In other words, prior precedent of the United States Supreme Court and of this court—including Ragan—holds that the State’s police power is limited by the due process clause or “by constitutional protection afforded certain personal liberties.” Talley, 122 Wn.2d at 199 (citing Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wn.2d 418, 435, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973)). The “constitutional protection[s] afforded certain personal liberties” implicated by RCW 69.50.4013 are (1) the principle that “‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence’”7 and (2) the rule that the government cannot criminalize “essentially innocent” conduct.8 With regard to the first constitutional limit, the principle that mens rea is generally a prerequisite to criminalization in “Anglo-American jurisprudence,” it is certainly true that this general rule has exceptions. In Washington, for example, 7 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978)). 8 City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794, 800, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973); see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957) (criminalization of “wholly passive” and “entirely innocent” conduct violates due process). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 10 the legislature can still create strict liability crimes in certain circumstances: “our legislature has the plenary power to criminalize conduct regardless of whether the actor intended wrongdoing.” State v. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d 155, 163, 456 P.3d 1172 (2020) (citing State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 604, 925 P.2d 978 (1996)). In particular, the legislature may create “strict liability offenses to protect the public from the harms that have come with modern life by putting the burden of care on those in the best position to avoid those harms.” Id. at 164 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1952)). But the second constitutional limit, the rule against criminalizing “essentially innocent” conduct, does not have such exceptions, and it applies with special force to passive conduct—or nonconduct—that is unaccompanied by intent, knowledge, or mens rea. The United States Supreme Court explained this over 60 years ago in Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957). In Lambert, Los Angeles had criminalized “remain[ing] in Los Angeles for a period of more than five days without registering” with the city. Id. at 226. A defendant charged with violating this ordinance was “given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default [failure to register] was entirely innocent.” Id. at 229. The United States Supreme Court held that this exercise of the police power to criminalize entirely passive, innocent AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 11 nonconduct deprived defendant Virginia Lambert of her liberty without due process of law. Id. at 229. The United States Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to a similar statute 15 years later. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), that Court considered the constitutionality of a Florida ordinance that criminalized, among other things, “nightwalking.” Id. at 163. The Florida Supreme Court had upheld the ordinance after construing it “not to make criminal one night’s wandering, only the ‘habitual’ wanderer or, as the ordinance describe[d] it, ‘common night walkers.’” Id. at 163 (citation omitted) (quoting and citing Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 391 U.S. 596, 88 S. Ct. 1713, 20 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1968) (per curiam)). But the United States Supreme Court reversed. It explained that walking, strolling, and wandering—even at night—are “historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them.” Id. at 164. It continued that criminalizing such historically innocent conduct was impermissible for many reasons, including the fact that it made “criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent” and did so without proof of any “intent to commit an unlawful act.” Id. at 163. It concluded that criminalizing passive nonconduct while eliminating the requirement of a guilty mind violated due process clause protections, “cannot be squared with our constitutional standards[,] and is plainly AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 12 unconstitutional.” Id. at 171. Lambert’s and Papchristou’s holdings rested on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 355 U.S. at 229-30; 405 U.S. at 165; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Our state constitution’s due process clause provides even greater protection of individual rights in certain circumstances.9 Thus, this court’s precedent also enforces the constitutional due process limit on the reach of the State’s police power (though often without specifying the specific constitutional source of that limit). City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794, 802, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973); see also City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405, 408, 423 P.2d 522 (1967) (“The right to be let alone is inviolate; interference with that right is to be tolerated only if it is necessary to protect the rights and the welfare of others.”). Restating Ragan’s due process test, we have analyzed whether “the area of regulation [was] within the government’s scope of authority and [whether] the particular ordinance [was] a reasonable regulatory measure in support of the area of concern.” Pullman, 82 Wn.2d at 799 (citing Markham Advert. Co. v. State, 73 Wn.2d 405, 420-22, 439 9 We “have repeatedly noted that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control our interpretation of the state constitution’s due process clause.” State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 639, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) (citing Olympic Forest Prods., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 418; Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wn.2d 144, 459 P.2d 937 (1969)); see also Yim, 194 Wn.2d at 690 (“[T]his court has a duty to recognize heightened constitutional protections as a matter of independent state law in appropriate cases.” (citing O’Day v. King County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988))). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 13 P.2d 248 (1968), overruled in part on other grounds by Yim, 194 Wn.2d 682; Ragan, 58 Wn.2d 779). Applying that test, we have held that criminalization of passive nonconduct without mens rea “makes no distinction between conduct calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent” and therefore exceeds the State’s police power. Id. at 795. The strict liability drug possession statute challenged in this case is similar to the strict liability curfew ordinance challenged in Pullman. In Pullman, the defendant challenged a Seattle ordinance that prohibited “accompanying a child during curfew hours.” Id. By the language of the ordinance, “any minor under the age of 18 could be arrested for standing or playing on the sidewalk in front of his home at 10:01 p.m. on a warm summer evening.” Id. Justice Utter, writing for the majority, recognized that the government has an “independent interest in the well- being of its youth” and hence has authority to “enact laws to assist those whose primary responsibility is for the well-being of minors.” Id. at 800 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968)). But the challenged law made “no distinction between conduct calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent,” and it bore “an insufficient relationship to the objective of safeguarding minors.” Id. at 795, 802. We therefore concluded that the law was “an unreasonable exercise of the police power.” Id. at 800, 802. We explained that the record before the court was “absolutely devoid of any evidence AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 14 showing ‘bad conduct’. . . . [T]he mere fact that the defendant was in the presence of two minors during curfew hours resulted in this prosecution.” Id. at 802.10 Pullman stands for the rule that the state legislature’s exercise of its otherwise plenary police power to criminalize entirely passive and innocent nonconduct with no mens rea or guilty mind violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions. But as discussed below, the legislature criminalized exactly that sort of passive and innocent nonconduct in this case. B. Blake Was Convicted of the Felony of Unknowing Possession of Drugs; This Is Wholly Innocent Nonconduct That Falls beyond the Legislature’s Power To Criminalize The question before us today is whether unintentional, unknowing possession of a controlled substance is the sort of innocent, passive nonconduct that falls beyond the State’s police power to criminalize. Because unknowing possession is just as innocent and passive as staying out late with a juvenile or 10 Criminalization of innocent nonconduct also tends to place “unfettered discretion” in the hands of police, Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168, and can make people “‘who look suspicious to the police’” become future criminals. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d at 801 (quoting Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164). This risks violating other constitutional and statutory protections. See Research Working Grp. of Task Force on Race & Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 623, 627-28, 651-53 (2012) (concluding that disproportionate minority representation in Washington’s prisons is largely “explained by facially neutral policies that have racially disparate effects”); see Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 262-70 (2002) (observing racial disparities in drug prosecutions and convictions). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 15 remaining in a city without registering, we hold that this felony drug possession statute is just as unconstitutional as were the laws in Lambert, Papachristou, and Pullman. To be sure, active trafficking in drugs, unlike standing outside at 10:01 p.m., is not innocent conduct. States have criminalized knowing drug possession nationwide, and there is plenty of reason to know that illegal drugs are highly regulated. The legislature surely has constitutional authority to regulate drugs through criminal and civil statutes. But the possession statute at issue here does far more than regulate drugs. It is unique in the nation in criminalizing entirely innocent, unknowing possession. The statute would criminalize, to list a few examples: “a letter carrier who delivers a package containing unprescribed Adderall; a roommate who is unaware that the person who shares his apartment has hidden illegal drugs in the common areas of the home; a mother who carries a prescription pill bottle in her purse, unaware that the pills have been substituted for illegally obtained drugs by her teenage daughter, who placed them in the bottle to avoid detection.” State v. A.M., 194 Wn.2d 33, 64 n.13, 448 P.3d 35 (2019) (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 432 (Fla. 2012) (Perry, J., dissenting)). “A person might pick up the wrong bag at the airport, the wrong jacket at the concert, or even the wrong briefcase at the courthouse. Or a child might carry an adult’s backpack, not knowing that it contains the adult’s illegal AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 16 drugs.” Id. at 64. These examples illustrate the unreasonable disconnect between the statute’s intended goals and its actual effects. The possession statute also imposes harsh felony consequences on this passive nonconduct. Violation of this simple possession statute constitutes a class C felony. RCW 69.50.4013(2). It is punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c). In addition, all such felony convictions strip defendants of many fundamental rights, both during their time of incarceration and long afterward. See generally Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); Tarra Simmons, Transcending the Stigma of a Criminal Record: A Proposal to Reform State Bar Character and Fitness Evaluations, 128 YALE L.J.F. 759 (2019); see also MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 62 (2006) (collecting state laws regulating licensure and employment of convicted persons). And drug offenders in particular are subject to countless harsh collateral consequences affecting all aspects of their lives. Pinard & Thompson, supra, at 588; Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 259-60 (“Those convicted of AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 17 drug offenses are subject to a number of additional penalties,” including denial of more than 750 federal benefits, including consequences for health care, education, employment, housing, parenting, professional licenses, and others.).11 Imposing such harsh penalties for such innocent passivity violates the federal and state rule that passive and wholly innocent nonconduct falls outside the State’s police power to criminalize. This is clear from a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court on the constitutionality of a similar drug possession statue from 1980: State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48 (La. 1980). In that case, decided 40 years ago, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that a criminal statute penalizing 11 E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (temporary ineligibility for student financial benefits); 21 U.S.C. § 862 (ineligibility for “the issuance of any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States”); 42 U.S.C. § 13661, 24 C.F.R. § 5.855 (denial of admission to federally assisted housing for a “reasonable time”); 21 U.S.C. § 862a (ineligibility for “assistance under any State program funded under part A of title IV of the Social Security Act,” or for “benefits under the supplemental nutrition assistance program . . . or any State program carried out under” the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008); 22 U.S.C. § 2714 (ineligibility for passport during supervised release). Federal regulations make prior felony drug convictions a permissible basis for denying employment in certain jobs. E.g., 48 C.F.R. § 352.237‐72 (“Any conviction for a . . . drug felony[] may be grounds for denying employment or for dismissal of an employee providing any” “child care services to children under the age of 18.”); 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71 (preventing “collector[s]” of controlled substances from employing anyone “who has access to or influence over controlled substances acquired by collection . . . who has been convicted of any felony offense relating to controlled substances”); 28 C.F.R. § 97.11 (felony conviction bars employment with private prisoner transportation companies); 49 C.F.R. § 1544.229 (felony conviction bars employment as airport security screener or baggage handler); 18 U.S.C. § 922 (prohibiting any person convicted of a felony from possessing, selling, shipping, transporting, or receiving a firearm in interstate commerce); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A)(ii) (preventing persons convicted of “drug-related offense[s]” from being approved as foster or adoptive parents for five years). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 18 unknowing drug possession violated the constitution. Id. at 51. The Louisiana statute had made it a crime to “‘unknowingly or intentionally’” possess a controlled dangerous substance. Id. at 49 (quoting statute). The defendants challenged the criminalization of “unknowing” possession as unconstitutional. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed. It ruled that, because the statute criminalized situations where “a third party hands the controlled substance to an unknowing individual who can then be charged with and subsequently convicted . . . without ever being aware of the nature of the substance he was given,” which “offend[ed] the conscious [sic],” the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 51. It is certainly true that Louisiana provides the only example of a state court striking down a passive and unknowing possession statute like RCW 69.50.4013 as unconstitutional. But that’s probably because Washington is the only state that continues to criminalize this innocent nonconduct. See Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 534 (citing Dawkins v. Maryland, 313 Md. 638, 647 n.7, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988)) (recognizing Washington and North Dakota as the only “exceptions” to the general trend of criminalizing only knowing possession). The North Dakota legislature, the last other state to criminalize passive unknowing possession, amended its drug possession statute by adding a “willfulness” mens rea element in 1989. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23; 1989 N.D. LAWS 748. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 19 Washington’s strict liability drug possession statute, like Louisiana’s strict liability drug possession statute, is therefore unconstitutional. It criminalizes unknowing, and hence innocent, passivity and therefore “has an insufficient relationship to the objective of” regulating drugs. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d at 802. The statute “goes beyond the scope of legitimate police power authority.” Id. (citing Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated sub nom. Shevin v. Lazarus, 401 U.S. 987 (1971); Alves v. Justice Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 419, 306 P.2d 601 (1957)).12 C. The Unwitting Possession Defense Cannot Make the Statute Comply with Due Process This court recognized the harshness of its Cleppe holding that RCW 69.50.4013 permissibly criminalized innocent, passive, unknowing possession. It addressed that harsh result with what it admitted was an “anomalous,” Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380, device: the court created a brand new affirmative defense out of whole cloth. Cleppe decided that an “unwitting possession” affirmative defense, that the defendant had the burden to prove, would “ameliorate[]” the harshness of its strict liability decision. Id. at 380-81. 12 The concurrence warns that our approach “has the potential to overturn a number of criminal statutes to the extent [we] find[] they criminalize innocent or passive conduct.” Concurrence at 22. This does not seem to be a valid fear. It’s the rare Washington State statute that criminalizes innocent, passive nonconduct; most Washington laws target actual conduct and most Washington laws target people who know, or should know, that they are engaging in that actual targeted conduct. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 20 Our addition of this affirmative defense to a statute that eliminated mens rea and was completely silent about affirmative defenses was “judicial legislation in its most direct form.” City of Kennewick v. Day, 142 Wn.2d 1, 16, 11 P.3d 304 (2000) (Talmadge, J., concurring). Bradshaw nevertheless reiterated this affirmative defense and justified doing so because it “ameliorates the harshness of a strict liability crime.” 152 Wn.2d at 538 (citing Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380-81). The State contends that this rewrite saves the statute. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 17. Blake argues that the defense unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof onto her from the State. Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 5-7. We disagree with both of them. The starting point for analyzing these two competing contentions is that “[t]he State is foreclosed from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant only ‘when an affirmative defense . . . negate[s] an element of the crime.’” Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110, 133 S. Ct. 714, 184 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2013) (quoting Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 237, 107 S. Ct. 1098, 94 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see State v. W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 765, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (“[W]hen a defense necessarily negates an element of the crime, it violates due process to place the burden of proof on the defendant.”). As we ruled in Cleppe and Bradshaw, the simple possession statute lacks a mens rea element entirely. Thus, contrary to the defense’s argument, placing the burden to prove AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 21 unwitting possession on the defendant does not “negate” any existing element of the crime. Instead, the question is whether the legislature may constitutionally penalize passive, unknowing drug possession without a mens rea element at all. Contrary to the State’s argument, the affirmative defense does not play into this analysis because it does not impact the elements that the State must prove to secure a conviction. A judicially created affirmative defense may “ameliorate the harshness” of criminalizing innocent nonconduct, but it cannot save an unconstitutional statute. The judicially created affirmative defense therefore has no legitimate place in our analysis of whether the statute that the legislature created exceeds its police powers. II. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE CLEARLY INTENDED TO OMIT A MENS REA ELEMENT FROM THIS STATUTE At one point in time, it might have been possible to avoid this constitutional problem by reading a mental element into the statute. But that time has passed. Now, in 2021, we have overwhelming evidence that the legislature intends the simple possession statute to penalize innocent nonconduct, and we have overwhelming legal authority that this violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 22 A. We Usually Interpret Statutes To Avoid Constitutional Problems— Including Reading in Absent Mens Rea Elements In general, “[w]e construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubt.” Utter ex rel. State v. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash., 182 Wn.2d 398, 434, 341 P.3d 953 (2015) (citing State v. Robinson, 153 Wn.2d 689, 693-94, 107 P.3d 90 (2005). But we construe statutes only “to avoid constitutional difficulties when such construction is consistent with the purposes of the statute.” In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 121 Wn.2d 655, 665, 853 P.2d 444 (1993). In many cases, these statutory interpretation rules have led the United States Supreme Court and this court to read mens rea elements into statutes where the legislature omitted them. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (interpreting a mens rea element into an unlawful firearm possession statute); State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357, 366, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000) (same); State v. Boyer, 91 Wn.2d 342, 344, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979) (interpreting a mens rea element into the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance statute). This line of cases does not explicitly discuss the constitutional limits of the police power—it emphasizes interpreting each statute in light of “the background rules of the common law, in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (citation omitted) (citing United States AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 23 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-37, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1978)). But they reflect a consistent concern about criminalizing fundamentally innocent conduct. Staples, 511 U.S. at 610 (“[T]he Government ignores the particular care we have taken to avoid construing a statute to dispense with mens rea where doing so would ‘criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.’” (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1985))); Anderson, 141 Wn.2d at 366 (concluding that the “[m]ost compelling” reason to interpret mens rea into the statute was “the fact that entirely innocent conduct may fall within the net cast by the statute in question”); Boyer, 91 Wn.2d at 344 (“[W]ithout the mental element of knowledge, even a postal carrier would be guilty of the crime were he innocently to deliver a package which in fact contained a forbidden narcotic.”); see also Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196, 204 L. Ed. 2d 594 (2019) (“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s importance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are legion.”). In part to address this concern, we have adopted a series of factors to consider in deciding whether to interpret a mens rea element into an otherwise strict liability statute. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d at 166 (quoting Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 605-06). But the case before us today does not lend itself to this approach. Unlike the statutes in Staples, Anderson, and Boyer, we are not interpreting RCW AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 24 69.50.4013 for the first time.13 Instead, we face 40 years of precedent and legislative acquiescence. B. The Legislature Has Embraced Our Early Cleppe and Bradshaw Decisions Holding that RCW 69.50.4013 Imposed Strict Felony Liability The legislature “‘is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretation of its enactments,’ and where statutory language remains unchanged after a court decision the court will not overrule clear precedent interpreting the same statutory language.” Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004) (quoting Friends of Snoqualmie Valley v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 118 Wn.2d 488, 496-97, 825 P.2d 300 (1992)). This is why “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989). 13 If we were interpreting RCW 69.50.4013 for the first time, we would interpret the statute to include a mens rea element for the reasons outlined by the concurrence. See concurrence at 13-19 (explaining the errors of statutory interpretation in Cleppe and Bradshaw and highlighting the harm they have caused, particularly to minority communities). But the interpretive rule of legislative acquiescence bars us from disregarding that body’s failure to amend the drug possession statute for the last 40 years. The concurrence seems to disagree with our use of legislative acquiescence as an interpretive tool; it makes plausible arguments about its origin and weaknesses, particularly when interpreting criminal statutes. The parties, however, have not made those arguments or asked us to overturn our precedent on that point. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 25 In Buchanan v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, for example, we were concerned that we had misinterpreted a statute in a prior case. 94 Wn.2d 508, 511, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980). But 22 legislative sessions had passed over 17 years and left our interpretation intact. Id. We therefore held that this showed that “it was and is the policy of the legislature to concur in” our prior ruling. Id. Despite a contrary United States Supreme Court holding interpreting identical language in a federal statute, we held that given that history of legislative acquiescence, the power to change our decision rested solely with the legislature. Id. Coming back to the drug possession statute, 40 years ago, we held that “if the legislature had intended guilty knowledge or intent to be an element of the crime of simple possession of a controlled substance it would have put the requirement in the act.” Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380. Sixteen years ago, we doubled down on Cleppe’s interpretation, holding that “[t]he legislature ha[d] amended RCW 69.50.401 seven times since Cleppe” without adding a mens rea element. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 537. This acquiescence in our decisions made the legislative intent “so clear” that we again declined to “read a mens rea element into the mere possession statute.” Id. at 540. Since Bradshaw, the legislature and the people have amended the simple possession statute an additional four times. See LAWS OF 2017, ch. 317, § 15; AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 26 LAWS OF 2015, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 4, § 503; LAWS OF 2015, ch. 70, § 14; LAWS OF 2013, ch. 3, § 20 (Initiative 502). Neither has ever added a mens rea element. We are confident that the legislature has not remained silent out of ignorance of our decisions. Cleppe and Bradshaw are far from obscure—these decisions have been frequently cited and have impacted the lives of countless criminal defendants as drug possession cases churn through the Washington courts. See, e.g., Day, 142 Wn.2d at 10-11; State v. Staley, 123 Wn.2d 794, 799, 872 P.2d 502 (1994); A.M., 194 Wn.2d at 44 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring). The drug statute that they interpreted has affected thousands upon thousands of lives, and its impact has hit young men of color especially hard. See Research Working Grp. of Task Force on Race & Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 623, 651-56 (2012) (attributing Washington’s racially disproportionate criminal justice system to disparity in drug law enforcement and drug-related asset forfeiture, among many other causes). Cleppe and Bradshaw “struck at the heart of our criminal law and social policies. The legislative silence is thus all the more deafening.” A.M., 194 Wn.2d at 56 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring). Thus, it remains true that “[w]here an issue may be resolved on statutory grounds, the court will avoid deciding the issue on constitutional grounds,” Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 210, 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (citing Senear v. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 27 Daily Journal-Am., 97 Wn.2d 148, 152, 641 P.2d 1180 (1982)). But the history summarized above shows that the “issue” of interpreting RCW 69.50.4013’s as a strict liability statute can no longer be “resolved” by this court “on statutory grounds.” Because of the clarity of our prior decisions about this statute and the legislature’s lengthy acquiescence, it is impossible to avoid the constitutional problem now (unless we overturn our own legislative acquiescence precedent as the concurrence, but not the parties, want us to do).14 III. THE STATE RETAINS THE POWER TO ENACT STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES, BUT THE SIMPLE POSSESSION STATUTE IS UNIQUE IN OUR STATE IN PUNISHING WHOLLY INNOCENT NONCONDUCT The State compares the drug possession statute to other crimes and claims that declaring it unconstitutional will undermine the legitimacy of those crimes, also. For example, the State is concerned about the continuing validity of strict liability crimes such as child rape. Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 9 (citing RCW 9A.44.030; State v. Chhom, 128 Wn.2d 739, 743, 911 P.2d 1014 (1996); State v. Joseph, 3 Wn. App. 2d 365, 374, 416 P.3d 738 (2018)). But the simple possession statute does not violate the due process clause solely because it is a strict liability crime. Instead, the simple possession statute 14 The concurrence contends that its approach “resolves this case on narrow grounds.” Id. at 22. But the concurrence’s approach disregards the court’s “fundamental objective” when interpreting statutes: “to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). That is the proper role for this court. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 28 violates the due process clause because it criminalizes wholly innocent and passive nonconduct on a strict liability basis. We do nothing here today to disturb the legislature’s power to enact strict liability crimes. See Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d at 163-72 (holding unlawful practice of law to be a strict liability crime); see also State v. Deer, 175 Wn.2d 725, 731, 287 P.3d 539 (2012) (“As a strict liability crime, child rape in the third degree requires no proof of mens rea.” (citing Chhom, 128 Wn.2d at 741-43)). Even after today, when the legislature enacts a statute without explicit mens rea language, we will still look to the statutory language, the legislative history, and a series of nonexclusive factors to determine “whether the legislature intended to create a strict liability offense.” Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d at 164-66. Our ruling today does not change this statutory interpretation analysis; the only reason that we have not applied that analysis here is because the proper interpretation of RCW 69.50.4013 is already settled law. The only thing we change here today is our view of the validity of the simple possession law as written and interpreted by this court. The key distinction between this simple possession statute and other, valid, strict liability crimes is that the former statute penalizes passive and innocent nonconduct (without mens rea) while the latter statutes do not. For example, to prove that a defendant practiced law unlawfully, the State must show that the defendant actually “practice[d] law, AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 29 or [held] himself or herself out as entitled to practice law.” RCW 2.48.180(2)(a). That conduct is, well, conduct. To be sure, Yishmael held that the defendant need not know that his or her conduct constituted the “practice of law.” 195 Wn.2d at 172.But we continued that the State must still prove the activity of practicing law, and that, of course, requires the State to show intentional activity (not passivity). Id. at 177. As we explained, “Yishmael did not dispute that he gave his clients advice about homesteading, adverse possession, and talking with the police, and that he offered assistance in completing documents to be filed with the county recorder’s office.” Id. Not surprisingly, Yishmael did not claim that he had not intended any of those actions. Id. Similarly, to convict a defendant of rape of a child, the State must prove that the defendant “ha[d] sexual intercourse with another” who is under a particular age, depending on the degree of the crime. RCW 9A.44.073, .076, .079. Sexual intercourse is conduct, not passivity. The crime is “strict liability” in the sense that the State need prove only “‘the doing of the acts constituting the offense,’” State v. Smith, 3 Wn.2d 543, 553, 101 P.2d 298 (1940); the State need not prove that the defendant knew the victim’s age, which is what makes the acts constituting the offense criminal. State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895, 902, 270 P.3d 591 (2012) AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 30 (citing Chhom, 128 Wn.2d at 741, 743). But the State must certainly show the activity of sexual intercourse, not just innocent passivity.15 The drug possession statute is different. It does not require the State to prove any intent or even any action. And in this case, the State did not prove that Blake did anything except wear jeans that had pockets. Valid strict liability crimes require that the defendant actually perform some conduct. Blake did not. Under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, the legislature may not criminalize such nonconduct. CONCLUSION Legislative acquiescence has locked our old interpretation of RCW 69.50.4013 into that drug possession statute. But that interpretation makes that statute criminalize innocent and passive possession, even by a defendant who does not know, and has no reason to know, that drugs lay hidden within something that they possess. The legislature’s police power goes far, but not that far. 15 We did hold in one case that the State may place the burden on the defendant to prove that her acts were involuntary. Deer, 175 Wn.2d at 731-38. That decision, however, dealt with “actus reus” of the rape charge only—specifically, it addressed whether the defendant’s actions were or were not “voluntary.” Id. at 740-41. It did not explicitly address mens rea. In this case, we deal with an issue not addressed in Deer: whether strict liability felony punishment for nonconduct that is both innocent and passive, without proof of mens rea is, constitutionally permissible at all. To the extent Deer relied on Bradshaw’s “unwitting possession” defense, all justices in the majority and concurrence now disavow Bradshaw’s interpretation—either because it does not save the unconstitutional criminalization of innocent nonconduct or because it was simply wrongly decided. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon B.), No. 96873-0 31 Accordingly, RCW 69.50.4013(1)—the portion of the simple drug possession statute creating this crime—violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions and is void. We vacate Blake’s conviction. WE CONCUR: AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) No. 96873-0 STEPHENS, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part)—The novel question the majority presumes to answer today about the extent of the legislature’s police power is a question that appears almost nowhere in the briefing of either party. The parties recognize, as do I, that the main question before the court is whether RCW 69.50.4013, our state’s model drug possession statute, should be read as having an implied mens rea element. Nearly every state to have interpreted the model statute holds that it does, and Blake urges us to embrace this interpretation. I would do so, concluding that our precedent in State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 380, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), and State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528, 539-40, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004), is both incorrect and harmful. On this basis, I concur in the majority’s decision to vacate Blake’s conviction. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -2- Where I part company with the majority is its decision to declare this court powerless to reconsider our prior statutory interpretation and to instead announce a broad constitutional holding, based on its own new test of passive nonconduct versus active criminal conduct. While we do not lightly overrule precedent, we should do so in rare cases such as this, and thereby avoid an unnecessary—and here essentially unbriefed—declaration that the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority. Because I would resolve this case based on statutory interpretation of RCW 69.50.4013, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis, though I concur in the result. ANALYSIS Shannon Blake was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.4013 following a bench trial; the court rejected her affirmative defense of “unwitting possession.” See State v. Blake, No. 35601-9-III, slip op. at 2 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2019) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/ 356019_unp.pdf. The Court of Appeals affirmed Blake’s conviction based on precedent from two decisions interpreting and upholding prior versions of Washington’s model drug possession statute. Id. at 6 (citing Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380 (holding legislature’s omission of “knowingly” or “intentionally” from drug possession statute resulted in strict liability); Bradshaw, AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -3- 152 Wn.2d at 532); see also Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 539 (rejecting due process challenge to statute as inadequately briefed).1 While the Court of Appeals necessarily followed this precedent, we are offered compelling reasons to reconsider it. I do not share the majority’s view that the legislature’s failure to correct our mistakes in Cleppe and Bradshaw renders us powerless to do so, especially in light of a plainly incorrect statutory interpretation and the harmful effects it continues to produce. I would overrule our erroneous precedent and, considering the main arguments actually briefed in this case, read an implied intent element into the drug possession statute. I.The Drug Possession Statute Does Not Impose Strict Liability but Necessarily Presumes Knowledge and Intent The presumption of mens rea is a common law principle foundational to our system of criminal justice. The Latin axiom actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea has long controlled our conception of criminal law. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932). It stands for the basic proposition 1 Relying on State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. 795, 801-02, 365 P.3d 202 (2015), the Court of Appeals determined Blake failed to articulate specific reasons why Schmeling was wrongly decided and found the two out of state cases Blake cited unpersuasive. Blake, slip op. at 6. Schmeling held that “RCW 69.50.4013 does not violate due process even though it does not require the State to prove intent or knowledge to convict an offender of possession of a small amount of a controlled substance.” 191 Wn. App. at 802. Schmeling, in turn, relies on Cleppe and Bradshaw in reaching its holding that the drug possession statute does not violate due process. See id. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -4- that a criminal act does not make a person guilty unless their mind is also guilty. See id. at 974. Strict liability crimes—those crimes that relieve the State from proving intent or mental state—are therefore disfavored. State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357, 361, 363, 5 P.3d 1247 (2000); accord Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994) (recognizing Congress may enact strict liability crimes, but “offenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored”). When a criminal statute does not include some form of intent or mental state, courts will apply a presumption of “‘scienter.’”2 Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251, 42 S. Ct. 301, 66 L. Ed. 604 (1922)); State v. A.M., 194 Wn.2d 33, 47, 448 P.3d 35 (2019) (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring) (collecting cases). It is not uncommon for criminal statutes to omit reference to an express mental state, and courts regularly read a mens rea element into such statutes. In Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009, 192 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2015), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the “‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent’ should not be read ‘as dispensing with 2 Scienter is another term denoting intent or mental state but is generally broader than mens rea because it also describes the culpable mental state required in civil cases. One definition of “scienter” is “[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1613 (11th ed. 2019). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -5- it.’” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952)). “This rule of construction reflects the basic principle that ‘wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.’” Id. (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252). Though our current drug possession statute has been recodified several times, both the former and current versions of the statute omit any reference to mental state: (1) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his or her professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. (2) Except as provided in RCW 69.50.4014, any person who violates this section is guilty of a class C felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW. RCW 69.50.4013. In the former version of the statute, our legislature deleted the words “knowingly or intentionally” from the uniform act. Compare former RCW 69.50.401(c) (1973), with UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 401(c) (1970), 9 pt. 5 U.L.A. 887 (2007). However, the legislature never stated that this omission rendered the drug possession statute devoid of any element of intent. Rather, “[t]he provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime . . . shall supplement all penal statutes of this state.” RCW 9A.04.060. Consistent with the common law’s general presumption of mens rea, we should read an intent element into the drug possession statute. Doing so upholds our requirement to interpret uniform statutes in a uniform manner with other states and provides the narrowest ground on which Blake is entitled to the relief she seeks. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -6- A. The Drug Possession Statute Is Required To Be Read in a Uniform Manner with Other States The Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) requires a defendant “knowingly or intentionally” possess a controlled substance. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 401(c). After the North Dakota legislature amended its own possession statute to add a “willfulness” mens rea element, Washington became the only state that interpreted its drug possession statute to not require proof of intent. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 647 n.7, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988) (recognizing Washington and North Dakota as the only states to determine “knowledge is not an element of the offense of possession of controlled substances”); N.D. CENT. CODE §19-03.1-23; 1989 N.D. LAWS 748. To be sure, Washington is not the only state whose model drug possession statute is ambiguous in regard to an intent element. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(3) (making it a class C felony to “possess[] any amount of a schedule IA controlled substance” without indicating whether “knowing” possession is required). But, at least 15 state courts have interpreted their own versions of the uniform drug possession statute to require proof of knowledge or intent. See Walker v. State, 356 So. 2d 672, 674 (Ala. 1977); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804, 809 n.17 (Alaska 1974); Loy v. State, 88 Ark. App. 91, 101, 195 S.W. 3d 370 (2004); People v. Rubacalba, 6 Cal. 4th 62, 67, 859 P.2d 708, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 628 (1993); State v. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -7- Carbone, 116 Conn. App. 801, 816, 977 A.2d 694 (2009); Ayers v. State, 97 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Del. 2014); Duvall v. State, 289 Ga. 540, 542, 712 S.E.2d 850 (2011); State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64, 122 P.3d 321 (2005); State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, 156, 551 P.2d 1247 (1976); Neal v. State, 191 Md. App. 297, 316, 991 A.2d 159 (2010); State v. Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Anderson, 159 Mont. 344, 351, 489 P.2d 295 (1972); State v. Sinclair, 191 N.C. App. 485, 492, 663 S.E.2d 866 (2008); Commonwealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 368- 69, 318 A.2d 327 (1974); Kabat v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 224, 227, 251 N.W.2d 38 (1977). Some state courts have gone so far as to interpret the possession of a controlled substance to require knowledge of both the presence of the substance and the general character of the substance. See, e.g., State v. Barber, 635 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. 1982); State v. Alexander, 471 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I. 1984); Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 619, 622, 238 S.E.2d 820 (1977); Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 119 (Wyo. 1982). Washington’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act “shall be so applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among those states which enact it.” RCW 69.50.603. “At least 48 states have adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and all but two (Washington and [at the time] North Dakota) expressly require knowledge to be AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -8- proved as an element of unlawful possession.” Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 541 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citing Dawkins, 313 Md. at 646-49). This is true regardless of whether the intent element is expressly set out in the operative language. See, e.g., Walker, 356 So. 2d at 675 (holding “knowledge is an essential element of the offense of illegal possession of a controlled substance under the Alabama Controlled Substance Act” despite statute’s omission of whether “knowing” possession is required). Reading Washington’s possession statute to require proof of knowledge or intent upholds RCW 69.50.603’s requirement for uniformity of interpretation and corrects an error that has made Washington an outlier among our sister states.3 3 The majority relies on a Louisiana case that held its drug possession statute unconstitutionally imposed strict liability. State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 49 (La. 1980). But the majority concedes “Louisiana provides the only example of a state court striking down a . . . statute like RCW 69.50.4013 as unconstitutional.” Majority at 14-15. Louisiana serves as the sole parallel because, as noted, at least 15 other state courts read a mens rea element into their respective possession statutes, thereby avoiding a constitutional conflict. Moreover, unlike our drug possession statute, the Louisiana statute explicitly made it “unlawful for any person ‘unknowingly or intentionally’ to possess a controlled dangerous substance.” Brown, 389 So. 2d at 49 (emphasis added). It was therefore impossible for the court in Brown to avoid the statute’s constitutional implications because the statute unambiguously stated unknowing possession was unlawful. Even so, Brown ultimately held only “the portion of the statute making it illegal ‘unknowingly’ to possess [certain controlled] substance[s] is unconstitutional” and found the remainder of the statute valid. Id. at 51. In contrast, the majority’s approach fails to save any portion of our possession statute, despite the fact that our state’s more ambiguous statute contains no explicit indication that unknowing possession is unlawful. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -9- B.Requiring Proof of Intent Addresses Blake’s Primary Request for Relief without Reaching an Unnecessary Constitutional Holding Blake’s primary request, both in her briefing and at oral argument, is for this court to read a mens rea element into the possession statute. See Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 1 (asking this court to “hold the drug possession statute requires the prosecution to prove knowledge”); see also Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, State v. Blake, No. 96873-0 (June 11, 2020), at 5 min., 45 sec. through 5 min., 58 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2020061060 (in which Blake’s counsel notes, “I would submit the language [in the drug possession statute] does reasonably permit [reading a mens rea into the statute]. . . . Just because the legislature does not explicitly put a mens rea element in the criminal statute does not mean they intend to eliminate it”). Blake correctly observes that such a reading is supported, in part, on “the maxim that all criminal statutes are [generally] read to have a mental element.” Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 1. Properly interpreting the drug possession statute to presume a knowledge element is consistent with the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. At oral argument, Blake’s counsel recognized that “this court can avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional by using the canon of constitutional avoidance or the canon of constitutional doubt and read in a knowledge element and avoid the constitutional AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -10- question.” Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, supra, at 1 min., 56 sec. through 2 min., 13 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID= 2020061060. Absent such an element, Blake submits the statute “should be declared unconstitutional,” but not for the reasons the majority offers. Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 17. In contrast to the majority’s declaration that RCW 69.50.4013 exceeds the legislature’s police power, Blake’s constitutional challenge is premised on the more modest notion that “due process does not permit shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove knowledge.” Id. at 17-18 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1991) (plurality portion)). Either of these constitutional concerns can be avoided by our willingness to revisit our past mistake in misinterpreting the drug possession statute and to properly read into it the presumed element of intent. While this requires us to revisit Cleppe and Bradshaw, as will be explained, these cases are both incorrect and harmful and should be overturned. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -11- II.Cleppe and Bradshaw Were Wrongly Decided and We Are Not Required To Uphold Their Erroneous Interpretations Today The majority rightly observes that stare decisis applies to our decisions in Cleppe and Bradshaw.4 “But stare decisis does not compel us to follow a past decision when its rationale no longer withstands careful analysis. When the generalization underpinning a decision is unfounded, we should not continue in blind adherence to its faulty assumption.” Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 184 Wn.2d 268, 282, 358 P.3d 1139 (2015). When a rule announced by past cases is clearly incorrect and harmful, we will overturn those erroneous decisions. State v. Schierman, 192 Wn.2d 577, 764, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018). (Yu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) This court does not limit the meaning of “incorrect” to any specific kind of error. State v. Barber, 170 Wn.2d 854, 864, 248 P.3d 494 (2011). “An opinion can 4 Blake argues we are not bound by stare decisis because Cleppe and Bradshaw “overlooked [the constitutional-doubt canon of statutory interpretation] and did not consider the due process argument presented here.” Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 14. Supporting amicus also notes the creation of the unwitting possession defense is a “judge-made rule” and “‘[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where, as here, a departure would not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule . . . , and experience has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”’ Br. of Amicus Curiae Inst. for Justice at 13 n.10 (alterations in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009)). While it is true that Cleppe never directly addressed the issues presented in this case, I find Bradshaw’s rejection of the petitioner’s due process argument (albeit on grounds of inadequate briefing) suggests we should analyze whether both of those decisions were incorrect and harmful for purposes of overcoming the doctrine of stare decisis. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -12- be incorrect when it was announced, or it can become incorrect because the passage of time and the development of legal doctrines undermine its bases.” State v. Abdulle, 174 Wn.2d 411, 415-16, 275 P.3d 1113 (2012). “A decision may be ‘harmful’ for a variety of reasons as well.” Barber, 170 Wn.2d at 865. In State v. W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 769, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014), we held a rule from two prior cases, which impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, was harmful because it violated the defendant’s constitutional due process right to have the State prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and could lead to wrongful convictions. The interpretation of our possession statute announced by Cleppe and extended by Bradshaw was incorrect from the start because those decisions ignored the legislature’s clear direction to “supplement all penal statutes” with “provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime and the punishment thereof,” which includes the common law presumption of mens rea. RCW 9A.04.060. Instead, recognizing the inherent injustice of convicting a person of criminal possession for something they carried unknowingly, the court adopted the affirmative defense of unwitting possession. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 380-81. But this work-around created the very constitutional harm Blake identifies: by requiring the defendant to prove a lack of mens rea—which, properly interpreted, is an essential AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -13- element of criminal drug possession—the unwitting possession defense arguably violates due process. See, e.g., W.R., 181 Wn.2d at 769. We should avoid this harm by overturning the clearly incorrect interpretation adopted by Cleppe and Bradshaw and instead supplement our possession statute with the common law presumption of mens rea. As noted, this is the approach taken by other states with similar statutes, and it properly reads the drug possession statute in context as a model criminal law. A. Cleppe Was Incorrect and Bradshaw Extended That Error As a matter of statutory interpretation, Cleppe—and, by extension, Bradshaw—is clearly incorrect. “The purpose of statutory interpretation is ‘to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’” State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013) (quoting State v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012)). We determine legislative intent “from the plain language enacted by the legislature, [including] the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. Only if the statute is ambiguous do we turn to legislative history and other tools of statutory construction to derive legislative intent. Id. at 192-93. Cleppe erred by turning directly to legislative history rather than examining the context of the possession statute, its related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole to determine legislative intent. As indicated above, both the former and AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -14- present version of the drug possession statute are silent as to whether proof of the defendant’s mental state is required. But the possession statute’s silence on mens rea does not automatically make possession a strict liability crime or render the statute unconstitutional. Years before Cleppe, the legislature enacted RCW 9A.04.060, which remains unchanged today: “The provisions of the common law relating to the commission of crime . . . shall supplement all penal statutes of this state.” LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.04.060 (emphasis added). The legislature thus directed the court in Cleppe and Bradshaw (and the court here today) to supplement the drug possession statute with common law principles—including the presumption of mens rea. See id.; A.M., 194 Wn.2d at 47 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring). By failing to apply RCW 9A.04.060, the court rendered that related statute meaningless. See State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 547-48, 947 P.2d 700 (1997) (holding a past decision was incorrect and harmful because it disregarded our basic rule of statutory construction to avoid rendering any relevant statutory provision meaningless).5 5 By not reading mens rea into the possession statute, Cleppe and Bradshaw also incorrectly rendered meaningless RCW 69.50.603, which requires the UCSA “shall be so applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among those states which enact it.” As noted above, Washington appears to be the only state in the United States that does not require the State to prove intent or mental state. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -15- Rather than properly supplement the statute with the relevant common law as directed by RCW 9A.04.060 and the United States Supreme Court, the Cleppe court immediately resorted to legislative history to try to resolve the statute’s ambiguity. See Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 377-79. Bradshaw repeated Cleppe’s flawed statutory interpretation and reliance on legislative history and likewise rendered meaningless RCW 9A.04.060 and RCW 69.50.603. Neither Cleppe nor Bradshaw considered and rejected arguments based on the failure to apply RCW 9A.04.060 as directed. Cf. Barber, 170 Wn.2d at 864 (noting we have been reluctant to overrule past decisions based on arguments that were adequately considered and rejected in the original decisions themselves, but not so when the past decision conflicts with controlling rules of law that the court failed to previously consider and apply). I would hold these cases were incorrectly decided. B. Cleppe and Bradshaw Are Also Harmful “It is not enough that a decision is incorrect for us to overrule it; we must also find that it is harmful.” Id. at 871. Cleppe and Bradshaw are clearly harmful. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause guarantees, “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend . XIV, § 1. When the government seeks to convict someone, it must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . every fact necessary to constitute the crime with AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -16- which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.”). This foundational principle stems from one of the hallmarks of our criminal justice system: “[T]hat every person accused of a crime is constitutionally endowed with an overriding presumption of innocence, a presumption that extends to every element of the charged offense.” State v. Crediford, 130 Wn.2d 747, 759, 927 P.2d 1129 (1996). “A corollary rule is that the State cannot require the defendant to disprove any fact that constitutes the crime charged.” W.R., 181 Wn.2d at 762. “[W]hen a defense necessarily negates an element of the crime, it violates due process to place the burden of proof on the defendant.” Id. at 765. The court in Cleppe recognized the inherent “harshness” of a law strictly criminalizing all drug possession and sought to mitigate the unjust consequences of such a law by adopting the affirmative defense of unwitting possession. 96 Wn.2d at 381. The affirmative defense currently provides, “A person is not guilty of possession of a controlled substance if the possession is unwitting. Possession of a controlled substance is unwitting if a person [did not know that the substance was in [their] possession] [or] [did not know the nature of the substance].” 11 WASHINGTON AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -17- PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 52.01, at 1196 (4th ed. 2016) (most alterations in original). “The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance was possessed unwittingly. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true.” Id.; State v. Deer, 175 Wn.2d 725, 735, 287 P.3d 539 (2012). The unwitting possession defense recognizes that a person cannot be convicted under the possession statute if possession is unknowing or unintentional. Blake makes a compelling argument that burdening a defendant with proving unwitting possession violates due process because it negates the implied mens rea element we must read into the statute. See W.R., 181 Wn.2d at 765. “This impermissible shift in burden is not merely academic but . . . rais[es] a very real possibility of wrongful convictions.” Id. at 769. For these reasons, Cleppe and Bradshaw are harmful. Those decisions are also harmful because they deviate from proper methods of statutory interpretation, render two statutes meaningless, and fail to adhere to long established common law principles. Affirming Cleppe’s and Bradshaw’s incorrect interpretations would harm the integrity of this court by approving of interpretative methods that are otherwise impermissible. While adhering to stare decisis is AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -18- generally desirable, we should not do so when it forces us to discard well-established rules of statutory interpretation and common law principles that safeguard the rights of the accused. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, “[t]he fact of racial and ethnic disproportionality in our criminal justice system is indisputable.” Research Working Grp. of Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice Sys. Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 623, 627 (2012). “[S]cholars have shown that the poor, people of color, sexual minorities, and other marginalized populations have borne the brunt of criminal punishment and police intervention.” Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 530 (2019). Given that criminal laws are enforced against marginalized communities at disproportionate rates, this court’s past decisions divesting the possession statute of mens rea created a constitutional harm that has hit these vulnerable communities hardest. The majority similarly recognizes the harm of reading the drug possession statute to criminalize unknowing possession given the racial disparities in drug prosecutions and convictions. Majority at 13 n.10 (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 262-70 (2002)). These AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -19- harsh realities give us all the more reason to overrule Cleppe and Bradshaw based on the harmful effects the holdings in those cases created. We recently acknowledged this court’s culpability in perpetuating the racial injustices in our legal system and pledged to recognize and correct such injustices. See Letter from Wash. State Supreme Court to Members of Judiciary & Legal Cmty. 1 (June 4, 2020) (“Too often in the legal profession, we feel bound by tradition and the way things have ‘always’ been. We must remember that even the most venerable precedent must be struck down when it is incorrect and harmful.”), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/Ju diciary%20Legal%20Community%20SIGNED%20060420.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNT4-H5P7]. We should take ownership of and responsibility for our mistakes in Cleppe and Bradshaw, and overrule those decisions as incorrect and harmful. C. The Majority’s Reliance on Legislative Acquiescence Sidesteps this Court’s Commitment To Overturn Incorrect and Harmful Decisions As the final authority on Washington law, we undisputedly have the ability to correct our own erroneous statutory interpretation in a previous case. See, e.g., Keene v. Edie, 131 Wn.2d 822, 834, 935 P.2d 588 (1997) (overruling Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890) (interpreting a statute to preclude community real estate from the execution of a judgment against a tortfeasor)). Yet, the majority AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -20- argues, “Given the interpretive principles of legislative acquiescence and stare decisis, only the legislature, not the court, can now change the statute’s intent.” Majority at 3. More specifically, the majority notes, whatever the current validity of Cleppe and Bradshaw, the legislature has acquiesced in their statutory interpretation by failing to add a mens rea element to the possession statute in the intervening years, thereby preventing us from revisiting those cases. Majority at 2.6 We should not lean so heavily on the rule of legislative acquiescence because “‘[legislative] inaction lacks persuasive significance’ in most circumstances.” Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015, 197 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2017) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650, 110 S. Ct. 2668, 110 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1990)). Importantly, “‘evidence of legislative acquiescence is not conclusive, but is merely one factor to consider.’” Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 187 Wn.2d 27, 39, 384 P.3d 232 (2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Safeco Ins. Cos. v. Meyering, 102 Wn.2d 385, 392, 687 P.2d 195 (1984)). In the context of criminal statutes, it is unclear whether the rule of legislative acquiescence should even apply to our statutory interpretation. The rule originated in the context of administrative constructions of ambiguous statutes, 6 In contrast to today’s majority, the concurrence in A.M. stated, “[I]t is debatable whether a finding of legislative acquiescence is constitutionally permissible when the text of a criminal statute cannot support the court’s long-standing interpretation using ordinary principles of statutory interpretation.” 194 Wn.2d at 56 (Gordon McCloud J., concurring). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -21- where deference to the executive often pertains. See, e.g., Pringle v. State, 77 Wn.2d 569, 573, 464 P.2d 425 (1970) (citing State ex rel. Pirak v. Schoettler, 45 Wn.2d 367, 371-72, 274 P.2d 852 (1954)); see also State ex rel. Ball v. Rathbun, 144 Wash. 56, 59, 256 P. 330 (1927) (“An executive construction is accepted generally by the courts as persuasive where the legislature has silently acquiesced in such construction by failing to amend the particular act.”); Smith v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 7 Wn.2d 652, 665, 110 P.2d 851 (1941). We are neither bound by legislative silence nor beholden to the legislature’s inaction in response to our incorrect and harmful decisions. The scant support legislative silence or inaction may lend a prior interpretation cannot overcome the need to correct a long-standing injustice of our own making. We should not hold ourselves powerless to correct prior decisions reflecting an erroneous statutory interpretation, even when the legislature has not responded to those decisions. To adhere to the majority’s view of legislative acquiescence would be to abdicate our judicial responsibility to correct course when precedent perpetuates harmful effects. Unlike the majority, I would hold that Cleppe’s and Bradshaw’s statutory interpretations are both incorrect and harmful, and should be overturned. We should reject these decisions in favor of a proper interpretation that recognizes the implied AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -22- mens rea element, requiring the State to prove the absence of unwitting possession defense beyond a reasonable doubt. III.Reading an Intent Element into the Drug Possession Statute Provides a Better Resolution Than Declaring the Statute Unconstitutional Recognizing that our drug possession statute includes an intent element corrects our past mistakes and resolves this case on narrow grounds. This approach avoids the majority’s sweeping holding to declare the statute unconstitutional in its entirety as beyond the legislature’s police powers. It is particularly noteworthy that the majority reaches its holding based on a test that was never addressed in the briefing of either party. While Blake raised a constitutional due process challenge as an alternative to her statutory interpretation argument, her arguments do not align with the majority’s position. The majority’s novel analysis of substantive due process has the potential to overturn a number of criminal statutes to the extent this court finds they criminalize innocent or passive nonconduct. I would reject this analysis because it reaches far beyond the issues and arguments before us, and it misinterprets the precedent the majority relies on. A. The Majority Oversteps by Creating a Test That No One Asked for and Is Not Sufficiently Grounded in Our Case Law Under the principle of “party presentation” the United States Supreme Court has noted, “‘[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking for wrongs AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -23- to right. We wait for cases to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only questions presented by the parties.’” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 171 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en banc)). The Court reaffirmed this point in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1578, 206 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2020), holding the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds by inviting amici to brief a First Amendment overbreadth issue and subsequently accepting amici’s arguments to declare a particular immigration provision facially unconstitutional— rather than confronting the petitioner’s request to find the provisions at issue did not cover her conduct or, if they did, “they violated the Petition and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment as applied.” The Court noted that while there are circumstances where “a modest initiating role for a court is appropriate,” “[n]o extraordinary circumstances justified the panel’s takeover of the appeal.” Id. at 1579, 1581. The majority’s approach in the current case presents substantially similar concerns as in Sineneng-Smith. Rather than meaningfully engage with the arguments Blake raises, the majority summarily concludes the “time has long since passed [to interpret RCW 69.50.4013 as including an intent element]” and rejects AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -24- Blake’s alternative due process challenge that the affirmative defense of unwitting possession “unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof onto her from the State.” Majority at 2, 20. The majority then steers this case into deep, uncharted waters to decide “whether unintentional, unknowing possession of a controlled substance is the sort of innocent, passive nonconduct that falls beyond the State’s police power to criminalize.” Id. at 14. I do not believe that question is actually before us. Moreover, the substantive due process test announced by the majority is constructed from a collection of passing phrases from three separate cases. Specifically, the majority strings together a series of citations to announce a new rule that the “legislature’s exercise of its otherwise plenary police power to criminalize entirely passive and innocent nonconduct with no mens rea . . . violates . . . due process.” Id. at 10-14 (citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1957); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973)). I cannot speak to what the parties may have to say about this rule, but I believe this passive nonconduct versus active criminal conduct test is not supported by the cited precedent and is ill suited to the present case. In Lambert, the United States Supreme Court held a felon registration ordinance unconstitutional where it was “unaccompanied by any activity” other than AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -25- “mere presence in the city.” 355 U.S. at 229. And in Papachristou, the Court determined a vagrancy ordinance was void for vagueness given that it “‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice’” and “makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent.” 405 U.S. at 162-63 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed 989 (1954)). In Pullman, we held a Seattle ordinance prohibiting individuals from accompanying a child during curfew hours was unconstitutionally vague and violated due process. 82 Wn.2d at 795. In reaching this holding, we noted that the certain words in the ordinance, including “‘to loiter, idle, wander or play”’ failed to “provide ascertainable standards for locating the line between innocent and unlawful behavior.” Id. at 799. One major distinction between these cases and the present case is that criminalizing the possession of controlled substances differs greatly from the criminalization of night walking or failure to register. To be sure, knowing possession of a controlled substance necessarily involves an active decision to obtain that particular drug. And the majority concedes that the active trafficking of drugs “is not innocent conduct.” Majority at 14. Instead, the majority appears to argue that “unknowing possession is just as innocent and passive as staying out late with a juvenile or remaining in a city without registering.” Id. (emphasis added). But if that is true, then the proper solution is to remedy the AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -26- statute’s unconstitutional implications by reading in an intent requirement, as courts regularly do. Adopting the majority’s approach means striking the possession statute in its entirety, and it opens the door to a slew of due process challenges asserting passive versus active conduct in criminal statutes. In addition to the future challenges the majority’s novel test will undoubtedly invite, the test also has the potential to undermine our existing constitutional analysis. The majority insists its “active” versus “passive” test leaves undisturbed other constitutionally permissible strict liability crimes such as the rape of a child because, there, “the State must certainly show the activity of sexual intercourse, not just innocent passivity.” Id. at 29 (emphasis added). But the majority acknowledges one case where we held a defendant had the burden of proving her acts were involuntary in a child rape case. Id. at 29 n.15 (citing Deer, 175 Wn.2d at 731-38). The majority attempts to distinguish Deer because that case concerned the “actus reus” element of the rape charge, whereas the present case concerns “strict liability felony punishment for nonconduct that is both innocent and passive.” Id. But the majority fails to explain how its test would account for our holding in Deer. Under the test the majority proposes, the defendant in Deer would be able to argue that criminalization of child rape without a mens rea element unconstitutionally punishes innocent and passive behavior where a defendant was AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -27- asleep and, therefore, failed to partake in the activity of the alleged rape. In Deer, we noted that just because a defendant was asleep during sexual intercourse with a child “does not negate the fact that sexual intercourse occurred.” 175 Wn.2d at 734. Similarly, if drug possession is regarded as a strict liability crime, just because an individual is unaware they possess an uncontrolled substance does not change the fact that possession of that uncontrolled substance occurred. The consequence of the majority’s test is that statutes that lack a mens rea element now have the potential to be overturned not because a mens rea element is required but as a result of a test that hinges on whether the act or conduct at issue is deemed passive or innocent. Such a test conflates the distinct elements of mens rea and actus reus and will undoubtedly lead to confusion and divergent application among the courts. B.The Better Course Is To Properly Construe the Drug Possession Statute and Follow the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance The majority recognizes that “‘[w]e construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubt.’” Majority at 21 (alteration in original) (quoting Utter ex rel. State v. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash., 182 Wn.2d 398, 434, 341 P.3d 953 (2015)). Interpreting the possession statute to require a mens rea element “avoids a confrontation with the constitution.” A.M., 194 Wn.2d at 49 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring). Yet the majority argues constitutional avoidance is impossible based on the “overwhelming evidence that the legislature intends the simple possession statute to penalize AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -28- innocent nonconduct.” Majority at 21. As explained, such “overwhelming evidence” does not exist, and legislative inaction following Cleppe and Bradshaw “‘is merely one factor to consider.’” Fast, 187 Wn.2d at 39. (quoting Safeco Ins. Cos., 102 Wn.2d at 392) When the drug possession statute is considered in context—including the context of RCW 9A.04.060, which favors presuming a general mens rea requirement in criminal statutes—there is little to suggest the legislature intended to impose strict liability. Admittedly, the legislative intent is not clear, but I would adhere to the constitutional-doubt canon, which instructs that ambiguous statutes are interpreted to avoid constitutional doubts when statutory language reasonably permits. Gomez v.United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 104 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1989); Utter, 182 Wn.2d at 434. The majority’s only reason for avoiding this outcome is unwarranted deference to prior case law that erroneously interpreted the statute as a strict liability crime. But as explained, this case law is incorrect and harmful, and should not be further extended given the constitutional implications at stake. In adherence to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, we should overturn Cleppe and Bradshaw and properly construe our model drug possession statute as containing an implied mens rea element, consistent with similar statutes in other states. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Shannon) (Stephens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 96873-0 -29- CONCLUSION Cleppe and Bradshaw are incorrect and harmful decisions that this court—not the legislature—should remedy by reading an intent requirement into the possession statute. Such an outcome is supported by the presumption of mens rea in criminal statutes and the requirement for uniform interpretation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act among the states. Because I read the drug possession statute to require proof of intent, I concur in result with the majority’s decision to overturn Blake’s conviction. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s unnecessary decision to declare the statute unconstitutional as exceeding the legislature’s police power. AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake No. 96873-0 JOHNSON, J. (dissenting)—Over 60 years ago, this court decided that the crime of possession of a controlled substance does not require knowledge or intent. “Whether intent or guilty knowledge is to be made an essential element . . . is basically a matter to be determined by the legislature.” State v. Henker, 50 Wn.2d 809, 812, 314 P.2d 645 (1957). We reiterated this principle in State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 378, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), unanimously rejecting a challenge to the validity of the legislature’s power to enact RCW 69.50.401(c), which continued to make possession of a controlled substance a crime without a mens rea requirement. In the course of our decision, we reversed holdings from Court of Appeals cases to the contrary. See Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d at 377 (citing State v. Weaver, 24 Wn. App. 83, 600 P.2d 598 (1979); State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 231, 562 P.2d 659 (1977); State v. Hennings, 3 Wn. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970)). And, again, more recently in State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004), we rejected an argument to AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Johnson, J., dissenting) 2 overrule Cleppe (and implicitly those many cases consistent with Cleppe’s holding). Finally, removing any doubt in this long-standing principle, in State v. Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d 155, 456 P.3d 1172 (2020), we held that the crime of the unauthorized practice of law, RCW 2.48.180(3), does not require proof of knowledge or intent. We stated, “[U]nder our constitutional system, our legislature has the plenary power to criminalize conduct regardless of whether the actor intended wrongdoing.” Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d at 163 (citing State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 604, 925 P.2d 978 (1996)). We call these crimes strict liability crimes. See, e.g., Yishmael, 195 Wn.2d at 163-64; Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d at 536-37. The legislative power to enact strict liability crimes remains consistent and undiminished, and the Court of Appeals decision upholding RCW 69.50.4013(c) should therefore be affirmed.1 Our continued recognition of this legislative power applies with special force in this case given the length of time that the crime of possession of a controlled substance has been upheld as a strict liability crime. The 1 This legislative power repeatedly affirmed by our cases is consistent with United States Supreme Court cases, which have recognized the ability of the legislature to enact strict liability crimes for over a century. See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68-70, 30 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 930 (1910); see also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254, 42 S. Ct. 301, 66 L. Ed. 604 (1922) (upholding strict liability for selling a controlled substance). AGENDA ITEM #7. • State v. Blake (Johnson, J., dissenting) 3 constitutional analysis in the majority’s decision is not convincing enough to outweigh those considerations. AGENDA ITEM #7. • CERTIFICATION OF ENROLLMENT ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 5476 Chapter 311, Laws of 2021 (partial veto) 67th Legislature 2021 Regular Session DRUG POSSESSION—STATE V. BLAKE DECISION EFFECTIVE DATE: July 25, 2021—Except for sections 1 through 11 and 13 through 21, which take effect May 13, 2021; and section 12, which takes effect July 1, 2022. Passed by the Senate April 24, 2021 Yeas 26 Nays 23 DENNY HECK President of the Senate Passed by the House April 24, 2021 Yeas 80 Nays 18 LAURIE JINKINS Speaker of the House of Representatives CERTIFICATE I, Brad Hendrickson, Secretary of the Senate of the State of Washington, do hereby certify that the attached is ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 5476 as passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on the dates hereon set forth. BRAD HENDRICKSON Secretary Approved May 13, 2021 11:58 AM with the exception of section 21, which is vetoed. FILED May 13, 2021 JAY INSLEE Governor of the State of Washington Secretary of State State of Washington AGENDA ITEM #7. • AN ACT Relating to responding to the State v. Blake decision by 1 addressing justice system responses and behavioral health prevention, 2 treatment, and related services for individuals using or possessing 3 controlled substances, counterfeit substances, and legend drugs; 4 amending RCW 69.50.4011, 69.50.4013, 69.50.4014, 69.41.030, 5 69.41.030, 69.50.412, 9.94A.518, 13.40.0357, 2.24.010, 2.24.040, 6 9.94A.728, and 10.64.110; reenacting and amending RCW 10.31.110; 7 adding new sections to chapter 71.24 RCW; adding a new section to 8 chapter 43.101 RCW; adding a new section to chapter 10.31 RCW; 9 creating a new section; prescribing penalties; making appropriations; 10 providing an effective date; providing expiration dates; and 11 declaring an emergency.12 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:13 NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. A new section is added to chapter 71.24 14 RCW to read as follows:15 (1) The authority, in collaboration with the substance use 16 recovery services advisory committee established in subsection (2) of 17 this section, shall establish a substance use recovery services plan. 18 The purpose of the plan is to implement measures to assist persons 19 with substance use disorder in accessing outreach, treatment, and 20 recovery support services that are low barrier, person centered, 21 ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 5476 AS AMENDED BY THE HOUSE Passed Legislature - 2021 Regular Session State of Washington 67th Legislature 2021 Regular Session By Senators Dhingra, Hasegawa, Hunt, Kuderer, Lovelett, Nguyen, Pedersen, Rivers, Robinson, Saldaña, and Wellman Read first time 03/24/21. Referred to Committee on Ways & Means. p. 1 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • informed by people with lived experience, and culturally and 1 linguistically appropriate. The plan must articulate the manner in 2 which continual, rapid, and widespread access to a comprehensive 3 continuum of care will be provided to all persons with substance use 4 disorder.5 (2)(a) The authority shall establish the substance use recovery 6 services advisory committee to collaborate with the authority in the 7 development and implementation of the substance use recovery services 8 plan under this section. The authority must appoint members to the 9 advisory committee who have relevant background related to the needs 10 of persons with substance use disorder. The advisory committee shall 11 be reflective of the community of individuals living with substance 12 use disorder, including persons who are Black, indigenous, and 13 persons of color, persons with co-occurring substance use disorders 14 and mental health conditions, as well as persons who represent the 15 unique needs of rural communities. The advisory committee shall be 16 convened and chaired by the director of the authority, or the 17 director's designee. In addition to the member from the authority, 18 the advisory committee shall include:19 (i) One member and one alternate from each of the two largest 20 caucuses of the house of representatives, as appointed by the speaker 21 of the house of representatives;22 (ii) One member and one alternate from each of the two largest 23 caucuses of the senate, as appointed by the president of the senate;24 (iii) One representative of the governor's office;25 (iv) At least one adult in recovery from substance use disorder 26 who has experienced criminal legal consequences as a result of 27 substance use;28 (v) At least one youth in recovery from substance use disorder 29 who has experienced criminal legal consequences as a result of 30 substance use;31 (vi) One expert from the addictions, drug, and alcohol institute 32 at the University of Washington;33 (vii) One outreach services provider;34 (viii) One substance use disorder treatment provider;35 (ix) One peer recovery services provider;36 (x) One recovery housing provider;37 (xi) One expert in serving persons with co-occurring substance 38 use disorders and mental health conditions;39 p. 2 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (xii) One expert in antiracism and equity in health care delivery 1 systems;2 (xiii) One employee who provides substance use disorder treatment 3 or services as a member of a labor union representing workers in the 4 behavioral health field;5 (xiv) One representative of the association of Washington health 6 plans;7 (xv) One expert in diversion from the criminal legal system to 8 community-based care for persons with substance use disorder;9 (xvi) One representative of public defenders;10 (xvii) One representative of prosecutors;11 (xviii) One representative of sheriffs and police chiefs;12 (xix) One representative of a federally recognized tribe; and13 (xx) One representative of local governments.14 (b) The advisory committee may create subcommittees with expanded 15 participation.16 (c) In its collaboration with the advisory committee to develop 17 the substance use recovery services plan, the authority must give due 18 consideration to the recommendations of the advisory committee. If 19 the authority determines that any of the advisory committee's 20 recommendations are not feasible to adopt and implement, the 21 authority must notify the advisory committee and offer an 22 explanation.23 (d) The advisory committee must convene as necessary for the 24 development of the substance use recovery services plan and to 25 provide consultation and advice related to the development and 26 adoption of rules to implement the plan. The advisory committee must 27 convene to monitor implementation of the plan and advise the 28 authority.29 (3) The plan must consider:30 (a) The points of intersection that persons with substance use 31 disorder have with the health care, behavioral health, criminal, 32 civil legal, and child welfare systems as well as the various 33 locations in which persons with untreated substance use disorder 34 congregate, including homeless encampments, motels, and casinos;35 (b) New community-based care access points, including crisis 36 stabilization services and the safe station model in partnership with 37 fire departments;38 (c) Current regional capacity for substance use disorder 39 assessments, including capacity for persons with co-occurring 40 p. 3 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • substance use disorders and mental health conditions, each of the 1 American society of addiction medicine levels of care, and recovery 2 support services;3 (d) Barriers to accessing the existing behavioral health system 4 and recovery support services for persons with untreated substance 5 use disorder, especially indigent youth and adult populations, 6 persons with co-occurring substance use disorders and mental health 7 conditions, and populations chronically exposed to criminal legal 8 system responses, and possible innovations that could improve the 9 quality and accessibility of care for those populations;10 (e) Evidence-based, research-based, and promising treatment and 11 recovery services appropriate for target populations, including 12 persons with co-occurring substance use disorders and mental health 13 conditions;14 (f) Options for leveraging existing integrated managed care, 15 medicaid waiver, American Indian or Alaska Native fee-for-service 16 behavioral health benefits, and private insurance service capacity 17 for substance use disorders, including but not limited to 18 coordination with managed care organizations, behavioral health 19 administrative services organizations, the Washington health benefit 20 exchange, accountable communities of health, and the office of the 21 insurance commissioner;22 (g) Framework and design assistance for jurisdictions to assist 23 in compliance with the requirements of RCW 10.31.110 for diversion of 24 individuals with complex or co-occurring behavioral health conditions 25 to community-based care whenever possible and appropriate, and 26 identifying resource gaps that impede jurisdictions in fully 27 realizing the potential impact of this approach;28 (h) The design of recovery navigator programs in section 2 of 29 this act, including reporting requirements by behavioral health 30 administrative services organizations to monitor the effectiveness of 31 the programs and recommendations for program improvement;32 (i) The proposal of a funding framework in which, over time, 33 resources are shifted from punishment sectors to community-based care 34 interventions such that community-based care becomes the primary 35 strategy for addressing and resolving public order issues related to 36 behavioral health conditions;37 (j) Strategic grant making to community organizations to promote 38 public understanding and eradicate stigma and prejudice against 39 p. 4 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • persons with substance use disorder by promoting hope, empathy, and 1 recovery;2 (k) Recommendations for diversion to community-based care for 3 individuals with substance use disorders, including persons with co-4 occurring substance use disorders and mental health conditions, 5 across all points of the sequential intercept model;6 (l) Recommendations regarding the appropriate criminal legal 7 system response, if any, to possession of controlled substances;8 (m) Recommendations regarding the collection and reporting of 9 data that identifies the number of persons law enforcement officers 10 and prosecutors engage related to drug possession and disparities 11 across geographic areas, race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual 12 orientation, and income. The recommendations shall include, but not 13 be limited to, the number and rate of persons who are diverted from 14 charges to recovery navigator services or other services, who receive 15 services and what type of services, who are charged with simple 16 possession, and who are taken into custody; and17 (n) The design of a mechanism for referring persons with 18 substance use disorder or problematic behaviors resulting from 19 substance use into the supportive services described in section 2 of 20 this act.21 (4) The plan and related rules adopted by the authority must give 22 due consideration to persons with co-occurring substance use 23 disorders and mental health conditions and the needs of youth. The 24 plan must include the substance use outreach, treatment, and recovery 25 services outlined in sections 2 through 4 of this act which must be 26 available in or accessible by all jurisdictions. These services must 27 be equitably distributed across urban and rural settings. If feasible 28 and appropriate, service initiation shall be made available on demand 29 through 24-hour, seven days a week peer recovery coach response, 30 behavioral health walk-in centers, or other innovative rapid response 31 models. These services must, at a minimum, incorporate the following 32 principles: Establish low barriers to entry and reentry; improve the 33 health and safety of the individual; reduce the harm of substance use 34 and related activity for the public; include integrated and 35 coordinated services; incorporate structural competency and 36 antiracism; use noncoercive methods of engaging and retaining people 37 in treatment and recovery services, including contingency management; 38 consider the unique needs of rural communities; and have a focus on 39 services that increase social determinants of health.40 p. 5 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (5) In developing the plan, the authority shall:1 (a) Align the components of the plan with previous and ongoing 2 studies, plans, and reports, including the Washington state opioid 3 overdose and response plan, published by the authority, the roadmap 4 to recovery planning grant strategy being developed by the authority, 5 and plans associated with federal block grants; and6 (b) Coordinate its work with the efforts of the blue ribbon 7 commission on the intersection of the criminal justice and behavioral 8 health crisis systems and the crisis response improvement strategy 9 committee established in chapter . . ., Laws of 2021 (Engrossed 10 Second Substitute House Bill No. 1477).11 (6) The authority must submit a preliminary report by December 1, 12 2021, regarding progress toward the substance use recovery services 13 plan. The authority must submit the final substance use recovery 14 services plan to the governor and the legislature by December 1, 15 2022. After submitting the plan, the authority shall adopt rules and 16 enter into contracts with providers to implement the plan by December 17 1, 2023. In addition to seeking public comment under chapter 34.05 18 RCW, the authority must adopt rules in accordance with the 19 recommendations of the substance use recovery services advisory 20 committee as provided in subsection (2) of this section.21 (7) In consultation with the substance use recovery services 22 advisory committee, the authority must submit a report on the 23 implementation of the substance use recovery services plan to the 24 appropriate committees of the legislature and governor by December 25 1st of each year, beginning in 2023. This report shall include 26 progress on the substance use disorder continuum of care, including 27 availability of outreach, treatment, and recovery support services 28 statewide.29 (8) For the purposes of this section, "recovery support services" 30 means a collection of resources that sustain long-term recovery from 31 substance use disorder, including for persons with co-occurring 32 substance use disorders and mental health conditions, recovery 33 housing, permanent supportive housing, employment and education 34 pathways, peer supports and recovery coaching, family education, 35 technological recovery supports, transportation and child care 36 assistance, and social connectedness.37 (9) This section expires December 31, 2026.38 p. 6 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • NEW SECTION. Sec. 2. A new section is added to chapter 71.24 1 RCW to read as follows:2 (1) Each behavioral health administrative services organization 3 shall establish a recovery navigator program. The program shall 4 provide community-based outreach, intake, assessment, and connection 5 to services and, as appropriate, long-term intensive case management 6 and recovery coaching services, to youth and adults with substance 7 use disorder, including for persons with co-occurring substance use 8 disorders and mental health conditions, who are referred to the 9 program from diverse sources and shall facilitate and coordinate 10 connections to a broad range of community resources for youth and 11 adults with substance use disorder, including treatment and recovery 12 support services.13 (2) The authority shall establish uniform program standards for 14 behavioral health administrative services organizations to follow in 15 the design of their recovery navigator programs. The uniform program 16 standards must be modeled upon the components of the law enforcement 17 assisted diversion program and address project management, field 18 engagement, biopsychosocial assessment, intensive case management and 19 care coordination, stabilization housing when available and 20 appropriate, and, as necessary, legal system coordination. The 21 authority must adopt the uniform program standards from the 22 components of the law enforcement assisted diversion program to 23 accommodate an expanded population of persons with substance use 24 disorders, including persons with co-occurring substance use 25 disorders and mental health conditions, and allow for referrals from 26 a broad range of sources. In addition to accepting referrals from law 27 enforcement, the uniform program standards must provide guidance for 28 accepting referrals on behalf of persons with substance use 29 disorders, including persons with co-occurring substance use 30 disorders and mental health conditions, from various sources 31 including, but not limited to, self-referral, family members of the 32 individual, emergency department personnel, persons engaged with 33 serving homeless persons, including those living unsheltered or in 34 encampments, fire department personnel, emergency medical service 35 personnel, community-based organizations, members of the business 36 community, harm reduction program personnel, faith-based organization 37 staff, and other sources within the criminal legal system, as 38 outlined within the sequential intercept model. In developing 39 response time requirements within the statewide program standards, 40 p. 7 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • the authority shall require, subject to the availability of amounts 1 appropriated for this specific purpose, that responses to referrals 2 from law enforcement occur immediately for in-custody referrals and 3 shall strive for rapid response times to other appropriate settings 4 such as emergency departments.5 (3) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 6 specific purpose, the authority shall provide funding to each 7 behavioral health administrative services organization for the 8 development of its recovery navigator program. Before receiving 9 funding for implementation and ongoing administration, each 10 behavioral health administrative services organization must submit a 11 program plan that demonstrates the ability to fully comply with 12 statewide program standards. The authority shall establish a schedule 13 for the regular review of behavioral health administrative services 14 organizations' programs. The authority shall arrange for technical 15 assistance to be provided by the LEAD national support bureau to all 16 behavioral health administrative services organizations.17 (4) Each behavioral health administrative services organization 18 must have a substance use disorder regional administrator for its 19 recovery navigator program. The regional administrator shall be 20 responsible for assuring compliance with program standards, including 21 staffing standards. Each recovery navigator program must maintain a 22 sufficient number of appropriately trained personnel for providing 23 intake and referral services, conducting comprehensive 24 biopsychosocial assessments, providing intensive case management 25 services, and making warm handoffs to treatment and recovery support 26 services along the continuum of care. Program staff must include 27 people with lived experience with substance use disorder to the 28 extent possible. The substance use disorder regional administrator 29 must assure that staff who are conducting intake and referral 30 services and field assessments are paid a livable and competitive 31 wage and have appropriate initial training and receive continuing 32 education.33 (5) Each recovery navigator program must submit quarterly reports 34 to the authority with information identified by the authority and the 35 substance use recovery services advisory committee. The reports must 36 be provided to the substance use recovery services advisory committee 37 for discussion at meetings following the submission of the reports.38 p. 8 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • NEW SECTION. Sec. 3. A new section is added to chapter 71.24 1 RCW to read as follows:2 (1) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 3 specific purpose, the authority shall establish a grant program to:4 (a) Provide treatment services for low-income individuals with 5 substance use disorder who are not eligible for medical assistance 6 programs under chapter 74.09 RCW, with priority for the use of the 7 funds for very low-income individuals; and8 (b) Provide treatment services that are not eligible for federal 9 matching funds to individuals who are enrolled in medical assistance 10 programs under chapter 74.09 RCW.11 (2) In establishing the grant program, the authority shall 12 consult with the substance use recovery services advisory committee 13 established in section 1 of this act, behavioral health 14 administrative services organizations, managed care organizations, 15 and regional behavioral health providers to adopt regional standards 16 that are consistent with the substance use recovery services plan 17 developed under section 1 of this act to provide sufficient access 18 for youth and adults to meet each region's needs for:19 (a) Opioid use disorder treatment programs;20 (b) Low-barrier buprenorphine clinics;21 (c) Outpatient substance use disorder treatment;22 (d) Withdrawal management services, including both subacute and 23 medically managed withdrawal management;24 (e) Secure withdrawal management and stabilization services;25 (f) Inpatient substance use disorder treatment services;26 (g) Inpatient co-occurring disorder treatment services; and27 (h) Behavioral health crisis walk-in and drop-off services.28 (3) Funds in the grant program must be used to reimburse 29 providers for the provision of services to individuals identified in 30 subsection (1) of this section. The authority may use the funds to 31 support evidence-based practices and promising practices that are not 32 reimbursed by medical assistance or private insurance, including 33 contingency management. In addition, funds may be used to provide 34 assistance to organizations to establish or expand services as 35 reasonably necessary and feasible to increase the availability of 36 services to achieve the regional access standards developed under 37 subsection (2) of this section, including such items as training and 38 recruitment of personnel, reasonable modifications to existing 39 facilities to accommodate additional clients, start-up funding, and 40 p. 9 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • similar forms of assistance. Funds may not be used to support the 1 ongoing operational costs of a provider or organization, except in 2 relation to payments for specific service encounters with an 3 individual identified in subsection (1) of this section or for 4 noninsurance reimbursable services.5 (4) The authority must establish regional access standards under 6 subsection (2) of this section, subject to the availability of 7 amounts appropriated for this specific purpose, by January 1, 2023, 8 and begin distributing grant funds by March 1, 2023.9 NEW SECTION. Sec. 4. A new section is added to chapter 71.24 10 RCW to read as follows:11 (1) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 12 specific purpose, the authority shall establish the expanded recovery 13 support services program to increase access to recovery services for 14 individuals in recovery from substance use disorder.15 (2) In establishing the program, the authority shall consult with 16 the substance use recovery services advisory committee established in 17 section 1 of this act, behavioral health administrative services 18 organizations, regional behavioral health providers, and regional 19 community organizations that support individuals in recovery from 20 substance use disorders, including individuals with co-occurring 21 substance use disorders and mental health conditions, to adopt 22 regional expanded recovery plans that are consistent with the 23 substance use recovery services plan developed under section 1 of 24 this act to provide sufficient access for youth and adults to meet 25 each region's needs for:26 (a) Recovery housing;27 (b) Employment pathways, support, training, and job placement, 28 including evidence-based supported employment program services;29 (c) Education pathways, including recovery high schools and 30 collegiate recovery programs;31 (d) Recovery coaching and substance use disorder peer support;32 (e) Social connectedness initiatives, including the recovery café 33 model;34 (f) Family support services, including family reconciliation 35 services;36 (g) Technology-based recovery support services;37 (h) Transportation assistance; and38 (i) Legal support services.39 p. 10 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (3) Funds in the expanded recovery support services program must 1 be used to reimburse providers for the provision of services to 2 individuals in recovery from substance use disorders, including 3 individuals with co-occurring substance use disorders and mental 4 health conditions. In addition, the funds may be used to provide 5 assistance to organizations to establish or expand recovery support 6 services as reasonably necessary and feasible to increase the 7 availability of services to achieve the regional expanded recovery 8 plans developed under subsection (2) of this section, including such 9 items as training and recruitment of personnel, reasonable 10 modifications to existing facilities to accommodate additional 11 clients, and similar forms of assistance.12 (4) The authority must establish regional expanded recovery plans 13 under subsection (2) of this section, subject to the availability of 14 amounts appropriated for this specific purpose, by January 1, 2023, 15 and begin distributing grant funds by March 1, 2023.16 NEW SECTION. Sec. 5. A new section is added to chapter 71.24 17 RCW to read as follows:18 (1) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 19 specific purpose, the authority shall establish a homeless outreach 20 stabilization transition program to expand access to modified 21 assertive community treatment services provided by multidisciplinary 22 behavioral health outreach teams to serve people who are living with 23 serious substance use disorders or co-occurring substance use 24 disorders and mental health conditions, are experiencing 25 homelessness, and whose severity of behavioral health symptom acuity 26 level creates a barrier to accessing and receiving conventional 27 behavioral health services and outreach models.28 (a) In establishing the program, the authority shall consult with 29 behavioral health outreach organizations who have experience 30 delivering this service model in order to establish program 31 guidelines regarding multidisciplinary team staff types, service 32 intensity and quality fidelity standards, and criteria to ensure 33 programs are reaching the appropriate priority population.34 (b) Funds for the homeless outreach stabilization transition 35 program must be used to reimburse organizations for the provision of 36 multidisciplinary outreach services to individuals who are living 37 with substance use disorders or co-occurring substance use and mental 38 health disorders and are experiencing homelessness or transitioning 39 p. 11 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • from homelessness to housing. The funds may be used to provide 1 assistance to organizations to establish or expand services as 2 reasonably necessary to create a homeless outreach stabilization 3 transition program, including items such as training and recruitment 4 of personnel, outreach and engagement resources, client engagement 5 and health supplies, medications for people who do not have access to 6 insurance, and similar forms of assistance.7 (c) The authority must establish one or more homeless outreach 8 stabilization transition programs by January 1, 2024, and begin 9 distributing grant funds by March 1, 2024.10 (2) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 11 specific purpose, the authority shall establish a project for 12 psychiatric outreach to the homeless program to expand access to 13 behavioral health medical services for people who are experiencing 14 homelessness and living in permanent supportive housing.15 (a) In establishing the program, the authority shall consult with 16 behavioral health medical providers, homeless service providers, and 17 permanent supportive housing providers that support people living 18 with substance use disorders, co-occurring substance use and mental 19 health conditions, and people who are currently or have formerly 20 experienced homelessness.21 (b) Funds for the project for psychiatric outreach to the 22 homeless program must be used to reimburse organizations for the 23 provision of medical services to individuals who are living with or 24 in recovery from substance use disorders, co-occurring substance use 25 and mental health disorders, or other behavioral and physical health 26 conditions. Organizations must provide medical services to people who 27 are experiencing homelessness or are living in permanent supportive 28 housing and would be at risk of homelessness without access to 29 appropriate services. The funds may be used to provide assistance to 30 organizations to establish or expand behavioral health medical 31 services as reasonably necessary to create a project for psychiatric 32 outreach to the homeless program, including items such as training 33 and recruitment of personnel, outreach and engagement resources, 34 medical equipment and health supplies, medications for people who do 35 not have access to insurance, and similar forms of assistance.36 (c) The authority must establish one or more projects for 37 psychiatric outreach to the homeless programs by January 1, 2024, and 38 begin distributing grant funds by March 1, 2024.39 p. 12 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (3) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 1 specific purpose, the authority shall increase contingency management 2 resources for opioid treatment networks that are serving people 3 living with co-occurring stimulant use and opioid use disorder.4 (4) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 5 specific purpose, the authority shall develop a plan for implementing 6 a comprehensive statewide substance misuse prevention effort. The 7 plan must be completed by January 1, 2024.8 (5) Subject to the availability of amounts appropriated for this 9 specific purpose, the authority shall administer a competitive grant 10 process to broaden existing local community coalition efforts to 11 prevent substance misuse by increasing relevant protective factors 12 while decreasing risk factors. Coalitions are to be open to all 13 stakeholders interested in substance misuse prevention, including, 14 but not limited to, representatives from people in recovery, law 15 enforcement, education, behavioral health, parent organizations, 16 treatment organizations, organizations serving youth, prevention 17 professionals, and business.18 Sec. 6. RCW 10.31.110 and 2019 c 326 s 3 and 2019 c 325 s 5004 19 are each reenacted and amended to read as follows:20 (1) When a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that 21 the individual has committed acts constituting a crime, and the 22 individual is known by history or consultation with the behavioral 23 health administrative services organization, managed care 24 organization, ((behavioral health administrative services 25 organization,)) crisis hotline, ((or)) local crisis services 26 providers, or community health providers to ((suffer from)) have a 27 mental disorder or substance use disorder, in addition to existing 28 authority under state law or local policy, as an alternative to 29 arrest, the arresting officer is authorized and encouraged to:30 (a) Take the individual to a crisis stabilization unit as defined 31 in RCW 71.05.020. Individuals delivered to a crisis stabilization 32 unit pursuant to this section may be held by the facility for a 33 period of up to twelve hours. The individual must be examined by a 34 mental health professional or substance use disorder professional 35 within three hours of arrival;36 (b) Take the individual to a triage facility as defined in RCW 37 71.05.020. An individual delivered to a triage facility which has 38 elected to operate as an involuntary facility may be held up to a 39 p. 13 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • period of twelve hours. The individual must be examined by a mental 1 health professional or substance use disorder professional within 2 three hours of arrival;3 (c) Refer the individual to a ((mental health professional)) 4 designated crisis responder for evaluation for initial detention and 5 proceeding under chapter 71.05 RCW; ((or))6 (d) Release the individual upon agreement to voluntary 7 participation in outpatient treatment;8 (e) Refer the individual to youth, adult, or geriatric mobile 9 crisis response services, as appropriate; or10 (f) Refer the individual to the regional entity responsible to 11 receive referrals in lieu of legal system involvement, including the 12 recovery navigator program described in section 2 of this act.13 (2) If the individual is released to the community from the 14 facilities in subsection (1)(a) through (c) of this section, the 15 mental health provider or substance use disorder professional shall 16 make reasonable efforts to inform the arresting officer of the 17 planned release prior to release if the arresting officer has 18 specifically requested notification and provided contact information 19 to the provider.20 (3) In deciding whether to refer the individual to treatment 21 under this section, the police officer must be guided by local law 22 enforcement diversion guidelines for behavioral health developed and 23 mutually agreed upon with the prosecuting authority with an 24 opportunity for consultation and comment by the defense bar and 25 disability community. These guidelines must address, at a minimum, 26 the length, seriousness, and recency of the known criminal history of 27 the individual, the mental health history of the individual, if 28 available, the substance use disorder history of the individual, if 29 available, the opinions of a mental health professional, if 30 available, the opinions of a substance use disorder professional, if 31 available, and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the 32 alleged offense. The guidelines must include a process for clearing 33 outstanding warrants or referring the individual for assistance in 34 clearing outstanding warrants, if any, and issuing a new court date, 35 if appropriate, without booking or incarcerating the individual or 36 disqualifying ((him or her)) the individual from referral to 37 treatment under this section, and define the circumstances under 38 which such action is permissible. Referrals to services, care, and 39 treatment for substance use disorder must be made in accordance with 40 p. 14 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • protocols developed for the recovery navigator program described in 1 section 2 of this act.2 (4) Any agreement to participate in treatment or services in lieu 3 of jail booking or referring a case for prosecution shall not require 4 individuals to stipulate to any of the alleged facts regarding the 5 criminal activity as a prerequisite to participation in ((a mental 6 health treatment)) the alternative response described in this 7 section. ((The)) Any agreement is inadmissible in any criminal or 8 civil proceeding. ((The agreement does)) Such agreements do not 9 create immunity from prosecution for the alleged criminal activity.10 (5) If ((an individual violates such agreement and the mental 11 health treatment alternative is no longer appropriate)) there are 12 required terms of participation in the services or treatment to which 13 an individual was referred under this section, and if the individual 14 violates such terms and is therefore no longer participating in 15 services:16 (a) The ((mental health)) behavioral health or service provider 17 shall inform the referring law enforcement agency of the violation, 18 if consistent with the terms of the program and applicable law; and19 (b) The original charges may be filed or referred to the 20 prosecutor, as appropriate, and the matter may proceed accordingly, 21 unless filing or referring the charges is inconsistent with the terms 22 of a local diversion program or a recovery navigator program 23 described in section 2 of this act.24 (6) The police officer is immune from liability for any good 25 faith conduct under this section.26 NEW SECTION. Sec. 7. A new section is added to chapter 43.101 27 RCW to read as follows:28 (1) Beginning July 1, 2022, all law enforcement personnel 29 required to complete basic law enforcement training under RCW 30 43.101.200 must receive training on law enforcement interaction with 31 persons with substance use disorders, including persons with co-32 occurring substance use disorders and mental health conditions, and 33 referral to treatment and recovery services and the unique referral 34 processes for youth, as part of the basic law enforcement training. 35 The training must be developed by the commission in collaboration 36 with the University of Washington behavioral health institute and 37 agencies that have expertise in the area of working with persons with 38 substance use disorders, including law enforcement diversion of such 39 p. 15 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • individuals to community-based care. In developing the training, the 1 commission must also examine existing courses certified by the 2 commission that relate to persons with a substance use disorder, and 3 should draw on existing training partnerships with the Washington 4 association of sheriffs and police chiefs.5 (2) The training must consist of classroom instruction or 6 internet instruction and shall replicate likely field situations to 7 the maximum extent possible. The training should include, at a 8 minimum, core instruction in all of the following:9 (a) Proper procedures for referring persons to the recovery 10 navigator program in accordance with section 2 of this act;11 (b) The etiology of substance use disorders, including the role 12 of trauma;13 (c) Barriers to treatment engagement experienced by many with 14 such disorders who have contact with the legal system;15 (d) How to identify indicators of substance use disorder and how 16 to respond appropriately in a variety of common situations;17 (e) Conflict resolution and de-escalation techniques for 18 potentially dangerous situations involving persons with a substance 19 use disorder;20 (f) Appropriate language usage when interacting with persons with 21 a substance use disorder;22 (g) Alternatives to lethal force when interacting with 23 potentially dangerous persons with a substance use disorder;24 (h) The principles of recovery and the multiple pathways to 25 recovery; and26 (i) Community and state resources available to serve persons with 27 substance use disorders and how these resources can be best used by 28 law enforcement to support persons with a substance use disorder in 29 their communities.30 (3) In addition to incorporation into the basic law enforcement 31 training under RCW 43.101.200, training must be made available to law 32 enforcement agencies, through electronic means, for use during in-33 service training.34 Sec. 8. RCW 69.50.4011 and 2003 c 53 s 332 are each amended to 35 read as follows:36 (1) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for 37 ((any)):38 p. 16 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (a) Any person to create((,)) or deliver((, or possess)) a 1 counterfeit substance; or2 (b) Any person to knowingly possess a counterfeit substance.3 (2) Any person who violates subsection (1)(a) of this section 4 with respect to:5 (a) A counterfeit substance classified in Schedule I or II which 6 is a narcotic drug, or flunitrazepam classified in Schedule IV, is 7 guilty of a class B felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for 8 not more than ten years, fined not more than twenty-five thousand 9 dollars, or both;10 (b) A counterfeit substance which is methamphetamine, is guilty 11 of a class B felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not 12 more than ten years, fined not more than twenty-five thousand 13 dollars, or both;14 (c) Any other counterfeit substance classified in Schedule I, II, 15 or III, is guilty of a class C felony punishable according to chapter 16 9A.20 RCW;17 (d) A counterfeit substance classified in Schedule IV, except 18 flunitrazepam, is guilty of a class C felony punishable according to 19 chapter 9A.20 RCW;20 (e) A counterfeit substance classified in Schedule V, is guilty 21 of a class C felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW.22 (3) A violation of subsection (1)(b) of this section is a 23 misdemeanor. The prosecutor is encouraged to divert such cases for 24 assessment, treatment, or other services.25 Sec. 9. RCW 69.50.4013 and 2017 c 317 s 15 are each amended to 26 read as follows:27 (1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess a 28 controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, 29 or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while 30 acting in the course of his or her professional practice, or except 31 as otherwise authorized by this chapter.32 (2) Except as provided in RCW 69.50.4014, any person who violates 33 this section is guilty of a ((class C felony punishable under chapter 34 9A.20 RCW)) misdemeanor.35 (3) The prosecutor is encouraged to divert cases under this 36 section for assessment, treatment, or other services.37 (4)(a) The possession, by a person twenty-one years of age or 38 older, of useable marijuana, marijuana concentrates, or marijuana-39 p. 17 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • infused products in amounts that do not exceed those set forth in RCW 1 69.50.360(3) is not a violation of this section, this chapter, or any 2 other provision of Washington state law.3 (b) The possession of marijuana, useable marijuana, marijuana 4 concentrates, and marijuana-infused products being physically 5 transported or delivered within the state, in amounts not exceeding 6 those that may be established under RCW 69.50.385(3), by a licensed 7 employee of a common carrier when performing the duties authorized in 8 accordance with RCW 69.50.382 and 69.50.385, is not a violation of 9 this section, this chapter, or any other provision of Washington 10 state law.11 (((4))) (5)(a) The delivery by a person twenty-one years of age 12 or older to one or more persons twenty-one years of age or older, 13 during a single twenty-four hour period, for noncommercial purposes 14 and not conditioned upon or done in connection with the provision or 15 receipt of financial consideration, of any of the following marijuana 16 products, is not a violation of this section, this chapter, or any 17 other provisions of Washington state law:18 (i) One-half ounce of useable marijuana;19 (ii) Eight ounces of marijuana-infused product in solid form;20 (iii) Thirty-six ounces of marijuana-infused product in liquid 21 form; or22 (iv) Three and one-half grams of marijuana concentrates.23 (b) The act of delivering marijuana or a marijuana product as 24 authorized under this subsection (((4))) (5) must meet one of the 25 following requirements:26 (i) The delivery must be done in a location outside of the view 27 of general public and in a nonpublic place; or28 (ii) The marijuana or marijuana product must be in the original 29 packaging as purchased from the marijuana retailer.30 (((5))) (6) No person under twenty-one years of age may possess, 31 manufacture, sell, or distribute marijuana, marijuana-infused 32 products, or marijuana concentrates, regardless of THC concentration. 33 This does not include qualifying patients with a valid authorization.34 (((6))) (7) The possession by a qualifying patient or designated 35 provider of marijuana concentrates, useable marijuana, marijuana-36 infused products, or plants in accordance with chapter 69.51A RCW is 37 not a violation of this section, this chapter, or any other provision 38 of Washington state law.39 p. 18 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • Sec. 10. RCW 69.50.4014 and 2015 2nd sp.s. c 4 s 505 are each 1 amended to read as follows:2 Except as provided in RCW 69.50.401(2)(c) or as otherwise 3 authorized by this chapter, any person found guilty of knowing 4 possession of forty grams or less of marijuana is guilty of a 5 misdemeanor. The prosecutor is encouraged to divert cases under this 6 section for assessment, treatment, or other services.7 Sec. 11. RCW 69.41.030 and 2019 c 55 s 9 are each amended to 8 read as follows:9 (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, deliver, or 10 knowingly possess any legend drug except upon the order or 11 prescription of a physician under chapter 18.71 RCW, an osteopathic 12 physician and surgeon under chapter 18.57 RCW, an optometrist 13 licensed under chapter 18.53 RCW who is certified by the optometry 14 board under RCW 18.53.010, a dentist under chapter 18.32 RCW, a 15 podiatric physician and surgeon under chapter 18.22 RCW, a 16 veterinarian under chapter 18.92 RCW, a commissioned medical or 17 dental officer in the United States armed forces or public health 18 service in the discharge of his or her official duties, a duly 19 licensed physician or dentist employed by the veterans administration 20 in the discharge of his or her official duties, a registered nurse or 21 advanced registered nurse practitioner under chapter 18.79 RCW when 22 authorized by the nursing care quality assurance commission, a 23 pharmacist licensed under chapter 18.64 RCW to the extent permitted 24 by drug therapy guidelines or protocols established under RCW 25 18.64.011 and authorized by the commission and approved by a 26 practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs, an osteopathic physician 27 assistant under chapter 18.57A RCW when authorized by the board of 28 osteopathic medicine and surgery, a physician assistant under chapter 29 18.71A RCW when authorized by the Washington medical commission, or 30 any of the following professionals in any province of Canada that 31 shares a common border with the state of Washington or in any state 32 of the United States: A physician licensed to practice medicine and 33 surgery or a physician licensed to practice osteopathic medicine and 34 surgery, a dentist licensed to practice dentistry, a podiatric 35 physician and surgeon licensed to practice podiatric medicine and 36 surgery, a licensed advanced registered nurse practitioner, a 37 licensed physician assistant, a licensed osteopathic physician 38 assistant, or a veterinarian licensed to practice veterinary 39 p. 19 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • medicine: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the above provisions shall not 1 apply to sale, delivery, or possession by drug wholesalers or drug 2 manufacturers, or their agents or employees, or to any practitioner 3 acting within the scope of his or her license, or to a common or 4 contract carrier or warehouse operator, or any employee thereof, 5 whose possession of any legend drug is in the usual course of 6 business or employment: PROVIDED FURTHER, That nothing in this 7 chapter or chapter 18.64 RCW shall prevent a family planning clinic 8 that is under contract with the health care authority from selling, 9 delivering, possessing, and dispensing commercially prepackaged oral 10 contraceptives prescribed by authorized, licensed health care 11 practitioners: PROVIDED FURTHER, That nothing in this chapter 12 prohibits possession or delivery of legend drugs by an authorized 13 collector or other person participating in the operation of a drug 14 take-back program authorized in chapter 69.48 RCW.15 (2)(a) A violation of this section involving the sale, delivery, 16 or possession with intent to sell or deliver is a class B felony 17 punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW.18 (b) A violation of this section involving possession is a 19 misdemeanor. The prosecutor is encouraged to divert such cases for 20 assessment, treatment, or other services.21 Sec. 12. RCW 69.41.030 and 2020 c 80 s 41 are each amended to 22 read as follows:23 (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, deliver, or 24 knowingly possess any legend drug except upon the order or 25 prescription of a physician under chapter 18.71 RCW, an osteopathic 26 physician and surgeon under chapter 18.57 RCW, an optometrist 27 licensed under chapter 18.53 RCW who is certified by the optometry 28 board under RCW 18.53.010, a dentist under chapter 18.32 RCW, a 29 podiatric physician and surgeon under chapter 18.22 RCW, a 30 veterinarian under chapter 18.92 RCW, a commissioned medical or 31 dental officer in the United States armed forces or public health 32 service in the discharge of his or her official duties, a duly 33 licensed physician or dentist employed by the veterans administration 34 in the discharge of his or her official duties, a registered nurse or 35 advanced registered nurse practitioner under chapter 18.79 RCW when 36 authorized by the nursing care quality assurance commission, a 37 pharmacist licensed under chapter 18.64 RCW to the extent permitted 38 by drug therapy guidelines or protocols established under RCW 39 p. 20 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 18.64.011 and authorized by the commission and approved by a 1 practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs, a physician assistant 2 under chapter 18.71A RCW when authorized by the Washington medical 3 commission, or any of the following professionals in any province of 4 Canada that shares a common border with the state of Washington or in 5 any state of the United States: A physician licensed to practice 6 medicine and surgery or a physician licensed to practice osteopathic 7 medicine and surgery, a dentist licensed to practice dentistry, a 8 podiatric physician and surgeon licensed to practice podiatric 9 medicine and surgery, a licensed advanced registered nurse 10 practitioner, a licensed physician assistant, or a veterinarian 11 licensed to practice veterinary medicine: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the 12 above provisions shall not apply to sale, delivery, or possession by 13 drug wholesalers or drug manufacturers, or their agents or employees, 14 or to any practitioner acting within the scope of his or her license, 15 or to a common or contract carrier or warehouse operator, or any 16 employee thereof, whose possession of any legend drug is in the usual 17 course of business or employment: PROVIDED FURTHER, That nothing in 18 this chapter or chapter 18.64 RCW shall prevent a family planning 19 clinic that is under contract with the health care authority from 20 selling, delivering, possessing, and dispensing commercially 21 prepackaged oral contraceptives prescribed by authorized, licensed 22 health care practitioners: PROVIDED FURTHER, That nothing in this 23 chapter prohibits possession or delivery of legend drugs by an 24 authorized collector or other person participating in the operation 25 of a drug take-back program authorized in chapter 69.48 RCW.26 (2)(a) A violation of this section involving the sale, delivery, 27 or possession with intent to sell or deliver is a class B felony 28 punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW.29 (b) A violation of this section involving possession is a 30 misdemeanor. The prosecutor is encouraged to divert such cases for 31 assessment, treatment, or other services.32 NEW SECTION. Sec. 13. A new section is added to chapter 10.31 33 RCW to read as follows:34 (1) For all individuals who otherwise would be subject to arrest 35 for possession of a counterfeit substance under RCW 69.50.4011, 36 possession of a controlled substance under RCW 69.50.4013, possession 37 of 40 grams or less of marijuana under RCW 69.50.4014, or possession 38 of a legend drug under RCW 69.41.030(2)(b), in lieu of jail booking 39 p. 21 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • and referral to the prosecutor, law enforcement shall offer a 1 referral to assessment and services available pursuant to RCW 2 10.31.110 or other program or entity responsible for receiving 3 referrals in lieu of legal system involvement, which may include the 4 recovery navigator program established under section 2 of this act.5 (2) If law enforcement agency records reflect that an individual 6 has been diverted to referral for assessment and services twice or 7 more previously, officers may, but are not required to, make 8 additional diversion efforts.9 (3) Nothing in this section precludes prosecutors from diverting 10 or declining to file any charges for possession offenses that are 11 referred under RCW 69.50.4011, 69.50.4013, 69.50.4014, or 12 69.41.030(2)(b) in the exercise of their discretion.13 Sec. 14. RCW 69.50.412 and 2019 c 64 s 22 are each amended to 14 read as follows:15 (1) It is unlawful for any person to use drug paraphernalia to 16 plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 17 convert, produce, process, or prepare((, test, analyze, pack, repack, 18 store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 19 introduce into the human body)) a controlled substance other than 20 marijuana. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a 21 misdemeanor.22 (2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent 23 to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, 24 knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, 25 that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 26 manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, or prepare((, test, 27 analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, 28 inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body)) a controlled 29 substance other than marijuana. Any person who violates this 30 subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor.31 (3) Any person eighteen years of age or over who violates 32 subsection (2) of this section by delivering drug paraphernalia to a 33 person under eighteen years of age who is at least three years his or 34 her junior is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.35 (4) It is unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper, 36 magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing, 37 or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the 38 purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the 39 p. 22 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. 1 Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor.2 (5) It is lawful for any person over the age of eighteen to 3 possess sterile hypodermic syringes and needles for the purpose of 4 reducing blood-borne diseases.5 Sec. 15. RCW 9.94A.518 and 2003 c 53 s 57 are each amended to 6 read as follows:7 8 TABLE 4 9 10 11 DRUG OFFENSES INCLUDED WITHIN EACH SERIOUSNESS LEVEL 12 13 14 15 III Any felony offense under chapter 69.50 RCW with a deadly weapon special verdict under RCW ((9.94A.602)) 9.94A.825 16 17 Controlled Substance Homicide (RCW 69.50.415) 18 19 20 21 Delivery of imitation controlled substance by person eighteen or over to person under eighteen (RCW 69.52.030(2)) 22 23 Involving a minor in drug dealing (RCW 69.50.4015) 24 25 Manufacture of methamphetamine (RCW 69.50.401(2)(b)) 26 27 28 29 30 Over 18 and deliver heroin, methamphetamine, a narcotic from Schedule I or II, or flunitrazepam from Schedule IV to someone under 18 (RCW 69.50.406) p. 23 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Over 18 and deliver narcotic from Schedule III, IV, or V or a nonnarcotic, except flunitrazepam or methamphetamine, from Schedule I-V to someone under 18 and 3 years junior (RCW 69.50.406) 8 9 10 11 12 Possession of Ephedrine, Pseudoephedrine, or Anhydrous Ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine (RCW 69.50.440) 13 14 15 Selling for profit (controlled or counterfeit) any controlled substance (RCW 69.50.410) 16 17 18 II Create((,)) or deliver((, or possess)) a counterfeit controlled substance (RCW 69.50.4011(1)(a)) 19 20 21 Deliver or possess with intent to deliver methamphetamine (RCW 69.50.401(2)(b)) 22 23 24 Delivery of a material in lieu of a controlled substance (RCW 69.50.4012) 25 26 27 Maintaining a Dwelling or Place for Controlled Substances (RCW 69.50.402(1)(f)) 28 29 30 Manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver amphetamine (RCW 69.50.401(2)(b)) 31 32 33 34 35 Manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver narcotics from Schedule I or II or flunitrazepam from Schedule IV (RCW 69.50.401(2)(a)) p. 24 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver narcotics from Schedule III, IV, or V or nonnarcotics from Schedule I-V (except marijuana, amphetamine, methamphetamines, or flunitrazepam) (RCW 69.50.401(2) (c) through (e)) 9 10 11 12 Manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance (RCW 69.52.030(1)) 13 I Forged Prescription (RCW 69.41.020) 14 15 Forged Prescription for a Controlled Substance (RCW 69.50.403) 16 17 18 Manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver marijuana (RCW 69.50.401(2)(c)) 19 20 21 22 ((Possess Controlled Substance that is a Narcotic from Schedule III, IV, or V or Nonnarcotic from Schedule I-V (RCW 69.50.4013) 23 24 25 26 Possession of Controlled Substance that is either heroin or narcotics from Schedule I or II (RCW 69.50.4013))) 27 28 Unlawful Use of Building for Drug Purposes (RCW 69.53.010) Sec. 16. RCW 13.40.0357 and 2020 c 18 s 8 are each amended to 29 read as follows:30 31 DESCRIPTION AND OFFENSE CATEGORY 32 33 34 35 36 JUVENILE DISPOSITION OFFENSE CATEGORY DESCRIPTION (RCW CITATION) JUVENILE DISPOSITION CATEGORY FOR ATTEMPT, BAILJUMP, CONSPIRACY, OR SOLICITATION p. 25 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 Arson and Malicious Mischief 2 A Arson 1 (9A.48.020)B+ 3 B Arson 2 (9A.48.030)C 4 C Reckless Burning 1 (9A.48.040)D 5 D Reckless Burning 2 (9A.48.050)E 6 B Malicious Mischief 1 (9A.48.070)C 7 C Malicious Mischief 2 (9A.48.080)D 8 D Malicious Mischief 3 (9A.48.090)E 9 10 E Tampering with Fire Alarm Apparatus (9.40.100) E 11 12 E Tampering with Fire Alarm Apparatus with Intent to Commit Arson (9.40.105) E 13 14 A Possession of Incendiary Device (9.40.120) B+ 15 16 Assault and Other Crimes Involving Physical Harm 17 A Assault 1 (9A.36.011)B+ 18 B+Assault 2 (9A.36.021)C+ 19 C+Assault 3 (9A.36.031)D+ 20 D+Assault 4 (9A.36.041)E 21 22 B+Drive-By Shooting (9A.36.045) committed at age 15 or under C+ 23 24 A++Drive-By Shooting (9A.36.045) committed at age 16 or 17 A 25 D+Reckless Endangerment (9A.36.050)E 26 C+Promoting Suicide Attempt (9A.36.060)D+ 27 D+Coercion (9A.36.070)E 28 C+Custodial Assault (9A.36.100)D+ 29 Burglary and Trespass 30 31 B+Burglary 1 (9A.52.020) committed at age 15 or under C+ 32 33 A-Burglary 1 (9A.52.020) committed at age 16 or 17 B+ 34 B Residential Burglary (9A.52.025)C 35 B Burglary 2 (9A.52.030)C p. 26 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 2 D Burglary Tools (Possession of) (9A.52.060) E 3 D Criminal Trespass 1 (9A.52.070)E 4 E Criminal Trespass 2 (9A.52.080)E 5 C Mineral Trespass (78.44.330)C 6 C Vehicle Prowling 1 (9A.52.095)D 7 D Vehicle Prowling 2 (9A.52.100)E 8 Drugs 9 10 E Possession/Consumption of Alcohol (66.44.270) E 11 12 C Illegally Obtaining Legend Drug (69.41.020) D 13 14 C+Sale, Delivery, Possession of Legend Drug with Intent to Sell (69.41.030(2)(a)) D+ 15 16 E Possession of Legend Drug (69.41.030(2)(b)) E 17 18 19 20 B+Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act - Narcotic, Methamphetamine, or Flunitrazepam Sale (69.50.401(2) (a) or (b)) B+ 21 22 23 C Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act - Nonnarcotic Sale (69.50.401(2)(c)) C 24 25 E Possession of Marihuana <40 grams (69.50.4014) E 26 27 C Fraudulently Obtaining Controlled Substance (69.50.403) C 28 29 C+Sale of Controlled Substance for Profit (69.50.410) C+ 30 E Unlawful Inhalation (9.47A.020)E 31 32 33 34 35 B Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act - Narcotic, Methamphetamine, or Flunitrazepam Counterfeit Substances (69.50.4011(2) (a) or (b)) B p. 27 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 2 3 C Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act - Nonnarcotic Counterfeit Substances (69.50.4011(2) (c), (d), or (e)) C 4 5 6 ((C)) E Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act - Possession of a Controlled Substance (69.50.4013) ((C)) E 7 8 9 C Violation of Uniform Controlled Substances Act - Possession of a Controlled Substance (69.50.4012) C 10 Firearms and Weapons 11 B Theft of Firearm (9A.56.300)C 12 13 B Possession of Stolen Firearm (9A.56.310) C 14 15 E Carrying Loaded Pistol Without Permit (9.41.050) E 16 17 C Possession of Firearms by Minor (<18) (9.41.040(2)(a) (vi)) C 18 19 D+Possession of Dangerous Weapon (9.41.250) E 20 21 D Intimidating Another Person by use of Weapon (9.41.270) E 22 Homicide 23 A+Murder 1 (9A.32.030)A 24 A+Murder 2 (9A.32.050)B+ 25 B+Manslaughter 1 (9A.32.060)C+ 26 C+Manslaughter 2 (9A.32.070)D+ 27 B+Vehicular Homicide (46.61.520)C+ 28 Kidnapping 29 A Kidnap 1 (9A.40.020)B+ 30 B+Kidnap 2 (9A.40.030)C+ 31 C+Unlawful Imprisonment (9A.40.040)D+ 32 Obstructing Governmental Operation 33 34 D Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer (9A.76.020) E 35 E Resisting Arrest (9A.76.040)E 36 B Introducing Contraband 1 (9A.76.140)C p. 28 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 C Introducing Contraband 2 (9A.76.150)D 2 E Introducing Contraband 3 (9A.76.160)E 3 4 B+Intimidating a Public Servant (9A.76.180) C+ 5 B+Intimidating a Witness (9A.72.110)C+ 6 Public Disturbance 7 8 C+Criminal Mischief with Weapon (9A.84.010(2)(b)) D+ 9 10 D+Criminal Mischief Without Weapon (9A.84.010(2)(a)) E 11 E Failure to Disperse (9A.84.020)E 12 E Disorderly Conduct (9A.84.030)E 13 Sex Crimes 14 A Rape 1 (9A.44.040)B+ 15 16 B++Rape 2 (9A.44.050) committed at age 14 or under B+ 17 18 A-Rape 2 (9A.44.050) committed at age 15 through age 17 B+ 19 C+Rape 3 (9A.44.060)D+ 20 21 B++Rape of a Child 1 (9A.44.073) committed at age 14 or under B+ 22 23 A-Rape of a Child 1 (9A.44.073) committed at age 15 B+ 24 B+Rape of a Child 2 (9A.44.076)C+ 25 B Incest 1 (9A.64.020(1))C 26 C Incest 2 (9A.64.020(2))D 27 28 D+Indecent Exposure (Victim <14) (9A.88.010) E 29 30 E Indecent Exposure (Victim 14 or over) (9A.88.010) E 31 B+Promoting Prostitution 1 (9A.88.070)C+ 32 C+Promoting Prostitution 2 (9A.88.080)D+ 33 E O & A (Prostitution) (9A.88.030)E 34 B+Indecent Liberties (9A.44.100)C+ 35 36 B++Child Molestation 1 (9A.44.083) committed at age 14 or under B+ p. 29 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 2 A-Child Molestation 1 (9A.44.083) committed at age 15 through age 17 B+ 3 B Child Molestation 2 (9A.44.086)C+ 4 5 C Failure to Register as a Sex Offender (9A.44.132) D 6 7 Theft, Robbery, Extortion, and Forgery 8 B Theft 1 (9A.56.030)C 9 C Theft 2 (9A.56.040)D 10 D Theft 3 (9A.56.050)E 11 12 B Theft of Livestock 1 and 2 (9A.56.080 and 9A.56.083) C 13 C Forgery (9A.60.020)D 14 15 A Robbery 1 (9A.56.200) committed at age 15 or under B+ 16 17 A++Robbery 1 (9A.56.200) committed at age 16 or 17 A 18 B+Robbery 2 (9A.56.210)C+ 19 B+Extortion 1 (9A.56.120)C+ 20 C+Extortion 2 (9A.56.130)D+ 21 C Identity Theft 1 (9.35.020(2))D 22 D Identity Theft 2 (9.35.020(3))E 23 24 D Improperly Obtaining Financial Information (9.35.010) E 25 26 B Possession of a Stolen Vehicle (9A.56.068) C 27 28 B Possession of Stolen Property 1 (9A.56.150) C 29 30 C Possession of Stolen Property 2 (9A.56.160) D 31 32 D Possession of Stolen Property 3 (9A.56.170) E 33 34 B Taking Motor Vehicle Without Permission 1 (9A.56.070) C 35 36 C Taking Motor Vehicle Without Permission 2 (9A.56.075) D 37 B Theft of a Motor Vehicle (9A.56.065)C p. 30 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1 Motor Vehicle Related Crimes 2 E Driving Without a License (46.20.005)E 3 B+Hit and Run - Death (46.52.020(4)(a))C+ 4 C Hit and Run - Injury (46.52.020(4)(b))D 5 D Hit and Run-Attended (46.52.020(5))E 6 E Hit and Run-Unattended (46.52.010)E 7 C Vehicular Assault (46.61.522)D 8 9 C Attempting to Elude Pursuing Police Vehicle (46.61.024) D 10 E Reckless Driving (46.61.500)E 11 12 D Driving While Under the Influence (46.61.502 and 46.61.504) E 13 14 B+Felony Driving While Under the Influence (46.61.502(6)) B 15 16 B+Felony Physical Control of a Vehicle While Under the Influence (46.61.504(6)) B 17 Other 18 B Animal Cruelty 1 (16.52.205)C 19 B Bomb Threat (9.61.160)C 20 C Escape 11 (9A.76.110)C 21 C Escape 21 (9A.76.120)C 22 D Escape 3 (9A.76.130)E 23 24 E Obscene, Harassing, Etc., Phone Calls (9.61.230) E 25 26 A Other Offense Equivalent to an Adult Class A Felony B+ 27 28 B Other Offense Equivalent to an Adult Class B Felony C 29 30 C Other Offense Equivalent to an Adult Class C Felony D 31 32 D Other Offense Equivalent to an Adult Gross Misdemeanor E 33 34 E Other Offense Equivalent to an Adult Misdemeanor E 35 36 37 V Violation of Order of Restitution, Community Supervision, or Confinement (13.40.200)2 V p. 31 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • 1Escape 1 and 2 and Attempted Escape 1 and 2 are classed as C offenses 1 and the standard range is established as follows:2 1st escape or attempted escape during 12-month period - 28 days 3 confinement4 2nd escape or attempted escape during 12-month period - 8 weeks 5 confinement6 3rd and subsequent escape or attempted escape during 12-month 7 period - 12 weeks confinement8 2If the court finds that a respondent has violated terms of an order, 9 it may impose a penalty of up to 30 days of confinement.10 JUVENILE SENTENCING STANDARDS11 This schedule must be used for juvenile offenders. The court may 12 select sentencing option A, B, C, or D.13 14 15 16 OPTION A JUVENILE OFFENDER SENTENCING GRID STANDARD RANGE 17 A++129 to 260 weeks for all category A++ offenses 18 A+180 weeks to age 21 for all category A+ offenses 19 A 103-129 weeks for all category A offenses 20 A-30-40 weeks 52-65 weeks 80-100 weeks 103-129 weeks 103-129 weeks 21 B++15-36 weeks 52-65 weeks 80-100 weeks 103-129 weeks 103-129 weeks 22 CURRENT B+15-36 weeks 15-36 weeks 52-65 weeks 80-100 weeks 103-129 weeks 23 OFFENSE B LS LS 15-36 weeks 15-36 weeks 52-65 weeks 24 CATEGORY C+LS LS LS 15-36 weeks 15-36 weeks 25 C LS LS LS LS 15-36 weeks 26 D+LS LS LS LS LS 27 D LS LS LS LS LS 28 E LS LS LS LS LS 29 PRIOR 0 1 2 3 4 or more 30 ADJUDICATIONS p. 32 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • NOTE: References in the grid to days or weeks mean periods of 1 confinement. "LS" means "local sanctions" as defined in RCW 2 13.40.020.3 (1) The vertical axis of the grid is the current offense 4 category. The current offense category is determined by the offense 5 of adjudication.6 (2) The horizontal axis of the grid is the number of prior 7 adjudications included in the juvenile's criminal history. Each prior 8 felony adjudication shall count as one point. Each prior violation, 9 misdemeanor, and gross misdemeanor adjudication shall count as 1/4 10 point. Fractional points shall be rounded down.11 (3) The standard range disposition for each offense is determined 12 by the intersection of the column defined by the prior adjudications 13 and the row defined by the current offense category.14 (4) RCW 13.40.180 applies if the offender is being sentenced for 15 more than one offense.16 (5) A current offense that is a violation is equivalent to an 17 offense category of E. However, a disposition for a violation shall 18 not include confinement.19 OR20 OPTION B21 SUSPENDED DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVE22 (1) If the offender is subject to a standard range disposition 23 involving confinement by the department, the court may impose the 24 standard range and suspend the disposition on condition that the 25 offender comply with one or more local sanctions and any educational 26 or treatment requirement. The treatment programs provided to the 27 offender must be either research-based best practice programs as 28 identified by the Washington state institute for public policy or the 29 joint legislative audit and review committee, or for chemical 30 dependency treatment programs or services, they must be evidence-31 based or research-based best practice programs. For the purposes of 32 this subsection:33 (a) "Evidence-based" means a program or practice that has had 34 multiple site random controlled trials across heterogeneous 35 populations demonstrating that the program or practice is effective 36 for the population; and37 p. 33 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (b) "Research-based" means a program or practice that has some 1 research demonstrating effectiveness, but that does not yet meet the 2 standard of evidence-based practices.3 (2) If the offender fails to comply with the suspended 4 disposition, the court may impose sanctions pursuant to RCW 13.40.200 5 or may revoke the suspended disposition and order the disposition's 6 execution.7 (3) An offender is ineligible for the suspended disposition 8 option under this section if the offender:9 (a) Is adjudicated of an A+ or A++ offense;10 (b) Is fourteen years of age or older and is adjudicated of one 11 or more of the following offenses:12 (i) A class A offense, or an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation 13 to commit a class A offense;14 (ii) Manslaughter in the first degree (RCW 9A.32.060);15 (iii) Assault in the second degree (RCW 9A.36.021), extortion in 16 the first degree (RCW 9A.56.120), kidnapping in the second degree 17 (RCW 9A.40.030), drive-by shooting (RCW 9A.36.045), vehicular 18 homicide (RCW 46.61.520), hit and run death (RCW 46.52.020(4)(a)), or 19 manslaughter 2 (RCW 9A.32.070); or20 (iv) Violation of the uniform controlled substances act (RCW 21 69.50.401(2) (a) and (b)), when the offense includes infliction of 22 bodily harm upon another or when during the commission or immediate 23 withdrawal from the offense the respondent was armed with a deadly 24 weapon;25 (c) Is ordered to serve a disposition for a firearm violation 26 under RCW 13.40.193;27 (d) Is adjudicated of a sex offense as defined in RCW 9.94A.030; 28 or29 (e) Has a prior option B disposition.30 OR31 OPTION C32 CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY/MENTAL HEALTH DISPOSITION ALTERNATIVE33 If the juvenile offender is subject to a standard range 34 disposition of local sanctions or 15 to 36 weeks of confinement and 35 has not committed a B++ or B+ offense, the court may impose a 36 disposition under RCW 13.40.160(4) and 13.40.165.37 OR38 p. 34 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • OPTION D1 MANIFEST INJUSTICE2 If the court determines that a disposition under option A, B, or C 3 would effectuate a manifest injustice, the court shall impose a 4 disposition outside the standard range under RCW 13.40.160(2).5 Sec. 17. RCW 2.24.010 and 2013 c 27 s 3 are each amended to read 6 as follows:7 (1) There may be appointed in each county or judicial district, 8 by the judges of the superior court having jurisdiction therein, one 9 or more court commissioners for said county or judicial district. 10 Each such commissioner shall be a citizen of the United States and 11 shall hold the office during the pleasure of the judges making the 12 appointment.13 (2)(a) There may be appointed in counties with a population of 14 more than four hundred thousand, by the presiding judge of the 15 superior court having jurisdiction therein, one or more attorneys to 16 act as criminal commissioners to assist the superior court in 17 disposing of adult criminal cases. Such criminal commissioners shall 18 have power, authority, and jurisdiction, concurrent with the superior 19 court and the judges thereof, in adult criminal cases, to preside 20 over arraignments, preliminary appearances, initial extradition 21 hearings, and noncompliance proceedings pursuant to RCW 9.94A.6333 or 22 9.94B.040; accept pleas if authorized by local court rules; appoint 23 counsel; make determinations of probable cause; set, amend, and 24 review conditions of pretrial release; set bail; set trial and 25 hearing dates; authorize continuances; accept waivers of the right to 26 speedy trial; and authorize and issue search warrants and orders to 27 intercept, monitor, or record wired or wireless telecommunications or 28 for the installation of electronic taps or other devices to include, 29 but not be limited to, vehicle global positioning system or other 30 mobile tracking devices with all the powers conferred upon the judge 31 of the superior court in such matters.32 (b) Criminal commissioners shall also have the authority to 33 conduct resentencing hearings and to vacate convictions related to 34 State v. Blake, No. 96873-0 (Feb. 25, 2021). Criminal commissioners 35 may be appointed for this purpose regardless of the population of the 36 county served by the appointing court.37 p. 35 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (c) The county legislative authority must approve the creation of 1 criminal commissioner positions.2 Sec. 18. RCW 2.24.040 and 2009 c 28 s 1 are each amended to read 3 as follows:4 Such court commissioner shall have power, authority, and 5 jurisdiction, concurrent with the superior court and the judge 6 thereof, in the following particulars:7 (1) To hear and determine all matters in probate, to make and 8 issue all proper orders therein, and to issue citations in all cases 9 where same are authorized by the probate statutes of this state.10 (2) To grant and enter defaults and enter judgment thereon.11 (3) To issue temporary restraining orders and temporary 12 injunctions, and to fix and approve bonds thereon.13 (4) To act as referee in all matters and actions referred to him 14 or her by the superior court as such, with all the powers now 15 conferred upon referees by law.16 (5) To hear and determine all proceedings supplemental to 17 execution, with all the powers conferred upon the judge of the 18 superior court in such matters.19 (6) To hear and determine all petitions for the adoption of 20 children and for the dissolution of incorporations.21 (7) To hear and determine all applications for the commitment of 22 any person to the hospital for the insane, with all the powers of the 23 superior court in such matters: PROVIDED, That in cases where a jury 24 is demanded, same shall be referred to the superior court for trial.25 (8) To hear and determine all complaints for the commitments of 26 minors with all powers conferred upon the superior court in such 27 matters.28 (9) To hear and determine ex parte and uncontested civil matters 29 of any nature.30 (10) To grant adjournments, administer oaths, preserve order, 31 compel attendance of witnesses, and to punish for contempts in the 32 refusal to obey or the neglect of the court commissioner's lawful 33 orders made in any matter before the court commissioner as fully as 34 the judge of the superior court.35 (11) To take acknowledgments and proofs of deeds, mortgages and 36 all other instruments requiring acknowledgment under the laws of this 37 state, and to take affidavits and depositions in all cases.38 p. 36 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (12) To provide an official seal, upon which shall be engraved 1 the words "Court Commissioner," and the name of the county for which 2 he or she may be appointed, and to authenticate his official acts 3 therewith in all cases where same is necessary.4 (13) To charge and collect, for his or her own use, the same fees 5 for the official performance of official acts mentioned in 6 subsections (4) and (11) of this section as are provided by law for 7 referees and notaries public.8 (14) To hear and determine small claims appeals as provided in 9 chapter 12.36 RCW.10 (15) In adult criminal cases, to preside over arraignments, 11 preliminary appearances, initial extradition hearings, and 12 noncompliance proceedings pursuant to RCW 9.94A.6333 or 9.94B.040; 13 accept pleas if authorized by local court rules; appoint counsel; 14 make determinations of probable cause; set, amend, and review 15 conditions of pretrial release; set bail; set trial and hearing 16 dates; authorize continuances; ((and)) accept waivers of the right to 17 speedy trial; and conduct resentencing hearings and hearings to 18 vacate convictions related to State v. Blake, No. 96873-0 (Feb. 25, 19 2021).20 Sec. 19. RCW 9.94A.728 and 2018 c 166 s 2 are each amended to 21 read as follows:22 (1) No person serving a sentence imposed pursuant to this chapter 23 and committed to the custody of the department shall leave the 24 confines of the correctional facility or be released prior to the 25 expiration of the sentence except as follows:26 (a) An offender may earn early release time as authorized by RCW 27 9.94A.729;28 (b) An offender may leave a correctional facility pursuant to an 29 authorized furlough or leave of absence. In addition, offenders may 30 leave a correctional facility when in the custody of a corrections 31 officer or officers;32 (c)(i) The secretary may authorize an extraordinary medical 33 placement for an offender when all of the following conditions exist:34 (A) The offender has a medical condition that is serious and is 35 expected to require costly care or treatment;36 (B) The offender poses a low risk to the community because he or 37 she is currently physically incapacitated due to age or the medical 38 condition or is expected to be so at the time of release; and39 p. 37 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (C) It is expected that granting the extraordinary medical 1 placement will result in a cost savings to the state.2 (ii) An offender sentenced to death or to life imprisonment 3 without the possibility of release or parole is not eligible for an 4 extraordinary medical placement.5 (iii) The secretary shall require electronic monitoring for all 6 offenders in extraordinary medical placement unless the electronic 7 monitoring equipment interferes with the function of the offender's 8 medical equipment or results in the loss of funding for the 9 offender's medical care, in which case, an alternative type of 10 monitoring shall be utilized. The secretary shall specify who shall 11 provide the monitoring services and the terms under which the 12 monitoring shall be performed.13 (iv) The secretary may revoke an extraordinary medical placement 14 under this subsection (1)(c) at any time.15 (v) Persistent offenders are not eligible for extraordinary 16 medical placement;17 (d) The governor, upon recommendation from the clemency and 18 pardons board, may grant an extraordinary release for reasons of 19 serious health problems, senility, advanced age, extraordinary 20 meritorious acts, or other extraordinary circumstances;21 (e) No more than the final twelve months of the offender's term 22 of confinement may be served in partial confinement for aiding the 23 offender with: Finding work as part of the work release program under 24 chapter 72.65 RCW; or reestablishing himself or herself in the 25 community as part of the parenting program in RCW 9.94A.6551. This is 26 in addition to that period of earned early release time that may be 27 exchanged for partial confinement pursuant to RCW 9.94A.729(5)(d);28 (f) No more than the final six months of the offender's term of 29 confinement may be served in partial confinement as home detention as 30 part of the graduated reentry program developed by the department 31 under RCW 9.94A.733;32 (g) The governor may pardon any offender;33 (h) The department may release an offender from confinement any 34 time within ten days before a release date calculated under this 35 section;36 (i) An offender may leave a correctional facility prior to 37 completion of his or her sentence if the sentence has been reduced as 38 provided in RCW 9.94A.870;39 p. 38 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (j) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, an 1 offender sentenced for a felony crime listed in RCW 9.94A.540 as 2 subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of total confinement shall 3 not be released from total confinement before the completion of the 4 listed mandatory minimum sentence for that felony crime of conviction 5 unless allowed under RCW 9.94A.540; and6 (k) Any person convicted of one or more crimes committed prior to 7 the person's eighteenth birthday may be released from confinement 8 pursuant to RCW 9.94A.730.9 (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an 10 offender entitled to vacation of a conviction or the recalculation of 11 his or her offender score pursuant to State v. Blake, No. 96873-0 12 (Feb. 25, 2021), may be released from confinement pursuant to a court 13 order if the offender has already served a period of confinement that 14 exceeds his or her new standard range. This provision does not create 15 an independent right to release from confinement prior to 16 resentencing.17 (3) Offenders residing in a juvenile correctional facility 18 placement pursuant to RCW 72.01.410(1)(a) are not subject to the 19 limitations in this section.20 Sec. 20. RCW 10.64.110 and 1977 ex.s. c 259 s 1 are each amended 21 to read as follows:22 (1) Following June 15, 1977, except as provided in subsection (3) 23 of this section, there shall be affixed to the original of every 24 judgment and sentence of a felony conviction in every court in this 25 state and every order adjudicating a juvenile to be a delinquent 26 based upon conduct which would be a felony if committed by an adult, 27 a fingerprint of the defendant or juvenile who is the subject of the 28 order. When requested by the clerk of the court, the actual affixing 29 of fingerprints shall be done by a representative of the office of 30 the county sheriff.31 (2) The clerk of the court shall attest that the fingerprints 32 appearing on the judgment in sentence, order of adjudication of 33 delinquency, or docket, is that of the individual who is the subject 34 of the judgment or conviction, order, or docket entry.35 (3) Amended judgment and sentences issued pursuant to State v. 36 Blake, No. 96873-0 (Feb. 25, 2021), are exempt from the 37 fingerprinting requirements in subsection (1) of this section when 38 there are no additional offenses of conviction from the original 39 p. 39 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • judgment and sentence and the defendant is in custody in a 1 correctional facility. In such cases, the amended judgment and 2 sentence shall reference the original judgment and sentence and the 3 fingerprints affixed thereto.4 *NEW SECTION. Sec. 21. The State v. Blake reimbursement account 5 is created in the state treasury. Moneys in the account may be spent 6 only after appropriation. Expenditures from the account may be used 7 only for state and local government costs resulting from the supreme 8 court's decision in State v. Blake, No. 96873-0 (Feb. 25, 2021), and 9 to reimburse individuals for legal financial obligations paid in 10 connection with sentences that have been invalidated as a result of 11 the decision.12 *Sec. 21 was vetoed. See message at end of chapter. NEW SECTION. Sec. 22. The appropriations in this section are 13 provided to the health care authority community behavioral health 14 program and are subject to the following conditions and limitations:15 (1) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 16 are each appropriated: $25,000,000 from the state general fund for 17 the fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $20,000,000 from the state 18 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 19 this subsection are provided solely for the authority to contract 20 with behavioral health administrative service organizations to 21 implement the statewide recovery navigator program established in 22 section 2 of this act and for related technical assistance to support 23 this implementation. This includes funding for recovery navigator 24 teams to provide community-based outreach and case management 25 services based on the law enforcement assisted diversion model and 26 for technical assistance support from the law enforcement assisted 27 diversion national support bureau.28 (2) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 29 are each appropriated: $1,673,000 from the state general fund for the 30 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; $3,114,000 from the state general 31 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023; and $3,890,000, from 32 the general fund-federal account for the fiscal biennium ending June 33 30, 2023. The amounts in this subsection are provided solely for the 34 authority to implement clubhouse services in every region of the 35 state.36 p. 40 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • (3) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 1 are each appropriated: $5,000,000 from the state general fund for the 2 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $7,500,000 from the state 3 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 4 this subsection are provided solely for the authority to implement 5 the homeless outreach stabilization team program, pursuant to section 6 5(1) of this act.7 (4) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 8 are each appropriated: $2,500,000 from the state general fund for the 9 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $2,500,000 from the state 10 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 11 this subsection are provided solely for the authority to expand 12 efforts to provide opioid use disorder medication in city, county, 13 regional, and tribal jails.14 (5) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 15 are each appropriated: $500,000 from the state general fund for the 16 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $500,000 from the state general 17 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in this 18 subsection are provided solely for the authority to expand opioid 19 treatment network programs for people with co-occurring opioid and 20 stimulant use disorder.21 (6) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 22 are each appropriated: $1,400,000 from the state general fund for the 23 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $1,400,000 from the state 24 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 25 this subsection are provided solely for behavioral health 26 administrative service organizations to develop regional recovery 27 navigator program plans pursuant to section 2 of this act and to 28 establish positions focusing on regional planning to improve access 29 to and quality of regional behavioral health services with a focus on 30 integrated care.31 (7) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 32 are each appropriated: $75,000 from the state general fund for the 33 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $75,000 from the state general 34 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in this 35 subsection are provided solely for the authority to contract with an 36 organization with expertise in supporting efforts to increase access 37 to and improve quality in recovery housing and recovery residences. 38 This funding shall be used to increase recovery housing availability 39 through partnership with private landlords, increase accreditation of 40 p. 41 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • recovery residences statewide, operate a grievance process for 1 resolving challenges with recovery residences, and conduct a recovery 2 capital outcomes assessment for individuals living in recovery 3 residences.4 (8) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 5 are each appropriated: $500,000 from the state general fund for the 6 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $500,000 from the state general 7 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in this 8 subsection are provided solely for the authority to provide short-9 term housing vouchers for individuals with substance use disorders.10 (9) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 11 are each appropriated: $250,000 from the state general fund for the 12 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $250,000 from the state general 13 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in this 14 subsection are provided solely for the authority to issue grants for 15 substance use disorder family navigator services.16 (10) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 17 are each appropriated: $200,000 from the state general fund for the 18 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $200,000 from the state general 19 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in this 20 subsection are provided solely for the authority to convene and 21 provide staff and contracted services support to the recovery 22 oversight committee established in section 1 of this act.23 (11) The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, 24 are each appropriated: $2,565,000 from the state general fund for the 25 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $2,565,000 from the state 26 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 27 this subsection are provided solely for staff and contracted services 28 support for the authority to develop and implement the recovery 29 services plan established in section 1 of this act and to carry out 30 other requirements of this act. Within these amounts, funding is 31 provided for the authority to:32 (a) Establish an occupational nurse consultant position within 33 the authority to provide contract oversight, accountability, 34 performance improvement activities, and to ensure medicaid managed 35 care organization plan compliance with provisions in law and contract 36 related to care transitions work with local jails.37 (b) Establish a position within the authority to create and 38 oversee a program to initiate and support emergency department 39 programs for inducing medications for patients with opioid use 40 p. 42 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • disorder paired with a referral to community-based outreach and case 1 management programs.2 NEW SECTION. Sec. 23. The appropriation in this section is 3 provided to the administrative office of the courts and is subject to 4 the following conditions and limitations:5 The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, are 6 each appropriated: $2,250,000 from the state general fund for the 7 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $2,250,000 from the state 8 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 9 this subsection are provided solely to fund grants for therapeutic 10 courts operated by municipalities and district courts. The 11 administrative office of the courts must allocate grant funding based 12 upon a formula established by the administrative office of the 13 courts. The formula must distribute the grant funding equitably 14 between those therapeutic courts located east of the crest of the 15 Cascade mountains and those therapeutic courts located west of the 16 crest of the Cascade mountains. Multiple jurisdictions served by a 17 single municipal court or district court may apply for funds as a 18 single entity. Local jurisdictions receiving grant funding for 19 therapeutic courts must use funding to identify individuals before 20 the courts with substance use disorders or other behavioral health 21 needs and engage those individuals with community-based therapeutic 22 interventions.23 NEW SECTION. Sec. 24. The appropriation in this section is 24 provided to the department of commerce and is subject to the 25 following conditions and limitations:26 The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, are 27 each appropriated: $500,000 from the state general fund for the 28 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $1,000,000 from the state 29 general fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in 30 this subsection are provided solely for the department to provide 31 grants for the operational costs of new staffed recovery residences 32 which serve individuals with substance use disorders who require more 33 support than a level 1 recovery residence.34 NEW SECTION. Sec. 25. The appropriation in this section is 35 provided to the criminal justice training commission and is subject 36 to the following conditions and limitations:37 p. 43 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • The following sums, or so much thereof as may be necessary, are 1 each appropriated: $150,000 from the state general fund for the 2 fiscal year ending June 30, 2022; and $150,000 from the state general 3 fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2023. The amounts in this 4 subsection are provided solely for the commission to compensate 5 trainer time to deliver the curriculum related to law enforcement 6 interactions with persons with a substance use disorder pursuant to 7 section 7 of this act.8 NEW SECTION. Sec. 26. Sections 1 through 11 and 13 through 21 9 of this act are necessary for the immediate preservation of the 10 public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government 11 and its existing public institutions, and take effect immediately.12 NEW SECTION. Sec. 27. Section 11 of this act expires July 1, 13 2022.14 NEW SECTION. Sec. 28. Section 12 of this act takes effect July 15 1, 2022.16 NEW SECTION. Sec. 29. Sections 8 through 10, 12, 15, and 16 of 17 this act expire July 1, 2023.18 NEW SECTION. Sec. 30. If any provision of this act or its 19 application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 20 remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other 21 persons or circumstances is not affected.22 Passed by the Senate April 24, 2021. Passed by the House April 24, 2021. Approved by the Governor May 13, 2021, with the exception of certain items that were vetoed. Filed in Office of Secretary of State May 13, 2021. Note: Governor's explanation of partial veto is as follows: "I am returning herewith, without my approval as to Section 21, Engrossed Senate Bill No. 5476 entitled: "AN ACT Relating to addressing the State v. Blake decision." The bill creates a new account that will not be used, therefore it is unnecessary. For these reasons I have vetoed Section 21 of Engrossed Senate Bill No. 5476. p. 44 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • With the exception of Section 21, Engrossed Senate Bill No. 5476 is approved." --- END --- p. 45 ESB 5476.SL AGENDA ITEM #7. • Parks & Recreation Department Memorandum DATE: March 28, 2022 TO: Ryan McIrvin, Council President Members of Renton City Council CC: Armondo Pavone, Mayor Ed VanValey, Chief Administrative Officer FROM: Kelly Beymer, Parks and Recreation Administrator STAFF CONTACT: Carrie Nass, Recreation Division Director SUBJECT: Recreation Division Summer Operations, Programs & Events The Recreation Division is pleased to announce the following operational, programming and event plans for summer 2022. Our team has strived to provide a variety of recreational and community engagement opportunities, programs, and events. Building Operations & Beaches o Renton Community Center  Open Monday – Friday, 9a-7p and Saturdays, 9a-3p for fitness room, gym use (pickleball, basketball, volleyball, racquetball) and other registered programs.  Facility rental reservations begin April 4 for events and meetings starting in June (includes Senior Center and Highlands Neighborhood Center too) o Renton Senior Activity Center  Open Monday – Friday, 8a-3pm (opening until 4pm starting in May). Daily activities include fitness, cards, billiards, library, lunch program, coffee bar social hour and ping pong; Weekly health checks, dental program, virtual bingo, and dance (starts May 1); and field trips start early June. o Highlands Neighborhood Center  Currently open for STREAM Team after school enrichment program and other recreation activities; Closed for portion of summer for floor renovations.  Summer camps moving to neighborhood park buildings. o Henry Moses Aquatic Center AGENDA ITEM #9. • Council President Ryan McIrvin Members of Renton City Council Page 2 of 4 March 28, 2022  Opening June 25 – September 5. Final schedule to be released in mid-April with updated information on admission fees, swim session times, online reservations, programming and what you can expect for summer 2022 o Coulon & Kennydale Beaches  Lifeguards will be guarding beaches from June – September. (Dates TBD) Programs o Youth, Adult, & Adaptive Recreation Athletic Leagues, Fitness and Enrichment Programs  A variety of registerable indoor and outdoor programming will be offered, including rowing, youth and adult sports leagues, youth sports camps, fitness classes, adaptive recreation, and environmental education. These offerings will be promoted via social media, newsletter, Let’s Go Renton Recreation guide via recreation registration software (PerfectMind). o STREAM Team Summer Day Camps: June 27 – Friday August 26  Camp locations: • Kennydale Park • Teasdale Park • Tiffany Park Recreation Division Coordinated Events o Chalk Your Walk: May 13-15 o Bike Rodeo & Safety Fair: May 21:  Collaboration with Harborview Medical Center, RRFA, and Renton Police Department. o Memorial Day: May 30:  Veteran’s Memorial Park o 4th of July  Evening fireworks show and music entertainment at Coulon Park. This year the entire park will be open for public use. The beach will be open as well and guarded. 4th of July themed volleyball tournament at Cedar River Park. o Pooch Plunge: September 10-11:  This very popular event for dog owners will be held at HMAC. The pools chemicals are reduced days prior, so the water is safe for the pups. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Council President Ryan McIrvin Members of Renton City Council Page 3 of 4 March 28, 2022 o Senior Center “Backyard” Ribbon Cutting: Date TBD  In partnership with the Parks Planning and Natural Resources Division o Age-Friendly Renton – Senior Resource/Wellness Fair”: Date TBD/Early fall  In partnership with Valley Medical Center Recreation Division and Partnered Events o Renton Multicultural Festival: May 6 & 7 o Renton River Days: July 17 – 23:  July 17-July 23: Nibble Around Renton - Promotion to explore/support eateries and restaurants city-wide  Friday, July 22: Piazza Park and Renton Pavilion Event Center - Live entertainment/bands, Rain City Catering to provide Craft Beer & Wine Garden, Arts & Crafts Vendors; Liberty Park – Family Movie Night  Saturday, July 23: Piazza Park and Renton Pavilion Event Center - Live entertainment/bands, Rain City Catering to provide Craft Beer & Wine Garden, Arts & Crafts Vendors; Coulon Beach Park – Antique & Classic Boat Show  Other Activities: Rubber Ducky Derby (date TBD); “Goose Chase” App (scavenger hunt app) o Outdoor Summer Concert Series (in partnership with Municipal Arts Commission)  June 29: Coulon  July 12: location TBD (RMAC taking lead on this date)  August 17: Sunset Neighborhood Park  August 31: Piazza Park (potentially “branded” Date Night) o Summer Outdoor Movie Series  July 22: Liberty Park (in partnership with Renton River Days)  August 5: Kennydale Park  August 13: Piazza (in partnership partnering with Rain City Catering’s Summerfest)  August 26: Tiffany Park City Vetted and Permitted Events (in queue) o April 30: Día del Niño AGENDA ITEM #9. • Council President Ryan McIrvin Members of Renton City Council Page 4 of 4 March 28, 2022 o May 22: Girls on the Run 5K o June 18 & 19: Juneteenth Celebration o July 16: Kaiser Permanente – Seattle to Portland Bicycle Classic o August 6: African American Male Wellness Run/Walk The Recreation Division is actively working through partnerships and in creative means to expand programming in a manner that is relevant, adaptable and of interest to a variety of community members. We look forward to seeing all of you. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Senior Activity CenterOverview Council Retreat March 31 & April 1, 2022 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Senior Activity Center Paving Repairs ADA Access Improvements 2 Construction tentatively begins 1st quarter 2022 Capital Improvement Projects AGENDA ITEM #9. • Senior Center Bocce Court Improvements –Spring 2022 3 Capital Improvement Projects AGENDA ITEM #9. • Renton Senior Activity Center Served over 55,000 senior meals –busiest location in South King County Partnered with RFA on COVID-19 Mobile Vaccination Unit Hosted ‘Thanksgiving Dinner’ –drive through event for 250 seniors Initiated Age Friendly Initiative & Action Plan - Citywide Will provide Council a summary update of findings soon Senior Center programming increasing (see attached “Let’s Go Renton” Recreation Brochure) Next issue, June through August will provide additional programming and expanded hours AGENDA ITEM #9. • Renton Senior Activity Center See pages 16 –19 for current Senior programs AGENDA ITEM #9. • City of Renton Recreation DivisionLet’s Go Renton! rentonwa.gov/register Chalk Your Walk BACK THIS MAY! MARCH-MAY 2022 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Chalk our Walk FRIDAY, MAY 13 5:30 –7PM Come get creative with recreation staff and show off your chalking skills in person! This is a FREE community event with chalk provided. We have two locations waiting to be chalked by YOU! For health, safety and gathering size, pre-registration is required. Register to chalk onsite at rentonwa.gov/register Highlands Neighborhood Center Code #10639 Renton Community Center Code #10640 It’s Showtime! SATURDAY, MAY 14 Show us the artistic ways you chalked your walk on Facebook or Instagram with #ChalkRentonOut. Meaningful Messages SUNDAY, MAY 15 Show your appreciation for others by leaving an inspirational message for a great week ahead. CHALK PICK UP FRIDAY, MAY 13 5:30 –7PM FREE! Pick up one bucket of chalk per family from the City of Renton Recreation Division at either of these drive-thru locations while supplies last (registration not required for pick up only): Highlands Neighborhood Center 800 Edmonds Ave NE - OR - Renton Community Center, 1715 Maple Valley Hwy GET OUTSIDE, GET CREATIVE & CHALK IT OUT! Calling all ages: let your sidewalk, driveway, or pavement be your canvas! Inspire your neighborhood and show love to your community! FRIDAY, MAY 13 Register to Chalk Our Walk! INFO BELOW FREE FOR ALL AGES! NEW FOR 2022 #ChalkRentonOut @RentonCommunityServices @RentonRecreation rentonwa.gov/chalkyourwalk #ChalkRentonOut Course Fees Renton Resident (R) and Non-Resident (NR) “R” indicates a fee for City of Renton residents and “NR” indicates a fee for non-residents. Indoor Recreational Facility Access Masks are required at all times, and a COVID-19 health screening must be completed to enter the facility. These mandates may be revised in the future at any time as per Public Health – Seattle & King County and Washington Governors Orders. Info & Contacts General Recreation Info rentonwa.gov/recreation Adaptive Recreation rentonwa.gov/adaptive Senior Center rentonwa.gov/rsac Questions? 425-430-6700 or email recreation@rentonwa.gov City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 2 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Pesky penguins have marched into our parks. Can you help us find them? When you spot one, return it to the Renton Community Center or Renton Senior Activity Center for a prize. 1. FIND A PENGUIN March 1-14 penguins can be spotted at these Renton parks: RON REGIS PARK, 1501 Orcas Avenue SE THOMAS TEASDALE PARK, 601 South 23rd Street HIGHLANDS NEIGHBORHOOD PARK 800 Edmonds Avenue NE 2. RETURN IT & CLAIM A PRIZE Once you’ve picked up a penguin, return it to one of two locations to claim your prize: Renton Community Center M-F, 9:30am–6:30pm, 1715 Maple Valley Hwy Renton Senior Activity Center M-F , 9:30am–2:30pm, 211 Burnett Ave N March 1 -14 March of the Penguins! Keep a look out for those pesky penguins! Renton City Concert Band SPRING CONCERT FriendsOld FriendsOld && New New Sunday, March 20, 4:00pm Renton IKEA Performing Arts Center 400 S. Second St., Renton rentonwa.gov/events // 425-430-6700 Adults = $10, Students & Seniors 50+ = $7. Tickets can be purchased at Renton Community Center, Renton Senior Activity Center, or at the door on the day of the performance. Proper masking is required. Conductor Michael Simpson City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 3 AGENDA ITEM #9. • ADULT MUSIC Renton City Concert Band March 31-June 9, Thursday rehearsals Come one, come all to the inspirational sound of the Renton City Concert Band under the magnificent direction of Michael Simpson. RCCB is a 60-plus member concert band consisting of local area musicians, that is dedicated to providing an opportunity for the local musicians to come together and play quality music for an appreciative community audience. The band’s repertoire includes a variety of music from Big Band to Broadway to the Classics. Each session concludes with a community concert. The band is sure to inspire you! An online/QR code COVID-19 health screening will need to be completed prior participating each week. McKnight Middle School, $30R/$36NR #10610 Get Involved in 2022 Volunteer your time and talents to support City of Renton programs, projects and events! One-time or ongoing opportunities are available to fit your schedule. Volunteering is a great way to connect with community members and make a difference where you live. Create an account at rentonwa.gov/volunteer, check the box(es) that describe your interests and you will be notified to register when a related program, project or event is scheduled. More information about volunteering at park restoration projects, at the Farmers Market and becoming a Trail Ranger will be listed on the website in March. If your group or business would like to participate in a park beautification project, contact Teresa Nishi, at tnishi@rentonwa.gov or 425-430-6694. VOLUNTEER OPPORTUNITIES Arbor Day / Earth Day Saturday, April 23, Location TBA Details and registration to volunteer for this event will start March 3 at rentonwa.gov/volunteer or contact Teresa Nishi, at tnishi@rentonwa.gov or 425-430-6694. SAVE THE DATE! City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 4 AGENDA ITEM #9. • RESERVE YOUR TIME AT RCC! RENTON COMMUNITY CENTER Register for all sessions online at >> rentonwa.gov/register << or call 425-430-6700 B ASKET B ALLFIT N ESS ROOMVOLLEYBA L LRACQUETBALL NOTE: All sessions are reservation-based. Please see Indoor Recreational Facility Access information on page 2. 1715 Maple Valley Hwy Reservations for Fitness Room, Racquetball and Gym usage will be available Mon–Fri 9am–7pm and, beginning March 26, Saturdays 9am–3pm.PICKLEBAL L City of Renton Recreation Division // 5 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Toddler Play, Movement & Dance with Caregiver AGES 1–4. Bring your little dancers to work on those gross motor skills! We will sing, dance, jump, shake and tumble together to some of your kids favorite songs. Using our imaginations and music we will discover new movements and new fun. Monday, 10–10:45am Renton Community Center Mar 7–28 #10313 $40R/$48NR Apr 4–25 #10449 $40R/$48NR May 2–23 #10450 $40R/$48NR Gymnastics AGES 4–12. Under the instruction of the Roach Gymnastics and Strength coaches your child will learn basic gymnastics skills including handstands, cartwheels, rolls and jumps as well as body aware- ness, coordination, social skills, and overall conditioning. We strive to create a safe, fun loving and high-energy class where the goal is to make each child feel better walking out the door than when they walked in. Those with previous experience will continue to develop their skills. Leotard or shorts and t-shirt are recommended and must be zipper free. Wednesdays, $48R / $58NR Highlands Neighborhood Center PRE-K AGES 4–5 Mar 2–23 #10511 4:15–4:55pm Apr 6–27 #10515 4:15–4:55pm May 4–25 #10518 4:15–4:55pm AGES 6–12 Mar 2–23 #10512 5–5:50pm Mar 2–23 #10514 5:55–6:45pm Apr 6–27 #10516 5–5:50pm Apr 6–27 #10517 5:55–6:45pm May 4–25 #10519 5–5:50pm May 4–25 #10520 5:55–6:45pm PRESCHOOL & YOUTH Dream Team Cheer Squad AGES 7–18. Be a part of the Renton Parks beginning-to-intermediate level cheer squad! You’ll learn dances, cheers, and beginning tumbling. There will be opportunities to perform too. Dream Team has performed at halftime for the Seattle Storm and University of Wash- ington basketball games, and numerous community events. Cheer classes are run by Eastside Dream Elite Cheer & Dance, www.EastsideDreamElite.com. Mondays, 5:15–6:45pm Renton Community Center Feb 28–Apr 11 #10508 $90R/$108NR Apr 18–June 13 #10502 $120R/$144NR City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 6 Apply for a scholarship at rentonwa.gov/giftofplay AGENDA ITEM #9. • PRESCHOOL & YOUTH RoboPets KINDERGARTEN–SECOND GRADE. Children will begin to explore the world of robotics as they build moving animals that teach the fundamentals of robotic design. Whether learning about animal habitats or discovering ways that gears and pulleys create move- ment while building dancing birds and robotic dogs, your child is sure to have a great time. Monday–Friday, 9am–12pm Renton Community Center Apr 4–8 #10562 $260R/$312NR GameBots GRADES 3–5. Calling all gamers! Have a blast creating games each week while learning about robotics. Students will learn about gear ratio, sensors, pro- gramming, and pulleys as they create fun to play games. Whether creating a pinball machine, duck hunt or a ring toss game, your child is sure to have fun building, learning, and playing. Monday–Friday, 12:30–3:30pm Renton Community Center Apr 4–8 #10525 $260R/312NR Creative Kids Craft Kits on the Go! AGES 3 & UP. Craft kits are back! Running out of ideas to keep busy hands creative? We’ve got it covered! Each art/ craft kit includes enough materials and directions to create two projects. Please note some common household supplies will be needed to complete the projects such as scissors, glue, markers etc. Each project has a registration deadline to give time for mailing materials—kits should arrive within a week after registration deadline. LUCKY WREATH Mar 17 #10524 $10R/$12NR Registration deadline March 7 MOTHER’S DAY CELEBRATION May 8 #10593 $10R/$12NR Registration deadline May 1 SPRING BREAK CAMPS NEW City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 7 Apply for a scholarship at rentonwa.gov/giftofplay AGENDA ITEM #9. • STORYWALK With King County Library System Get Outdoors! Get Reading! StoryWalks combine healthy activities of walking and movement while reading a book! Look for StoryWalks at Liberty Park and Sunset Neighborhood Park this spring. Check rentonwa.gov/parks for exact dates and locations. City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 8 • For Spring 2022 classes, only one adult per student will be allowed for class check-in. Gathering/waiting in the community center lobby is not allowed at this time. • Students in Ballet and Creative Movement classes must wear ballet shoes with leather bottoms. • Students in Jazz classes must wear jazz shoes. • Students in Hip-Hop classes must wear sneakers and comfortable clothing. • Students in Tap classes must wear tap shoes. • Students in Contemporary may dance barefoot or instructors will advise shoe type. See courses next page >> “Steppin’ Together” Dance offers professional instruction with a strong emphasis on technique, fitness and fun, all in a nurturing and motivating environment. Each student receives individual attention, initiating the creative expression, joy and appreciation of dance and music. Recreation Scholarships Scholarships for course fees are available for youth 18 or younger, adults 50 and older, and individuals who participate in Adaptive Recreation programs. This program is funded entirely through generous donations from individuals, service organizations, local businesses, and grants. Complete an application at rentonwa.gov/scholarship For questions, email recreation@rentonwa.gov STEPPIN’ TOGETHER Emphasizing technique, fitness and fun for ages 6–18 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Session Day Ages Class Time Fee Instructor Reg. Code Mar 5–Apr 2 Saturdays 7–10 Contemporary I/II 9:15–10:05am $35R/$42NR Gladney 10580 7–10 Ballet I 11:15–12:05pm $35R/$42NR Gladney 10587 10–13 Ballet II 12:15–1:05pm $35R/$42NR Gladney 10589 11–14 Intermediate Contemporary 10:15–11:05am $35R/$42NR Gladney 10582 12–18 Advanced Tap 11–11:55am $35R/$42NR Brashears 10585 14–18 Advanced Contemporary/ Lyrical Technique 12–12:55pm $35R/$42NR Brashears 10578 14–18 Advanced Ballet 1–1:55pm $35R/$42NR Brashears 10576 Mar 7–Apr 4 Monday 14–18 Advanced Contemporary/ Lyrical for Performers 6–7:30pm $50R/$60NR Brashears 10573 Mar 2–30 Wednesday 6–12 Youth Hip Hop Dance 5–5:45pm $50R/$60NR Tampinco 10316 Apr 6–27 Wednesday 6–12 Youth Hip Hop Dance 5–5:45pm $50R/$60NR Tampinco 10447 Apr 23–June 4 Saturdays 7–10 Contemporary I/II 9:15–10:05am $42R/$50NR Gladney 10581 7–10 Ballet I 11:15–12:05pm $42R/$50NR Gladney 10588 10–13 Ballet II 12:15–1:05pm $42R/$50NR Gladney 10590 11–14 Intermediate Contemporary 10:15–11:05am $42R/$50NR Gladney 10586 12–18 Advanced Tap 11–11:55am $42R/$50NR Brashears 10575 14–18 Advanced Contemporary/ Lyrical Technique 12–12:55pm $42R/$50NR Brashears 10579 14–18 Advanced Ballet 1–1:55pm $42R/$50NR Brashears 10577 Apr 25–June 13 Monday 14–18 Advanced Contemporary/ Lyrical for Performers 6–7:30pm $60R/$72NR Brashears 10574 May 4–25 Wednesday 6–12 Youth Hip Hop Dance 5–5:45pm $40R/$48NR Tampinco 10448 City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 9 YOUTH & TEEN DANCE OUR MISSION: To provide a safe, encouraging and engaging dance experience where students build confidence, work as a team, express themselves and improve their overall technique. We welcome dancers of every kind and give our students the tools they need to thrive in a classroom setting. AGENDA ITEM #9. • PEE WEE SOCCER Ages 3–6, Saturdays, April 2–May 7 NEW The Pee Wee Soccer program is focused on fun, participation, and socialization. We structure our group into a ‘team’ format, meaning your child will be placed on a team of eight and assigned a volunteer coach. The first 30 minutes is focused on basic skills and practice with the remaining 30 minutes devoted to recreational game. Game times will vary each week. Schedules will be sent out two weeks prior to first game. Saturdays, 10am–3pm, $42R/$50NR Ages 3–4 Apr 2–May 7 #10584 Ages 5–6 Apr 2–May 7 #10592 VOLUNTEER COACHES NEEDED: Our program would not be possible without you! Multiple coaches are needed for each age group. FACTS ABOUT COACHING: • One hour per week commitment • We provide lesson plans, equipment, coaching attire and set-up • All coaches/volunteers must complete and pass a national background check. Interested in giving back? Contact Sean Conway at sconway@rentonwa.gov for the volunteer coaches application. City of Renton Recreation Division // 10 Apply for a scholarship at rentonwa.gov/giftofplay MARTIAL ARTS Tae Kwon Do AGES 6 & UP. Join instructors Martha Soto and Carla Abbott of Forza Dragon Martial Arts. They will instruct students in the formal styles of Korean Martial Arts including Tae Kwon Do, Hapkido, and Hwrang Do. This is a program for the entire family. Questions: email the instructor at forzadragonma@gmail.com. Tuesdays & Thursdays, $50R/$60NR Highlands Neighborhood Center Beginning White Belt Mar 1–Apr 14 #10507 5:30–6:30pm Gold Belt & Above Mar 1–Apr 14 #10509 6:30–7:30pm VOLLEYBALL Co-ed Volleyball Clinic AGES 8–14. Spring into fun with our volleyball clinic! This is a great time to practice and improve your serving, pass- ing, setting, and hitting skills! Coaches will cover ball handling, footwork, and court awareness. Each progressive session will involve full game play, being a good teammate is emphasized! All skill levels are welcome. Renton Community Center Saturday, 9-11am Mar 26-Apr 30 #10694 $50R/$60NR TRACK & FIELD AGES 5–14. This program is about fun, participation, skill development and competing with friends. Events include sprints, relays, softball throw and long jump. Track meets will be held on Thursday’s beginning in June. Tuesdays & Thursdays, $50R/$60NR Renton Stadium Ages 5-8 May 24–Jul 14 #10671 6-7pm Ages 9-14 May 24–Jul 14 #10672 7-8pm AGENDA ITEM #9. • Flag Football AGES 4 –12. An exciting introduction to America’s favorite game! Using skills and drills from the experts at the sport’s national governing body, USA Football, coaches will teach the key concepts of passing, receiving, running, kicking, punting and flag pulling—all presented in a positive environment with a focus on teamwork and sportsmanship. Outdoor SATURDAY, March 5, Cedar River Park ONE-DAY CLINIC Ages 7–12 10am–12pm #SSA134410 SATURDAYS, Apr 2–23, Tiffany Park Ages 4–6 9:30 –10:15am #SSA134430 Ages 7–12 10:30–11:15am #SSA134431 Register at skyhawks.com, $35 –$52 Basketball AGES 4–12. This fun, skill-intensive program is designed for beginning to intermediate players. Using their progressing curriculum, Skyhawks focuses on the whole player—teaching sportsmanship and teamwork. Kids will learn the fundamentals of passing, shooting, ball handling, rebounding, and defense through skill-based instruction and scrimmages. FRIDAYS Apr 29–May 20 Kennydale Park, Outdoor Ages 4-6 4:30–5:15pm #SSA134463 Ages 7-12 5:30–6:15pm #SSA134464 Register at skyhawks.com, $52–$61 Soccer Camp AGES 4 –12. Your young athlete will gain the technical skills and sport knowledge required for their next step into soccer. Areas of focus are dribbling, passing, shooting and ball control. By the end of the program, your child will have learned new life skills such as teamwork and sportsmanship, made new friends and improved their soccer skills WEDNESDAYS, Mar 9–30, Tiffany Park Ages 4–7 4–4:45pm #SSA134407 Ages 8–12 5–5:45pm #SSA134408 FRIDAYS, Apr 1–22, Tiffany Park Ages 4–7 5:30–6:15pm #SSA134426 Ages 7–12 6:30–7:15pm #SSA134427 SATURDAYS, Apr 30–May 21, Tiffany Pk Ages 4–7 9–9:45am #SSA134466 Ages 7–12 10–10:45am #SSA134465 Register at skyhawks.com, $52–$61 SKYHAWKS YOUTH SPORTS To register visit skyhawks.com or call 800-804-3509 City of Renton Recreation Division // 11 AGENDA ITEM #9. • STREAM Team Afterschool Program is back! Spots are limited so register now. Through a generous grant from King County’s Best Starts for Kids Out-of-School-Time Program, the city’s Parks and Recreation Department will provide high-quality out-of-school programming for elementary and middle school students coordinated through School’s Out Washington. STREAM Team will bring high-quality, culturally-appropriate programming, featuring a variety of engagement options and a strong focus on science, technology, reading, recreation, environment, arts, and math.  Our partner organizations include Environmental Science Center, and Snapology. For more information, please contact streamteam@rentonwa.gov. Highlands Neighborhood Center Elementary, Grades K-5, #10377, Middle School, Grades 6-8, #10378 ADAPTIVE RECREATION Connect with Adaptive Rec partici- pants through “The Buzz” quarterly publication for virtual activities and in-person activities! Tasty Tuesdays Zoom Cooking Class Tuesday, $20R/$25NR Apr 5–May 31 #10510 4–5pm Special Olympics Cycling Ages 8 and up Monday, $34R/$40NR Mar 21–May 23 #10501 6–7pm Track and Field Ages 8 and up Monday and Wednesday, $34R/$40NR Mar 21–May 25 #10503 6–7pm Soccer Ages 8 and up Monday and Wednesday, $34R/40NR Mar 21–May 25 #10504 6–7pm City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 12 AGENDA ITEM #9. • ADULT FITNESS Dance Fitness & Cardio Hip Hop AGES 14 & UP. Just come and dance like nobody’s watching, all while having fun and burning calories! This one-hour class including warm-up and cool-down will be sure to get you moving with explosive Hip Hop, Reggaeton, Afro and Pop beats. Bring a towel, water bottle, and a friend to class! No experience required. Single-day reservations allowed as space permits. Renton Community Center WEDNESDAYS, 10–11am Mar 2–30 #10331 $30R/$36NR Apr 6–27 #10451 $24R/$29NR May 4–25 #10452 $24R/$29NR Single–day reservations: Mar 2–30 #10332 $7R/$8.50NR Apr 6–May 25 #10453 $7R/8.50NR SATURDAYS, 9:30–10:30am Mar 5–26 #10327 $24R/$29NR Apr 2–30 #10455 $30R/$36NR May 7–28 #10456 $24R/29NR Single–day reservations: Mar 5–26 #10328 $7R/$8.50NR Apr 2–May 28 #10454 $7R/$8.50NR Body Sculpt AGES 14 & UP. Bring your mat and join us for a 1-hour Body Sculpt class. We will use our own body weight, light dumb- bells (optional) and resistance bands to tone and improve flexibility, balance, and muscle strength in our bodies. This class is a fusion of cardio, yoga, and strength training to target all major muscle groups with a focus on core strength. It is suitable for all levels and modifications will be shown. Single-day reservations allowed as space permits. Renton Community Center TUESDAYS, 10:30–11:30AM Mar 1–29 #10319 $30R/$36NR Apr 5–26 #10441 $24R/$29NR May 3–31 #10442 $30R/$36NR Single–day reservations: March #10320 $7R/$8.50NR Apr/May #10446 $7R/$8.50NR THURSDAYS, 6–7PM Mar 3–31 #10323 $30R/$36NR Apr 7–28 #10443 $24R/$29NR May 5–26 #10444 $24R/$29NR Single–day reservations: March #10324 $7R/$8.50NR Apr/May #10445 $7R/$8.50NR Inner Stillness Meditations AGES 16 & UP. Are you running on an empty tank? Would you like to feel lighter, more inspired and more peace of mind? Join instructor Amy Rachelle for Inner Stillness Meditations. You’ll be guided using a blend of heart-centering practices from Eastern philosophy, energy psychology, and gentle body wisdom. No experience necessary, just a curious heart and an open mind. Bring a mat, eye cover, cushion, or blanket for your comfort. Optional: A notebook and pen to record insights & reflections. Banquet Room Renton Community Center SATURDAYS, 8:15-9:15am Mar 5 #10678 $12R/$15NR Apr 16 #10679 $12R/$15/NR May 7 #10680 $12R/$15NR Cardio Fusion AGES 16 & UP. Start your day with a well-rounded workout! 15 minutes of cardio, 15 minutes of weights, 15 min- utes of core (abs/back) and 15 minutes of yoga. All fitness levels welcome! Single-day reservations allowed as space permits. Renton Community Center THURSDAYS 9:05–10:05am Mar 3–31 #10303 $30R/$36NR Apr 7–28 #10426 $24R/$29NR May 5–26 #10427 $24R/$29NR Single–day reservations Mar 3–31 #10304 $7R/$8.50NR Apr 7–May 26 #10428 $7R/$8.50NR NEW City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 13 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Spring Softball Leagues Coed and Men’s Rec Divisions The spring adult softball leagues will begin early May! Double-header format, 14 game guarantee. Game times are 6/7:10pm and 8:30/9:40pm. League is sanctioned by USA softball and umpires are provided for league play. Team fee: $800 + WA state sales tax. Coed Rec Tuesdays, May 3–Jul 5, #10505 Men’s Rec Wednesdays, May 4–Jul 6, #10506 ADULT LEAGUES FOR ALL LEAGUES: Full payment is due at the time of registration. Space is limited. Top teams will advance to a league championship tournament. Tournament winners will receive awards. Kickball League, Co-Ed Thursdays this Summer! Remember playing kickball as a kid? It is simple fun, social and anyone can play! Gather your friends, family and co-workers and kick some red rubber balls. Officials provided, four men and four women must be on the field at the start of a game. Games are played on Thursday evenings 6–10pm. Team fee: $350 + WA state sales tax. Thursdays, Jun 2–Jul 28, #10564 REGISTER NOW! Summer Softball League Coed Adult Rec Sunday The summer co-ed Rec softball league runs on Sundays from early June to late July. This is a recreational skill level league. All teams are guaranteed 8 single games. All games are played on Sundays at 3pm, 4:15pm, 5:45pm, or 6:30pm. League follows USA Softball format, and provides a certified umpire for all games. Registration begins April 4. Team fee: $400 plus WA state sales tax Sundays, Early June–Late July, #10566 City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 14 AGENDA ITEM #9. • NEW FOR 2022 AT RENTON COMMUNITY CENTER Fitness Room Pass Cards are Back! AGES 16 AND UP are eligible to purchase a monthly fitness pass. Register and purchase pass cards in-person at Renton Community Center or online at rentonwa.gov/register. • Memberships are active for 31 days after purchase, no automatic renewals. • $22 Renton Residents / $26 Non-Residents Currently, access times for the Renton Community Center fitness room are arranged in two-hour sessions Monday–Friday. See times to the right. Appointment-based reservations will remain within these time limits. Fitness Room Sessions Monday–Friday 9–11am 11am–1pm 1–3pm 3–5pm 5–7pm City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 15 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Beginning Tai Chi Yang Style 24 AGES 50 & UP. Tai Chi for begin- ners will get you back on your feet and moving again! The Yang style is one of the most popular of Tai Chi forms and it consists of 24 slow, continuous, soft and circular move- ments in a flowing form. Join our new instructor Marjie Croston for relaxing morning of movement. Whether you are new to Tai Chi or would like to sharpen your skills, please join us. No experience is necessary. Tuesdays, 10–10:45am Renton Senior Activity Center Mar 1–29 #10493 $20R/$25NR Apr 5–26 #10668 $16R/$20NR May 3–31 #10669 $20R/$24NR BE WELL Meditations AGES 50 & UP. Would you like to feel more at ease, alert, connected, and energized? Join wellness instructor Amy Rachelle for BE WELL Medita- tions. In this class, you’ll discover a range of mindful and calming activities to support your entire wellness, body, mind, and heart. You’ll be guided using a blend of exercises from Eastern phi- losophy, energy psychology, and gentle body wisdom. Please bring something for your comfort such as a mat, pillow, or blanket; chairs are available as well. Optional: A notebook and pen to record insights and track your progress. Madrone Room Renton Senior Activity Center Thursdays, 9:15–10:15am Mar 3–31 #10675 $32.50R/$40NR Apr 7–28 #10676 $26R/$32NR May 5–26 #10677 $26R/$32NR SENIORS 50+ NEW NEW Container Gardening Workshop AGES 50 & UP. Do you want fresh herbs, flowers, and even vegetables at your fingertips year-round? Do you miss the soothing activity of gardening, but find yourself without an outdoor plot, or lacking the energy to kneel outdoors to weed and harvest? Come to our free indoor, porch, and balcony planting workshop this quarter! We will teach you which veggies and herbs are easiest to grow indoors or in small spaces, what you need to get started, and tips and tricks for keeping up your new hobby. All planting supplies will be provided. Bring pen and paper to take notes if you wish. This workshop is FREE thanks to the Veterans, Seniors, and Human Services Levy Grant. Renton Senior Activity Center, FREE Thur, April 21 10–11:30am #10673 Thur, May 12 6–7:30pm #10674 Indoor Recreational Facility Access: Masks are required at all times, and a COVID-19 health screening must be com- pleted to enter the facility. These mandates may be revised in the future at any time as per Public Health – Seattle & King County and Washington Governors Orders. City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 16 AGENDA ITEM #9. • AARP-sponsored Outdoor Fitness Park Organized by FITLOT North Highlands Park 3000 NE 16th St Check out Washington’s only FITLOT! Located at North Highlands Neighborhood Center, work-out at your own pace! For questions regarding this amenity please email recreation@rentonwa.gov. For more info visit: FitLot.org/parks/Renton Strength and Balance AGES 50 & UP. Studies show adults 50+ who strength train with weights greatly improve their ability to perform their daily activities by increasing bone density, and metabolism, and improving balance. This class teaches resistance training using correct form while maintaining good posture. Both men and women are encouraged to attend. Tuesdays, 1:45–2:45pm Renton Community Center Mar 1–29 #10307 $25R/$30NR Apr 5–26 #10429 $20R/$24NR May 3–31 #10430 $20R/$24NR Thursdays, 10:15–11:15am Renton Community Center Mar 3–31 #10310 $25R/$30NR Apr 7–28 #10431 $20R/$24NR May 5–26 #10432 $20R/$24NR SENIORS 50+ Indoor Recreational Facility Access: Masks are required at all times, and a COVID-19 health screening must be com- pleted to enter the facility. These mandates may be revised in the future at any time as per Public Health – Seattle & King County and Washington Governors Orders. Virtual BINGO! 1ST & 3RD WEDNESDAYS, 3PM AGES 50 & UP. Virtual Bingo! Join us for a fun-filled afternoon via Zoom for Bingo. Prizes will be mailed to the winners following the Bingo session. Players will be sent a link to access Zoom the day before the event along with their Bingo cards to print at home. If you don’t have access to a printer, we will mail you a copy of your Bingo Cards (time permitting) or you can pick up a copy at the Senior Center. Don’t miss out—reserve your spot today! FREE, Course #10383 City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 17 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Beach Ball Volleyball THURSDAYS, 12:30–1:30PM FREE, Register with #10650 It takes a team to bump, set, and spike their way to a win! Beach ball volleyball is played while sitting in chairs and con- sists of six member teams. Join us every Thursday to enhance your eye-hand coordination, upper body flexibility and cardio fitness. Madrone Room Bean Bag Baseball FRIDAYS, 10–11AM FREE, Register with #10649 We are moving into spring so come and warm up your arm to play Bean Bag Baseball. Show everyone how to hit a home run. We pick different teams each time. You’ll meet new friends while rooting for your team. Cedar River Room Card Games are back! FREE, Register w/ course numbers below Whether you like playing Bridge or Pinochle, players are getting back into the swing of things. We have time set aside for you to come back and play cards with friends. Please see the dates and times for specific game days. Alder Room Bridge #10644 Mondays and Fridays 12–2:30pm Duplicate Bridge #10645 Tuesdays 11am–2:30pm Pinochle #10646 Wednesdays 12–2:30pm Corn Hole MONDAYS, 10–11AM, #10648 WEDNESDAYS, 12:30–1:30PM, #10670 FREE with registration Similar to Horseshoes, Corn Hole is one of the more popular games! Played in pairs, participants throw bean bags at an elevated platform to score points. To score the most points, the bean bag must go in the hole, or you can score points by landing on the board. Each player takes turns throwing to score points. Once the weather turns nice, we will move this outside. Cedar River Room Handicraft Group MONDAYS, 9–11AM FREE, Register with #10651 Share your knowledge and your crafts! You have been crafting during COVID-19 by yourself, now is the time to come back together and share your secrets. If you have a certain skill, maybe you can share it with others who have the same passion for crafting. If you can knit, crochet, hand sew, etc., bring your own projects and materials and join the group for great camaraderie and support of fellow handcrafters. Creative Crafts Room Nintendo Wii Games TUESDAYS, 9–11AM FREE, Register with #10647 Gaming has evolved from the days of spinning the wheel of life. Wii encour- ages you to join the fun and experience the laughter in a variety of virtual sports. Bowling is the most popular sport to play, but we have other options! Lounge WHAT’S HAPPENING AT THE SENIOR CENTER? City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 18 Clutter Busters Group FRIDAYS, 9:30–11AM FREE, Register with #10643 Helping hoarders, clutterers and creative messy people get control of their living space. This group meets weekly to gain insight and motivation toward overcoming hoarding and disorganiza- tion in a supportive, non-judgmental support-group atmosphere. Co-led by Keith Collingwood and Halina Kiljanczyk. Alder Room Easy Microwave Cooking & Vegetable Prep Class 1ST TUESDAYS 1–2PM FREE, Register with #10642 Learn how to prepare meals with minimal time and effort at our Easy Microwave Cooking & Vegetable Prep class. Feel free to bring your questions about specific ingredients, vegetables, and cooking techniques. Bring pen and paper to take notes if you wish. This program will be held the first Tuesday of the month; March 1, April 5, May 3. Questions, email vkvitek@rentonwa.gov. Free Grocery Cart TUESDAYS, 10:30–1PM There will be a cart full of easy- to-prepare foods and ingredients in the lobby of the Senior Activity Center on Tuesdays. Bring your own reusable grocery bags to “shop” at the cart. Limited quantities and selection may vary. This program is courtesy of Sustainable Renton’s Free Drive Thru Grocery Store (Mondays 5:30–8pm at St. Matthew’s Lutheran Church, 1700 Edmonds Ave NE). Questions, email vkvitek@rentonwa.gov. Hearing Loss Assoc. of America–Renton 2nd FRIDAYS, 1–2:15PM FREE, Register with #10490 Group will meet on the second Friday of each month. This group helps inform, educate and support individuals with hearing loss. The program is free and led by a volunteer. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Register for all sessions online at rentonwa.gov/register or call 425-430-6633. 211 BURNETT AVE N, MONDAY–FRIDAY, 8AM–3PM NOTE: All sessions are reservation-based. Register for all sessions online at rentonwa.gov/register or call 425-430-6633. RENTON SENIOR ACTIVITY CENTER Pick-Up Senior Lunch 11:30am – 12:30pm Reservations required 3 days in advance. Register in person or over phone, 425-430-6633. Beach Ball Volleyball Thursdays, 12:30 –1:30pm, #10650 Madrone Room Bean Bag Baseball Fridays, 10–11am, #10649 Cedar River Room Billiards Monday–Friday, 8 am – 2:45 pm, #10399 Billiard Room Cards Bridge, Mon & Fri, 12–2:30pm, #10644 Duplicate Bridge, Tue, 11am–2:30pm, #10645 Pinochle, Wed, 12–2:30pm, #10646 Alder Room Clutter Busters Group Fridays, 9:30–11am, #10643 Alder Room Corn Hole Mondays, 10–11am, #10648 Wednesdays, 12:30–1:30pm, #10670 Cedar River Room Fitness Room (To register, search “Daily Wellness ”) Monday–Friday, Max 6 8 – 8:45 am, 9 – 9:45 am, 10 – 10:45 am , 11 – 11:4 5 am 12 – 12:4 5 pm, 1 – 1:4 5 pm, 2 – 2:45 pm Handicraft Group Mondays, 9–11am, #10651 Creative Crafts Room Nintendo Wii Games Tuesdays, 9–11am, #10647 Lounge Ping Pong Monday–Friday, 8 am – 2:45 pm, #10397 Willow Room Puzzles Monday–Friday, 8 am – 2:45 pm, #10400 Lounge 02/22/2022City of Renton Recreation Division // rentonwa.gov/register // 19 AGENDA ITEM #9. • PARKS PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT Meeting the recreational demand and needs of current and future generations MAPLEWOOD GOLF COURSE General Information 425–430–6800 Onsite Golf Pro Shop 7am–6:30pm Daily Driving Range 425–430–6800, ext. 1 • 30 covered, lighted and heated stations for comfortable use year round • Monday & Friday 8am–7pm* • Tue, Wed & Thur 7am–7pm* • Sat & Sun 7am–7pm* *Last call for balls and driving range door locked at 6:15pm* Book tee times online at rentonwa.gov/maplewood Kiwanis and Philip Arnold Parks are about 60 to 70 years old. These parks will be receiving significant renovations this year to meet the needs of the current community and future generations. Major enhancements include a new accessible walking path, playground, restroom, picnic tables, and benches. Check out the upcoming major renovations and improvements happening at Kiwanis and Philip Arnold Parks, as well as playground replacements at Kennydale Beach Park and Cascade Park at rentonwa.gov/currentprojects. Kiwanis Park Kennydale Beach Park Philip Arnold Park Cascade Park City of Renton Recreation Division // 20 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Futsal Court at Highlands Park City of Renton, in partnership with the RAVE Foundation, presented Renton’s own Mini Futsal Court at Highlands Park, 800 Edmonds Ave. NE. Futsal is a fast-paced, 5-a-side game played on a hard-surfaced, basket- ball-sized court with a smaller, harder, low-bounce ball than soccer. It is excellent for skill development. Futsal is played in over 100 countries by 12 million players, including superstars Lionel Messi and Pelé. This court is open to the public. Grab a ball and come check it out today! Track Trail Cedar River Trail Park ALL AGES. Track Trail is a FREE self- guided nature walk starting at Cedar River Trail Park, 1060 Nishiwaki Lane. Families can have fun and learn about animals, trees, salmon, and the outdoors. Educational brochures for families are available at the park or can be printed at home via kidsinparks.com/cedarriver-trail-park. Earn prizes when you record your journey online. A free, fun, and friendly weekly 5K community event. Walk, jog, run, volunteer or spectate–it’s up to you! Saturdays at 9am Cedar River Trail Trailhead The trailhead is not the easiest to find. Search the phrase “Cedar River Trailhead” in your navigation app, or use GPS coordinates: 47.4805 - 122.1995. See parkrun.us/renton for more details. What does it cost to join in? Nothing— it’s free! But please register before your first run at parkrun.us/register. You need only register with parkrun once. Don’t forget to bring a printed copy of your barcode. Request a reminder at parkrun.com/runner/getbarcodelink. If you forget, your 5K will not be timed How fast do I have to be? We all take part for our own enjoyment. Please come along and join in whatever your pace! Renton parkrun needs you! It is entirely organized by volunteers—email renton@parkrun.com to help. We’re friendly! Every week we grab a post parkrun coffee at a local café— please come and join us! Reserve Picnic Shelters & Facilities Visit rentonwa.gov/rentals for information on booking a picnic shelter or Renton facility for your next gathering. Shelter reservation registration opens April 1 and Facility reservation registration opens April 4. City of Renton Recreation Division // 21 AGENDA ITEM #9. • 2022 Renton Police Drive-Through For a list of accepted items, go to rentonwa.gov/shredathon SShhrreedd--AA--TThhoonn PLUS: Prescription Drug Take Back & Food Drive SAT., APRIL 30, 9 A.M.–12 P.M. *or until trucks are full Renton Memorial Stadium, 405 Logan Ave N Shred away identity theft by safely disposing of sensitive documents and bring your unused or expired prescription (controlled and non-controlled) and over-the-counter medications for safe disposal. Canned food, dry goods, or monetary donations will be also accepted to benefit the Renton Salvation Army Food Bank. rentonwa.gov/shred a t h o n Info: 425-430-7519 o r s h y n e s @ r e n t o n w a . g o v Hosted by the Renton Police Department in partnership with: B I KE R O DEO & F A M I L Y S AFETY FAI R RENTON COMMUNITY CENTER SATURDAY, 10 AM –12 PM Bring your own bike and try out your skills in our bike obstacle course and road safety test. Get helpful bike maintenance tips from our experts! Families will also receive valuable safety information and helpful tips from many agencies. RENTONWA.GOV/REGISTER COURSE #10692 In partnership with Safe Kids Seattle King County, Harborview Medical Center, UW Medicine, and collaboration with emergency service providers ALL AGES AND ABILITIES WELCOME! • FREE MAY 21, 2022 Home Safety • Emergency Preparation • Water Safety Emergency Services with Helpful Tips • Prize Giveaways City of Renton Recreation Division // 22 AGENDA ITEM #9. • AGES 6 –14 HENRY MOSESAQUATIC CENTER Sat, June 25—Mon, September 5 Check back in April for the latest developments on admission fees, swim session times, online reservations, programming and what you can expect for summer 2022 as our guest at Henry Moses Aquatic Center. Rentonwa.gov/hmac Camps will be held at: Kennydale Lions Park, Thomas Teasdale Park and Tiffany Park Weekly camp fees are $190R/$230NR. Registration begins Tues., April 12, at 9am rentonwa.gov.register City of Renton Recreation Division // 23 AGENDA ITEM #9. • Parks & Recreation Department Memorandum DATE: March 29, 2022 TO: Ryan McIrvin, Council President Members of Renton City Council VIA: Armondo Pavone, Mayor FROM: Kelly Beymer, Parks & Recreation Administrator STAFF CONTACT: Erica Schmitz, Parks Planning and Natural Resources Director SUBJECT: Park Bond Projects Update Parks Planning and Natural Resources Division Park Bond Projects Overview Kiwanis Park Improvements: Playground replacement, new picnic shelter, new parent plaza, new restroom, ballfield improvements including synthetic all-weather surface infield and covered dugouts, Union Avenue streetscape and park entrance improvements, looped accessible walkway, basketball court improvements, and repaved parking lot. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Council President Ryan McIrvin Members of Renton City Council Page 2 of 4 March 30, 2022 Philip Arnold Park Improvements: New looped accessible walkway and boardwalk, playground replacement, new picnic shelter, new paved parent plaza, new restroom, basketball court renovation, improved site drainage and storm water management, and new park signage. Coulon Trestle Bridge Replacement: Removal of timber piles and existing bridge structure, new single-span steel bridge with light penetrating decking and overlook viewing area with interpretive signage, and repair of the Rose Wall bulkhead. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Council President Ryan McIrvin Members of Renton City Council Page 3 of 4 March 30, 2022 Coulon North Water Walk Improvements: Wrapping all existing piles (corrosion protection), replacement of concrete deck with light-penetrating fiberglass grating and concrete panels to match deck at Ivar’s, new fiberglass picnic float grating and aluminum structure, new steel framing, all timber components replaced with plastic timber, new Clam Lights outlet at Pilot House, picnic float benches and tables refurbished for accessibility. Park Bond Projects Timeline and Impacts Project Construction Begins Completion Impacts Kiwanis Park Improvements April 2022 December 2022 Park Closure, Union Avenue streetscape work. Philip Arnold Park Improvements September 2022 May 2023 Majority of park closed during construction. Coulon Park North Water Walk Improvements September 2022 September 2023 Closed access to north water walk, interior water area and day moorage floats closed during construction to accommodate barge-based construction. Small portion of parking area closed for project staging and contractor use. Coulon Park Trestle Bridge Replacement October 2022 March 2023 Park closure north of the bridge site, North restroom closure, limited access to North turnaround, sailboat moorage and water area around bridge closure to accommodate barge-based construction. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Council President Ryan McIrvin Members of Renton City Council Page 4 of 4 March 30, 2022 Communications Plan On-site • For each project, a “Coming Soon” banner announcing the project improvements will be posted at least two weeks before the project begins. The banner will provide the project manager’s contact information, a QR code linking to the division’s Current Projects page of the City website (rentonwa.gov/currentprojects) with the latest information, an image showing the improvements, and a notice of closure during construction. • During construction, banners on construction fencing will provide the project manager’s contact information, a QR code linking to the division’s Current Projects page of the City website with the latest information, an image showing the improvements, anticipated completion timeframe, and grant funding sources, where applicable. Online • The division’s Current Projects webpage will be updated regularly with the latest project information, including anticipated starting and ending timeframes for construction. • Social media posts and ‘This Week in Renton’ will provide a “coming soon” notice of construction, project information, and anticipated closure information ahead of construction beginning. Print • The Spring “Let’s Go” recreation guide provided notice of the upcoming improvements to Kiwanis Park and Philip Arnold Park. • The Summer “Let’s Go” recreation guide will provide notice of the Trestle Bridge Replacement and North Water Walk Improvements at Coulon Park, including an explanation of why the work is needed. Internal Communication • Parks and Recreation staff are invited to a zoom presentation on April 20th to review the latest project information and ask questions. • The Parks Planning and Natural Resources Division will continue to work with Communications staff for opportunities to share information. • A Renton 101 is planned to share what has been completed, the process for larger renovation projects, and upcoming project key details. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Veteran’s Outreach/Programming Below is a summary through the Age Friendly Initiative, of our outreach, plans and programs to better serve Veterans through our recreation programs and buildings/operations. • Veteran Focus Group Feedback: Attached and below is a summary of the focus group feedback (8 – 10 participants from our Perfect Mind database). Due to this feedback, we aren’t currently creating any new veteran only programs, but will continue to offer a variety of programs and promote to all seniors. • Veteran Demographic Tracking: We will be adding veteran status demographic questions to our recreation software. This is not finalized yet. Discussions have begun to implement this citywide, if possible (through Age Friendly Initiative that identifies gaps), so as a city we could collectively see what veterans we are serving and how to better address any needs. • Senior Advisory Board Recruitment: In the past we have had veterans on our advisory board. We will be recruiting for more diverse board members this spring, to include veterans. • Veteran-Focused Events: We plan and offer a community-wide Memorial Day celebration to honor those that have served. We have discussed the possibility of adding a drive-thru veteran’s day celebration in November, to honor our veterans, we would be happy to lead planning and implementation of this. At our senior center we often have special events in November to honor veterans. • Veteran Resources: Through our involvement in King County’s VSHSL initiative, we have been trained on and have been providing resources to veterans when asked (see attached Veterans Resource Guide and King Co. Veterans Program brochure) We’d be more than happy to meet with additional veterans (i.e., VFW) to hear what their collective needs are that can be addressed by our division through programs and operations. We have reached out both locally and regionally and have not heard of specific needs at this point. AGENDA ITEM #9. • Veterans Name Communication Preference How heard about RSAC? COVID Programming Preference Pandemic Challenge Senior Challenge Emotional/Mental Health Needs Physical Health Needs Nutritional Needs Programming Involvement (Current) Desired RSAC/CoR Programming Involvement Comfort w/Technology Housing Situation Housing Needs Transportation Situation Transpor tation Needs Bill Spurrier Email, text, mail RHRS?In person Social Isolation none none met elsewhere (biking)none none Field trips (Boeing, museums, wind farms), bike group Can always learn more Lives in age-restricted park with wife uses RHRS drives self none Sandy Spurrier Text, email, mail RHRS?Very cautious (?)Social isolation none none met elsewhere (although interested in RSAC gym)none none Playing cards, socializing, crochet/crafts, library Uses ipad for facebook and instagram Lives in age-restricted park with wife uses RHRS drives self none Al Hammers email, mail? (unclear)volunteer at RSAC In person Social Isolation none none met elsewhere (belongs to a gym)none volunteer Continuing ed programs (any subject); volunteering More comfortable with computer than with phone: Smart phone/apps class might be appreciated Lives in own home no needs drives self none Kenneth Dankwardt Email, mail looking for an art class (graphic designer)Social distancing none mentioned none mentioned none mentioned met elsewhere (belongs to 3 gyms)none none arts has had same computer since 1984? unclear, likely lives independently uses RHRS; could use cleaning service drives self none Jeri Youd- Olson Email, text recieved email from CoR; lives across the street from RSAC Vaxed; however, she is high risk, so doesn't want to meet right now with new variant; outside is better; Zoom meetings are great! social isolation: works full time, family small and far away none mentioned Met elsewhere Would like walking group none none crafty things ; volunteering (as long as not physically demanding) uses internet/google search lives alone more affordable housing drives self; rides from friends when needs them none Gary Studt Mail, email Interested in Pinochle, heard had a game at Renton senior center...pre-covid went to many different centers in the county In person, no mask if vaccinated Doesn't like virtual meetings None none none met elsewhere none none (has strong friendships) none: although did enjoy the coffee room not comfortable, technology "beyond" him, dislikes Zoom lives alone (feels fortunate for this)none drives self none John Richardson Email, text in the lunch program comfortable with anything? (or, wants utmost precaution?? unclear) none none unmet: hard to find services met elsewhere none works with the RHRS None Has a computer and a smart phone, uses to learn about resources lives alone none (but suggests streamlining house/apartmen t-hunting resources) Bus, special bike none? (unclear) Ron Cornilles Text, email unclear vaxed and boosted with mask none none met elsewhere met elsewhere none none would like to be better at volunteering Not very comfortable, would like to be more confident with phone (android) and Windows 10 lives independently (w wife), uses RHRS Cleaning and organizing, senior-proofing unclear unclear Thomas Davis Phone unclear not comfortable meeting at all at this time (and doesn't own a computer) none none none met elsewhere none none none doesnt own computer, not interested lives with wife in townhouse none drives self none AGENDA ITEM #9. • 1911_9910E_Veterans_Program_Brochure.ai KING COUNTY VETERANS PROGRAM A full service hub for veterans, servicemembers and their families. kingcounty.gov/veterans TUKWILA 645 Andover Park West, Suite 100 Tukwila, WA 98188 Hours: M – F, 8:30 am – 4:30 pm Walk-in hours: M/Tu/W/Th, 8:30 – 11:00 am Phone: 206-477-7022 Fax: 206-205-3213 SEATTLE 2106 2nd Avenue, 1st Floor Seattle, WA 98121 Hours: M – F, 8:30 am – 4:30 pm Walk-in hours: M/W/Th, 8:30 – 11:00 am Tu, 1:00 – 3:00 pm Phone: 206-477-8282 Fax: 206-569-4355 kingcounty.gov/veterans kingcounty.gov/vshsl The King County Veterans Program is in part funded by the Veterans, Seniors and Human Services Levy (VSHSL). The VSHSL promotes healthy living, financial stability, social engagement, housing stability and service system access for veterans, seniors and vulnerable populations. LOCATIONS / CONTACT WELL-BEING Our social service professionals can connect you to health and mental health resources, assistance with substance use disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain Injury resources, and connections to social groups and supports. KCVP may also help cover costs of medical supplies and devices not covered by your health insurance, such as reading glasses, emergent dental costs, or medical assistive devices. AGENDA ITEM #9. • SERVICES AND RESOURCES The following types of short-term resources may be available for veterans, servicemembers and their families, depending on eligibility and program guidelines: EMERGENCY SUPPORT KCVP is not a 24-hour emergency services facility, but services are available to help with unforeseen catastrophic events. KCVP may be able to provide help with emergency food, expenses, clothing, transportation, hygiene items, utilities or shelter. KCVP can help you obtain vital documents such as driver’s license/ID, birth certificates or military records. Assistance with basic household goods, child care, onsite emergency supplies such as cold weather clothing, or other emergency related needs may be available if you encounter a hardship. HOUSING STABILITY KCVP may be able to help with temporary shelter, assistance with move in costs, basic furniture, or rent/mortgage/moorage or storage costs in a crisis. KCVP can assist with utilities needs, including shut o prevention. Our social service professionals may be able to connect you with the larger housing assistance community to coordinate VASH vouchers, SSVF rapid re-housing assistance, low-income housing or supportive or transitional housing options. EMPLOYMENT Assistance developing an employment plan, help with your resume and interview skills, job search support, work clothing/tools, vocational assessments, short term training certificates, computer lab access, and connections to employment opportunities are available. KCVP often hosts onsite job fairs to help connect veterans to employment opportunities in King County. FINANCIAL STABILITY In addition to helping you find employment and connecting you with training resources, KCVP provides financial coaching, budgeting support and can help you apply for VA, Federal, or State level benefits such as disability or social security. LEGAL AND END OF LIFE KCVP has onsite specialists who can help with civil legal issues, discriminatory housing practices or emergent eviction prevention. Our social service professionals can connect you with post incarceration programs and supports for other obstacles to recovery. KCVP can also help with finding assisted living in Veterans Homes or help you or your family with burial expenses. The King County Veterans Program (KCVP) works with partners across the region to provide financial, housing, employment and other supportive services to veterans, servicemembers and their families throughout King County. Visit one of our two locations during walk-in hours to meet with a social service professional. Through a collaborative case management process, your assigned social service professional will help determine the type and levels of services and resources that you may qualify for. To be eligible for services or resources, you must be a veteran (served at least one day in the military, any discharge type), servicemember, or respective family member living in King County. Some services are income dependent. When you visit a King County Veterans Program oce, bring your ID, proof of service and proof of income. ELIGIBILITY The King County Veterans Program removes barriers and provides services that deliver the most equitable opportunities for empowering veterans, servicemembers and their families to achieve their greatest potential. MISSION STATEMENT VISITING KCVP AGENDA ITEM #9. • VISION Renton: The center of opportunity in the Puget Sound Region where families and businesses thrive MISSION The City of Renton, in partnership and communication with residents, businesses, and schools, is dedicated to: ƒProvide a safe, healthy, vibrant community ƒPromote economic vitality and strategically position Renton for the future ƒSupport planned growth and influence decisions to foster environmental sustainability ƒBuild an inclusive informed city with equitable outcomes for all in support of social, economical, and racial justice ƒMeet service demands and provide high quality customer service Provide a safe, healthy and vibrant community ƒPromote safety, health, and security through effective communication and service delivery ƒFacilitate successful neighborhoods through community involvement ƒEncourage and partner in the development of quality housing choices for people of all ages and income levels ƒSupport the growing need of human services funding to address the challenges of housing and mental health ƒPromote a walkable, pedestrian and bicycle- friendly city with complete streets, trails, and connections between neighborhoods and community focal points ƒProvide opportunities for communities to be better prepared for emergencies Promote economic vitality and strategically position Renton for the future ƒPromote Renton as the progressive, opportunity-rich city in the Puget Sound region ƒActively seek grants and other funding opportunities ƒCapitalize on opportunities through bold and creative economic development strategies ƒRecruit and retain businesses to ensure a dynamic, diversified employment base ƒNurture entrepreneurship and foster successful partnerships with businesses and community leaders ƒLeverage public/private resources to focus development on economic centers Support planned growth and influence decisions to foster environmental sustainability ƒFoster development of vibrant, sustainable, attractive, mixed-use neighborhoods in urban centers ƒUphold a high standard of design and property maintenance ƒAdvocate Renton’s interests through state and federal lobbying efforts, regional partnerships and other organizations ƒPursue transportation and other regional improvements and services that improve quality of life ƒAssume a critical role in improving our community’s health and environmental resiliency by addressing impacts of climate change for future generations ƒPursue initiatives to increase mobility, promote clean energy in our existing buildings and in new development, preserve and expand open spaces and tree coverage, and other efforts to reduce CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions Building an inclusive, informed and hate-free city with equitable outcomes for all in support of social, economic, and racial justice ƒAchieve equitable outcomes by eliminating racial, economic and social barriers in internal practices, city programs, services, and policies such as hiring and contracting ƒImprove access to city services, programs and employment, provide opportunities and eradicate disparities for residents, workers and businesses ƒPromote understanding and appreciation of our diversity through celebrations, educational forums and festivals ƒSeek out opportunities for ongoing two-way dialogue with ALL communities, engage those historically marginalized, and ensure that we lift every voice, listen and take action on what we learn ƒBuild capacity within the city to implement inclusion and equity by providing the knowledge, skills, awareness, and tools to integrate anti-racism approaches into daily work Meet service demands and provide high-quality customer service ƒPlan, develop, and maintain quality services, infrastructure, and amenities ƒPrioritize services at levels that can be sustained by revenue ƒRetain a skilled workforce by making Renton the municipal employer of choice ƒDevelop and maintain collaborative partnerships and investment strategies that improve services ƒRespond to growing service demands through partnerships, innovation, and outcome management CITY OF RENTONBusiness Plan 2022–2027 GOALS AGENDA ITEM #10. •